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The Evolution of Representative Government in India 
1884 - 1909, with reference to> central and provincial 
legislative councils.
, * * * * * * * * *
This thesis analyses the emergence of 
representative government in India both in the central 
and provincial governments between 1884 and 1909*
The first chapter examines the non- 
official demand for representation, and the attitude of 
various sections of public opinion to it in India as 
also in England. The second chapter deals with the 
reaction to these demands of the various governmental 
authorities leading to the drafting of the first reforms 
bill which became law in 1892. The career of this 
bill in the British parliament forms the subject of the 
third chapter. The fourth chapter covers the rules 
and regulations giving effect to the 1892 Act and the 
non-official views on the measure. The fifth chapter
concerns the two provinces --- the Punjab and the Central
Provinces --- excluded in 1892 from the scope of the reforms
£= The sixth chapter tells of demands for fresh reforms,
and their repercussions on Indian and British non-official 
opinion. The seventh chapter studies Government reaction 
and the formulation of the Morley-Minto reforms. The 
passage of the Indian Councils bill 1909 through 
Parliament is the subject of the eighth chapter. The
ninth chapter having considered the rules and regulations 
made under the 1909 Act analyses the state of feeling of 
different non-official schools of opinion on the new 
reforms: the conflicting view-points are summed up and
commented upon at the end of the chapter.
The materials consulted include private 
papers, original government correspondence and records, 
parliamentary papers, parliamentary proceedings, annual 
reports, newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets and 
published books.
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CHAPTER I .
THE NON-OFFICIAL DEMAND FOR REFORMS.
The British withdrawal from India and the experiments of 
democratic government in India and Pakistan ever since have evoked 
keen interest throughout the world. For here is a trial in these 
eastern lands of a system of administration which was by many 
deemed compatible with the societies of Western people alone. With 
the traditions of autocratic rule, social divisions and inequality, 
conflict of race and religion, India presented an altogether 
different picture.
In the light of the present interest in the working of 
parliamentary institutions in India and Pakistan - greatly stimulated 
by the first general elections held on an unprecedented scale in 
India - the story of the inception of representative government in 
India assumes new significance.
It is necessary, however, to say that the wor<t/ "representative” 
is used in a very broad sense. As we shall see, different inter­
pretations were put to the term during discussions of the develop­
ments in India. In Britain, where the system of representative 
government was evolved and perfected, it had different connotations 
in different ages. Its scope, originally narrow, was liberalised 
only by stages, the last of which found the government answerable 
to the representatives of the adult population. Early in the 
period which this work covers, the process of liberalisation in
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Britain was almost in its last lap* This presented a standard, and 
an ideal to those who desired representative government for Indians.
I As with all ideals, it could not necessarily be the first step: it
could only come after many more. The development of representative
principles in India had, however, a distinctive feature. India being
under foreign rule, transfer of authority from British hands to
Indian was the main criterion of this development, relegating to
comparative unimportance the issues linked with theories of
representation. But all this forms part of our story which seeks to
tell how India set out on a parliamentary career, and also to unravel
the forces which influenced its course.
*** *** *** *** ... ... ... ...
The transfer of the government of India to the Crown in 1858
was only the most obvious, and important of the changes to which the 
mutiny of 1857 led. The mutiny had other lessons and other consequences 
which were to influence the course of Indian history for years to come.
It pointed the moral that education was the best antidote to ignorance 
and fanaticism. It also disturbed and embittered the relations between 
Europeans and Indians in India, and left the former, who had large stakes 
in the country, less willing to leave the administration of the country 
altogether in the hands of the bureaucracy. The increasing burden of 
taxation which the task of recovery entailed was equally irksome to 
Europeans and Indians. A feeling grew that the non-officials should 
have some improved scope of advising, if not influencing, the 
administration, and the idea of admitting them into the governor-general*
/
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council for legislative purposes (called the governor-general^ 
legislative council for the sake of convenience) was mooted. The same 
plea for Indians was contained in a pamphlet written immediately after 
the mutiny by Syed Ahmed Khan, a government official marked for his 
courage and devotion to duty during the mutiny, who was des-^ined to 
become in after years the undisputed leader of the Moslem community* 
Privately circulated among the officials, the pamphlet asked for 
admission of Indians to the legislative council so that the authorities 
might know how the Indians felt on different issues*
^  Sir Charles Wood, the secretary of steite for India, was originally 
impervious to this idea, because the legislative council of the 
governor-general was in theory only the government of India, aided for 
purposes 01 legislation by a few additional members. He resented its 
somewhat parliamentary procedure which had been initiated by Dalhousie, 
and could not approve of it being turned into an independent legislative 
body* However, gradually by persuasion he reconciled himself to the 
idea of non-official participation in the legislative council* Canning, 
the governor-general and Sir Bartle Frere, a member of the government 
of India, helped to change the attitude of Sir Charles Wood. Frere not 
only advocated the development of representative character of the 
g'rovernor-general1 s legislative council, but also wanted the establishment 
of local legislative councils on the same lines. Need of knowing local 
wants and wishes was emphasized, as well as the utility of f,some barometer 
and safety-valve combined in the shape of a deliberative council*1.^ *
I. Martineau, Life of Bartle Frere, vol.l. p.3^0.
He pointed out too the impossibilty of admitting non-official
Europeans while keeping out Indians "who in intelligence and education
are their equals and who have a far greater stake in the country".^*
This Sir Charles Wood did not dispute because he knew that the worst
2
form of popular government was "of one race over another". * None of 
them ever imagined self-government for India within the limits of 
possibility, and the Indian Councils Act, l86l, piloted by Wood through 
parliament, while incorporating for the first time the non-officials 
in the legislative machinery of the country, only recognised the. fact 
that legislation for such a vast country, with its numerous races and 
interests, could not be entrusted to the care of a handful of officials, 
however able.
The Act reinforced the Council of the governorr&eneral by 
additional members, not less than six .year-m nor more than twelve. They 
were all to be nominated by the governor-general, and not less than 
one-half of the number nominated were to be persons not holding any 
office under government. The Madras and Bombay councils also got 
additional members, and provision was made for other provinces to have 
similar councils. The theory of legislation by the executive remained 
unassailed; the additional members reinforced the council for 
purposes of legislation only.
1. Ibid, p.339*
2. Ibid, p.3^.
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While the Indian Councils Bill was passing through the House of 
Commons, A. H. Layard proposed that at least a certain number of the 
additional members of the Council, when sitting as a law-making body, 
should be natives of India. Wood considered it undesirable to make a 
statutory distinction between different classes of Her Majesty’s 
subjects in I n d i a . I n  forwarding the Indian Councils Act to the 
glover nor-general-in-council, Wood in his despatch dated 9th August, l86l 
anticipated, however, the advantages of introducing "intelligent native 
gentlemen" into the legislative councils. They would bring to the 
deliberations "a knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the native 
population," and the laws passed by the council would thereby tend to 
be more in consonance with the wants of the "great mass of the 
population of India." He hoped that "influential native gentlemen" 
would be available for the purpose. * In his speech on the first 
reading of the bill, he had favoured the inclusion of ^native chiefs 
and noblemen" in the governor-general*s legislative council.^*
Under this Act, the functions of the legislative council were 
strictly limited to the consideration and enactment of laws. It could 
transact no other business. It could entertain no motion except one 
for leave to introduce a bill or having reference to a bill actually 
introduced. Some matters could be discussed only with the prior 
sanction of the governor-general. *----------------  /
1• Cambridge History of India , vi. p.235•
2. Sir Courtenay Ilbert, The Government of India, p. 562.
3. Ibid, p. 555.
k. Cambridge History of, India, vi. p. 235*
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Wood, in the above mentioned despatch, made clear that it was his 
intention to "prevent the legislature from interfering with the functions 
of the executive government and occupying its time with matters which are 
not directly or immediately connected with"' the making of laws.^* 
Consequently, the annual financial statement of the government could 
come before the council only if the statement involved a legislative 
enactment*
Under the new Act the grovernor-general1 s legislative council and
the legislative councils of Madras, Bombay and Bengal came into
existence in January, l862.+ These councils worked more like committees
and commissions than like parliamentary bodies proper. Usually they
worked hard as can be gathered from a study of their number of sittings
and the acts passed. In 1863 the governor-general*s council passed
thirty-two acts in twelve sittings, and in l86*t twenty-eight in nineteen
sittings. The rapidity of legislation continued to be the feature of
the council even in much later years. In 1886, 1887 and 1888, when
meeting in Calcutta, the council passed respectively thirteen acts in 
thirteen acts in seven sittings ^
twelve sittings«/and twelve acts in as many sittings. It came to be
felt that the scope of scrutiny and discussion of important public 
matters was inadequate in these councils, and distaste for the stringency 
of conditions of working was shared alike by European and Indian non­
officials. Even the government of India sometimes felt the disadvantage
1. Ilbert, p. 565*
+ A council for North-West provinces and Oudh was created much later, 
on 5*1.1887.
"X. Pari. Papers 1890. 42.
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of this. On 31^t March, I87O, the grovernor-general,Mayo, in the course 
of a speech in the legislative council, said, "The Government of this 
country is, in one respect, in an unfortunate position, for there is no 
assembly nor any means of discussion similar to that which exists, in 
other countries, whereby members of the Government can give immediate 
replies to statements made, and administer on the spot the negative to 
extravagant and inaccurate assertions.' We are often obliged to wait 
for weeks and months before an answer can be given to even the most 
absurd accusations". In 1887 when presenting the Indian budget in 
governor-general's legislative council for the first time since 1872, 
Finance Member Sir John Strachey expressed governments pleasure in 
being able to return to this practice
In fact, the strictness of the provisions of the Indian Councils 
Act, l86l permitted the government of India to present the Indian 
budget in the legislative council only on fourteen occasions between 
1862 and 1887. After 1872 the budget was presented in council only in
1877, 1880 and 1882. On the remaining twelve occasions the budget was
2
published by resolution in the gazette. *
In October, 1887 the Bengal Chamber of Commerce approached the 
government of India with proposals for liberalising and extending the 
scope of discussion of the budget. While expressing their belief "that 
the free and public discussion of the financial arrangements as a whole
1. I.P.P., April, 1888. No. 31* (Quoted in a letter dated October 20 , 
1887 from Bengal Chamber of Commerce to the Government of India^
2. Ibid.
- 8-
would be of great value, not only as a means of eliciting information, 
but also as an accession of strength which no Government can afford to 
neglect”, they urged upon the government of India to suitably amend the 
Indian Councils Act of l86l to enable annual discussion of the budget in 
legislative council irrespective of legislative requirements#^"*
Similar representations were made by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 
in November, 1887* which drew the government's attention to "the rapid 
development of interest in the questions regulated by the Budget" 
during the last decade# They reminded the government of India that "an 
enlightened body of public opinion has grown up which it must be in the 
best interests of the Government and the country at large to consult, 
and if possible, act in unison with*" *
The Madras Chamber of Commerce followed suit in December 1887*
They characterized the existing system as "out of accord with the spirit
3
of the age," which did not Encourage the public to take that intelligent 
interest in its own financial affairs which must be the basis of true
.Aeconomy#"
The European and Anglo-Indian Defence Association also pressed for
annual discussion of the budget. They had no doubt "that the Government
would gain instead of lose strength if its proposals and its policy were
intelligently discussed, and made known to the general public by the
medium of a debate, rather than if they were consigned to the practical
5
oblivion of the Supplement of the Gazette#"
1. I.P.P. April, 1888* No.31.
2. Ibid, No#32.
3. Ibid, No.33* 
km Ibid, No.3^ -*
3. Ibid, No.37*
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While these bodies prayed for reforms regarding the annual
presentation of the budget alone, the demand of Indians was for more
extensive changes. In a meeting presided over by John, Bright in London
on 23rd July, 1879, Lalmohun Ghose said, "An idea has taken root amongst
the educated classes in India that the time has fully come when some
1
system of representative government ought to be conceded to us."
In fact, to the politically advanced Indians - most ofwhom were educated 
in English and many of whom had the benefit of a liberal education in 
England - the English parliamentary form of government offered a ready­
made model on which they set their mind.
In presenting ah address of welcome to the governor-gteneral, Dufferin, 
on 24th December, 1884, the Indian Association of Calcutta advocated 
re-constitution of the provincial legislative councils. They asserted 
that these councils, as then constituted, "without the right of 
interpellation or any share in financial management, with their official 
majorities, for the most part, and the non-official members owing their
appointment entirely to nomination, admit of little room for the
2
successful expression of popular opinion...". At about the same time 
a conference of leading Indians throughput the Presidency was held at 
Madras which drew, under the auspices of the Mahajan Sabha, a scheme of 
reforms suggesting the introduction of a representative element in the
■Z
government. The formation of the Indian National. Congress in 1885
1. The Natives and the Government of India. p.l6, .
2. Stfafendranath Banerjea, A_Nation in Making, p.89*
3* Report of second I.N.C. p.l04T
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af forded a national platform for progressive political thinking 
throughout India, whence was voiced annually the hopes and prayers 
for reforms#
The question of representation loomed large in the mind of 
Indian politicians. The principal defect of existing councils was 
diagnosed to be the absence of any representative element in them.
They spoke of nominated members with unconcealed lack of confidence#
In his memorial to the secretary of State for India in 1880, Dadabhai 
Naoroji spoke of "the present farce of the nomination system for the /As
Legislative Council and of the dummies that are sometimes nominated," ^
It was also felt that the scope for useful work by non-official members
was hopelessly inadequate. Speaking at the first Indian National
Congress in 1885 S# Subramania Iyer, a member of the Madras legislative
council, deplored the fact "that the functions of these councils are
limited to registering the decrees of the executive Government and
2
stamp them with legislative sanction". At the second Congress in
1886, Dr, Rajendralal Mitra said that the non-official members
"represented no one but their own good interests" and were "selected
so as to produce more ornament than usefulness," He wanted to do away
with "nomination by the authorities", and desired instead "election by
3those whom the elected are to represent".
At the 1889 Congress, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya regretted that
1. R,P. Mas&hl, Dadabhai Naoro.ii, p.207*
2. Report of the first I.N.C. p, 26#
3. Report of the second I,N.C# p. ^9*
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the nomination of non-official members had not been made by the
government with the best interests of the people in view. In the
majority of cases, he complained, the power of selection "has been
exercised in favour of persons who have proved to be the least
qualified or willing to advocate the interests and plead fearlessly
for the rights of the people,"  ^ Such complaints received
countenance from the way that nominations sometimes looked like
official patronage. In Madras legislative council a Moslem member
first nominated in November 1867 was regularly re-nominated afterwards,
so that on 1st July, 1889, he could look back upon an uninterrupted
tenure of 21 years, 3 months, 28 days. A Hindu member in the same
council had sat for 15 years, 11 months, 17 days, and another for
11 years, 11 months, 18 days.
In a letter dated 25th January, 1888 to the Home Secretary,
National
government of India, the Honorary Secretary of Bengal/Chamber of 
Commerce asserted that the nominated members "cannot be said, 
properly and adequately, to represent the varied interests of the 
country," It would be too much to expect these members to thoroughly 
lay before the councils "the views and wants of so many and at times 
conflicting interests in the country," The government were therefore
urged upon to adopt the elective principle in the constitution of the
3legislative councils*
1, Report of fifth I,N.C. p.l8.
2, Pari. Papers, 1890,
3, I.P.Pi April, 1888. No.38.
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These views were shared by some high government officials who had
sat on these councils, and had experience of their working. H. J. Cotton
characterized these councils as "the merest farce. Not only do officials
predominate to an extent which absolutely precludes the possibility of
any independent action, but these officials consist almost entirely of
individuals who, from the very position they hold, are unable to
display any personal independence.” 1 Herbert J. Reynolds, C.S.I., read
to the East Indian Association, London, a paper in which he recalled
his "experience gained as a member of the Bengal Provincial Council and
the legislative council of the Viceroy." The councils were "councils
only in name: they neither represented the public nor possessed the
public confidence". He enumerated among the defects of the councils
the overwhelming preponderance of official members,"the absence of
any system of representative election, and the narrow limits to which
2
the functions of the councils were restricted."
In a pamphlet published from Madras in 1886, John Murdoch advocated
reform of the councils of Bombay, Madras and Bengal: while proposing
equal number of official and non-official members in a council of
sixteen, he concluded that "it seems best to concede the right of
3election in India". As many as six non-official members might be 
elected by municipalities, district boards, chambers of commerce^, 
university graduates and Moslem associations. Annual discussions of 
budget and right of interpellation were also recommended to be conceded.
1. H. J. S. Cotton, New India (1885) p. 83.
2. The Pioneer, 1st May, 1892.
3. John Murdoch, Ll.D. Indiafs Needs, p*73#
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The first Congress adopted a resolution - proposed, seconded,
and supported by three members of the legislative councils of
Bombay and Madras - pleading for an enlargement of the legislative
councils by admission of ”a considerable proportion of elected
members*1. The resolution held that lfall Budgets should be referred
to these councils for consideration, their members being moreover
empowered to interpellate the Executive in regard, to all branches of
the administration”. To guard against the reckless over-ruling of
the majority decisions of the council by the executive, a right of
protest to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons was provided.
for.^ No definite proportionof elected members was laid down. It
was argued that local conditions and necessities in different
ptovinces would determine this. The mover of the resolution,
K. T. Telang, however, expressed his personal view that at least half
of each council should be elected. Coming to the mode of election,
Telang suggested election by municipal corporations, chambers of
commerce, universities, various rural and municipal boards and well-
established political associations. Obviously, Indian conditions were
2
not deemed suitable for territorial constituencies.
The Congress resolutions of the next year propounded a more 
complex scheme of reforms* Having reaffirmed the necessity of reform 
and expansion of legislative councils, the Congress made tentative 
recommendations to the government. Reiterating that membership of
1. Resolution III.
2. Report of the first I. N.C., pp.23-2*f.
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legislative councils should be materially increased, the resolution 
laid down that at least half of the members of the enlarged councils 
should be elected^; "not more than one-fourth to be officials having 
seats ex-officio in such councils, and not more than one-fourth to be 
members, official or non-official, nominated by Government11. The 
resolution took care to mention that the right.of election to 
provincial councils should be conferred "only on those classes and 
members of the community, prima facie, capable of exercising it 
wisely and independently." In Bengal and Bombay the councillors might 
be elected by the members of the municipalities, district boards, 
chambers of commerce and the universities, "or an electorate may be 
constituted of all persons possessing such qualifications, educational 
or pecuniary, as may be deemed necessary." In Madras the election 
might be by the bodies mentioned in case of Bombay and Bengal, or "by 
electoral colleges composed by members partly elected by these bodies 
and partly nominated by Government." In the Punjab and North-West 
Provinces and Oudh, for both of which the Congress had demanded 
legislative councils, the election might be by electoral colleges 
"composed of members elected by municipal and district boards, and 
nominated to an extent not exceeing one-sixth of the total number by 
Government." In these two provinces the right of election was further 
sought to be bestowed on the cultivating classes through the district 
boards. Irrespective of the method adopted for any province, the 
resolution insisted upon the adequate representation of "all sections
- 15-
of the community and all great interests". Speaking on this
clauses, the mover of the resolution, Surendranath Banerjea, asserted,
"Representation is our motto, our watch-word, our battle-cry, the
gospel of our political redemption." He explained, besides, that
whatever might be the scheme of representation ultimately adopted by
the authorities, "the interests of all classes of the community,
Hindus, Mahomedans, Parsees, Sikhs, Eurasians, of all races and of all
2
creeds should be adequately cared for* We desire to exclude none."
The resolution recommended the election by members of provincial
councils of non-official members of the governor-general^ legislative
council. In the sphere of rights and powers of legislative councils,
the Congress demanded that all legislative measures and financial
questions, including all budgets whether these necessitated fresh
measures of taxation or not, should be placed before the councils*
The privilege of putting questions to government on matters relating
to the administration was sought, and it was suggested that while
replying government should also furnish "copies of any paper requisite
for the thorough comprehension of the subject"* The council should
thereupon be free to discuss the subject matter of the question and
adopt a resolution recording the majority view on it* The resolution
also contained a provision allowing the executive to decline to
answer certain questions and to over-ride the majority decision, in
public interest. The tight of appeal to a standing ccfcittee of the
3
Commons by the over-ruled majority was also reiterated.
1. Resolution iv.
2* Report of second I.N.C., p.99«
3. Resolution iv. (1886)
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These resolutions indicate in which light the question of reforms
was viewed by Indian politicians. Every year these views were
reaffirmed from the Congress platform* and in 1891 the Congress
reasserted !lthe conclusion arrived at by all previous Congresses, viz,
that India can never be well or justly governed, nor her people
pYdsjSerous^ or contented, until they are allowed, through their elected
representatives, a potential voice in the Legislatures of their own
country,” and urged the people of Great Britain and Ireland ”to permit
M1no further delay in the concession of this just and necessary reform.
The Congress cry for reforms was enthusiastically taken over by a
considerable section of the people at that time. Memorials and
resolutions, adopted at public meetings at various places, poured in
the Home department of government of India. By a letter dated 19th
February, 1889, the government of India forwarded to the Secretary of
State one hundred and two such memorials, resolutions, proceedings of 
2
meetings, etc. It. appears that most of these meetings were held 
during the first half of 1887* By far the largest number of meetings 
were held in Bengal, though the North-West Provinces and Oudh, Madras 
and Bihar had also a good share. These meetings must have been 
organised by people who had imbibed Congress ideals. The demand for 
representative councils was the sheet-anchor of all the petitions.
It is interesting to know that the Indian Associations memorial was
1. Resolution ii, (1891)
2. Public letters from India, 1889, vol.10, p.227*
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signed by forty thousand persons; the first three signatories were 
Kali Sahkar Sukul (Principal,. Victoria College, Narail), Heramba 
Chandra Maitra, (Editor, Indian Messenger), and Surendranath Banerjea 
(Editor, The Bengalee). This memorial, while talking its stand on the 
Cohgires^ x*e3oluti6nls bf! 1’883 ‘ahd11886,' r’eniafk^d1 that the reconstituted’ 
councils would continue to be consultative in their character, and 
reassured the government that ’’the power of the Executive Government 
would remain as before, and indeed it would become stronger by the 
intelligent discussion of its measures by a partially representative 
assembly”.'*’
Much the same line of approach was taken by the British Indian
Association, the leading organisation of landed aristocrats in Bengal*
In addressing a letter to the government of India on the question of
reforms on 27th December, 1887* Raja Peary Mohun Mookerjee, the
Associations Honorary Secretary, prayed for enlargement of
legislative councils by inclusion of more non-official members,
annual discussion of budget, and right of interpellation* While
referring to a ’’wider representation of popular Views in councils”,
the letter admitted, ’’there has been for several years no prayer from
native public more eagerly or more widely and influentially submitted,
to Government than the one for a reform of the constitution and
2
powers of the legislative councils.”
1. Ibid, 2*fl, (The Indian Association’s letter dated June 25* 1889*)
2. I.P.P. April, 1888, No.35*
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In a letter about a month later, the same suggestions were
placed before the government by the Bengal National Chamber of
Commerce. Dealing with interpellation, they dwelt on the advantages
that would follow from it both for the public and the government.
"It will afford the public an opportunity to hear the official and
therefore authoritative explanation in justification of a measure
which, in the absence of such explanation, might seem to them improper
or unjust, and save the Government the harsh and unworthy criticisms
which are at times directed against it by the press from want of
sufficient information on the subject".^
Despite elaborate Congress resolutions on the structure of
reforms, the purpose for which they were sought was interpreted with
some difference in emphasis. One school of thought - and they formed
the majority - looked upon the reforms as calculated to help the
foreign rulers to better administer the country by placing them more
intimately in contact with public opinion. Thus at the second Indian
National Congress, Pandit Thakur Prasad, a delegate from Agra, said
that if the country was to prosper, it was necessary to give its
children, "who understand its ways and wants", a share in the
2
management of public affairs. At the same Congress, Dr. Rajendralal 
Mitra argued, "we live not under a National Government, we live under 
a foreign bureaucracy: our foreign rulers under the peculiar
circumstances of the case are foreigners by birth, religion, language,
1. Ibid, No.38.
2. Report of second I.N.C., p.71»
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habits - everything that divides humanity into different sections.*
They cannot possibly dive into our hearts: they cannot ascertain
our wants and feelings and aspirations.ff^  Therefore, they wanted a
sufficient number of representative men, each bringing his quota of
knowledge of the requirements of a particular section of the community.
Later on, Dadabhai Naoroji expanded the same idea, and spoke of the
inability of English officials, with all their superior knowledge, "to
enter into the feelings of the people, and feel as they feel, and enter
2
into their minds."
Some others evidently had different ideas. Speaking at the first
Congress', K. T. Telang, though recognising that the power of rejecting
the budgets of the executive government should not immediately be
sought, said that non-official views nevertheless should be permitted
to be expressed in such a manner that the authorities must necessarily
3
feel themselves called upon to answer such views. At the Congress 
of 1886 Surendranath Banerjea counted upon the power of interpellation
Zf
"to bring many an erratic magistrate to book". A year later he 
explained that ho "domestic grievance" would remain unremedied if the 
legislative councils were reconstituted according to the Congress 
demand. "Talk of the separation of judicial from executive functions: 
why, the reform would be effected at once if we had a potential voice 
in the making of our laws. Talk of the wider employment of our
1. Ibid, p.^9*
2. Ibid, p.56.
3. Report of first I.N.C. p.2*f. 
k* Report of second I.N.C. p«99#
countrymen in the public service: why, the Queen's Proclamation
would be vindicated to the letter, if we had some control over the
management of our domestic concerns# You fret and fume under the
rigours of an income-tax which touches even the necessities of
subsistence: why, the incidence of the tax would be altered, the
minimum raised, if we had anything to do with the imposition of the
tax...*" In fact, the reform of the legislative councils was the
"panacea" for grievances relating to the "internal administration" of
the country#^ Eardley Norton assured the same Congress that through
the reformed legislative councils "the great question of taxation
will be within your grasp", and that he "who has the dispensing of
2
money is he who has the controli of all ultimate authority". In the 
Congress of l889i Norton foresaw that even limited right of election 
would introduce "the thin end of the wedge" leading to the 'political 
emancipation" of the Indians.^ Thus this section looked forward to 
self-government. But as Banerjea himself pointed out in his
k
autobiography, this new departure was hardly noticed at the time.
The dominant sentiment completely lacked any desire of bringing the
executive under the thumb of the legislature.
* * * * * * *  * * * *  * * * * * *
The ideals for which the Congress stood met staunch opposition 
from others. It would indeed have been unnatural if the agitation for
1. Report of third I.N.C. p.83.
2. Ibid,jp•90-91•
3# Report of fifth I.N.C. p#13*
4. A Nation in Making, p.67*
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reforms had been altogether devoid of contention. The vastness of 
the country, the multiplicity of interests, and interplay of numerous 
cross-currents of faith, sentiment and tradition stood in the way of 
unanimity. The Moslems were the most powerful opponent of the 
Congress.+ Their initial antipathy to British rule, which had 
dislodged them from power, had disappeared. The Moslem nobility took 
the lead in popularising the new regime. One of the Moslem organisa­
tions was the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta, which was 
founded in April, 1863* with the object of imparting "useful 
information to the higher and educated classes of the Mahomedan 
community". Its membership included Moslem gentlemen from all parts 
of India. This society took pains to dispel any antagonism to 
British rule. Thus on 23rd November, 1870, the society decided in 
a meeting, after discussions strongly flavoured with religion, that 
British India was Darul Islam, - country of Islam or safety* As 
such no Jihad (religious war) could be waged therein. Such a war
would be pronounced as rebellion, which was forbidden by the Moslem
a
law. It also declared that in case of such a war, the duty of/Moslem 
lay on the side of the government to fight such r e b e l s I n  a 
pamphlet published in 1872, Sir Syed Ahmed, the father of the Moslem
+ Unless otherwise stated, references to the Moslem view in this work 
should be taken to mean the view that took Moslems first, looked after 
Moslem interest as distinct from the interest of the general body of 
the people, - a stand which the Moslem League later on embodied.
1. Duty of Mahommedans in British India towards the Ruling Powers, 
(published by Erasmus Jones, Calcutta-Cambrian Press, - 1871)
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renaissance in modern India, upheld this view more forcefully, and
quoted in his support decisions of Moslem divines from far and near.***
The alignment of Moslemswith British rule in India on religious
considerations was more clearly brought out in a speech at Meerut on
15th March, 1888, by Sir Syed Ahmed. He quoted from the holy Koran
and said that none could deny that the British were "people of the 
2
Book". The Koran "has ordained them and us to be friends". He 
referred to the religious and social affinity between the Moslems and 
Christians. God had made the Englishmen "rulers over us ... The 
Prophet has said that if God place over you a black negro slave as 
ruler, you must obey him". Therefore he advised his community to 
cultivate friendship with the British. The Moslems "should, adopt 
that method by which their rule may remain permanent and firm in India^ 
The dislike for the reforms movement, which for Sir Syed Ahmed 
spelt Hindu domination, was no doubt a vital factor in determining 
his attitude towards the British connection. The Congress agitation 
for political reforms he considered harmful to the Moslems. Reforms 
would benefit the Hindus alone. He also thought that of all Hindus, 
the Bengali Hindus would reap the richest harvest from the reforms.
In two speeches which can be considered his policy statements, Sir 
Syed Ahmed elaborately explained his stand. - at Lucknow on 28th 
December, 1887, and at Meerut on 15th March, 1888. He reminded
1. Syed Ahmed, Review of Dr. Hunter*s Indian_Musalmans; Are they 
bound in_conscience to rebel against the Queen?
2. Idem, The Present State of Indian Politics, p.^9.
3. The Present State of Indian Politics, pp.50-51*
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his fellow-Moslema that election could only be injurious to them. 
Under a system of universal suffrage, for each Moslem vote there 
would be as many as four Hindu votes. Under a s:heme based on 
financial competence, the Moslems would fare no better. "Suppose, 
for example, that an income of Rs.5,000/- a year be fixed on, how 
many Mahomedans will there be? ... In the normal course, no single 
Mahomedan will secure a seat in the Viceroy’s Council." ^ If any 
allotment of seats on councils was to be by considerations of 
proportion to total population, "there will be one member for us to 
every four of the Hindus." Even if the government allotted seats 
equally to the two communities, there would be fewer Moslem members 
to "leave his business and undertake the expense of living in
2
Calcutta and Simla, leaving alone the trouble of the journeys."
Thus the Hindus would even then have their way. He feared that the
Hindu allegiance to reforms was in certain cases actuated by a belief
that increased powers would enable the Hindus "to suppress those
Mahomedan religious rites which are opposed to their own, and by all
3
uniting, annihilate them."
It is interesting to note that similar Moslem misgivings were 
expressed even in Congress sessions. In 1889 a Moslem delegate 
moved an amendment to the Congress resolution about the legislative 
councils to the effect that the number of Moslem members in the
1. Ibid, p.13*
2. Ibid, p.lA-.
3. Ibid, p.35*
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always
Imperial and provincial councils should also be equal to that of the
Hindus, In fact one delegate, Syed Wahid Ali Rizwi, called upon the
Congress to declare that in view of the past glories of the Moslems
always
and of their superior ability there should -et-l-eo be three times as 
many Moslem as Hindu members, "If India is to be represented let her 
be represented by her best and not by her inferior r a c e s T h e  
amendment was opposed by Hamid Ali Khan, a Barrister from Lucknow, 
and was lost in division by 23 votes to 16, only Moslem delegates 
voting, though a large number of them remained neutral*
Sir Syed Ahmed considered representative government incompatible 
with the maintenance of British authority in India, Representative 
government presupposed that the rulers and the ruled belonged to the 
same nation. This could not be achieved in a country where the native 
population had been conquered by foreign rulers. He, therefore, 
considered it against the "true principles of government11 that Indians 
should ask to "be appointed by election to the legislative council"« 
Because, "the meaning of it is this: 1Abandon the rule of the country, 
and put it into our hands!" "HenceV,he advised, "it is in no way 
expedient that our nation should join in and echo these monstrous 
proposals",^
He considered it impossible for the British government to pay 
heed to "these unrealisable and impossible proposals", because these 
collided against the primary duty of the authorities in India, that of
1. Report of fifth I*N.C* p*36*
2. The present state of Indian politics, p*40.
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flpreserving the Empire on a firm and secure basis." ^
He saw no more relevance in the prayer for annual discussion of 
budget. The budget included provision of finances for the army.
Devoid altogether of any idea of war, - its cost, arms and troops - 
how could the members make up their mind and judge the merits of a
budget? "How ridiculous then for those who have never seen a battle­
field, or even the mouth of a cannon, to want to prepare the Budget
2
for the army?tf Besides, why should the conqueror approach the 
expenses for
conquered for/the governance of the country! It was not’bonsonant with
3
the principles of empire• "
Sir Syed Ahmed thus voiced the antagonism of a considerable 
section of the Indian population to the claims for representation.
He always held that the Congress had not the authority, nor the 
mandate to speak for the Moslems. Mentioning the name 1Indian National 
Congress1, he said, rtWe and our nation gave no thought to the matter". 
He regarded the Congress as a handiwork of the Bengalis; he believed 
that the Congress had been founded only to benefit the Bengalis, "and
3
next to them the Mahrattas and Brahmans". Disputing the suggestion 
that representative Moslems had supported the Congress, he protested, 
"To say that the Mahomedans have joined it is quite wrong and is a 
false accusation against our nation".^
1. Ibid, p. 13.
2. Ibid, pp.19-20
3. Ibid, p.41.
k. Ibid, p.30.
3. Ibid, P*27 •
6. Ibid, P.34.
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So much was he inflamed that he did not hesitate to say that
,fthe Congress is in reality a civil war without arms" to determine
who should rule India. The Congress wanted that the government of
India should be English in name only, and that the internal rule of
the country should be entirely in their own hands* "They speak in
the name of the whole people of India: but they very well know that
the Mahomedans will be unable to do anything and so the rule of the
country will be monopolised by them"*'*’ *
There can be no doubt that the Syed’s views had considerable
support among the politically minded Moslem intelligentsia. Even in
Bengal where the Congress hold was indisputable, influential Moslems
slammed their doors on Congress importunity by declining through the
Central National Mahomedan Association of Bengal and the Mahomedan
Literary Society of Calcutta, to participate in the Congress and
2
assume "an attitude of uneasiness towards the Government". Meetings 
of Moslems were held at Madras, Allahabad, Lucknow, Lahore, Ludhiana, 
Amritsar and other places expressing confidence in Sir Syed Ahmed and
3
endorsing the stand taken by him in the Lucknow speech.
Associations opposed to the Congress ideals emerged. Two such 
were the United Indian Patriotic 4ss°ciation, of which Sir Syed Ahmed 
was the secretary, and the British Indian Association of Oudh* Public
1. Ibid, p.27,
2. Ibid, appendix, p.v.
3. Ibid, appendix.
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meetings and demonstrations were organised in many parts of the
country to denounce the Congress and to challenge Mits right to
speak on behalf of the people of the country."^ Anti-Congress
literature was distributed both in India and in England, and special
care was taken to send it to the members of parliament and the
English Press. Representations were also made by Moslem leaders to
2the government of India complaining against the Congress. The 
United Indian Patriotic Association, more active than the others, 
issued several pamphlets, one of which was entitled - ’Showing the 
seditious character of the Indian National Congress and the opinions 
held by eminent Natives of India who are opposed to the movement'.
This Association, it may be said, was predominantly Moslem, and its 
membership was drawn overwhelmingly from the landed nobility. Its 
donors were nine in number, headed by the Nizam of Hyderabad. Of the 
remaining eight, four were Moslems and four Hindus* The Moslems all 
came from Hyderabad: of the Hindus three were landlords from the
North-West Provinces, and the remaining one was the ruler of Chhatarpur 
bordering on that province. Early in December 1888, the Association 
had ninety-four members, seventy-nine of whom were Moslems, ten 
Hindus and five British. Most of the members came from the North-West 
Province. The five British members included Theodore Beck, the 
Principal of Sir Syed Ahmed's Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College at.
Aligarh, and a Joseph Beck, who presumably was initiated by the former.
1. Dadabhai Naoroji, p.305•
2. Hansard, Indian Extracts, 1888, p.11^5•
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Another was a late officer of the Royal Engineers, then living at
Hyderabad* The Association thus at best stood for narrow sectional
interests, which being what these were could hardly be expected to
have sympathy for the aims of the Congress.^*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * *
Equally strong in antagonism to the demand for representative
institutions was a section of the Anglo-Indians, - the British
population of India, mostly non-official, engaged in trade, industry,
and commerce. The Pioneer, an influential organ of this community,
voiced their dislike and apprehension. A redoubtable protagonist of
this view-point was Theodore Beck. Beck wrote profusely, and with zeal,
in an attempt to buttress the anti-reforms agitation. Writing in the
Pioneer on the National Congress, he mentioned "four insurmountable
obstacles to the success of representative institutions in India: to
wit, the ignorance of the peasantry, the absence of a class from which
to select capable statesmen and legislators, the inability of a
Parliament to control the army, and the mixture of nationalities♦" He
explained that the virtues of a popular government lay in its support
by more than half of the people, and in the chance it offers to the
poorer classes to exercise a check on the "natural tendency to selfish
2
legislation in the governors". Ignorant as were the peasants of
1. The Pioneer, *fth December, 1888.
2. Theodore Beck, Essays on Indian Topics, p.65#
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India, who formed more than ninety per cent of the total population,
how could they be entrusted with such political power? The
introduction of true representative government in India must,
therefore, wait.
Beck then examined the introduction of partially representative
institutions, on the basis of limited suffrage or election through
municipalities, district boards, etc. This was, no doubt, possible;
but it would just be ’’pseudo-representative Representation could
be ensured only to a small section of the people. Mainly, the English-
educated classes would benefit under this scheme. This, he argued,
would introduce a system lacking ’’the two great virtues of popular
government, which are generally held to balance its defects - its
2stability and its impartiality.” It would lack stability because
the English- educated class did not ’’hold in its hands the keys of the
magazines of physical force” in India. How long would the people with
war-like traditions consent to be kept out of the places of power and
prestige! It would lack impartiality because each class must look to
its own interest first, and even with a ’’representative oligarchy”,
3
’’self-interest is the rule and self-sacrifice the exception.”
He also endorsed Syed Ahmed's opinion that representative 
governments was unsuitable in a country with two or more nations. In 
India obviously the Hindus and the Moslems would come into conflict, 
and ultimately the issue must be left for decision to physical prowess.
1. Ibid, p.66.
2. Ibid, p.67.
3. Ibid, pp.70-71.
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Incidentally, he had his own interpretation of the Moslem opposition
to reforms. This was due to Moslem distrust of new-fangled ideas -
ideas that fitted ill with their traditional notion of right to rule,
namely, conquest. Besides, joining in the clamour for reforms would
mean for Moslems Tla rope round their own necks and place themselves at
the mercy of those who have hold of the other end.” ^
In a further article in the Pioneer, Beck made a case against any
concession to the agitation for reforms, even in part. This would be
unfair to those who were left unrepresented. This would be unjust to
the communities that remained calm and loyal, and refused to "hamper
the hands of the Government”: ”to neglect them, but to listen to the
noisy voices of the ungrateful, would be shameful: it would encourage
ingratitude and discourage gratitude., create sedition and dispel 
2
loyalty.” A further objection to such partial measure was that it 
would serve as a great stimulus to the whole movementf It would drive 
in the thin end of the wedge "for the agitators ever to hammer at” .^  
Besides, it would mislead people about the true nature of the British 
rule in India, which was, and Beck said must be, a despotism. To him 
"a cosmopolitan bureaucracy, with the ultimate authority in the hands 
of Englishmen” was "the only possible ambition for the Indian political 
idealist.”^
This typical aversion fcr- representative institutions often 
found expression in a section of the Anglo-Indian press in India.
1* Ibid, p.84.
2. Ibid, p.123.
3. Ibid, p«99.
4. Ibid, p.100.
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Early in 1891 Sir William Hunter in an essay in the Contemporary
Review, having described the advancement effected by British rule in
India, reasoned in favour of "the noble gift of a true beginning of
representative government". This was severely attacked by the Pioneer.
Averring that India and the Indians had benefited immensely and
progressed a good deal under the existing system of administration,
how could that enlightenment be used as an argument for a change in
the form of government of which it was the product? "If there was ever
an inconsequential conclusion," Pioneer declared, "this is surely one.
The goods we have are made an argument for flying to the ills, or at
all events possible ills, we know not of." For, the introduction of
an elective system "in the East" was "a leap in the dark, the dangers
of which are numerous and exceedingly formidable." They were even
daiubtful of the efficacy and worth of representative form of
government. This had never been proved, and in India this could not
be proved "except by one of the most perilous and uncalled-for
experiments ever ventured upon by infatuated politicians." ^
The idea of representation was opposed also on the ground that
the vast mass of the people, the numberless peasants, had never asked
for it and had no aptitude for the ballot-box. They would much prefer
to be 3e ft in peace so as to be able to pursue their avocations
without interference by attacking marauders. The vast multitude of
2India's population had no political aspirations.
1. The Pioneer, 3rd March, 1891*
2. Ibid 24th May, 1891.
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On the question of election, their stand was equally emphatic.
Not only were they opposed to the extension of the elective principle 
to legislative councils, its adoption in the scheme of local self- 
government came in for harsh criticism. They described this as 
transplanting a full-grown tree from England and "planting it in sand." 
Lacking the Englishman's long experience and tradition of elective 
system, how could the Indian "understand, appreciate, and use"it? 
Referring to the result of elections to local bodies, they pronounced 
judgment that the system had failed to fulfil its purpose. For, "a 
representative system that produces no representative men stands self­
condemned". The cause of this finding lay in the return to different 
committees and boards of pleaders, doctors and teachers in large 
proportions, in exclusion of "the landed property, the large trade, or 
the shop-keeping interests", which could not secure their due 
representation » They, therefore, recommended the rescission of 
elective system, in the interest of better administration: "there are
some cases in which a step back will quicken a man's progress to his
journey's end", was the counsel to the authorities.*^
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **. ** **
The opposition to the Congress movement was not, however, confined 
to the Moslems and the Anglo-Indians. Hindu voices were also heardi 
against the Congress. A pamphletL entitled 'Democracy not suited to 
India'was written by the Raja of Bhinga, controverting the Congress 
claim to speak for the people of India and also denying the suitability
1. Ibid, l6th June, 1891*
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of representative institutions in Indian conditions.+
The Raja took the stand that for the vast majority of the people 
the Congress had no locus standi to speak. Ninety per cent of the 
Indians were the politically uneducated agricultural masses. They had 
no interest in theories of representation, and did not know what they 
meant. As Uma Shankar Misra pointed out, Indians had been used to 
"despotism in soma form or other": prior to the British regime "people
had no rights and privileges ..." The notion of political training was 
still more new, and the people neither understood the system of election 
nor were interested in it. ^
If, however, any people had a right to represent the masses, they
were the old aristocracy and the landed gentry of the country "whom the
masses naturally and instinctively regard as leaders ..." But the
landed nobility had no sympathy with the Congress and democratic
methods. They and the Congress stood poles asunder. They were
conservative and valued "the preservation of the social distinctions
which have existed in India from time immemorial". The Congress
agitators were innovators who sought "to give, men of inferior origin
and caste power over men immensely their superiors in birth and
2
social position." The Bangabasi, a Bengali weekly, held similar 
views and said that elective system was unsuited to India, and would
+■•• This pamphlet was reprinted in the Pioneer in three instalmenta
in October, 1888 - on 10th, 13th and 18th.
1. Asiatic Quarterly Review, Vol.vi. 1888. p.401.
2. The Pioneer, 10th Oct: 1888.
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only result in "social revolution and anarchy1*. The Hindus did not
want it. Its advocate was the ,fEnglish.educated Babu**, to whom ftthe
Babu class is his nation. .’* Even the Babus did not cherish election
of a low caste Hindu: they wanted only election of one of themselves.^
It may be said here that the identification of political agitation with
the English-educated people only was not fair. In the Congress itself
there were delegates, who were ignorant of English., but actively
2
participated in its proceedings. They mostly spoke in Urdu.
The Baja of Bhinga questioned the merit, of the system of 
representative government. It had suceeded only in Britain and 
America, but even in Britain he discerned its weaknesses. To him, 
weakness was indeed the principal feature of popular government: 
*'irresolution, fear of public opinion, dishonest flattery of the 
public and its prejudices, excessive partisanship**, need to give 
prominence to any issue which caught the public imagination and the.
difficulty of beneficial legislation except with the backing of
3
popular agitation.
Even if these general defects were ignored, how could they 
surmount the obstacles which were peculiar to Indian conditions?
The vastness of the country, its numerous population divided into 
many a tribe and race, separated by profound social and religious 
divisions, rendered democratic government impossible to adopt in India.
1. Quoted in the Pioneer, l4th January, 1888.
2. Report of fourth I.N.C. pp.20,25, & of fifth I.N.C., pp.52-36.
3* The Pioneer, 13th October, 1888.
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Such a form of government presupposed that the voice of the majority
would prevail, but it never anticipated that particular sections of
the population would be permanently in the minority* Due to the
peculiar conditions of India, there would indeed be permanent
minorities* Would not this lead to flendless discord and difficulty"?
How could the warlike and vigorous races of India be controlled by a
parliament composed mostly of the educated Bengalis and Madrasis?**"
He, as also Misra, referred to the Moslem opposition to representative
system. "As the late rulers of the country they have a sense of their
own dignity and importance". It would not do to ignore them. In view
of all this, "political unity in a country like India seems to be an
2
impossibility*"
Misra enumerated three essential requirements for a representative 
system: "An educated and enlightened class; a politically trained
f
3people; and a consequent touch between the two classes". Even if
the first requirement was, for argument’s sake, taken as existing in
India, the/twoNqthep^were absent. The Haja of Bhinga would not
accept that due to the backwardness of the people, "the educated resi-
k
due form the Indian body politic and should be treated as such..."
The ordinary people were "the backbone of the Indian Empire", and 
they must have votes in a democratic system; but their "constitutional
5
duties would be most perplexing to them." . He argued that more than 
positive opposition, the inability of the people to understand
1. Ibid.
2. The Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol.vi., 1888, p.^ -0^ .
3* Ibid, p* *f00.
The Pioneer, 10th October, 1888.
5. Ibid,13th October, 1888.
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representative government and their indifference to it formed the
real obstacle to its establishment*
The Congress claim to debate the budget could lead to nothing
but barren discussion, utilised for demonstrating to the people of
India nhow heavily they are taxed and otherwise oppressed by an unjust
government...11 Interpellation would mean wastage of time, and scope
of doing mischief. All in all, the reforms advocated by the Congress
sought to’introduce a tremendous revolution”, whose effects were
difficult to foresee.^"
Newul Kishore, a proprietor of an Urdu journal of Lucknow, thought
likewise. He urged upon the authorities to promptly suppress "the
seditious talk and writing of the old, disappointed place hunters, and
the young hare-brained political adventurer who form the backbone of
the Congress agitation....11 Unless this was done, the Congress
propaganda would estrange the loyalty of the masses from the government
and might ultimately lead to a convulsion, ‘'compared to which the
2great Mutiny will have been child's play”.
*** *** *** *** * * * *** *** * * * ***
The question of reforms, which so exercised the public opinioji in 
India, aroused keen interest in England. The agitation for 
reconstitution of the legislative councils, as it gained strength in 
India, received support in England. Long before the Indian National 
Congress was born, long before any organised move for reforms
1. Ibid, 16 October 1888.
2. Ibid, 21 November 1888. Letter to the Editor by Newul Kishore 
proprietor, Oudh. Ukbar.
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originated in India, a change in the constitution of the legislative
councils was advocated by James Caird, an agricultural expert who,
as member of the Famine Commission, travelled in India in the cold
season of 1878-1879* and submitted at the instance of Lord Salisbury
a report on the condition of India to the secretary of State for
India, Lord Cranbrook, on 31st October, 1879* In proposing a scheme
of decentralization, Caird recommended a legislative council in each
province in which native opinion should be fairly represented.^
Interest in Indian questions in England was immensely stimulated by
the birth of the Congress. Writing to a friend in Bombay from
London on 30th January, 1887 Dadabhai Naoroji stated that 11 the Congress
is exciting much interest here”, and hoped that with care and
perseverance the Congress would create rta permanent and effective
2
interest in India" in England.
Support for Indian reforms and sympathy with Indian 
aspirations were increasingly voiced by members of the House of 
Commons on the floor of the House. This backing of Indian demands 
was restricted to a limited, though vocal and sincerely earnest, 
circle of members, and was far from a general feature of the entite 
membership of the House. Even then they, more than anybody else, 
placed before the English public the issues concerning the various 
apsects of Indian administration. Many of these members had personal 
connection with India: some of them had served in that country. But
1. Pari. Pape is, 1880, C.2732.
2. Dadabhai Naoroji, p.297*
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some others, including a few Irish members, were moved only by their
interest in the Indian question. On 9th September, 1887, Sir R* T*
Reid emphasized the necessity of listening to the best advice and
opinion that could be obtained from the Indians themselves. He
considered many suggestions of the Congress as "most interesting and
valuable", and as "worthy of adoption". He was averse to trust
Anglo-Indians, because they were "pledged to the lips in favour of a
bureaucratic and despotic system of Government which in India is a
" 1benevolent despotism, but still a despotic bureaucratic Government*
On 20th February, 1888 Samuel Smith in moving an amendment to the
Queen's Address brought up the question of Indian reforms. He hoped
that the government of India would concede the "most reasonable
to
request" that native members "should be elected/the Legislative
Councils of India, in place of being nominated as at present". The
plea for annual discussion of the budget also received equally
sympathetic and full support. He sought to "impress on the House the
urgent necessity" of a fundamental change giving the Indian people "a
voice in the government of their own country". Past was the time when
India could be governed as a nation of children. The British rule had
given them education: Indians had been familiarised by the British
with their own political maxims, and the British could not complain if
Indians tried to act up to the lessons the former themselves had
2
taught the latter*
1, Hansard, Indian Extracts, 1887, PP*386-387*
2. Ibid, i$88, p.135.
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0
Speaking in the House of Commons on 2nd August, 1889, J. G*
Swift Macneill favoured a "complete, final and far-reaching*reform
of Indian administration.^ On the same day Sir W. Plowden, a retired
in North-West Provinces 
Indian civilian who had risen to be a Commissioner/ spoke much in the
same vein. He would even have an Indian element on the India ,
Council at Whitehall, and this he would secure by utilising as lfa
good starting point11 the system of village administration in Northern
2
India which rested upon the representative principle •
On the 27th of the same month, during the consideration of the 
Indian budget, Charles Bradlaugh, who was now widely reputed for his 
independence of character, expressed a hope that steps would be taken 
to implement the scheme of reforms advocated by Indians.^ Sir R. 
Temple, an eminent retired Indian official who rose to be the head of
a province, - whose views usually were conservative - admitted: lfI have
long thought that elective members might be substituted for the
if
appointed members on the various Legislative Councils11.
The efforts of these gallant few made the India Office sit up
and stir. In one of his earliest letters to Lansdowne, the governor-
general, the newly appointed Under-Secretary of State for India, Sir 
John Gorst referred (November, 1888) to the Congress "relations with 
several prominent members of Parliament♦** He considered it likely 
that the House of Commons would devote more attention than heretofore 
to Indian affairs. Government of India would be unable to retain the
1. Ibid,. 1889, B.^39.
2. Ibid, 1889, p.^5^.
3. Ibid, p.525.
4. Ibid, p.527*
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confidence of the House "unless it keeps up its character as a
progressive and reforming, Government," and the governor-general was
urged upon to "show a readiness to promote wise and gradual
development". It was, however, farthest from the Under-secretary*s
mind to encourage "the crude application of British democratic
maxims tot India.
These members of parliament were abty seconded by the Agency of
the Indian National Congress, which started its activity in London in
1887 on the initiative of Dadabhai Naoroji. Next year affstirs of the
Agency were entrusted to the able management of W. Digby^ who, by a
clear-cut scheme of publicity and propaganda tried to supply the
British public with information regarding India. The Agency’s work
2
was assumed by the British Committee of the Congress in July 1889*
Sir William Wedderburn, a retired civil servant and a staunch
exponent of Congress aims, became the Chairman. The Congress of 1889
formally confirmed the appointment of the committee which initially
consisted, besides the Chairman, of W. S. Caine, W. S. Bright
Maclaren, J. E. Ellis, Dadabhai Naoroji and George Yule. Digby
3
remained the secretary. This committee had a journal of its own, 
named India, which survived various financial vicfcissitudes through 
the large-hearted self denying acts of sacrifice of several of
1.Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne - A biography, pp.60-6l.
2.Dadabhai Naoroji, pp.306-307.
3*Resolution xiii (d)
+ William Digby (1849-190**) Journalist by profession, Digby was Editor 
of Madras Times, 1877-79* He became Secretary of National Liberal 
Club in 1887*
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all
committee^ members, but most of/of the Chairman himself. The 
circulation of India was not large. Nevertheless it fulfilled the 
important purpose of focussing on the major problems of Indian 
administration the attention of that section of the British public 
which was interested in India.(India was discontinued only when the 
London organisation was shut down in 1921 for causes other than 
financial).
The endeavour of the few members of parliament took a different
sought
shape in order to hasten the much-sor-t- for reforms. The fifth session
of the Congress at Bombay in December 1889 under the presidency of Sir
William Wedderburn was attended' by Bradlaugh. He had already
conceived the idea of introducing in the House of Commons a Bill
incorporating the reforms advocated yearly in India. He had prepared
a draft Bill on the basis of the oft-repeated Congress views, and had
circulated it throughout India. He wanted to ascertain- on certain
1
points the considered, mature opinion of Indians. The Congress of
1889 adopted a resolution outlining the principles on which they would
like the Bill to be drawn, and offered the same as a skeleton scheme to 
2
Bradlaugh. The resolution required at M s t  half the members of the 
legislative councils to be elected, one-fourth to be ex-officio 
official members, and the rest to be nominated by government. The real 
innovation in the scheme was to recommend election by electoral bodies, 
^which in their turn were to be elected by " all male British subjects
1. Reportl of fifth I.N.C. p*l$.
2. Resolution ii.
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above 21 years of age possessing certain qualifications and not 
subject to certain disqualifications", both of which were to be settled 
later. Revenue districts were to constitute territorial units for
i
J electoral purposes. The strength of the electoral bodies was to be 
at the rate of twelve per million of the total population. The 
electoral bodies were to elect members to the governor-generalfs 
legislative council at the rate of one per every five millions of 
the total population, and to the provincial legislative councils at 
the rate of one per million. It was besides laid down that in 
electing members of provincial councils "whenever the Parsees, 
Christians, Mahomedans or Hindus are in a minority, the total number 
of Parsees, Christians, Mohomedans or Hindus as the case may be, 
elected to the Provincial Legislature, shall not, so far as may be 
possible, bear a less proportion to the total number of members 
elected thereto, than the total number of Parsees, Christians, 
Mahomedans or Hindus, as the case may be, in such electoral 
jurisdiction bears to its total population". All elections were to be 
by ballot. As Eardley Norton, mover of the resolution, said the 
scheme embodied two great principles: "First, the great principle
that we are to introduce for the first time in Indian political 
history, the principle of election by the people, and secondly, that
-42-
we have taken into consideration and respected the question of the
1
representation of the minorities of this country11 ♦ Another speaker,
Pandit Bishen Narayan Dhar, enthusiastically supported the idea of
election. "What we want", he said, "is not sham, but reality: not
shadow, but substance: not nomination which is another name for
deception, but representation which is the essence of political 
" 2reform.
Bradlaugh introduced a Bill in the Commons in 1890. The Bill
substantially followed the scheme laid down by the Congress* It
maintained the same proportion of elected, ex-officio and nominated
members. For the governor-general*s legislative, council it provided
eighty members: the provincial councils varied, - 76 for Bengal,
46 for North-West Provinces and Oudh, 36 for Madras, 20 each for
4Bombay and the Punjab, and 12 for the Central Provinces . The forty
non-official elected members of the governor-general’s council were
distributed as follows:- Bengal 14, North-West Provinces and Oudh 9*
Madras 6, Bombay 4, the Punjab 4, Central Provinces and British Burma
5
2, and 1 respectively.
The councils were to enjoy all those powers of annual discussion 
of budget, interpellation, adoption of resolution etc. which had been 
the chief planks on the Congress platform. In case of the executive
1. Report of fifth I.N.C. p.l8.
2. Ibid, p.19*
3* Pari.Papers, 1890, (Bill 56) cl. 9*
4. Cl.28-33.
5* Cl.9.
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over-ruling the majority in legislative councils, the reasons thereof
were to be explained within a month in the official gazette., and the
matter reported to the Secretary of state* The over-ruled majority
retained the right of appeal to a committee of the House- of Commons
The votes for electing representatives to the electoral body
were conferred on all male adults, with a residential eligibility of
at least six months, who had not been in jail on conviction for a non-
bailable offence during the last ten years, and who had certain
financial qualifications or were members of local or municipal boards
or were graduates. None was to have more than a single vote. The 
financial
fin nil qualification laid down was low* A member of the electoral
body, an electoral represehtative, had stricter conditions to satisfy:
ability to read and write English or some vernacular, income of not
less than Rs.1200 annually; besides, he must not be insolvent: or
bankrupt, and must not have been in jail within the previous ten
2
years for a non-bailable offence. Except the financial requirement, 
the other conditions were required to be fulfilled by members of 
legislative councils.^ These higher qualifications were presumably 
intended to ensure the return of persons able to do their duties.
The interests of the minorities were safeguarded on the basis 
of the ratio which they bore to the total population, as recommended
1. C1.18 (a) (b)
2. Ibid, cl.24.
3. Ibid, cl*25*
in the Congress resolution.1 This Bill showed how far the advanced
politicians at Westminster were prepared to go towards the Indian
direction. Enlarged powers for the councils, and the electorate
scheme for representation, no less than the device to ensure an
adequate share for the minorities, manifested their confidence in the
political ability of Indians. Despite this, it is significant that
jthere was no suggestion to make the executive even slightly
answerable to the legislature. The councils were to remain purely
consultative, but for the proper discharge of their functions they
were to be not only broad-based and well equipped, but must also have
wider privileges.
Bradlaughfs Bill never proceeded beyond the stage of first
reading. The Bill was received with hostility. Bradlaugh informed
the British Committee of the Congress, 11 In England the Bill as read
a first time has, with some exceptions, been disapproved by.the Press
of all shades of opinion, and has not been very warmly supported by
2
any considerable number of members of the House.!f The Bill had to
be dropped, and was replaced by another Bill of Bradlaugh whose
provisions were more moderate.
3
This new Bill left the membership of the governor-general^ 
council between forty and sixty, and of provincial legislative councils
1. Ibid, cl. 27.
2. Report of sixth I.N.C. p.13*
3. Pari. Papers, 1890-91, Bill 67.
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var^ing from thirty-six to forty-eight. Not less than one-third 
and not more than one-half of the members were to be elected. The Bill 
sought to recognise clearly the principle of election, and indicated 
that the franchise should be conferred on at least two per cent of the 
population of India. But it refrained from setting down the details. 
Instead, the mode of election was left to be determined by the 
government of India. They would frame rules concerning this, subject 
to the sanction of parliament. The parliament would possess the right 
to amend the rules. These must also provide for "reasonable 
representation of minorities11 , ^ and must authorise annual discussion 
of budget, interpellation, resolution and division on budget.
The Congress of 1890 approved the new Bill, having recognised, 
in the words of the President, P.M. Mehta, that the earlier Bill had 
"not proved congenial to the English political mind, averse to new
2
departure, and looking askance at theoretical airs of perfection".
He hoped for the acceptance by Parliament of the "principle for which
we are fighting", namely, election. Once elective principle was
conceded, in respect of other matters he prescribed the method of
3
"moderate, gradual and substantial gain." Undoubtedly, the Congress 
could not take any other stand: it had to trim its sails to suit the
wind• r
This new Bill met no better fate, When Bradlaugh died on 30th 
January, 1891, the parliament had yet to grant an instalment of reforms
1. Ibid, cl. 1 (k)
2. Heport of 6ixth I.N.C., pp.8-9* 
3* Ibid, p.10.
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to India* In him the cause of Indian reforms lost an ardent friend.
In England, however, he was considered an impracticable champion, if 
not an imperfect student, of Indian ambitions* In an editorial on 
31st January, 1891? the Times expressed this feeling and wrote of him: 
"In the name of free government he would have established institutions 
in India out of which an infinitesimal section of the population would 
have sucked no small advantage, and which would have deprived the 
inarticulate multitude of the benefits they now enjoy under an 
enlightened autocracy,"
In February, 1892, yet another private Bill for the reform of 
Indian legislative councils was introduced in the Commons by Sir 
William Plowden and two other members, Beaufoy and Lawson.^" It 
provided for equal number of nominated and elected members. The 
system of representation was based on elected village panchayets, 
whose members were to constitute the sub-divisional, tuhseel or thana 
vlcouncils. These councils would elect from their members the district 
councils, which were to be consultative bodies for the district 
officers. Each district council would elect its representatives to the 
provincial legislative council according to a scale resting on 
population. The provincial council similarly Would elect from among 
its elected members its representatives on the governor-general1s 
legislative council. The number of the elected representatives of a 
province on this latter council was to be fixed on the basis of one
I
1, Pari. Papers, 1892, Bill 193*
for every ten millions of population, though a maximum for each 
province was also laid down: this varied from six for Bengal to one
for the Central Provinces. As to the functions of the legislative 
councils, these were confined to annual discussion of budget and 
interpellation, and thus went less than Bradlaughfs Bill. The Bill is 
significant in that it sought to give practical shape to the oft-talked- 
of idea of evolving a representative system in India by utilising the 
village panchayets.* This Bill too did not proceed beyond the first 
reading.
These abortive Bills, however, were not likely to be altogether
without their use• It can well be imagined that apart from focussing
the attention of the House on the Indian question, these were thorns
at the side of the government. It must be difficult for any
government to allow others to steal a march on it in spheres which 
legitimately
were te 1-y-its own. If only to put a stop to what in the
governments estimate were extravagant claims, the authorities could
hardly avoid moving in the matter themselves.
* * * # * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ★ * *
But all this enthusiasm for reform was not unchallenged. There 
were others who were opposed to the Indian agitation for representation 
and sought to belittle it by ascribing it to the self-interest of the 
educated, or of the Bengalis - for they were then undoubtedly more 
advanced than other races in India, an effeuct of their having imbibed
+ The fact that its principal author, Plowden, was a retired Indian 
official lends it additional significance*
-*f8-
earlier than others, Western ideas through English education. This
point of view was characteristically put forward by Sir R. Temple in
the House of Commons on 20th February, 1888. nWho were the educated
natives?11 he asked, and then proceeded^ ”They were men who only
spoke for themselves, and not for their countrymen collectively, and
who had but two objects in view, one of which was to obtain for
themselves a larger share in the management of the country, through
representative institutions: and, in the second place, to secure for
themselves also some of the loaves and fishes distributed among
Europeans”.'1’ Referring to the reforms in a speech during the debate
on the Indian Budget in the House of Commons nearly a year and a half
later, Sir John Gorst, the Under-Secretary of eltate for India,
ridiculed the talk of ”the people managing their own affairs.” He
declared that a closer examination would reveal that ”the natives of
Bengal are anxious to manage the affairs of the Punjab, where they
2are just as much foreigners as we are”.
The Times, opposed to the Congress aims from the first, reminded
the Bengali that he owed his advantages entirely to British supremacy. 
If the British were to withdraw from India, ”his intelligence would be 
powerless to cope with the more masterful qualities of other Indian 
races.” The Bengali was therefore exhorted to be ”a little more 
more grateful and a little less voluble about what he assetts to be
1. Hansard, Indian Extracts, 1888, p.1^6.
2. Ibid, 1889, p.571.
the denial of constitutional rights.” The Times endorsed Sir Syed
Ahmed’s stand, and accepted his reading of the consequence of
introducing representative institutions in India. The Moslems would
find themselves ’'practically deprived of the share of Government to
which their position and influence entitle them, and they would find
their condition intolerable.” .^
These views were countered by the pro-reform members of the
Commons. They acknowledged the bona fides of the educated Indians to
2
speak for all their countrymen. A well-reasoned reply to such line
of thinking had come, however, from Sir Henry Harrison, who was a
member of the Indian service. In a pamphlet written about 1883 he
discussed the role of educated Indians; he called them "agents,
guides, instructors and purveyors of information to the Indian nation.
He deprecated the notion that the educated community was insignificant
for "the India of the future will infallibly think and act as that
section of the community ....may instruct them.... It is clearly
destined to be the voice of India, and the brain of India, the masses
will be its hands and will reflect its teaching.” He, therefore,
warned that it would be "the greatest blunder” to suppose "that the
effect of our dealing with the educated natives can be made to begin
and end with that class.
* * * * * * * * * * * * # * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
1. The Times, 9th February, 1888.
2. cf. Bradlaughfs speech, Hansard, Indian Extracts, 1889, P*525*
3* Quoted in ’A Nation In Making1, p.91*
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Having delineated the genesis and growth of idea of 
representative government in India, - and the reaction thereto of 
different sections of the people, Indian and British - let us turn to 
the study of its reception by the government.
57
Chapter II 
THE SHAPING OF THE REFORMS.
In the present chapter it is intended to consider the governmental
attitude towards the introduction of representative institutions in India*
We shall see how the authorities faced the issue, both in India and in
England, and shall try to weigh separately the contribution of different
agencies of the government*
Towards the end of 1882 Ripon, the Viceroy, drew the Secretary of
/State's attention to the vastly ohanged conditions in India* He ascribed
this to the spread of education, growing influence of a free press, better
communications, easier and wider influx of European ideas and to an
administration based on rule of law* In consequence, new ideas had sprung
up and new aspirations had been called forth* Public opinion was growing
in strength steadily* Ripon recognised the difficulty of a despotic
administration in such ohanged circumstances* The problem, as he saw it,
was how to deal effectively with Mthis new-born spirit of progress*,f He
apprehended that to ignore this spirit cr to repress it would be Ma source
of serious political danger•” Instead he wanted to marshal this into
channels, which would ultimately lead to the development and welfare of the 
I
country*
*► Lord Ripon (1827-1909) was noted for his staunch liberalism* Once he 
asserted, ttI have always been in favour of the most advanced thing in the 
Liberal programme *w In fact, 'The Duty of the Age', written by him in I852, 
containing a plea for democracy was suppressed by his confreres in the 
Christian Socialist Publication Committee for its extreme radical tendency* 
He held many posts in the various Idberal administrations • Be was Under­
secretary of jitate for India for six months in 1861, and succeeded Sir 
Charles Wood as Secretary of ^ State for India in 1866* His appointment as the 
governor-general of India in 1880 was his first important assignment after a 
period of comparative political inactivity since I87I+ when ha became a Roman 
Catholic* In India he repealed the Vernacular Hress Act of Lord Lytton, 
introduced reforms in the local self-government, and sought to pass, without 
success, the ill-fated Ilbert Bill which caused much racial ill-feeling.(DUB)
I* Lucian Wolf, Life of Ripon, ii, pp*92-9^*
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In the same memorandum Ripon gave his own idea of meeting the
problem; nit would always be an aim worthy of the English Government
in India to train the people over whom it rules more and more as time
goes on to take an intelligent share in the administration of their own
I
affairs.” To him this was the highest attainable object in India*
Ripon undertook a reform of local self-government —  of municipalities* 
and district and local boards —  in the light of his belief* Be introduced 
elected members into these bodies* which were also granted wider powers*
The provincial and central administrations were not reformed in his time*
Be had mooted* however* in December 1881* the proposal of adding some
v/
elected members to the legislative councils* central and looal* These 
members were to be returned by municipal bodies of the larger towns and 
presidency corporations* Their presence and criticise of legislative
2
measures would make the council proceedings "more efficient and useful"•
+
The Secretary of Atate* Hartington* privately consulted Sir Benry 
Maine* a member of the India Council* and two high offioials of India then 
on leave in England* Sir Alfred lyall and Sir Charles Aitohison* All of 
them considered the suggestion attended with considerable risk and of 
"doubtful advantage" • Members chosen by the municipalities only could in 
no case be deemed true representatives of the vast multitude of Indians*
I* Ibid.
2* Ripon papers - British Museum* Addl* Mss* 1*355^ # *156 (Hartington to 
Ripon* dated 26*12*1882)
+ Lord Hartington* afterwards Duke of Devonshire (1883-1908)* began his 
political career as a Liberal* and soon rose to prominence* Returned to 
parliament first at the age of twenty-four* he w^i Under-JBeoretary for War 
under Palmerston when he was hardly thirty* Three years later he got his 
first Cabinet post under Lord John Russell* In Gladstone’s first government 
he was Postmaster-General* When in I875 it appeared for a time that 
Gladstone had really retired from the leadership of the Liberal party* 
Hartington was chosen to sucoeed him* But Gladstone re-emerged in active 
politics* and in his government of 1880 Hartington became the Secretary of 
£tate for India* Hartington later on broke with Gladstone and Liberal party 
on the question of Home Rule for Ireland* (DUB)
S ' I
On his transfer to the War Office at the end of 1882, Hartington urged 
upon Ripon a polioy of "wait and see” • The experiment of extended local 
s elf-government was "quite the right end at which to begin." This should 
be tried cautiously and developed gradually* Perhaps, the principle of 
self-government inherent in many Indian village institutions would help 
this trial. But to give the people an effective voioe in the legislative 
functions of the government by introducing "an independent native element" 
in the councils, "would be absolutely novel and alien" to their ideas. 
Besides, once such an innovation was made, it would not be easy to retrace 
steps if it did not work well. Hartington did not think that the time had 
yet arrived for such a venture to be undertaken with safety. He advised 
Ripon, however, that the practical advantages of elective principle might 
be secured "by a freer and more careful use of the power of nominating 
intelligent and representative Native members. Did not he thus indicate, 
perhaps rather vaguely, the desirability of some sort of representation, 
may be not in the popular senset
♦
The new secretary of state, Kimberley, informed Ripon that he was
2
"decidedly adverse to the proposed reform". So Riponvs ideas in this 
matter came to naught.
I. Ibid.
2* Ibid, - Addl. Mss. h357h* tQ (Kimberley to Ripon dated ll|..2.1883)
♦ Lord Kimberley (1826-1902) s Belonging to^Whig family, Kimberley 
entered active polltios early in life. He served various Liberal governments, 
and was one of the party1 s leading men. Holding office first as Under­
secretary of Foreign Ministry under Aberdeen and Palmerston, he was raised 
to the Cabinet rank by Gladstone in his first government, when he became 
Lord Privy Seal. Hie was Colonial Secretary afterwards: during his tenure 
Cape Colony was granted full responsible government, and the Boers complete 
self-government on aooepting British suzerainty. He was thrice seoretary of 
state for India, - from December 1882 to June 1883* from February to 
August 1886, and again in the last Gladstone government from 1892 to
189U* (dnb)
♦
His successor* Dufferin, in a letter dated 26th April, 1886, to 
Kimberley referred to the popular agitation -which was assuming every day 
"more distinct and legitimate proportions1* * He did not consider it safe to 
allow the continuance of such agitation in India* He favoured a careful 
examination of the different demands and proposals, most of which were
"neither very dangerous nor very extravagant1*, and counselled "to give
a.
quickly and with^good grace whatever it may be possible or desirable to
accord; to announce that these concessions must be accepted as a final
settlement of the Indian system for the next ten or fifteen years; and to
I
forbid mass meetings and incendiary speechifying•"
Dufferin acknowledged that the "most vital and important" of popular
demands was the change in the legislative councils —  "a large admixture of
elected natives" • To this demand he was inclined to respond with sympathy*
With more education, a desire for larger share in the management of domestic
affairs was "a legitimate and reasonable aspiration” for the people* He
felt that Improvement was possible in this direction, and said that
"personally I should feel it both a relief and an assistance if in the 
settlement of many Indian administrative questions****I could rely to a 
larger extent than at present upon the experience and counsels of Indian 
coadjutors*" Be explained that the loyal co-operation of many able and
I • Kimber ley
+ Lord Dufferin (1826-1902) was a Liberal in politics* Quite early in his 
twenties, he held under Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen posts in the 
Court* After a brief spell of successful diplom&tie assignment, in 1861+ he 
was appointed by Palmerston as the Under-Secretary of JBtate for India* 
Gladstone made him Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1868* In 1872 he 
went to Canada an governor-general: during his tenure there he introduced 
ballot system# of elections to the Canadian House of Commons* On return 
from Canada he became British ambassador first in Russia and then in Turkey* 
After the unsuccessful rebellion of Arabi Bey against the Egyptian King in 
188?, he was sent by Gladstone to Egypt for re-organising the Egyptian 
administration* His liberalism asserted itself in this task; he advocated 
a policy "of representative institutions, of municipal and communal self- 
government, of a political existence untrammelled by external importunity*" 
Legislative councils and Assemblies were created* He succeeded Lord Ripon 
as Viceroy of India in 18814.* (DNB)
rr
sensible Indians oould be counted upon* Such support from Indian members 
would assure the legislative enactments more popular reception* and would 
minimise in public eyes tbs despotic authority of the executive**
Dufferin was not* however* without doubts* Be discerned in most 
demands for reforms a concealed desire for internal autonomy which would 
ultimately give the leaders* protected by the British army against 
external invasion and usurpation by native princes* "free scope to 
administer their domestic affairs untrammelled by the interference of white 
men*" Ee feared that moderate Indian leaders might lose ground rapidly to 
more violent and extremist politicians* The latter* once invited to 
legislative councils* might prove more an impediment than an assistance* 
Dufferin feared that increased native membership might mean greater hindrance 
to the governments the new members might "instinctively" oppose the govern­
ment on matters of Imperial interests* The government would then* with 
larger native element in legislative councils* be obliged "to fight against 
a heavier dead weight of native opposition" • Besides* the native members
might be guided by olass interests and would most likely be too timid to
2
support any cause in open defiance of the native press*
In spite of these doubts Dufferin did not advise against all change*
On the contrary* he recommended an "experiment of liberalizing, if not the
supreme* at least the subordinate legislative councils*" He hoped that
this might be done without unduly compromising the Imperial supremacy of 
3
the government*
Both Ripon and Dufferin were thus aware of a change in the Indian 
situation; both of thamwere also in sympathy with the spirit, though not 
the letter* of the popular aspirations • Dufferin took tbs next step to 
formulate what seemed at that time a reasonable measure of reform* Under
I* 2* 3* - Ibid*
M s  instructions a scheme mis prepared by the Homo Secretary to the
I
government of India, A #P #MacDonne11 •
HacDonnel^s proposals related to the provinces only# He suggested 
a chamber of two orders in which the non-officials would number two-fifths# 
They would be appointed by means of both nomination and election# He 
proposed to allow the Maharajas, Rajas and Nawabs, holding titles recognized 
by the government, to elect from their own rank the members of the first 
order# The proportion of Moslems to Hindus was to be determined by the 
relative strength of the population of these two classes, exoept in those 
provinces in which, owing to the great preponderance of Hindus (Madras and 
North-West provinces and Oudh), a subsidiary system of nomination would be 
required to ensure the proper representation of minorities# MaoDonnell 
proposed to regulate the proportion of Hindu and Moslem members in the 
second order upon the same principle# Representation of minor communities 
was also provided for# The eleotoral body for the second order was to be 
a college or a committee of moderate size selected by the combined 
municipal and district boards of each constituency# He thought of fcrming 
"/the constituencies by dividing each province into ethnical areas; should 
this prove impossible, he would utilise the existing large administrative 
divisions# The municipal and district boards of each district were to 
select two or more electors, who would assemble at the headquarters of the 
constituency to elect either (a) members of the councils or (b) eligible 
candidates from among whom the government would select the members, the
I# Kimberley * (Lansdownefs Note dated 16#6 #1892, attached to Ms 
letter dated 23#8#1692). MacDonnell was afterwards Lt#-governor of 
North-West Provinces# Subsequently, he was created a Baron#
S'7
proportion of Hindus and Moslems being regulated in each case according 
to the population of these two olasses either in the province generally 
or in the particular constituency• MaoDonnell's schema further envisaged 
constituencies from large cities and the universities* He deprecated 
presort to self-constituted association not formed by law, for selection 
of members.
On 20th September 1868 Dufferin expressed to his exeoutive council
in considerable detail his views as to the "desirability of reconstructing
the provincial councils upon a broader basis, and of enlarging their 
2
fuhotions"* The council seemed to be unanimously with him in considering
that the time had arrived for such a change* On the following day
Dufferin directed three members of the executive council —  General Chesney,
Sir Charles Aitohison and J.Westland —  to form themselves into a committee
for the purpose of giving practical effect to a scheme of reform* The
governor-general's legislative council was not within their terms of
reference. Dufferin forwarded HlaoDonnell's scheme to this committee and
recommended the committee to make use of his services* MacDonnell was
appointed their secretary*
** ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
The committee signed their report on 10th October 1888. They 
asserted incidentally that the proposals regarding the provincial councils 
did not involve in principle any suggestion regarding the governor-general1 s 
council* They would in any oase prefer to await the result of the changes 
suggested for provincial councils before considering any alteration in the 
supreme council* As Sir Charles Aitchison pointed out elsewhere, the
I. Ibid*
2* Public Letters from India, 1888, vol*9, pl!89«
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Imperial legislative council should be placed beyond the rides of these
experiments* which might turn out to be undesirable* Once an innovation
was made in the Imperial council* it would be irrevocable* Further* the
question of reform of the provincial councils was closely linked with
the issue of decentralization* If all the power was concentrated in the
hands of the seoretary of state and government of India* what purpose
were the local councils to fulfil? Surely they must have a sphere of
their own within which "their influence could be felt and their opinion
will be potent in the settlement of affairs•" He did not* however*
foresee anything like parliamentary government* The councils were to be
y less parliamentary bodies than "consultative bodies to help government
with ftdvioe and suggestion*"
The committee did not think that the time had yet arrived for
constituting a legislative oouncll for the Punjab* As to the council of
North-West provinces and Oudh* which had come into being very recently,
they did not advocate any enlargement of its powers* and preferred to
await the vievgof the provincial government* They recommended the reform
of the legislative councils of Kadras* Bombay and Bengal* In doing this*
they eschewed untried changes and radical innovations* They made plain
their desire to proceed by developing established methods* "to build
2
higher on the old lines"•
They accepted in the main the structure suggested by MaoDonnell
I* Mont&gu-Che 1msford report, para 66 
2* Public Letters from India* 1888* vol*9* p 1175
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for the constitution of the legislative councils* Thus they declared 
in favour of a counoil "which shall consist of two Divisions", organized 
with reference to the classes of their non-official members* Bub in 
doing so great emphasis was placed on the representation of different 
important interests* The committee enumerated four broad divisions of 
interests deserving representation:- "(a) the interests of the hereditary 
nobility and landed classes, who have a great permanent stake in the 
country; (b) the interests of the trading, professional and agricultural
V
classes; (o) the interests of the planting and commercial European
I
community, and (d) the interests of stable and effective administration" •
This recommendation of representation of interests deserves more than a
passing notice* This principle, as opposed to representation based on
population, was destined to become the corner stone in the structure of
representative institutions in the government of the country*
The hereditary nobility and the landed classes were regarded eligible
for access to legislative councils Independent of popular election* The
committee considered it necessary especially because the interests of
these classes were "not always coincident with those of other classes",
2
and as such should have means of independent expression* They would be 
represented in the First Division of the council* A& indication of the 
committee's idea about the status of the landed proprietors can be had 
from their recommendation that in Bengal the right to vote should be given 
to those paying a minimum revenue of Rs« 5^,000 to the government* They 
also suggested that the Chiefs of native states in political subordination 
to provincial governments should be afforded opportunity to sit in this 
Division*
Lo
The trading, professional and agricultural interests which the
committee considered to be the npopular element in the community”,
along with the interests of planting and commercial European community,
and the minorities would be represented in the Second Division of the
I
council# Officials would sit in both the Divisions#
The method of representation of the various interests differed
widely# For the hereditary nobility and the landed classes was prescribed,
in view of their community of Interests and smallness of number, direct
election from among their own class of their representatives#
The case was different with the Second Division# The members of the
committee were "fully aware that in India at present there can be no such
2
thing as popular representation as understood in Western countries”, and 
yet thought it desirable, in certain oases at le^st, not to rely solely 
on nomination# So they advocated an approximation to the principle of 
popular election in selecting representatives of the trading, professional 
and agricultural olasses# The other non-offioial interests including the 
minorities were adjudged capable of due representation only by mefps of 
nomination.
The officials would, of course, all be nominated#
It is worthwhile to examine the suggested Approximation1 to elective 
principles# Each province was to be divided into a convenient number of 
electoral circles, largely based on existing fiscal or administrative 
divisions, which might in their turn be grouped on ethnic or linguistic 
considerations# The metropolitan city and the university might each be 
treated as such a circle if thought expedient# The electors should t/ 
be the members of the municipal committees, and local and district boards
1. Ibid, pll76
2, Ibid#
uas by law established* In the universities, votes would be conferred on
the Senate and the degree-holders* The committee attaohed special
importance to their proposal of conferring voting rights only on members
of bodies established by law* For, "no Associations, even though they be
stable and permanent, oan form a safe basis for the electoral system
unless their constitution is prescribed, and their functions and
I
responsibilities determined by law*tt They also attached some significance
to the application, though inadequate, of elective principle in the
constitution of these bodies* But imperfect though this application was,
"in our opinion, it is only by making use of it in the way proposed that
any approach to a practicable elective system can be made in this 
2
connection" •
A candidate for election to the Second Division was required to 
possess a clear annual income of not less than £a* 5,000 and should 
reside or own immovable property of like annual value in the electoral 
circle from which he sought election* A lower financial eligibility
3
was considered undesirable* .
Another important aspect stressed was the respective representation
of Hindus and Moslems* Both these communities must have due
representation in each Division* In both places the ratio of members
belonging to the respective communities should be as advocated by 
+
MacDonnell* This was sought to be ensured by requiring the government, 
for the First Division, to prescribe, if necessary, the proportion of
I. Ibid, ppll77-1178 
2* Ibid, p 1178
3* Ibid, p 1179; also see p II87 
+ see above,^
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members to be elected from these two communities, and in the Seoond
Bivision to resort to nomination to remedy any marked inequality in
the results of election*
The size of the enlarged councils was left to be decided on the
advice of local governments* Counoils of moderate size would be
preferred: one-third of members should belong to the First Bivision,
and in each Division not less than two-fifths should be elected*
As to the official strength, in each Division as also in the
council as a whole the officials should be in a majority* But the
report admitted the desirability of working the councils ordinarily
without the presence of all the official members* Some of the officers
would attend only on oooasions of more than ordinary importance* The
government’s supremacy must be put beyond doubt, if challenged* "It is
of the essence of the case that the government should be able to command
a majority, and we therefore consider that it should have the power of
securing this, by calling to its aid a sufficient number of official members
when the necessity arises*" Not satisfied with this, the executive
supremacy was guaranteed by arming the local government with powers "to
overrule the council and to adopt, suspend or reject any executive
I
measure notwithstanding the vote of a majority of oounciln* This 
insistence on official majority was in accord with the nature of the 
legislative councils which were conceived as purely advisory and 
consultative bodies, without detracting in any way from.tjie supreme 
authority of the executive*
I. Ibid, piI81
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Coming to the functions of the reformed legislative counoi Is, the
J committee classified them into legislative and consultative* No change
was thought necessary for legislative functions and procedure* In
regard to the consultative functions, the councils might be given tbe
right of initiating advice and suggestion, and of asking questions., on
any subject connected with the internal civil administration of the
province, excepting those excluded from their cognizance by section h3
-+
of the Indian Counoils Act, 1861* They would also be entitled to call
for and, unless prevented by reasons of state, be supplied with papers
on subjects within their competence* Besides, the governor or the
Lt*governor might in writing require their advice on any subject, even
including those under section U3t latter case, however, the
sanction of the governor-general in council must be obtained before the
I
requirement is so made*
In the domain of financial powers, the financial statement of the
local government was to be submitted annually to the council* Tbe
committee desired to give the local councils na real control and a real
responsibility” in certain matters relating to local finance* The local
government "should endeavour to confine its control and direction of the
council's proceedings to the broader questions of policy, and to the
2
assurance of general financial stability”• To achieve this end, the
* These were: public debt; custom duties and taxes; coins and currency; 
posts and telegraphs; the Indian Penal Code; religion and religious rites 
and usages; patents and oopyright; discipline and maintenance of army 
and navy; and relations with foreign princes or states*
I. Ibid. pII8I 
2* Ibid. pll82
committee recommended the division of the provincial budget into two
categories* One would be oonoerned with needs of general administration,
whereas the seoond would relate to sohools, hospitals, sanitation, roads
and communications etc. It is over this second category of subjects that
the provincial councils would exercise a real control* The first would
not be plaeed under them to the same extent, though the members would be
*■
free to discuss them and make suggestions*
With regard to the council9s procedure, the members9 requests for
ashing questions, suggesting amendments to finanoial proposals,
initiating debate and discussion on administrative or finanoial matters
etc* should be first examined and reported on by standing committees, on
whose advioe the president was to ordinarily proceed* The final decisions
of the council would be submitted in the form of memorandum or address to
the governor or Lt-governor* It was contemplated that the governor or
Ltvgovernor would not ordinarily be present, though possessing the right
to be so, at the meetings of the council exoept when assembled for
I
legislative purposes*
The report of the committee, despite its authors9 protestations 
against any desire to try radical innovations, was nevertheless remarkable 
for certain significant concessions* It admitted that the legislative 
councils needed to be enlarged to ensure adequate representation of all 
important interests* It aooepted that the constitution of the legislative 
councils should be liberalized and, within limits, be based on elective 
principles* Greater initiative was granted to the councils, which also 
gained two powerful parliamentary privileges —  rights of putting 
questions and examining finanoial proposals* In advocating some amount
I. Ibid, pIX83
+ of* Sir Charles Aitohison9s views* /V
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of real control over a part of the local finances* the committee -went 
far indeed. Hot only was this more advanced* as we shall see* than any 
subsequent official proposal* but very few of the non-officials went as 
far.
But the report did not detract from the full executive control of the
administration* nor from the official supremacy in legislative councils*
Besides* the provision of separate representation for the nobility* and
the emphasis on communities and interests introduced elements markedly
"'consistent with the disavowal of popular representation as understood
*
in western countries* • for India* Even then, taking the entire report* 
it must be admitted that it contained a substantial measure of reform.
Dufferin* 3 views* as embodied in the MacDonnell scheme* evidently 
exercised a deciding influence over the committee's findings* In their
I
report the committee thanked MacDonnell for "many valuable suggestions".
It may not be rjtash to suppose that he as the secretary of the committee
had an important hand in drawing up the actual recommendations.
It is interesting to note that the committee at the same time
urged$ in a separate report* the curbing of "libel and seditious
propagandism." They expressed concern at the "growing license of the
newspaper press”* which might prove disastrous among an ignorant and
2
credulous population. The reform of the councils would afford an 
adequate scope for the expression of public opinion on government 
measures and policies. This provided additional justification for 
bringing the press under effective restraint. They thought that "the
* see above (((?o
I. Ibid* pH83 
2* Ibid* p 1215
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liberalization of our institutions for Local Government would go hand in
hand with the provision of safeguards against the propagandism of 
I
disorder •" The authorities should be enabled to suppress seditious
propaganda and punish libel against the government and the officials*
They thus foreshadowed* rather remarkably* the government policy in
later years —  particularly at the time of J&nto and Morley —  which,
as we shall see afterwards* aimed simultaneously at concessions to
public demands and suppression of disorder and seditious agitation*
** a* ee ee ee ee ee ee
On completion of the labour of the committee of his executive 
council, the governor-general wrote & minute, in November 1888* explaining 
his stand upon reforms* In it he confined himself to the general 
considerations which* in his view* should guide the policy of the 
government in this respect*
Dufferin dealt with the difficulties in -the situation* India* with 
its large area* had a numerous population as marked for diversity in 
race* religion and language as for widely fluctuating stages of civilization, 
and consequently varied political Ideals and fitness* The government had 
to provide for the safety and welfare of all these people* The complexity 
of the task was not lessened by the necessity of looking after the 
European planting and manufacturing interests* scattered all over the 
country* and of watching over the enormous commercial interests of England* 
represented by an investment worth £220 million* in India* Besides* 
there were the problems of defence and external obligations* involving 
a land frontier of 6000 miles and seaboard of 9000 miles* From amidst
I Ibid, p 1217
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this Indian "cosmos” emerged the patent characteristic of the situation*
—  co-existence of two mighty political communities, 190 million Hindus
and ^0 million Moslems, whom Dufferin considered "as distant from each
other as are the poles asunder” in their religions, antecedents and
I 2
natural aptitudes* Henoe was the need to proceed "warily and wisely"*
It was impossible to relax the hold of British authority over India*
Any parliamentary government based on English constitutional system could
not be thought of so long as India remained under -the British Crown*
y "India is an integral portion, and it may be said one of the most
3
important portions, of the mighty British Empire." Be therefore denied 
^hat by enlarging and liberalizing tbe provincial councils it was intended 
to depart from the real basis of administration in India* He maintained 
most emphatically that the recommendations of the committee of his executive 
council did not introduce any essential alteration in that which already 
existed; they were "not taking a new departure, or starting upon fresh
h
lines, or revolutionizing the constitution," of the councils* That was 
the justification and explanation of retaining official supremacy in the 
oounoils as also a veto for the executive to overrule the council* It 
was essential to leave with each provincial government "the ultimate 
decision upon all important questions,and the paramount control of its
5
own policy*"
Why, then, did he advocate any change at all? Because he viewed
M
with feelings of "approval and good will" "the natural ambition of some 
Indians "to be more extensively associated with their English rulers in
I. Public Letters from India, 1888* ^
2* Ibid, p 1192 
3* Ibid, p 1193 
ij.* Ibid, p 1202 
5* Ibid, p 119k
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the administration of their own domsstio affairs.*1 Dnfferin saw no 
reason why the government should not desire to ”&ssooiate with themselves 
in eounoil in very considerable numbers such of the natives of India as 
may be enabled by their acquirements, experience and ability to assist 
and enlighten” the government in the discharge of their difficult duties. 
Representation was impossible to obtain in Indian conditions* The 
government only hoped to contact a larger surface of public opinion by 
associating with the administration ”a considerable number of persons
3
selected and elected from the educated classes.”
It would appear from this that Dufferin considered the personal 
ability and fitness of individuals to be the sole criterion of their 
incorporation in the legislative machinery. This, however, hardly fitted 
in with the detailed provisions for representation of different interests. 
Even in this minute, he spoke of the prospective members as ”the legally 
constituted representatives of various interests and classes.” He dilated 
upon their responsibility ”to enlightened and increasing sections of their
k
own countrymen". It is difficult, therefore, to avoid concluding that 
Dufferin was actuated by ideals other than of individual competence alone.
The reforms would enable the government to have ”a far more distinct 
knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the communities.” This would not 
fail to influence the executive immensely in formulating or modifying 
their course. As "acknowledged representatives of legally constituted 
bodies, or chosen from amongst influential classes”, the Indian members 
would receive more careful and respectful hearing from the Indian press
5
and their fellow countrymen. Their openly expressed views would wield a
1. Ibid, p. 1189 U* Ibid, p,119l*
2. Ibid, p.1191* 5. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p.l2C£
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more ready support. There was no doubt, ha thought, that an adequate 
number of able Indians would be forthcoming to carry into effect the 
reform proposals. The spread of education during the last twenty years 
had equipped many a native for such task*
But Dufferin was not slow to warn everybody against excessive 
enthusiasm over the situation* which might consider the concessions less 
than warranted, and might press for more far-reaching changes* Though 
the limits of education had widened, it was yet too restricted* In a 
population of two hundred million, literates were hardly more than five 
or six per cent; less than one per cent had any knowledge of English* 
Since the inauguration of Indian universities in 1857* less than eight 
thousand persons graduated* The vast majority of the population was 
steeped in the grossest ignorance* There were consequently only a few 
thousand Indians capable by reason of training and education to 
intelligently appreciate the requirements of purely local public affairs, 
not to speak of larger problems that were presented day to day in the 
administration of the country* All schemes of reform would have to be 
worked with this relatively small class of people* But they did not
J
stand for, or represent the interests of, the people of India* The 
people of India were the “voiceless millions” to guard whose interests 
was the foremost duty of the government* He, therefore, considered it
\ i n
 ^ impracticable, under the oircumstanoes, to extend to this infinitesimal
and only partially qualified fraction of the people of India anything
beyond the consultative, critical and suggestive powers" which were being 
I
recommended*
I. Ibid, pp*1195-1196
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Ge was conscious that a section of the educated class had been
crying themselves hoarse over demands fcr more extensive reforms* Th^ r
included the followers of the National Congress. These persons did nob
stand for the people of India* They thought in terms of their own class
interest —  the small educated class —  which was all important to them*
They spoke only for themselves, —  neither for the aristocratic sections
of the Indian society, nor for the great masses of the people with whom
they had but little contact or sympathy* Nor were they fitted except
very imperfectly "to grasp any of the larger questions which affect the
stability or *^3 safety of the Empire as a whole* To hand over, therefore,
the government of India either partially or otherwise to such a body as
this would simply be to place millions of men, dozens of nationalities,
and hundreds of the most stupendous interests under the domination of a
 ^ microscopic minority, possessing neither experience, administrative
ability, nor any adequate conception of the nature of the tasks before 
I
them*"
Such were the leading considerations which guided Dufferin* It may 
be noted that while emphasizing the division of Indians on basis of race, 
religion and language in this minute, —  simultaneously endorsing in the 
recommendations of the Chesney committee the division of the people on 
occupational and propertied interests —  he introduce4 yet another 
division, the eduoated and the illiterate* In his analysis no less 
significance^*#/ lent to this division* This only reveals how the 
authorities felt themselves overwhelmed by the cross-currents of the 
Indian population, and how, perhaps, on important oooasions they held
I. Ibid, p.1198
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themselves back in cautious estimation of rival interests among the 
population* This assists us again and again, as we shall see, in 
understanding why the reforms stopped where they did, and did not go 
farther •
In his minute, however, Dufferin took up two further points not 
related to provinoial councils nofc dealt with by the Chesney committee*
The first was the mode of handling the annual budget by the government 
of India* Though at one with the Chesney committee that *tfhe changes 
suggested for provinoial councils should not extend to governor-generalfs 
legislative council, Dufferin desired an amendment of the existing 
prooedure* He considered it Very useful and desirable” that there should 
be a yearly financial discussion in the governor-general’s legislative 
oouncil, irrespective of the requirements of fresh legislation* It was 
farthest from his intention to seek the council’s approval of the 
financial proposals, or to submit for examination in detail the different 
heads of expenditure* What he wanted was that “an opportunity should be 
given for a full, free and thorough criticism and examination of 
financial policy of the government” • This would benefit the Indian 
administration by enabling open and informed criticism of government polioy, 
and doing away with the prevailing uninformed “misapprehension and mis­
representation” regarding financial estimates* The government would 
stand to gain in reputation: annual discussion would also be “conducive
to the improvement” of their financial polioy* Besides, this would meet 
the wishes of the European and Indian mercantile bodies* In recommending
this change of procedure, he made known thqt the Finance Member of the
I
government of India, Westland, fully shared his views*
Tl ibid, p*lk!oi V  of* views of Chambers of Commerce, Chapter !♦
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The second change contemplated was the advisability of allowing
questions in the supreme legislative council# He referred to the
malicious misrepresentation of government's intentions indulged in by
a section of the press "bent upon holding up English Rule to the hatred
and oontempt of the people•" Sometimes wrong or exaggerated accounts of
events were given to work up a state of excitement and alarm, which
undermined the loyalty of the public and gave rise to a feeling of
discontent# In the existing circumstances, the government had no means
of controlling these mischievous practices# "it has no adequate medium
through which it can explain its policy, correct a wrong impression, or
controvert a false statement# •••" Dufferin, therefore, recommended -that
under oertain restrictions, the members of the governor-general's
legislative oounoil should be permitted to ask questions on current
matters of domestic, as distinguished from those of imperial, interests#
It would afford the opportunity of communicating exact facts in regard
to matters under question, to the great advantage of the government, and
would also be a source of satisfaction to all the members of the council
I
and the public at large#
In concluding Dufferin mentioned that the views of the provinoial 
governments would have to be obtained on these important recommendations, 
and that their opinion would require to be most oarefully weighed and 
considered#
Dufferin's minute and the Chesney committee's report were forwarded
by the government of India to the secretary of state on 6th November, 1888#
* '
In doing so, they expressed their general concurrence wiih the 
| recommendations of the committee#
I •)(■ x '*
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| I. Ibid, pp#1201-120e#
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Soori after this Dufferin relinquished the reins of the government
of India* The question of reform engaged the attention of his successor* 
♦
Lansdowne. Be too m s  convinced that some change in prooedure was 
necessary* and declared in his legislative counoil on 29th likrch, 1689, 
that f,the opportunities aocorded to the Legislative Council for passing 
tinder review the financial situation of the country should occur with 
regularity* and should not depend* as they depend at present* upon what 
is after all a mere accident, —  I mean the necessity of financial 
legislation in any particular year#n Be was also in favour of permitting* 
under proper safeguards* the members of council to address questions to 
the government* In this speech Lansdowne confined his remarks to the 
supreme council* He informed the council that the secretary of state*
* i
Cross* had given his “cordial adhesion” to these proposed changes* No 
mention was made of the recommendations concerning provinoial oounoils*
I* Pari.Papers, 1890* c5950*
♦ Lord Lansdowne (181*5-1927) - Coming from a family of long-standing Whig 
traditions* Lansdowne had many friends in the inner councils of the Liberal 
party* He held under Gladstone several minor posts* and was appointed 
Under-Secretary of State for India in 1880* He broke with the Liberal 
party and resigned his office the same year on Irish questions* An Irish 
landlord* Lansdowne could not approve of Gladstone’s Irish policy, which he 
opposed in the House of Lords* Gladstone offered him governor-generaldiip 
of Canada! he held that post from I883 to 1888* He was offered governor- 
generalship of India by Lord Salisbury* whose earlier offer of a place in 
the Conservative ministry he had declined* (DNB)
* Lord Cross (I823-I91W  - Richard Assheton Cross* afterwards first 
Viscount Cross* started his career at the Bar where he was soon a success* 
Later on, on the death of his father-in-law who was a Banker, he took to 
Banking, where too he rose high* A Conservative from early life, he did 
not take to active polities keenly till he was in his forties* though he 
had already sat in the Commons for a few years* Cross had sensational 
success in the elections of 1868 when he entered the House of Commons by 
defeating Gladstone* Disraeli made him secretary of state for Home in
1 though he had not held any minor post previously* He had some social 
reforms at his credit while at Home Office* He was appointed secretary of 
state for India in 1886* when he was raised to the peerage* (DNB)
Ilf
Shortly afterwards, the government of India furnished the secretary
of state with their views as to the extent to which these privileges
I
could be conceded. At one with Buffering recommendations they held
that the right of examining financial proposals should be confined to
discussion and criticism only. They made it clear that it would be
impossible to reconstruct or amend their budget in consequenoe of
criticism, and as such were loath to encourage any division of the council
in this connection. This would serve no useful purpose and would only
emphasize the standing official majority# Nor would they allow any motion
or resolution on any budget proposal. The only advantages anticipated
from the discussion were the exposure of unpopular features in the
budget, the opportunity afforded to the administration to offer explanation
and the benefit of suggestions for future guidanoe#
As to questions, however, the government of India were now ready to
go a stage farther than Dufferin. Whereas Dufferin had welcomed questions
on current matters of domestic as distinguished from imperial interests,
the government of India would now favour a larger measure of liberty.
They thought that occasions might arise when it would be extremely 
2
desirable1 in the Interests of the government that questions should be
asked on subject^. ordinarily enumerated as beyond the scope of domestio
interests, and thereby afford the government an opportunity for publio
exposition of the matter.
They recommended that both these privileges should be extended to the
provincial councils as well. They were further of opinion that these rights
should be seoured by legislation, and advised simultaneous legislation to
confer them on the supreme and provinoial legislative councils.
I* Par 1 .Pagers, 1890, c595^ (The Govt, of India letter no .tub lie 35* dated
2. Ibid, para.8.
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All these recommendations had a varied reception in the India
Office. The secretary of state and his council did not favourably
receive the elaborate proposals of Dufferin and his executive council*
The Judicial and Pub lie committee of India Counoil recorded their opinion
that it would at present be "impossible to devise any practicable scheme
I
of representation by an eleotive system*1 They thought that the 
principle of representation could be given effect only through a system 
of nomination* The local bodies* in whose constitution election had 
been introduced only recently, were not as yet peculiarly fit for the
\j
proposed hazardous experiment* Such an experiment would only expose the
municipal and local boards to the danger of political manoeuvres based
on motives other than of effioient discharge of their proper functions*
The committee, therefore, found themselves unable to recommend any
method other thah nomination by the head of the government. The
Judicial and Publie committee's views were approved by India Council in
2
a meeting on JOth July, 1889, without any did sent*
In his despatch to the government of India —  Ho .80 dated 1st August, 
1889 —  the secretary of state reaffirmed the views of his Judicial and 
Public committee* The principle of election in local bodies had "not yet 
J passed so far beyond the experimental stage as to Justify at present any
3
further advance in that direction*” He further thought that the findings 
of the Chesney committee had been affected by the impending departure of 
Dufferin, and that this fact had influenced the executive counoil in
I* Kimberley (Lansdowne's Note, attached to his letter dated 23*8*1892)
2. India Council; Minutes, vol*63*
3* Public Despatches to India, 1889, vol.10, p*332*
The Judicial and Public committee then consisted of: Sir C.Turner, Sir 
John Strachey, Sir C»T.Burne, Sir J*Peile, and Sir A*C*lyall*
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endorsing the recommendations• This explained their inability to
furnish "complete and matured conclusions upon the details contained in
I
the report of the Committee"* Besides, the ^provincial governments had 
not been consulted, though fundamental changes had been proposed in their 
executive and legislative constitution* There was thus need for "further 
consultation and discussion in India*" Having admitted this scope of 
further examination, the seoretary of state took a sudden jump to an 
absolute and definite rejection of the elective system* Be characterised 
the system as "unfamiliar to oriental ideas" and "foreign to their 
administrative institutions"* He considered the introduction of such a
fundamental change unwise* Consequently, he would not even undertake any
2
detailed examination of the scheme*
Other aspects of the reform had a more sympathetic reception at
J
Whitehall* At a meeting on 1st August, 1889, presided over by Cross, 
the India Council approved by six to one —  four members including the 
secretary of state abstaining from voting —  the proposals for annual
3
financial discussion and asking of questions. They also decided to 
increase the number of additional members in the several councils* A 
draft bill which had been drawn up covering these measures was directed 
to be sent for the consideration of the government of India, The 
Secretary of state's despatch to India the same day conveyed this decision, 
and invited comments on the draft bill* It is worth noticing that in 
proposing to increase the number of additional members in several councils, 
the secretary of state included the supreme council as well, which had
1. Ibid, p.331
2. Ibid, p*332
3* India Counoil Minutes, vol*63 (^ he opposing member was Sir John Strachey)
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hitherto been left alone* In affirming that the time had come for
larger and more varied representation of public opinion he reiterated^
however, that na simple extension of the existing system” would enlarge
the oirole of selection by increasing the number of nominations to the 
I
councils*
2
The draft bill provided for the nomination of additional members 
for a term of two years in the various councils as belows-
Counoil Not less than Not more than
Governor-Generals 10 16
Madras 8 20
Bombay 8 20
Bengal • 20
North-West provinces
and Oudh - 15
The bill authorised the governor-general in council, the governors 
in council and the Lt*-governors o oncer nod to make rules permitting the 
discussions of annual financial statement in the respective councils, and 
the asking of questions, under such conditions and restrictions as to 
subject and otherwise, as might be laid down in the same rules* The rules 
framed by the local governments would have to be sanctioned by the governor- 
general in council, and those framed by the latter would require the 
sanction of secretary of state in council*
It also contained a clause, —  No.3 —  enabling a provincial 
legislature, with the previous sanction of the governor-general, to repeal 
or amend as to that province any law or regulation passed by any authority 
other than the local legislature concerned*
The bill defined ’local legislature’ as "(i) the Governor in Council 
of the respective provinces of Fort St.George and Bombay; and (ii) the
1, Public Depsatohes to India, 1889, vol*10, p.356 (Despatch No#81, dated 
1.8.1889)
2. I.P.P., September 1889, No.35!
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Lt.-Governor of any province to which the provision of the Indian
Councils Act, 1861, touching the making of laws or regulations have been
or are hereafter extended or made applicable,” thus underlining the
I
executive authority over legislation.
A saving olause declared that nothing in it would detract from or
diminish the powers of the governor-general in council at meetings for
the purpose of making laws and regulations.
** ** a* ** *# ** ** ** **
On receiving the draft bill, the government of India circulated it
to the different provincial governments for their opinion. The government
2
of Madras approved the draft bill without any comment. The government 
of Worth-West province and Oudh likewise concurred in the provisions of
3
the bi 11 •
k
The Bengal government's reply admitted that an increase in the number 
of members would lead to greater efficiency of the local council. The 
Lt.-governor —  Sir Steuart Bayley —  was, however, of opinion that the 
increase provided for his council was inadequate. He estimated that the 
number of official members of the council would have to be about fifteen 
to cope with the enhanoed official duties in consequence of the new 
privileges adumbrated. The non-official interests deserving representation 
would require at least twelve members, if not more. Thus the total would 
exceed the maximum fixed by the bill far Bengal, which might therefore be 
raised to thirty.
Regarding questions, it was suggested that restrictions as to their
1. cl .6.
2. I .P.P., January I89O, No .1+1
3. Ibid, No.50
1+. Ibid, No*1+7 (Bengal government letter no.l!2-J-D dated 16.10.1889)
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subject or otherwise should not be left to be determined by the looal 
governments* A large and influential seotion of the people would resent 
all restrictions, of whatever nature, utilising them for fault-finding 
with these governments* The governments would be aecused of intentionally 
narrowing and reducing the privileges which parliament intended to bestow* 
It was therefore necessary that the nature of the restrictions contemplated 
should, if not mentioned in the bill, be explained while piloting the 
bill through parliament* This would save the local governments a lot of 
complication afterwards*
It was also urged that questioning on matters still, or until recently, 
under discussion between the local and central governments should be 
prohibited, except without the previous consent of the superior authority* 
It should not be left to the discretion of the president of the council 
to allow questions on such matters* The reason why this suggestion was 
made /seems to be an anxiety on the part of the looal government to prevent 
disclosure of the nature, extent and cause of any difference between 
the two governments*
The Lt*-governor of Bengal had still further recommendations to 
limit the right of questioning* Be argued that though questions would be 
answered by officials in the oouncil, the responsibility for governmental 
aotion lay with the head of the province* Be would not allow answers to 
travel beyond the limits fixed by the head of the province, and as this 
would be difficult if answers were followed up by further questions* 
the right of asking questions was sought to be confined to a single 
question and answer*
Regarding the budget discussion, the Bengal government were no mere
8o
enthusiastic* Here doubts rested on the fact that the looal government 
were not the master of their own budget. In reality, the government of 
India controlled provinoial finance by quinquennial contracts• The 
looal governments freedom regarding receipt and expenditure was, 
therefore, restricted to the limits fixed by Provincial Contracts* Such 
being the case, the discussion of the provinoial budget was attended by 
two-fold risks* Under its cover attacks might be made on the government 
of India* Again, provincial governments might be criticised for 
decisions which were really*government of India*s, perhaps forced upon 
a protesting looal government* The government of Bengal, therefore, 
recommended that should the right of discussing the budget be conceded, 
the budget should be divided into two parts* Receipts and expenditure 
under the Provincial Contract should be excluded from the council’s 
consideration* Only those items of revenue, which were within the final 
control of the local government, should be open for discussion by the 
council*
The Bengal government thus hardly welcomed the provisions of the 
bill* T0 the enlarged powers of the legislative council they had 
serious objections* They would be reconciled to them, if at all, only 
in a largely diluted form* Their objections to extended power perhaps 
originated in the situation in Bengal* Here, and in Bombay, criticism 
of the administration was most rife* A section of politicians and 
press —  alike in Bengal and Bombay —  would go further than elsewhere 
in India in denouncing the government and pressing for more radical 
changes* The new powers would enable more effective probing in government’s 
affairs by means of questioning* The budget might be discussed in a fashion
detrimental to the prestige of the government and oalculated to incite
public indignation* This in the context of local polities could hardly
be encouraged by an administration which was unused to open and popular
controversy within the precincts of governmental institutions. It is
noteworthy* however* that the Bengal government not only did demuru
over, but pressed for further, increase of additional members*
If the Bengal government's attitude was not cordial* that of the
Bombay government was openly hostile* They were averse to increasing
the number of members* This* they held* without altering the essential
constitution of the council would only render the conduct of legislative
I
business ttmore troublesome* tedious* costly and uncertain*1 More 
additional members must be offset by a corresponding increase of official 
members* This would mean withdrawal of officials from their usual and 
more important duties* Besides* their presence in a more numerous council 
would seem anomalous* and would expose them to censure and ridicule by 
non-official members* The Bombay government thought that the natural 
bias of non-official members would be towards opposition, and that 
increasingly they would evince popular instincts and tendencies* Thus 
the proposal was unlikely to enhance efficiency, besides being fraught 
with undesirable possibilities* Eence they advooated that the minimum 
number of members should remain unaltered even if the maximum was 
raised* The maximum they would accept was fourteen* In making this 
recommendation the Bombay government's intention was to leave the number 
of additional members usually at the former level* but to add to it, as 
exigency of legislation demanded* a few additional me&bers possessing
I* I*P.P.* January 1890* H0J4B (Bombay government letter Uo.i+588 —  13^
oonfl*dated ££.10.1889# para*2)
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special knowledge of the subject of legislation* With this end in 
view they also sought express power to nominate Chiefs of states 
under the political control of the looal government and also persons 
subject to the authority of such Chiefs*
The government were equally intransigent about the proposed enlarge­
ment of power* The councils were intended to be deliberative bodies for 
purposes of legislation alone* Why then equip them with powers which 
resembled those of more powerful and differently constituted assemblies I 
They apprehended, like the Bengal government, that in discussing the 
budget, one-sided criticism of central government might be indulged in 
and considerable embarrassment might be caused to the local government*
It was even possible that such discussion would be utilised by the 
looal government in their financial controversy with the central 
government* This would only accelerate irresponsible criticism by non­
official members who, devoid of any chance of office, would speak 
increasingly for an outer audience*
Similarly, interpellation was a doubtful advantage* If too closely 
restricted, an occasion would be created for perpetual argument and 
complaints regarding the limitations imposed* If, on the other hand, 
allowed under only slight reservations, no endeavour would be spared to 
discredit the government and excite popular discontent* Besides, 
interpellation need not be resorted to for explaining and publicising 
the government’s views* This could be done by publishing resolutions
and correspondence, "without any servile copying of a procedure adapted
I
only to a true parliamentary system*1
I* Ibid, para*7
? 3
Even after all this consideration, if the extension of these
privileges m s  persisted in* they -would not leave the rules to be
framed by the governor in council* There might be different
interpretations of the term 1 governor in council11 The enlarged
legislative council might claim to frame the rules themselves I They
demanded* therefore* that "the rules should be carefully considered
and definitely prescribed in the Statute itself* They -would thus be
placed beyond the reach of encroachment*carelessness and craving for 
I
popular ity*w
+
The definition of 'local legislature' -was criticized on the
ground of possible confusion in interpreting the term 'governor in
council', which had already acquired a definite and recognised meaning*
*
and should not* therefore* be open to ambiguity* Neither did clause 3 
of the bill earn their approval* It might enable the governor-general* 
with the help of the provincial council, to defeat the legislation of 
his own council for all India*
The opinions of the Bombay government were not shared by the 
governor of the presidency* Reay* He had been overruled by his 
executive council, and did not concur with their opinions* except with 
one about the definition of 'local legislature'* Reay drew up a minute
setting forth his own views on the draft bill*
Before we pass on to Reay's minute, it may be well to note that ihe 
Bombay government were entirely hostile to the reform* They did not 
approve of a single aspect of the reform* and their suggestions only
I* Ibid* para*11
♦ see above p^ 7 7 - 7$
* see above p* 7^
tended to stiffen the not-too-liberal provisions of the draft bill.
The necessity of fuller representation of the different interests and 
communities did not appeal to them* In their intense dislike for the 
move, they concluded that all non-official members would tend to oppose 
the government, —  a conclusion which would not bear examination. The 
only suggestion they made regarding representation of interests —  of 
native chiefs under political subordination and persons under their 
authority —  hardly allowed any possibility of detraction from official 
strength in the oounoils. Their dislike for the Indian politicians and 
their ways is evident. How far this was accentuated by the Congress 
agitation, which had a stronghold in Bombay under the guidance of able 
leaders, must remain, however, a matter for conjecture. Undoubtedly, 
they took only a one-sided view of the picture, which consequently 
lacked balance.
There can be little occasion for surprise that the Bombay governor
I
submitted substantially different views in his minute. Reay was a
Liberal, and could not be expected to fight shy of all proposals to
♦
liberalize the administration.
Reay confessed that in its present strength, the Bombay legislative
I. I.P.P., January 1890, NoJto*
♦ Lord Reay (1839" 1921) * Butch by birth, Reay left Holland in I875 and 
settled in England. He succeeded to the Scottish title of Reay in I876 
and became naturalised in 1877* Be was created a peer of the United 
Kingdom in 1881. His leanings were with the Left: in Holland he had entered 
the Chamber of Representatives in I87I as a member of the Left; in Britain 
he became an ardent supporter of the Liberal Party. Gladstone appointed 
him governor of Bombay in 1885* He was later on Under-Secretary of state 
for India in the Liberal government for fifteen months during 189U-95*
^He presided in 1908 over the departmental committee which led to 
the foundation of the School of Oriental Studies.) (DUB)
r^JZfC^ C ^ UTTa-v
council was not sufficiently representative of all interests concerned*
He enumerated some of these interests? they were the following:-
” (a) the trade of Bombay, Karachi, and Aden, (h) the manufacturing
^interest, (c) the banking interest, (d) the railway interest, (e) the
managers of aided institutions, whether educational or medical, (f) the
owners of lands, (g) the occupiers of land, (h) Native Chiefs and their
subjects, (i) the owners of commodities which are taxed, such as salt-works
I
and toddy trees, (j) the managers of endowments”• Besides these
interests, he would include in the councils the representatives of Sind,
Gujarat, Deccan and of the Kanarese districts, ”as well as of the great
2
towns and of the European, Hindu, Muhamedan and Farsi communities*”
Reay’s manifold classification of interests reveals once again the 
J official repudiation of popular representation, as commonly understood 
in the West, whioh the Congress sought to emulate* Though similar to 
divisions adumbrated by Dufferin and the Chesney committee, Reay* s plan 
was more detailed and covered a wider field* He said that it was not 
at all likely that the representatives of all these various interests 
would combine into a regular and permanent opposition against the 
government: on the contrary, to the authorities would accrue the
advantage of support to government policy by independent non-official 
members* He heartily supported the provision for larger membership of 
the legislative council, and declared that the suggested increase was
5
certainly not more than circumstances require*”
Similarly, he welcomed the proposed enlargement of powers* To 
facilitate discussion he even suggested that, as the council had not
I* Ibid, para*I 
2* Ibid, para*2 
3* Ibid, para*5
nbeen given any right to move a resolution or submit a motion, it -was
desirable that following the answer to a question other members of the
council might be allowed to join in a discussion on the subject* This
would make available to the government all possible views on the matter*
In his minute, Reay attempted to refute some of the arguments of his
executive council* There were indeed different ways of meking a government's
voice heard, but none could be considered sufficiently far-reaching and
impressive by itself* The most authoritative and efficient rebuttal of
attack on the government could be made in the legislative councils alone*
He answered the misapprehension regarding the scope and nature of
interpellation by saying that in a provinoial council this must naturally
be confined to matters within the competence of the provincial government*
Likewise, budget discussion in a local council could only be confined to
the allotment of funds within the assignment made by the supreme
government* The council would not discuss Imperial financial policy*
No doubt, the right of interpellation and the discussion of budget were
essential to a parliamentary government, nbut the exercise of these rights
does not necessarily transform the assembly in which they are exercised
into a representative assembly* They may be exercised by the Council of
State in a purely autocratic state without in any way substantially
altering the form of government •** He did not contemplate that any
modification of financial proposals would follow from the criticism in
the council* These remarks would only be of use in framing the budget
for the next year* In welcoming the draft bill, Reay expected that its
natural result would be an "increased sense of responsibility in the 
I
administration*"
I* Ibid, para*II
*7
What stands out from all this is that none of the governments
thought that the bill had erred on the side of caution* On the contrary,
Bombay and Bengal governments thought that the bill was too liberal*
No provinoial government, not even Reay, made any mention of elective
principle* Apart from Reayfs recommendation that members should be
allowed to join a disoussion on subjects of interpellation, there mis
hardly any suggestion to -widen the scope of privilege of members. Bad
the initiative for reforms been invited from the provinces, and not
taken by the government of India, the results would thus be unlikely to
be more in consonance -with the hopes and ideals of the more advanoed
Indian politicians*
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
The government of India, having considered the reaction of the
different provinces, next apprised the secretary of state of their own
I
views on the bill* They would not consider reducing the minimum of 
additional members for any looal council below eight* As to the maximum, 
soma members of the government of India would have preferred even a 
higher ceiling than fixed in the draft bill, to be attained by degrees*
They were unanimous, however, in accepting the limits, minimum and 
maximum, as detailed in the bill.
As to the increase in the membership of g over nor-gener al* s legislative 
council, the majority of the government of India were opposed to it* They 
did not think that the proposed enlargement of the council would either 
enhance its efficiency or satisfy those who advocated reforms in this 
body. The proposal would only add to the expenses.
I* Parl*Papers, 1890, c 595^. (Grovernment of India*s letter no*75 Public, 
dated 24*12.1889.)
The government of India supported Bombay governments request for 
powers to nominate chiefs of native states and persons under their 
authority. They pointed out, however, that even under the 1861 Act, two 
Maharajas had been nominated to the supreme legislative counoil. In 
case these precedents were not valid enough, or if there was any doubt 
upon the point, they recommended specific provision for sudi nomination.
They were opposed to embody in the bill the rules. But thqy sought 
to prohibit clearly any resolution, or division of the councils, in 
respect of any matter arising out of financial discussion cr answer to 
a question.
They next dealt with doubts expressed by various provinces and gave 
their own views, (a) A provincial council would be competent to discuss 
the budget of the local government alone, (b) The rules governing the 
new powers conferred on the councils would be framed by the respective 
governments in their executive capacity. Hone but the head of the 
province and his executive council, where there was one, could claim to 
do so. (c) Referring to a doubt expressed by Sir Auckland Colvin,
Lt.-governor of North-West provinces and Oudh, they explained that the 
right of interpellation would not be limited to occasions of financial 
discussion alone.
Lastly, the government of India wanted the governor-general in 
council, and not governor-general alone, to have the power of sanction 
under clause 3*
The government of India's objection to change the constitution of 
the supreme legislative council is understandable. All along they had 
maintained that changes should be effected in the structure of provincial
legislature alone* Except on this point* the draft hill closely followed
the intentions of the government of India* So there was scarcely any
occasion for serious divergence of opinion*
Simultaneously* the government of India approached the secretary of
state separately on an important matter* They expressed their regret at
^ the outright rejection of elective system by the latter* They were
inclined to a further careful re-examination of the question* No doubt,
the bill about to be introduced in parliament did not warrant such far-
reaching changes as had been recommended by the Chesney committee* But
this should not preclude the government altogether wfrom resort to some
j form of election where the looal conditions are such as to justify a
belief that it might be safely and advantageously adopted." The secretary
of state was* therefore, urged to reserve to the government of India
authoriiy to make rules from time to time for the appointment of additional
members "by nomination or otherwise•" It should be enough precaution to
provide for previous sanction of such rules by the secretary of state in
council. In recommending the acceptance of this proposal and its
incorporation in the bill* the government of India believed that such an
enactment would provide "for the gradual and tentative introduction of a
carefully guarded mode of electing Additional Members without involving the
I
creation of a franchise by Act of Parliament*" If this was conceded in
the draft bill* it would prevent "continued agitation for further
legislation", which the passage of the bill in its present form was
2
anticipated to entail* Did not this indicate that government's awareness
I* Public Letters from India* 1889* vol.II, p*315$ (Government of India's 
letter no* Public 76 dated 2i**12*1889)
2* Ibid* p.3159
that the draft bill fell short of popular expectations*
Though this proposal lacked the detail of the earlier suggestions, 
it nevertheless bore out the governments preference for some form of 
election and unwillingness to rely solely on nomination# This continued 
inclination towards elective principles gains some significance from the 
fact that since the time of the Chesney committeefs report, half of the 
governor-general’s executive counoil had been replaced by new incumbents#
** ** ** ** 4c4c 4c* ** ** ** *4> **
The request of the government of India failed to move the secretary
I
of state in council# In the bill that the secretary of state introduced 
in the House of Lords early in 1890 no device was left for resorting to
J
any means of appointment other than nomination. In selecting the papers 
presented to parliament along with the bill, Cross omitted the Chesney 
committee’s report and gave only extracts from Dufferin1 s minute# All
-■V
v references to elective principle and to papers not published were excluded
I
from these extracts#
The bill as introduced slightly varied from the earlier drafts the 
alterations were made mostly in the light of the views and recommendations
3
of the governments in India# Thus any person resident in India” was 
declared eligible for nomination as an additional member, obviously to 
secure wider choice including that of native chiefs*
The rules governing financial discussion and interpellation, it 
was clearly stated, would be framed by the executive, and would ”not be 
subject to alteration or amendment” at the meetings of the legislative
I# I.P.?*, May 1890, No.151
2. Ibid, No *11+9
3# Ibid, No#l5l (clause 1(3))
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council* Besides, no member would be free to propose a resolution or
divide the oounoil on matters arising from financial discussion or
interpellation* It was made clear that the provincial councils would
I
discuss the budget of "their respective looal governments”• To avoid 
confusion, the definition of 1 looal legislature’ was made explicit* It 
was "the Governor-in-Council for the purpose of making laws and regulations" 
in Madras and Bombay, and "the Council for the purpose of making laws and
a
regulations" elsewhere. No indication as to restrictions or limits of
♦
enlarged powers was given in the bill* The bill dropped clause 3 of the 
*
draft bill.
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** #*
On the official side thus the most favourable reception to the
reforms came from Dufferin* Though Lansdowne did not express views 
equally liberal as his predecessor’s, there cannot be any doubt that he 
too desired some liberalization of the method of constituting the 
legislative councils*
We have already indicated the reasons which might account for the
hostile reception of the proposals by two of the local governments* It
seems safe to conclude that the peculiar conditions of these two provinces,
the atmosphere of criticism and opposition from an increasingly vocal press
and a section of the public, —  made them averse to widen^ the scope of 
such embarrassment* The fact of unquestioned approval of the proposals 
by the remaining two local governments precludes us from ascribing any
I* Ibid, clause 2*
2, Ibid, clause 5* above p*^3J
+ see above p."??, f ^
| * see above p* #3
t
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common approach to all of them. These provinces were not free from the
influence of the Congress, though they had comparative political quiet.
The third and fourth sessions of the Congress were held at Madras and
Allahabad respectively. The extent of their participation in the Congress
can be gauged from the number of their delegates to the various sessions.
This was as followsi-
Total delegates Delegates from Delegates from
Madras North-West provinces
and Oudh.
1885 72 21 7
1886 h3k 1+7 7b
1887 607 36I 1+5
1888 121+8 93 578
1889 1889 358 261
1890 677 60 li+8
The political situation of Madras and North-West provinces and Oudh could
therefore hardly be expected to offer no cause for official umbrage. This
perhaps justifies an assumption that factors of personal belief and ideal
influenced officials in adopting such divergent views in different provinces.
The reception of the proposals in India Office could hardly be
different. The contingenfc of old Indian officials on the India Council,
having fixed ideas regarding the needs of India, were not likely to take
kindly to departure from what they had known to be working well for so long.
They would look with disbelief upon any innovation. They would not take
seriously the views of the Congress. One of these distinguished persons
considered England*s duty in India to be "to govern....with unflinching
determination on the principles which our superior knowledge tells us are
I
right although they may be unpopular." So the India Council, unless led
I. Sir John Strachey, India, p*506
by a secretary of state confirmed in different beliefs, would naturally 
be cautious in such matters* As ire shall see subsequently, there were 
reasons for Cross to take the stand he took*
Even then the provision to increase the membership of the supreme 
legislative counoil was an innovation of Whitehall* The India Council 
minutes give us no clue to this. Other papers of the Council, which 
might threw light on this development, are not available to us* The 
reason for suoh a departure may be that having refused to have anything 
to do with an eleotive system, the increase in membership was perhaps 
thought less risky and innocuous* It might have been deemed rather 
incongruous to exclude the supreme legislative council from the reforms 
which aimed at greater opportunities for the representation of admittedly 
diversified interests and communities* This would be more so, as the 
enlarged powers were to be conferred on governor-general’s legislative 
council as well*
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Having traced the story of the bill’s birth and the part played by 
different agencies in the process, we shall, in the next chapter, follow 
its career through the parliament to the Statute Book*
CHAPTER III
The Indian Counoils bill in {Bfcrliament, I89O-I892
The Indian Councils bill was Introduced in the House of lords on 
21 February 1890* Earlier the same day, Hersohell referring to it had
I
moved for the communications "received from the present or late Viceroy•" 
TVhile speaking on the bill Ripon pressed for the full official correspond­
ence between the government of India and the secretary of state for India 
2 +
on the subject* Northbrook, the only other speaker, beside the secretary 
of state, on the bill that day likewise asked for the "full and complete 
views of the Government of India" and for "the opinions both of the
3
Governor-General-in-Counoil and of my noble friend Lord Duffer in#" More
pointed reference to Dufferin’s views was made in the debate on the 
second reading of the bill* Northbrook said that Dufferin was supposed 
to favour elective or selective choices Ripon believed that Duffer in’s 
minute "went beyond the extraots which have been given to us" and
u.
referred to the unauthorized publication of the minute by a newspaper* 
Kimberley also asked that the complete minute of Dufferin should be
I* Indian Parl*Debates, 1890, p*25 ^  .
2* Ibid, p*30*
f- Lord Northbrook (I826-I90I4.): A great-grandson of a chairman of the 
Court of Directors of the East India Company, Northbrook was nurtured in 
an atmosphere of Whig politics* A nephew of Sir George Grey, the TUhig 
statesman, he began a political career quite early in life* From 1859 
to I86I4., except for a brief interlude in 1861, he was under-secretary 
of state for India* He was governor-general of India, 1872-1876* (DNB)
3 • lb id , p *31 •
If.* Ibid, pp*66-67* (Surendranath Banerjea claimed that his paper, the 
Bengalee, was the first to publish it in March, 1889* See, A Nation 
In Making, p*93)
presented to the House: because of the newspaper publication, it was
I
already public property anyway# Granville, the leader of the Opposition
in the Lords, supported this stand#
The above fact is mentioned at the outset because the discussion of
the bill throughout in both Houses was influenced by the disclosure of
Duffer in’s views# Attention was more closely drawn by the government
endeavour to hold them back# The supporters of the elective system had
thus gained an initial advantage at the expense of the government#
The bill came up for its second reading in the House of Lords on
6 March 1890# Speaking first, Horthbrook gave the bill his cordial
support# Prom his experience he bore testimony to the "ability”, "firmness”
and "perfect independence’1 of Indian members of legislative councils and
2
welcomed the enlargement of the councils# The proposed increase in 
membership was adequate and the secretary of state had ’’provided fully for
3
all present needs in respect of the increase of numbers#** He regretted, 
however, the absence of any elective system in respeot of at least a part
\j
of the non-official members of local councils# The government were urged 
not to "shut the door, as it would be done by this bill,to the introduction 
of some system of selection or election, at any rate, into the subordinate
h
legislative councils of India#” With safeguards an elective system 
could be introduced in some form or other# He would not, however, 
prescribe the method by statute, and would be satisfied with the insertion 
of a clause authorising the government of India to draw up a scheme
I# Ibid, p#80# 
2# Ibid, p#51# 
3# Ibid, p#55«
I4.0 Ibid, p#60#
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subject to the approval of secretary of state to council, of a part or
■whole of a local council* The -working out of details -would be left to
the authorities in India because they possessed more knowledge of local
needs and conditions which differed widely from province to province*
Regarding the supreme legislative council, the fa rthez£ Northbrook could
go was to allow each of the local Councils to elect a member to that body*
It is significant that Northbrook considered that the governor-
general^ legislative council needed to be treated on a different fobttog
than the local councils* He approved of the proposed change in its
constitution, but believed that "there would be great difficulty to
I
making ary much larger increase" to its membership* Nor would he
oountenanoe any suggestion of liberalising the constitution of this council*
Referring to a scheme of the Bombay Congress to reconstitute the council on
the basis of population through electoral colleges from different parts of
the country, Northbrook said that such a system was "entirely unsuited to
the present condition of the country", and that it would constitute "a
serious political danger•" Representation to proportion to population
would give preponderance to Bengal and Madras, at the cost of "neoessaxy
political weight" to the rest of India which contained parts "of the
2
greatest political importance*" Therefore he advocated a measure of 
decentralization, giving more powers to the looal councils which should be 
strengthened* But the Supreme council should remain "very much as it now 
stands until some wider experience than we have at present is possessed
3
of the effect of the measure upon the local legislature*"
I* Ibid, p*5(jF« 
2* Ibid, p*60* 
3#' Ibid, p*5B*
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As to interpellation, he -was at one with the government in conceding 
restricted rights only. Any right to move a motion or divide the councils 
would be inconsistent with the nature of these bodies# These councils 
were not intended to be parliamentary bodies# These were "practical 
bodies" for "practical business" and not "debating societies"# Motions
SJ
and divisions could fit in the scheme of a responsible government alone,
I
and could not be th_ought of In India#
Speaking next, Ripon wholeheartedly supported Uorthbrook*s plea for 
inserting a olause enabling the government of India to have resort to an
2
elective system# In this respect the bill should be "an empowering bill", 
laying down the principle of constitution of the councils, but leaving the 
details to the government of India# He was averse to increasing the 
number of nominated members and explained from his own experience some of 
the difficulties of ensuring representation of various classes and interests 
by nomination# It was difficult to determine who would represent a 
oouammity or an interest in the best manner# Having decided upon a choice, 
It was not infrequent that the man nominated lost considerable influence 
among his fellow-countrymen by "the mere fact of having been selected by 
the Government"# The system of nomination presented another difficulty at 
the time of re-appointment# For whatever valid reasons, at the lapse of a 
term of office, a particular member, who happened to oppose the government 
was not re-nominated, the fact would provide the occasion for the person 
concerned to pose as a "martyr" and for the people to think that he was
I • lb id , p #5® *
| 2# Ibid, p#62*
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not re-nominated “beoause he had been a thorn in the side of the
Government." Besides, it was usual for the nominated members to desist
from open criticism of the government in the councils* They thus
deprived the latter of any chance to reply on the spot, and defend their
policy against “the misrepresentations and misunderstandings which spring
. I
up and which are propagated by the Press •“
Ripon illustrated his contention in favour of election by mentioning
his experiences in India* He had informally approached the British Indian
Association and another association on two occasions to select suitable
persons to represent landowners in the Imperial legislative council
during the consideration of the Bengal Rent bill* He accepted the
nominees of these associations and appointed them to the council on both
oocasions* This worked very well: the nominees concerned were considered
to represent landowners and helped in passing the bill*
Ripon differed from Horthbrook, however, in advocating election to
the Supreme legislative council as well* He thought that the exclusion of
this council from any change on these lines would not satisfy public
j opinion* This would not help to realise the object of the bill, which he
took to be "such a change in the councils at the present time as will give
2
fair and reasonable satisfaction to the public desirqj*"
As to the mode of election, Ripon did not explain his views in detail* 
But he was thinking in terms of indirect election, in which the 
municipalities and other public bodies would be utilised*
In his speech, the secretary of state reiterated the impossibility 
of parliamentary government in India, the unsuitability of parliamentary-
I* Ibid, p*65* 
2* Ibid, p*68*
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constituencies in India, and the essential difference between thfei central
and local councils* But this did not mean that the government were not
prepared ”to erfcend the representative elements as far as possible •” lYhat
he meant by this was a preparedness T,to throw the Government of India
I
open to the natives themselves/1 and to use their servioes as far as
could be safely done* He would not provide for election to achieve this,
beoause Mthe state of India was not ripe at present for this principle 
> 2
of eleotiori*” He referred to the various suggestions of applying 
elective principle through the municipalities, universities, chambers of 
commerce etc* The municipalities were not constituted for Mthe purpose of 
interesting themselves in questions which deeply affect the millions of 
ryots throughout India•" The universities could not ”really represent the
3
whole interests of India •” The bodies like chambers of commerce were not 
known to the law and could hardly be given legal status for a particular 
purpose* It was very difficult to find a suitable constituency* Cross 
would, therefore, be content with the system of nomination*
But this need not preclude any resort to a device as adopted by Ripon 
in securing representation of landlords during the consideration of the 
Bengal Rent bill* The head of an administration might informally approach 
certain bodies of his choice for suitable candidates* If the candidates 
so recommended were acceptable to him, he might conveniently nominate them 
to the council* Thus while the members would for all practical purposes 
be selected by certain bodies and would represent them, the responsibility 
for nomination under the law would rest solely on the governor-general,
I. Ibid, p*72.
2/ Ibid, p*73*
3. Ibid, p.7^*
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governor or Lt-governor# In view of the proposed enlarged powers of
legislative councils, the increased number of Indian members must be
carefully selected# They should assist, not thwart, the government "in
I
carrying out the new plan#" Cross, therefore, would rely upon nomination 
alone# He suggested, however, that a despatch might be addressed to the 
government of India, when forwarding the new Act, advising consultation 
with bodies in the manner indicated above for the pufrpose: of selection of 
suitable nominees# Of course, the nomination would rest solely on the 
discretion of the head of the administration, and the responsibility would 
in no way be shared with the bodies consulted# Cross thus endeavoured to 
meet the opposition’s point of view without yielding his position#
Commenting on the secretary of state’s plan, Kimberley said, "you
have in India as everywhere else to oonsider not merely the thing which
is to be done itself, but the mode in which it is to be done#" Men’s
minds needed to be satisfied# There was a great deal of difference
between the selection of members upon the recommendation of certain bodies,
and informal consultation with the same bodies# In the former case the
2
members "would be respected as representatives" of important public 
bodies, whereas in the latter they would be deemed as nothing more than 
nominees of the government# He therefore favoured an explioit recognition 
vof the elective principle#
With reference to Cross’s misgiving regarding suitable constituencies 
Kimberley thought that the bill should be an enabling measure, permitting
I# Ibid, p#76, 
2# Ibid, p#82.
the governor-general-in-council to determine the mode of giving effeot 
to the elective principle. It would not do to try to lay dorm the 
details: these must be left to the men on the spot* Since the authorities
in India considered election possible and desirable, as was known from the 
unauthorised version of Dufferinfs minute, men with better competence to 
judge had evidently concluded in favour of establishing a system of
of
election in India* So he urged the secretaryNstate T,to introduce some
I
elective elements into the legislative Councils*"
Kimberley considered that once election had been conceded in the
local councils, it would be impossible to refuse its extension to the
Supreme legislative council* It was better to include in this council
2
as well "the representative element#"
He agreed generally with the rest of the bill*
The repeated plea in favour of election was countered by the prime 
minister, Salisbury#- He apprehended that the advocates of the elective 
system could not rightly estimate "the intense gravity of the question 
they have raised#" The principle of election was unknown to Eastern ideas
3
and did "not fit Eastern traditions or Eastern minds#" The difficulty was 
accentuated beyond measure by the existence of two communities - Hindus 
and Moslems - "bitterly hostile" to each other, one even ready to oppose
1+
the other "upon all occasions#" Representative government could, on the
1# Ibid, p#79 
2# & 3# Ibid, p#8i|.#
L|/# Ibid, p*8§"
^ Lord Salisbury was twice secretary of state for India: from July 1866 
to March I867, and from February 187i+ to March 1878#
contrary, flourish only in communities with identity of interests* The
innovation proposed was thus "one of the gravest parting of the ways
I
which it is possible for any Government to have to fflffte*"
He argued that the difficulty of forming constituencies could not be
2
ignored* They "must not drift into an elective Government of India*”
They must make up their mind on suitable constituencies to represent the
i
vast and varied interests* Representation by small doses would neither be 
enough nor satisfy the communities* He ridiculed the idea of entrusting 
to the local bodies "elected only for the purpose of making streets and
3
taking care of draSns/1 the task of representing "those vast interests 
which we have undertaken to represent*” He thus urged upon the House "not 
to make so great a change without the most careful and circumspect 
examination of all the difficulties and dangers which surround it, not to
. b
slip into this great innovation,.as it were, accidentally*"
The prime minister’s forebodings did not silence the exponents of
election* Though the leader of the Liberals, Granville, did not press the
+
question, Stanley of Alder ley returned to it* He pointed out that elect ions 
would ensure the independence of members of the councils* He drew attention
5
to the "great progress in India in regard to unity”, and said that
I* Ibid, p*8lj.*
2* Ibid, p*86*
5* Ibid, p*85* 
ij.* Ibid, p*86*
5* Ibid, p*88*
+  Lord Stanley of Alderley (1827-3*903)* He was a warm supporter of the 
Indian Rational Congress* In the House of Lords "he sat on the cross 
benches, declining to identify himself with either political party*" He 
became a convert to Islam* (DRB)
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differences of religion, race, language etc* were not peculiar to India; 
these could be traced in many European countries, including the United 
Kingdori*
The bill was read a second tine without any amendment* Ho other 
member of the House participated in the debates* The majority of the 
speakers in the Lords could thus be described as desiring a restricted 
application of the elective principle as an effective agent; in the 
government of India*
■When the bill came before the House of Lords in committee on 13 March 
I89O, Uorthbrook referred to the secretary of state1 s admission that it 
would be possible under the bill to obtain the views of certain bodies in 
selection of members of councils* But were the provisions of the bill 
adequate to achieve this end? He considered that an extension of words 
would be necessary to make the intention quite clear* So he proposed the 
following amendment s-
"Provided that the Governor-General-in-Council may from tine to time
with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council make regulations
as to the conditions under which such nominations or any of them shall be
made by the Governor-General, Governors and Lt-Govemors respectively,
and prescribe the manner in which such regulations should be carried into 
I
effectV1
This would help to carry into effect some suoh system of selection 
as was resorted to by Ripon on two oocasions, and which had been approved 
by Cross in his speech on the second reading of the bill*
I • lb id, p *99
10 If
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The secretary of state accepted this amendment# He explained that
he would not 11Ice to "leave a legal difficulty open for further dispute",
which the amendment set at rest# Besides, the amendment would show that
I
the elective system had been "thought of and considered" in forming the
measure, and would thus satisfy its advocated in India #
Kimberley, speaking next, expressed his pleasure at the acceptance
of the amendment# He hoped that this would "leave an open door" for the
government "to practically leave the selection to bodies who will in fact,
2
elect the representatives#” It may be noted that no comment on this 
most liberal interpretation of the amendment was made by the secretary of 
state#
How far towards election were Its protagonists prepared to travel? 
TThile moving his amendment Horthbrook disavowed "the introduction of any
3
general system of popular representation#" He would not even have all
the non-official members of the councils nominated in the spirit of his
&
' own amendment* he preferred only "a certain number of nominations#" to 
be made In this manner# Kimberley likewise did not consider it desirable 
"that this system#.##should be extended to the whole of the non-official
5
members." He explained, however, the reason for leaving certain
I# & 2# Ibid, p.101#
3 • lb id, p #98 •
It# Ibid, p#99*
5# Ibid, p.101. /~j
^ ol.l(U) This clause has come to be known as ’Kimberley clause1 • 
(Monfcagu-Chelmsford report, para #69#) "Why this has been so is only 
open to oonjecture# Was the guiding spirit behind the move Kimberley’s?
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nominations to the discretion of the head of the administration* It
was necessary to secure the interests of minorities; they must have
their representation* Kimberley made special mention of the Moslems
and ryots* It appears, therefore, that both Northbrook and Kimberley,
though ardent advocates of election, had misgivings about its universal
application in India* The constituencies is*-which they themselves
suggested they apparently considered inadequate to guarantee the
representation of the varied interests*
Stanley of Alder ley moved another amendment providing against
prohibition of T,questions being asked relating to complaints respecting
I
alleged acts of maladministration within British territory *n The 
amendment was opposed on the ground that the head of the administration 
should have liberty to refuse to admit inadvisable questions*
The bill was reported in the House of Lords on 17 March 1890* The 
secretary of state informed the House then that the Viceroy had entirely 
approved of Northbrook’s amendment* It could hardly be otherwise in view 
of the government of India’s letter No*76 of ^ /jfej^ ifti;1889* It Is probable 
that the secretary of state’s knowledge of that body’s desire led him to 
accept the amendment* The amendment almost coincided with the modification 
recommended by the government of India*
The bill was read a third time on the following day, 18 March!*
The bill came before the House of Commons on 21 March I89O, when it 
was given the first reading* It was fixed to be read a second time on 
2h March* In fact, it did not come up on that day* Despite frequent 
requests by Bradlaugh subsequently for a fixed date for the second reading,
I. Ibid, p. 103. 
+ See Ch.IX p.
none -was decided upon* In reply to Brad la ugh, the First Lord of the .
Treasury and the Leader of the House, W*H*Smith, stated on 5 August 1890
that "it will not be possible to afford an adequate opportunity for the
I
discussion of the Bill this session*” He said that the government would
not proceed with the bill, and the bill was therefore withdrawn*
The bill was introduced in the House of Commons early in the next
session, 26 January 1891* But this year too it had no better fate* After
repeated delays, it was ultimately withdrawn without any progress, on
15 June 1891* The same day, Bryce, member for Aberdeen, said that a
feeling of disappointment would greet this decision* He affirmed that
there was a "general disposition” among the members of the opposition
2
"to assist in passing this measure of reform*" The government were 
requested to re-introduce the bill at the beginning of the next session* 
Though the bill was not considered in the Commons during the I89O 
and I89I sessions, certain indications of their attitude towards it can 
be had from the views of a few members* Brad laugh, at the time of with­
drawal of the I89O bill, referred to the "number of amendments" and "the 
avowed intention of raising in committee the question of elective
3
principle*" On 5 August I89I M|Laren hoped that in re-introducing the 
bill in 1892 the government would do it "in a somewhat wider form, and 
show a more favourable leaning to the adoption of the elective principle 
in the provincial councils"*” He referred to Dufferin's views in favour 
of election and said that many members would be greatly satisfied if the 
government "could promise that the bill will contain in some moderate
I* Ibid, p*503*
2* Indian Pari* Debates, I89I, p*305*
3* Indian Parl*Debates, I89O, p*50i|.*
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degree a recognition of the elective principle#" IPLaren’s plea was
strongly supported by Morton, member for Peterborough# He advised the
authorities further to consider during the reoess "the wishes of the
people of India in reference to the introduction of the elective
principle into the Indian councils#" He emphasised that acceptance of
I
election was "the only proper way Of governing the people of India#"
A day earlier, Sir R# Temple ■* the Conservative member, ex-governor of
Bombay - had declared himself in favour of eleoted membership of the
councils# Seymour Keay observed this was "one distinct advance" on the
2
part of Sir R#Temple#
Why was the bill not proceeded with on both these occasions? The 
government said that it was due to the pressure of other business# In a 
letter dated 28 July 1891# the secretary of state informed Sir William 
Wedderburn that the withdrawal of the bill was due to circumstances beyond 
the control of the government# TJie impression that the bill would take
r
long to pass through the Commons was challenged by M*Iarenwho said that 
two days would suffice for the purpose - one day each for the second 
reading and the committee# He blamed the government for intentionally
3
neglecting the bill# Even the Times characterised the delay in passing 
the bill as "little shorb of a scandal", and expressed dissatisfaction with
h
the plea of pressure of business#
Sir John Gorst, the under-secretary of state for India, spoke in some 
detail about this on 5 August 1891* He explained that time could be found
I# Indian Parl#Debates, 1891# p#668 (Bradlaugh, M»Laren and Morton were
Liberals)
2# Ibid, p#653#
3# Ibid, p#667•
Lfm The Times, 16#2#1892#
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to pass the bill as it stood, "a very small measure#” But a section
of members had always made plain their intention to use this simple
measure for ”a discussion of the whole constitution of India and a
proposal to introduce into the constitution of India what they vaguely
oall Representative institutions •*" This question was, however, of great
import and greater consequence, and could not be agreed to ”without ample
I
and complete discuss ion •” The government could not make time for such
discussion during the last two sessions, and,Gorst added, they could not
promise ”that the House of Commons in the coming session will have leisure
2
to discuss and decide this great constitutional question#” He explained
that the issue of election thus appended to the bill rendered the small
3
reform formulated by It "perfectly impossible#”
It is clear that the government were lukewarm in regard to this 
measure# Whatever my have been the pressure of business, there is no 
doubt that they were not keen on seeing the bill through# Writing to 
Iansdowne on 27 June I89O Salisbury described the bill as one "which has 
some enemies and no ardent supporters♦” Apart from the usual difficulties 
due to pressure of business and party conflict, Salisbury mentioned "a
1/
special cause” why the bill had "little chance of forcing its way through# 
This was the intention of the "votaries of popular government in India to 
have their say#" He did not conceal his repugnance to the "inflammatory 
speeches" that were likely to be delivered in the House and of their
u
influence on the Indian mind* Particularly he was afraid of Gladstone!
"to speak plainly#**####it would be a capital danger to the Empire if the
I# Indian Parl#Debates, I89I, p#670#
2. Ibid, p#671 
5. Ibid, p#672
Lord Iansdowne, a biography - p#73
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language he is sure to use is taken as a watchword by the innovators in
India*" He would, therefore, prefer to hold back the reforms if only to
I
"avoid a speech from Mr*Gladstone on the rights of the Indian people*"
It would appear that the real motive of the government in not 
pressing the bill was their antagonism to any elective system for India 
and their desire to avoid political embarrassment if the Liberals 
championed one* This would of course divest the secretary of state of 
the sole responsibility for the course of events* Apparently the decision 
lay elsewhere than in the India Office* While speaking on Morley’s 
Reform bill in 1909# Cross referred to the earlier bill and said that he 
had Mthe greatest difficulty” with his Cabinet colleagues to persuade 
them to agree to the introduction of the bill* "Many of them had great 
apprehensions”, and Salisbury "had the greatest possible objection to 
many provisions in the Bill*" He also explained that the surreptitious 
publication of Duffer in’s minute forced our hands at that time and made 
it necessary to do something*" In view of all this, the ultimate
withdrawal of the bill both in I89O and in I89I can only be ascribed to
the attitude of Cross’s colleagues in the government*
The Queen’s Speech on the opening day of the next session, 9 February 
I892, contained the following sentences "A measure will be introduced for
3
the improvement of the legislative councils in India*"
In the debate on the Queen’s Speech in the Lords, Iamington 
expressed his hope that the bill would be passed into law during the
I. Ibid, p*7i*
2* Indian Debates - House of Lords - 1909, p*127
3* Indian Parl*Debates, 1892, p*3*
msession, "as it has been long and cqrefully considered by the Indian
Government, who are most desirous that Her Majesty's Indian subjects
should possess this gradual and judicious extension of responsibility*"
Kimberley also pressed for passing the bill without further delay and
regretted that "It is really a misfortune that a measure of this kind
I
should be hung up Session after Session*"
In the House of Commons on the same day Samuel Smith welcomed the
reference to the Indian bill in the QueenTs Speech* He laid stress on
the introduction into the bill "in some substantial way" of the elective
principle* Without this, the measure would neither satisfy the people
nor fulfil the purpose of better government* He was of opinion that "the
establishment in India of a measure of representative government" would
stabilise the British regime in India and would "give solidarity to our 
2
Empire ♦ • •
The next speaker, Sohwann, also hoped that the measure would 
"contain, in some decided shape, the elective principle*" He reminded 
the government, "if the Bill is to be at all commensurate to the 
aspirations of the Indian people, it must contain the representative
3
princ iple *"
The governments desire to get the bill through the House as early
as possible was assured by the Under-secretary--<^^tate, George Hathaniel
\
Curson* He said that from their view-point the bill was a serious 
attempt to tackle Indian problems*
I l l
The bill was introduced in the House of lords on 9 February 1892,
and came up for second reading on 15 February 1892* The secretary of
state explained that the measure was identical with the bill of 1890,
including the amendment then accepted* He assured the House that the
government would be glad to see the bill passed without delay#
Kimberley repeated his preference for more explicit recognition of
the elective system: but he believed that under the provisions of the
bill elect ion would, to a certain extent, be resorted to* He asserted
I
that the bill was "essentially a tentative measure", leaving to the
discretion and initiative of the men on the spot the measure of application
of the elective principle# Should the initially limited introduction of
modified election succeed, he hoped that the governor-general, with the
approval of secretary of state, would "give a further extension to the 
2
principle#"
Horthfarootf spoke cautiously as in 1890# He believed that under the 
enactment the government of India would "popularise in some way or other
*
the selections for the different Legislative Councils in India*" But he 
would not conceive for India "any system of popular election by the
 ^formation of popular constituencies and the election of members by large
3
constituencies#" Representation could be obtained through the municipal
i .
and other public bodies# The elasticity of the bill - which prescribed 
no hard and fast rules and left the initiative to the authorities of India - 
was to him its great merit#
Salisbury was of opinion that representation could not be "confined
I# Ibid, p#30#
2# Ibid, p#3l.
3# Ibid, . *, .
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or even specifically assigned to municipal bodies*” He would not aocept
I
them as ”the main representatives of Indian opinion*” In popularising
the councils, care must be taken against bringing "into power not the
strong, natural, vigorous, effective elements of Indian society, but the
more artificial and weakly elements which we ourselves have made and have
brought into prominence*” Evidently he meant that the English educated
classes - and not the hereditary aristocracy and landed nobility •• would
profit most by elections* The application of "occidental machinery", he
warned the House, should not deprive the really strong sections of Indian
people of "that share in the government to which their natural position
2
among their own people traditionally entitles them*"
The prime minister’s distrust of an elective system for India thus 
found justification in anticipating the inadequacy of the system even 
before it had been given a trial* His misgivings did not take account 
of the fact that the number of seats to be filled by election, the mode
of election, and the bodies to give effect to it were left at the
discretion of the government of India* Hot even the most ardent advocates 
of election, Northbrook and Kimberley for example, had asked for more than
the election of some of the non-officials* It would thus be impossible
for aiy section or sections of the people to monopolise representation 
at the cost of others*
The bill was read a second time the same day* Its subsequent 
career in the Lords was uneventful* It was introduced in the House of
I* Ibid, pi*32*
2* Ibid, p*33*
mCommons on 22 February 1892 j it came up for second reading there on 
28 March 1892.
In moving for the second reading Curzon dwelt in a masterly speech
on the advantages of the measure. Regular annual discussion of the budget
would enable the members "to Indulge in a full, free and fair criticism of
I
the financial policy of the Government.... •" Such discuss ion would
benefit all parties concerned. The government would be able to explain
their policy, to remove misapprehension, to answer unreasonable, hostile
or misohrevous criticism, and would "also profit by the criticism delivered
in a public position, and with a due sense of responsibility, by the most
competent representatives of non-official India." The native community
would gain by the definite laiowledge of financial policy and by the scope
of open and responsible criticism of that policy. The "interests of
finance themselves will gain by this increased publicity, and by the
2
stimulus of a vigorous and instructive scrutiny•" He dealt with the 
issue of interpellation much on the same line, with emphasis upon the 
governments opportunity to answer critics and the publioTs possession
+ The speakers who participated in the discussion in the House of Commons, 
on second reading and in committee, were the followingi-
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3# S«Eo8re. 3
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of correct information* The bill would thug remove a defect which,
earlier in thia speech, he had described as lack of "an opportunity to
the non-official element, to those who may legitimately call themselves
the guardians of the public interest, of asking for information, stating
their grievances and becoming acquainted with the policy of the 
I
Government*"
Coming to the increased membership of the councils, he said that its
object was tTby extending the area of selection in each case, to add to
the strength and representative character of the councils*" The increase
every year of Indians "qualified and willing to take part in the work of
Government” led to a correspondingly greater advantage of their co-operationt
Specially in the looal councils, ”it has been found that more effeotive
2
means wre needed of reinforcing imtive and non-official opinion*”
Curson next touched the question of election, which had been raised 
in an amendment by Schwann* He explained that under clause l(lj.) it would 
be open to the government of India to include "some such principle, be
3
the method election, or selection, or delegation*” The enactment would
not rule out the "representative bodies" in India being approached "to
elect or select or delegate representatives of themselves and of their
opinions to be nominated” to the councils* Thus gradually the elective
principle could be brought in* He indicated that the bodies thus approaohed
would be of the nature of municipalities, universities, chambers of commerce,
the "well-known Association of the Zemindars of Bengal", the British
Indian Association? he made particular mention of "the various great
I* Ibid, p.121.
2* Ibid, p*!28.
5* Ibid, p*129*
1
religious denominations" in the country# It is remarkable that Curzon
$
^by this enumeration made a departure from the insistence on bodiesJ 4-
framed under la##
But in conceding the possibility of election, Curzon made clear that 
representation in that manner oould only be secured of "the most Important 
sections of native society#" The authorities would thereby have the
advantage "of the opinions and the criticism of gentlemen representing
2
the advanced phases of Indian society#" The people of India could in no 
case be represented by means of election# He pointed out that the people 
of India were the "voioeless millions" who could neither read nor write, 
nor had any political aspirations# Their life was one*bf mute penury and
3
toil#" He deolared that it would be extremely "unwise and premature" 
to devise any elaborate scheme of representation for these people# Any 
effort in this behalf "would be little better than a farce#" Representative 
institutions, as understood in the West, could not be established in India# 
The idea was urtoown to the Indian mind - a mind used to the division of 
the community into "irreconcilable camps by differences of caste, of 
religion, of custom, which hold men fast-bound during their life-time,
5
and the rigour of which is not abated even beyond the grave#"
Curzon therefore oommended the bill as it stood to the sympathetic 
attention of the Housed
Curzon1 s eloquence did not deter Schwann from moving the following 
amendment: "That in the opinion of this House, no reform of the Indian
Councils which does not embody the elective principle will prove
I# Ibid, p#l30# 5# Ibid, pp#l32-l33#
2. Ibid, p#l33#
3# Ibid, p#l3l 
k. Ibid, p#l32#
4. See Chill, p#kl
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satisfactory to the Indian people, or compatible with the good government
I
of India*”
He thought that the bill as it stood contained nbuh a very slight
trace of the elective principle” and would not satisfy ”the expectations,
the desires and the aspirations of the Indian people#” He asked for a
2
”more determined expression” in favour of the eleotive system*
Challenging the general assumption against a common Indian nationality, 
he pointed out that there was hardly a nation ”with absolute purity of 
race and of origin*” He maintained that the Indian people ”have to a very
3
large extent now attained to a clear idea of nationslity*****”
Similarly, Schwann would neither admit that elections were unknown
to Indians, nor consider the level of eduoation a great hindrance* He
pointed out that not only in 755 municipal and 892 distinct boards, but
also in the selection of delegates to the annual Congresses, ”the elective
principle has been already carried on in India; to a very large extent***#*”
As to eduoation, the products of the five Indian Universities and the
number of Indians who studied in the British Universities, along with those
others who had already received higher eduoation, did not warrant any
misgivings concerning the 3ack of suitable attainments among Indians* On
the contrary, increasing education and growing reliance on a common
language - English - had fostered unity among them* Election, therefore,
.needed to be more clearly accepted, because the Indian demands were as 
”irresistible” as they were ”just and reasonable^# Ee would, however,
I* Ibid, p«l5U*
2* Ibid, p*l35*
3# Ibid, p*136* 
i|* Ibid, p*l38*
5* Ibid, p*ll+3*
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leave to the government of India the details of the method of 
representation*
The next speaker was Gladstone, whose advent in the Indian debates
Salisbury so much disliked* He professed a desire to ourb controversial
debate on the bill, and would therefore see if there was any such
difference of principle involved as to justify an open rift* Though the
I
bill was ambiguous to some extent, the nauthoritative commentary” of
Curzon helped them to a clearer understanding of the government view-point*
CurzonTs assurances and Schwann’s amendment taken together revealed a
substantial meadttre of agreement* Curzon1s speech appeared to him to
2
"distinctly embody” the elective principle, though Curzon chose to leave 
the details to the discretion of the authorities in India* He took it 
that the government intended "that a serious effort shall be made to 
consider oarefully these elements Tfrhich India in its present oondition 
may furnish for the introduction into the Councils of India of the elective
3
principle*” Gladstone agreed with the government that this effort must 
be made by the men on the spot - by the authorities in India* The House
h
should not limit their discretion as to the "choice of means•" They 
should be content with "a clear indication of the principles on which we 
desire them to proceed*" It was not the business of the House to prescribe 
the machinery which the authorities in India should adopt* they should 
only give the government of India "ample information as to what we believe
5
to be sound principles of Government*" Incidentally, he made a mention of
I* Ibid,
2* Ibid, p.1^5*
5# Ibid, p*3l|6* 
I;* Ibid, p*lL|7*
5* Ibid, p*314.6*
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the municipal and other local bodies in -which eleotion had already been
introduced, and to which he would look ”with the greatest amount of
I
expectation and hope•••••” He stressed the Importance of introducing
an elective element, - ”a question of vital importance” which ”overshadows
2
and absorbs everything else#”
Of course, the government were not expected ”at once to produce large
3
and imposing results*” Gladstone would be satisfied with a modest 
beginning, but expected that the first steps would constitute a genuine 
and a real approach to the elective principle# They should be more 
concerned with quality than with quantity# Bub, he warned the government, 
failure to ensure ”the genuine even though limited application of the 
elective principle” would be a most grave and serious disappointment to
5
this House#” "What should be striven after was ”to get at the real heart
and mind - at the most upright sentiment and the most enlightened thought -
6
of the people of India #”
He deprecated a division on the amendment, which he viewed as 
”amplification”, and not contradiction, of Cursor's views# He therefore 
concludeds "There is no difference of principle disclosed, beoause the 
acceptance of the eleotive prinoiple by the Under-Secretary, though
7
girded,•••••••••was, on the whole, not otherwise than a frank acceptance#”
/
1. Ibid, p #1/4j5.
2.) Ibid, p.Utf .
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k* Ibid, p. li£.
5. Ibid, p.lZ»B.
6. Ibid, p.litf*
7. Ibid, pp.1/4.9-150.
He advised Schwann to withdraw the amendment so that the House might give 
unanimous assent to the bill*
In the subsequent debate the same day nine more speakers took part*
As many as seven members, including a Conservative member - Sir R*Temple -,
spoke in favour of introducing some elected members* The remaining two —
4
Y a clean and Hoare - were averse to this suggestion* Maclean feared that
election would place administrative powers into the hands of t!men like
the Bengalees, who have been slaves, nay, the bondsmen of slaves, for
I
fifty generations*TI He protested against stealthy introduction of 
election in India and maintained that parliament must knew What was really 
being done instead of throwing the burden on the government of India*
Hoare did not dispute that a time might come when further powers might 
have to be given to the people of India, but regarded any resort to
i
election at that time as premature*
There was a general agreement to leave the details to the government 
of India? but this agreement was not unanimous* Maclean considered it 
” extremely dangerous” to leave such powers to whoever might be secretary 
of state or governor-general for the time being* He said that supposing 
the two Liberal peers, Bipon and Beay, were secretary of state and 
* governor-general respectively, ”would not these two noblemen strain every
, t
v olause of this Bill for the purpose of introducing an elective system
which would suit the views of their friends the members of the National 
2
Congress?” He thought, therefore, that should election be persisted in,
■f Maclean, a journalist by profession, began his career as the editor 
of the Newcastle Chronicle, 1855-58: he was on the staff of the Manchester
Guardian 1856-59* He tke n went out to India, where he was the editor and 
proprietor of the Bombay Gasette, 1859-79*
r. ibid, p.155.
2. Ibid, P*157 •
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the relevant rules should be submitted for sanction to parliament so
that any rash application of the principle might be prevented* From
an altogether different point of view, Samuel Smith also hesitated to
leave the details to the government of India* Anxious to introduce the
elective principle, he feared that "the principle would be non-existent"
in the regime of an "ordinary" governor-general* It oould be expected to
be put in practioe under the enactment only by a governor-general with a
I
strong predilection for the principle, by "another Lord Ripon"* Likewise,
Dr*Tanner concluded that the bill would f,not confer upon the Indian
2
people any benefit ••••••"
Eaturally there was some insistence upon a clearer declaration of 
government intentions* IVhereas LSaclean pressed for an unambiguous 
repudiation of the elective system^ others pressed for an equally 
unequivocal acknowledgment of it* Thus Maoneill wanted "to know whether
3
the Government accepted the principle of representation or not?” He
requested the First Lord of the Treasury"to say whether the government’s
intentions had been truly interpreted by Gladstone* Samuel Smith
complained of "ambiguous and unsatisfactory" language and confessed his 
tr U*
inability*clearly see the elective principle in the bill* Picton also
pressed for a more distinct acknowledgment of the principle*
Some reasons for the apprehension that the authorities would not,
unless compelled, introduce elections in India were advanced during the
1. Ibid, p.181. flA. fi
2. Ibia, p.195.
3. Ibid, p.159*
Ij,* Ibid, p*181*
debate# Thug Seymour Keajf- mentioned two principal causes "why the
alien bureaucracy which we call the Government of India are fairly
frightened at the bare idea of the introduction of the elective principle#"
The first reason was the official knowledge that the Indian representatives,
in so far as they could, were sure nto insist on a reduction of the vast
salaries and appointments^held by Europeans, whereby the natives are
excluded from all good offices in the Public Service of their own country,
»I
and whereby the revenues of their country are appropriated, and eaten away#
The seoond reason was that the elected mambers would give the lie to the
official story of peace and prosperity in India# fc/fxile all the time the
2
economic condition of the people was declining and "biting poverty” was 
manifesting itself# How could the officials welcome the elected members, 
who would divulge the real miserable plight in Indiai Similar argument 
was advanced by Samuel Smith too# He thought that the "extreme poverty” 
and ” a cornu la t ion of grievances" of the Indian people pointed to "the 
necessity of establishing in India some kind of local representative
3
Government#"
It is evident that such arguments implied a lack of confidence in the 
nomiiated non-official members# This too found overt expression# Speaking 
on the necessity of having some elected members, Macneill dilated on the 
advantage of the government receiving "fair and independent expression of
I. Ibid, p#l7l 
2# Ibid, p.172#
3# Ibid, pp#l79-180#
+ Keay had lived in India for nearly thirty years! he was a banker 
and was for some time a noted figure at Hyderabad#
) % %
I
opinion#” Likewise Samuel Smith insisted on securing "independent
or it io ism and judgment” which could be forthcoming only from "genuine
representation#” Indeed# he openly oomplained that the nominated members
2
"will not do anything that might be inconvenient to the Government•"
Hone of the speakers pleaded for an unrestricted application of the 
elective principle# It was generally recognised that India was not as 
yet capable of a full-scale experiment of representative government as 
 ^understood in the TTest# This hesitancy related as much to the mode of 
election as to the extent of authority of the members* Sir R#Temple 
thought that the election of members might be entrusted to certain 
important cities of the country# to be so seleoted "as to represent as
3
nearly as possible the various sections of the population#” Samuel Smith 
■would not suggest "a complete system” of representation for India - a 
system analogous to that existing in England or .America# or based on 
universal suffrage# Instead# India "must have an intermediate system
h
yjresting on existing bodies and existing associations#" 0#V*Morgan#
5
similarly welcomed representation "in a small way#" Picton left to
the future "the gradual development of the elective principle^ we would
be contented with the most modest introduction of it at the present time#"
He wanted "a tentative,gradual and very moderate introduction of the
7
elective principle •••••"
As to the extent of authority of the councils# Ma one ill saw them as
^consultative" bodies whose advice would be sought by the government# who
8
should, however, "act on their own res pons ibility#” Sir R#Temple did
I# Ibid# p#l6l# 5* Ibid# p#185
2# Ibid, p#181 6# Ibid# p#l9U
3# Ibid# p#l62j.# 7# ibid, p#193#
I;7# Ibid, p#185# 8# Ibid# p#l62#
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not think of giving the elected members "ai^thing like control of the
legislation and finance*” He would not give them a majority in the
councils, -which must he governments: he reminded the House somewhat
obtrusively that this could not be otherwise because the ”ultimate basis”
of the British tenure in India was nupon the sword and on nothing else*”
I
"therefore, we must hage a majority on the legislative Council*” Seymour
Eeay pleaded fo r cautious and careful development of representative
government, though it was at the same time to be honest and real* Smith’s
ideas -were much the same*
There was a general agreement on the question of interpellation and
financial discussion* The advisability of introducing these reforms was
on the whole accepted* In fact, very few speakers touched these issues at
all and the debate in the Commons revolved on the elective principle*
Gladstone’s speech gave a turn to the debate and subsequent speakers
who favoured election, though at times insisting on its clearer acceptance,
expressed their readiness to be satisfied with the interpretation of
government’s intentions by Gladstone* A few of them invited the government
to openly accept this interpretation* Thus Macnaill referred to Cross’s
presence in the gallery when Gladstone spoke, and to the absence of "any
2
expression of dissent or of disapprove 1*" from the leader of the House 
to Gladstone’s speech: he perceived in that the government’s acquiescence
in Gladstone’s interpretation and asked for a declaration to that effect* 
Smith hoped that the "Government will give something like an assurance
3
that they will take the generous view put upon the Bill” by Gladstone*
The same expectation was also O.Y*Morgan’s*
I. Ibid, p.165 
2* Ibid, p.159 
5* Ibid, p*18U
In replying to the debate, Curzon pointed out the practical
unanimity of the House in welcoming the spec if io reforms contained in the
bill* Referring to a criticism by Schwann of the inadequacy of the
increase in the membership of the oouncils, Curzon said that the presence
of Indians quite suitable for serving on the councils was not being
questioned* The real difficulty lay in "obtaining men with both the
qualifications of willingness and intelligence who will surrender that
portion of their time that is required for the important business of these 
I
couno ils •"
Coming to Gladstones "wise and weighty speech", Curzon acknowledged 
that it had the immediate effect of largely eliminating "the element of
2
controversy" and of diffusing "a spirit of harmony over these proceedings*" 
As regards Gladstone’s interpretation of the government intentions* he 
said that clause l(lj.) had been incorporated in the bill with a clear 
realisation of its meaning* He admitted the competence of the governor- 
general under this clause to resort to "election, or selection, or 
delegation" or any other method for "the introduction of the principle of
3
representation in India*" Though he reminded the House that the manner of 
such introduction was to be determined by the government of India, he 
concluded by entirely aooepting Gladstone’s statement as to the objeots 
of the bill: "They are undoubtedly to enlist in the service of the
Government of India what I think he described as the upright sentiment 
and the enlightened opinion of native society*♦•*••"
I* Ibid, p*188 
2* Ibid, p*189*
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. i*e* Horthbrook’s amendment *
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Curzon’s reply failed to satisfy Pioton and Tanner both of whom
asserted that elections would not be introduced under the clause* Schwann
then appealed to Balfour to distinctly state if the clause was intended
for initiating an electoral system* Balfour, declining to interfere, left
the reply to Curzon, who pleaded inability to add anything further to
what he had already said* He requested the House, instead of taking the
initiative themselves, to leave it to the Viceroy* Thereupon Schwann
•withdrew his amendment though lamenting that he had not had nan altogether
I
satisfactory pledge from the Government*”
The bill was then read a second time*
It appears that the principle of election had nevertheless been
approved, though the government did not accept Schwann1 s amendment, nor
gave any explicit guarantee of elected elements in Indian councils*
Curzon’s reaction to Gladstone’s speech admits of no othei* conclusion*
Gladstone’s advocacy of election hardly calls for any comment* This
was so consistent with his political principles and so harmonious with the
Liberal tenetst Besides, clause l(lj.) had found place in the bill on the
initiative of Liberal members of the Lords* Long before, in 1890, he had
assured a Congress deputation, - consisting of Hums, Mudholkar,
Surendranath Banerjea and a few others, - that he would speak in support
2
of the elective system in the Commons* Tet, so far as his speech on the 
second reading of the bill on 28 March 1892 is concerned, it can be shown 
that his speoifio approach to the measure as also his attitude to Schwann’s 
amendment had been largely influenced by Kimberley# In a letter dated
I* Ibid, p*l97*
2* Heport of seventh IHC*, p*li; (Banerjea’s speech)*
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27 March 1892, - that is, a day before Gladstone was to speak on the bill
in the Commons - Kimberley explained to Arnold Morley, Chief Whip of the
I
Liberal party in the Commons, his stand on the bill# This letter, which 
is in the Gladstone papers, appears to be a reply to an earlier 
communication from Morley# Perhaps it would be safe to suppose that 
Morley had written to Kimberley at Gladstone’s behest, and Kimberley’s 
reply was really meant for Gladstone# Kimberley wrote that he would muoh 
prefer an explicit recognition of election, but he believed that under 
clause 1(14.) "the Governor-Genora 1 will have power to make regulations 
for electing a certain number of councillors•" Though the form of 
nomination1 would oontinue, under the system nthe councillors would 
practically be elected#” He referred to his speech in the committee of 
House of Lords in I89O, when he had expressed satisfaction with Horthbrook’s 
amendment ’’because I regarded it as to a certain extent admitting the 
elective principle#” He then went on to say that this sentence exactly 
"defines the position we took} and as the Government made no comment on 
or objection to this view, we assumed that it was admitted#” Kimberley 
explained that they could not insist on clearer acceptance of election, 
because "17e had reason to think that Cross was not unfavourable to some 
elective element, but that Salisbury would not consent to any direct 
mention of it#" It was,therefore, considered "politic to be content with 
getting in the thin end of the wedge#" He was still of that opinion and 
advised Morley that the first introduction of an elective element must be 
effected with greatest*caution, and that the manner of doing it should be
I# Gladstone Papers, British Museum, Add# MSS# 1|1|229, ff ly-22#
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left to the authorities in India# He discouraged any attempt "to frame 
regulations here by an act of Parliament#" They had not the necessary 
knowledge to undertake this task#
To Sflhwann’s amendment Kimberley had no objection, but he felt that 
"it would be injudicious that it should be pressed on the Government if 
they admit that the Elective principle1 may be introduced under the 
words of the bill to which I have referred above," i#e# clause 1(ZjJ#
The defeat of Schwann*s amendment would have the most undesirable, even 
dangerous, effect in India* whereas a "distinct" though "inadequate" 
admission of the elective system would "enable the Indian Government to 
meet the legitimate wishes of the Indian people so far as it will be 
safe as a beginning*" He also added* "Experience will show how far it 
may be precedent to go hereafter#"
The dose resemblance of this letter to Gladstone’s speech suggests 
that Gladstone chose to be guided by Kimberley in every important aspect 
of the question# Thus he was content with the compatibility of election 
with the provision of the bill; he would leave the details of working 
to the authorities in India; he would not encourage a division on 
Schwann’s amendment, and would be satisfied with the assurance of genuine, 
though inadequate, application of elective system# TTor need Gladstone’s 
reliance on Kimberley in this respect surprise us# Gladstone himself 
could not claim an expert knowledge of Indian affairs# Kimberley had, 
on the other hand, been secretary of state for India under him#
Haturally Kimberley’s views were regarded as emanating from an export 
and were treated as such# Besides, insistence on a different approach
and a trial of strength with the government would be futile#
v. 'V '/<•
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The bill was considered in a committee of the whole House on
25 April 1892# Schwann moved the first of many amendments seeking to
I
introduce "election as hereinafter provided for*" He adopted Bradlaugh's
seoond bill as th& model of the structure of the councils* As on the
second reading great pressure was brought upon the government for frank
and explicit admission of election* The arguments in favour of election
followed the pattern of speeches on 28 March* Schwann foreshadowed an
improvement of the economic conditions of the Indian people flowing from
ifce introduction of election, as he believed that the elected members would
give that "serious attention" . feb financial matters which was really 
2
called for* Bryce desired "independent expression of opinion on the 
councils" in the interest of better administration, and thought that could 
"only be obtained by adopting the eleotive principle*" He said that 
usually the nominated members "feel themselves bound to act in accordance
3
with the wishes of those who appoint them*"
Seymour Keay wanted elections on two grounds* Firstly, the absence
of periodical examination of Indian affairs in the House which was
previously undertaken before the Company^ Charter was renewed, and the
transformation of the Home government from the "Judge" to the "advocate"
of the government of India had rendered it necessary that "the voice of
the people of India should be heard in the Legislative Council of India*1
His second reason was based on the argument that a practioe of concealing
adverse facts reported by distinct off ioials from the superior authorities,
particularly the governor-general and secretary of state, had grown up*
I* Indian Farl*Debates, I892, p*2l8«
2* Ibid, p*212*
5* Ibid, p*225*
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This was dons by the "rank and file of the officials of the Government
I
of India", and ,Tin provincial centres such as Commissionerships*••••"
Hence "the necessity for hearing the views of the population by their
2
own mouthpieces yearly increases*” Keay warned the government that the 
refusal of an outlet to the Indian people "for the expression of their 
views and wants" might lead to "a crisis - nay# even a catastrophe" due
3
to increasing financial distress* Samuel Smith endorsed the views of 
Seymour Keay* He urged upon the House the absolute necessity of a 
definite directive for introducing elections* In view of "the unwilling­
ness of the Indian Government to have its prerogatives interfered with", 
he doubted very much "whether there will be any practical result in the
u
absence of definite instruct ion •"
Sir W*Plowden, the ex-Indian administrator, supported elections saying
that for "an alien Government•• • ••••administering the affairs of a vast
population" it was "absolutely essential to have a thorough expression of
5
public opinion*•••••" In advocating elections, Maofetill mentioned a 
fresh justification* He said that the initiation of an elective system 
could "alone bring about that political training which every stable 
Government, like that of the British Government in India, must desire to 
see fostered*" He reminded the House that public spirit could never be
generated without giving to the people "certain privileges and a certain
6
amount of political power*" He also harped upon the advantages to the
administration of a knowledge of the popular "wishes, wants, feelings and 
7
prejudices*"
i* Ibid, p*227 « 5. Ibid, V^3b
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Though many speakers asked for a olear assurance of some elective
elements in the oounoils, none of them insisted on the details of
Schwann*s amendment# On the contrary, several of them thought that the
details should be left to the government of India: what they desired was
a olear directive# Thus Samuel Smith would be satisfied with "one single
amendment asking the Government of India to add to the council a certain
I
number of elected members", without binding them as to the manner of
election# Plowden^ plea was for "words which would make it plain to the
authorities in India that the electoral principle is accepted by this 
2
House#" Maoneill too would not go further# Bryce advised Sohwann not 
to divide the oommittee upon the terms of his amendment#
If the advooate^of election showed such hesitation in laying down the 
details, government could hardly be expected to trouble themselves about 
the amendment# Curzon criticized the details of Schwann*s scheme and 
complained that the amendment was altogether outside "the legitimate 
province of interference of this House with the Government of India, and
3
as altogether outside the scope of this Bill#" He quoted Gladstone in
support of abstaining from setting forth the details, and wanned the House
that the acceptance of the amendment would be "absolutely fatal" to iiie 
*4-
bill# Referring to the plea of enfranchisement of two per oent of the 
population, Curzon repeated his objection to any comprehensive scheme of 
election and representative institutions in India# The idea of represent­
ation was not only "uncongenial" but "absolutely repugnant" to many classes 
of the Indian p e o p l e n o  scheme could be devised to represent the people
I# Ibid, p#229«
2. Ibid, p.235#
3# Ibid, p.219#
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of India# He also reiterated his doubt if one could speak of "the people
of India”, because of the absence of "any unity or homogencousness" that
I
is supposed to be implicit in the term#
Curzon’s intransigence found strong support from Sir H#Temple • He
thought that the government of India should have the option to initiate
elections • The amendment would, further, commit that authority to "a
large system of constituencies", even though "no human wit oan devise a
system of constituencies for such a country as India is at the present 
2 3 
time#" He pointed out that itvro per cent meant "a great deal", e#g#
620,000 electors in the Horth-lTest Provinces and Oudh, 1,100,000 in Bengal#
They could not be found in the prevailing conditions# He also confirmed
Curzon1 s objection to the phrase ’people of India’: "You can no more speak
of the people of India" he concluded, "than of the people of Europe or of
Agia#" Dilating upon the manifold differences that divided the people, he
claimed that they were "united in nothing except the golden bond of British
rule and of loyalty to the Queen Empress of India#"
Schwann ultimately v/ithdrew his amendment#
The next amendment was also Schwann’s# By it he sought to increase 
the membership of the councils to the minimum of forty in the Imperial 
legislative council and thirty in the local councils# He pointed out that 
the increase which might seem large was in fact less than what had been 
suggested by others# He mentioned the views of two persons in particular - 
of Coleman Haoaulay who had been Chief Secretary to the Bengal government
I# Ibid, p#221#
2. Ibid, p.231. 
3# Ibid, p.232. 
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For a long time, and of H.J .Reynolds, who had sat in the Imperial
legislative council and in the Bengal legislative council for six and
twelve years respectively. The former in proposing reconstruction of the
different councils had provided seventy members for the Bengal council,
I
whereas the latter would give I0I4. members to the Supreme Council* John
Ellis and ISacneill supported the spirit of the amendment. Sir R.Temple,
however, urged caution as more non-official members would involve the
nomination of more officials to the detriment of administrative efficiency
and cost. The same plea was made by Curzon who asserted that official
majority in the councils could not be dispensed with: these were not
parliamentary bodies to control the executive. Referring to his speech on
the second reading, he spoke of the difficulty nof finding good men who are
unemployed and willing to devote that part of their time which is neoessary
2
to the purposes of these councilsBesides, more members would mean more 
time spent on the debates and consequently more expense. But there would 
be no corresponding increase of efficiency. He also feared that a large 
membership would necessarily lead to the formation of two parties - for 
and against the government. The Opposition party, devoid of ary chance to 
come to power, would be irresponsible critics and would introduce into the 
proceedings of the oounoils an element of hostility and bitterness which
3
was hitherto unknown. Schwann pressed the amendment which was lost by 
93 to I48 votes*
Curzon’s arguments in this case warrant some oomment. Hot much time 
was required for the business of the councils in India. These oounoils 
were deliberative bodies and would remain basically so despite the new
I. Ibid, p.2ljO-2l;l* 
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measure under ©consideration: the needs of legislation were not great.
Hence the members were not likely to be subjected to any great call on
their time and resources. It was, therefore, somewhat incongruous to
argue that though suitable Indians were there, few of them would willingly
spare time to serve on the councils* As the government thought in terms of
representation of interest* and classes, this plea became especially untenable 
because many of the classes enumerated would consist of persons not 
depending for a living upon personal effort. Unlike the more politically 
clamorous professional classes, they had more leisure at their disposal.
In forecasting the emergence of an opposition party as the necessary 
oonsequenoe of larger membership, Curzon did not take into account the 
other side of the picture. The feeling of political disability, and 
consequent discontent, which lack of representation gave rise to, might no 
less surely drive some people against the government*
Sir W*Plowden then moved two amendments, on© fixing the number of 
additional members of the Punjab council at twelve, and the other enabling 
the governor-genera 1-in-council to establish a legislative oouncil in ai$r 
chief commissionershipj fixing the total number at not more than one per 
million of population* Plowden explained that the latter amendment vras 
intended to provide for legislative oounoils in Burma and the Central 
Provinces without any necessity for the expensive preliminary of converting 
them into Lt*-governorships. Curzon opposed both the amendments* the 
former on the ground that the hands of the government should not be tied in 
respect of a council which was not yet in existence and whose date of birth 
was not yet Imownj the latter amendment erred in laying down a rule to
73 k
determine the^size of the oounoils which could only depend on the interests
deemed fit for representation and the classes of the bulk of the inhabitants*
The first amendment we3 withdrawn* The other received support from as many
as seven speakers, - Bryce, 12a one ill, Samuel Smith, Morton, Ellis, Keay
and Conybeare* Sir R*Temple, opposing the amendment, said that from his
experience as the first chief commissioner of the Central Provinces, he
felt sure that the area was not fit for a legislative council, which, if
introduced, might lead to embarrassing results* Morton reminded him that
several years had passed sinoe he had been in the Central Provinces, which
had greatly progressed of late* Corybeare introduced the question of Assam,
and asserted that the great tea-grcwing industries there were a strong
argument for establishing a legislative council in that territory* Despite
some resentment and surprise at the government’s attitude about what was
considered a harmless provision, Curzon did not alter his stand* The
I
amendment was put to the vote and lost*
The next amendment moved by Schwann imposed a time limit for the
implementation of the measure - Ttwithin eighteen months of the passing of 
2
the Act*” The intention was to avoid a risk of delay which, Seymour Keay 
apprehended, was likely because of the antagonism of European officials 
representative principles* The amendment sought ”to strengthen the hands
3
of the Governor-General *!l Curzon assured the House that the government 
would take the $_arliest advantage of the provisions of the bill, but he 
would not consent to fetter their discretion in anyway* This amendment 
too was lost in a division*
1. Ibid, pp.2lj.7-25U« 3.Ibid, p.256 ~
2. Ibid, p«255«
/Maclean, the Conservative member, who had opposed the bill on the
second reading, then moved an amendment requiring the sanction of both
Houses of parliament to the rules for the nomination of additional members#
Ai^ y recognition of the elective principle in India would, in his view,
I
"do away with the logical basis of our rule of that country#11 He feared
that a weak or rash governor-general might, in framing the rules j "go far
beyond the intentions of Parliament", to the greatest possible injury to
the British rule in India# Annoyed with the Indian National Congress, which
he thought was aiming at the overthrow of the British regime, he apprehended
that a governor-general and a secretary of state might even recognise this
body as a regular institution and might utilise it in constituting the
legislative councils# In order to avoid these rislsy possibilities,
Maclean wanted parliament not to part with the immediate control of the
government of India, and protested against what he regarded as "this first,
this irrevocable, and this fatal step towards the overthrow of English
2
influence and authority in India#" He was supported by Major-General 
Goldsworthy, who asserted that "India was won by the sword and must be
3
kept by the sword#"
The amendment was approved by two Irish nationalist members - Dn*Taimer
and Col#ITolan - on altogether different grounds* They thought that
elections would never be brought in under the bill, and saw in the amenctosnt
a chance for the Commons to interfere and, if possible, force the hands of
the government of India#
Curzon, in reply, assured his hearers that the bill would not be a 
cste’Tueet 'Jr ij,
"dead-letter", and he ^"conceals a revolution#" Deprecating further
I* Ibid, p#258#
2m Ibid, P#26i;*
3# Ibid, p#27l. 
Ij.# Ibid, p#269•
parliamentary interference into Indian administration, he said that in the
diverse political allegiance of changing Viceroys and secretaries of state,
in the great experience and knowledge of members of the India Council
and of the governor-generalTs executive council lay enough safeguards* He
sounded a note of warning: ,Tif the Government of India is doomed at any
time to end in failure or collapse, it will not be from the attack of foes
from without, nor from internal disruption, but in consequence of the undue
I
interference of Parliament •’* The amendment was lost on a division*
Sir Vf*Plcwden then moved an amendment for the addition to clausel(lj,)
of the following words: IfIn those provinces or territories where the
ancient institutions of the country recognise the representative principle,
such as the village panchayet, or the village council, regard shall be paid
to such old custom in the nomination or appointment of the councillors to be
2
created under these regulations *M He quoted the views of many distinguished 
administrators admitting the utility of consulting these ancient institutions, 
and saw in them an easy method of "adopting to Eastern countries Western 
principles of government •”
Supporting Plowde^s amendment Dr*Clark and Morton, among others, 
welcomed the proposal because it would give the ordinary people, who paid 
the taxes and bore all the burdens, an interest and a share in ohbsing their 
representatives to the councils*
Curzon could not see his way to accept the amendment* Hot only were 
these village institutions not formed by a system of election, they were not 
even large enough to be utilised as electoral units; wnor had they any legal 
status at all* They could not be fitted into the scheme of contemplated
1*7
changes# Besides, the main objection would be a departure from the giving
of freedom to the man on the spot and from refraining to limit his choice
by any indication of method* If village oounoils could be mentioned, why
I
not municipalities, district boards etc*?
This amendment, like its predecessors, was defeated*
Another amendment, moved by Schwann, concerned the rights of members
of council* It would empower a member, during financial discussion, to
move aYesolution or divide the council on a matter arising out of such
discussion: it also secured the right of protest in writing by a member,
which was to be duly recorded in the proceedings* The amendment would further
enable any member at any meeting of the council to move a resolution calling
for papers relating to any question, to divide the council thereon, and to
record a dissent from the majority decision to be duly incorporated in the 
2
proceedings*
These proposals could hardly be welcomed by the government* Curzon 
pointed out that they would change the nature of these councils, which were, 
and must remain, deliberative bodies* If the government had conceded 
financial discussion and interpellation, this was in order to secure freer 
expression of representative opinion of the communities, and to facilitate 
useful criticism* Schwann1 s proposals would turn the counoils into 
parliamentary bodies, and "would only generate friction between the official
3
and non-official members of the council*1 Curzon vehemently protested 
against these extensive privileges, which would not only obliterate the 
benefits of the measure of reform but would lead to "perfectly disastrous"
h
consequences*
r. ibid, pp.27i4.-275
2. Ibid, p.281.
3. Ibid, p.283. 
Ibid, p«28lj.»
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Curzon’s opposition was resented by supporters of the amendment.
Macneill complained that Curzon had throughout "not shown the slightest
conciliatory spirit or endeavour in this Bill to consult native public 
I
opinion#" Along with Morton he argued that the opinion of the members of 
the councils on various financial questions could be clearly ascertained 
only by means of division* Since divisions had been banned, as also 
resolutions, financial discussion and interpellation would be ineffectual 
and impracticable* Curzon, however, stood firm and the amendment was 
negatived*
The Committee was then adjourned and met again on 6 May 1892* Consider­
ation of the bill was completed, but not before an abortive last minute 
effort by Sir W#£lcwden "to obtain from the government an express recognition
of the principle which they have admitted, of the desirability of represent-
2
ative natives being added to the Indian Councils*"
The bill was read a third time on 26 May 1892, and received Boyal 
assent on 20 £une 1892* The Indian Councils Act 1892 thus came into being#
Prom the debates in the House of Commons the faot stands out that 
whereas there were a few ardent supporters of reform who considered the 
provisions of the bill inadequate, opposition to the bill on the ground that 
it went too far was practically confined to a single member, Maclean*
Since the Conservatives, usually cautious about innovations, were in office 
and responsible for the bill, the lack of opposition to it is understandable# 
Only a few members, however, took an active interest in the bill# The 
discussion over it, on the second reading and in committee, was confined to
I* Ibid, p#285«
2. Ibid, p*308*
twenty speakers including the Under-secretary of state for India, 
The number of members taking part in the divisions was at the
maximum l4l. Considering that the bill concerned the welfare of
millions of Indians, this figure reveals a great lack of interest
in Indian affairs on the part of the House. This was in marked
contrast to the keenness which members evinced in some other 
matters hardly of comparable importance* A glance at the following 
table which sets out the total of a few divisions during February 
and March 1892 on mwasures which are also named will make this
Many of those who spoke on the bill had either served in 
Inflia or were in sympathy with the activity of the Indian 
nationalists in England; to the former category belonged, for 
example, Temple, Plowden, Keay and Maclean, and to the latter 
Ellis, Schwann, Macneill and Smith, The latter were largely 
influenced by the ideals of the Indian National Congress. Thus 
during discussion of his amendment on 28 Mifcrch 1892 Schwann 
praised the Congress and based his views on Congress ideals. He 
asserted that "India has a national voice" and identified, it with
County Court Judges Bill 
The Church in Wales 
London County Council Tramways Bill 
Southampton Dock Bill 
Evicted Tenants (Ireland) Bill 
The Mombasa Railway 
Eastbourne Improvement Act
309
48?
318
367
k03
332
(Amendment Bill) 391
+ The figures are taken from the Times
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ihe Congress. Samuel Smith likewise extolled the Congress and 
felt proud of this organisation, which to him was the logical 
culmination of British influence in India. The Congress, he said,
was "our own creation It is indeed an exact copy of ourselves
2
in Indian form."
The Liberals strongly supported the Indian reforms. We have
already seen how in the House of Lords the Liberal peers pressed
upon the government the elective principle and succeeded in
persuading them to leave an open door for it by accepting.
Northbrook's amendment. In the House of Commons Gladstone's speech
helped the cause. Of the speakers participating in the discussion
in the Commons twelve were Liberals, three Irish Nationalists and
five Conservatives. The Liberals and the Nationalists were equally
enthusiastic for Indian reform. Of the amendments moved in the
+
committee eight came from two Liberal members, Schwann and Plowden. 
These amendments, as we have seen, either sought to extend the 
scope of reform or originated in an anxiety to protect the reform 
from unsympathetic and hostile treatment. Some of the Liberal 
speakers wanted to bind their party to an advanced programme for 
India. Thus Schwann took Gladstone*s speech as an assurance of 
introducing elections in India in case of the latter's return to 
power. Morton said: "The people of India may rest assured that 
when the Radicals of this country come into power....they will do 
what is just and right towards them, and enable them to assist in
1. Indian Pari.Debater, 1892, p.136.
2. Ibid, p.182.
+ One amendment, moved by Schwann, not dealt with above, related 
to the availability of proceedings of the Indian Councils to 
parliament*
governing their own country in a better manner than it is governed 
at the present^’" He also claimed that his party had shown the 
people of India their anxiety "to do away with the necessity for
holding that country by the sword,11 and repeated his promise of
2
"some share in the g o v e r n m e n t • "
** ** ** ** ** ** ** * * ** **
How did public opinion in India and in England react to the
Indian councils bill? As with the ideal of representative 
+
government, the opinions of different sections of the people were 
diverse.
As early as 1 April 1890 the committee of the Muhammadan
Literary Society submitted a memorial to the secretary of state
expressing their satisfaction with the Indian Councils bill as
3
passed by the Lords that year. At the same time they made plain 
their belief that owing to the "religious and social circumstances 
of India" election could not be the basis of the constitution of 
the legislative councils. They apprehended that any such acceptance 
of election would leave the fifty million strong Moslem community
1/
"at the mercy of a strong and compact Hindu majority whose nations 
of right and expediency are so different, in many vital points, 
from those entertained by the Mohammedans." Besides, owing to 
Modlem backwardness in English education and political organisation 
they would be incapable of profiting by an elective system to an 
extent adequate to guard their vital interests* Hence they
_ _  Ibidi p.22^.
2. Ibid, p.289.
3. I.P.P., April 1890, No.152.
+ See Ch,I,
■H<L
accepted the bill as it stood and prayed "that in dealing with
the bill, Her Majesty's Government will be pleased not to allow
any system of election to be introduced therein", and pleaded for
leaving to the executive the selection*of members of councils.
The attitude of a section of Anglo-Indians, as expressed by
the Pioneer, was in spirit one of disapproval, though they would
accept the bill in the most rigid interpretation of its provisions
without conceding any necessity therefor* Thus the measure was
not "in any tolerable sense of the term urgent", nor were the
changes introduced by it "presfcingly needed." They would not
expect from it "great changes or great benefits", and would
consider it as an experiment, "which, though it may have some bad
I
results, may be for good. " They pointed out that such
endeavours "to introduce the political methods of the West into
the East" were "partly due to an incapacity to grasp the truth
that the results of government are everything and the form of
2
government nothing." Regarding election, their opposition was 
clear and forceful. If the authorities intended to utilise "some 
diluted electoral method of bringing popular agency in the govern­
ment," they should not shrink from "saying so in explicit language." 
They protested against assigning to the government of India the 
task of introducing elections while the "statesmen at home" would 
not commit themselves to such a course. Therefore "the debate as 
well as the bill sin in this way by tiding to get credit for an 
ultra-liberal intention, which it fails in defining with sufficient
1. The Pioneer, 19*2.1802.
2. Ibid, 9.3.1892.
#3
exactitude to open the way for expert criticism.” Besides, the
hill raised tffalse hopesrt regarding elections. They asserted
that excepting a small community of political agitators, no
considerable body of the Indian people pined for elections. Yet
,fin this strictly permissive shape” the bill would give an
excuse to the agitators, should the government of India refuse to
introduce elections, ”for representing themselves as denied the
full benefit” which the bill intended to confer on them. Acceding
to the usefulness of ”stronger native elements” on the councils
for purposes of consultation, they would rely solely on nomination.
They feared that the bill by exciting more glamorous expectations
I
would endanger ”its humbler usefulness.” The opposition to 
elective principle found more pronounced expression in the denuncia­
tion of the bill as a ”delusion, and therefore more or less a snare”,
and they doomed to disappointment everyone who foresaw in the bill
2
”a new departure in Indian policy.” In summing up, they said:
”The addition of the new members will fail to satisfy radical 
demand, and there is no other demand to be considered.n All other 
innovations and improvements of the bill could be brought about 
without ”the elaborate pretence of a measure which has been put 
forward as if it were the beginning of a new regime of self- 
government in India, and as a sham on the whole, it is out of 
keeping with the generally straightforward and thoroughly honest
3
character of Indian administration.”
1. Ibid, 12.3.1892.
2. Ibid, 26.^.1892.
3. Ibid, 6.5.1892.
/lilt
The gloomy forebodings of the Pioneer were not, however,
universally endorsed by the Anglo-Indian press. The Statesman\
expressed different views, very much in sympathy with those of
advanced Indian politicians. They thought that the bill was not
only no answer to the Indian prayer for representation; t!it is
not even intended as an answer to that prayer, but only as a
sop to a half-informed public opinion at Home.” They were not
sure whether the bill could properly be called ”an instrument of 
I
reform at all.” Too much was left to the discretion of the
government. The Statesman could not feel any enthusiasm over
clause 1(^0. How could one know that any progress towards
representation would be its outcome? Referring to Salisbury*s
speech in the Lords in this connection, they felt inclined, on the
whole, to be pessimistic, and thought that the ”motive for adopting
2
it (clause l(^)) was to throw dust in the eyes of Parliament.”
The people of India were advised, therefore, to make clear to the 
British public and parliament that the bill was ”not even an 
instalment of what they have asked for, and that they will rest
3
satisfied with nothing short of this.”
The Indian press was much discouraged by the absence of any 
explicit recognition of election. On the billfs introductiorTin 
the Commons in 1892 the Bengalee confessed, ”the bill is as 
disappointing as it could possibly be. It makes no provision of 
any kind for the recognition of the elective element in the
T~, The Statesman & Friend of India, 5#3.1892-
2. Ibid, 19.3.1892.
3. Ibid, 5.3.1892.
constitution of the legislative councils.” They cautioned the
authorities that the bill would satisfy none nuntil our educated
countrymen are represented in the legislative councils through
I
their chosen representatives.” Later on, after the second reading, 
they recognised that the bill had been made sufficiently elastic 
to admit of the elective principle, and credited its framers 
with the object of not relying solely on nominations, but to
2
”admit of the play of local opinion in the selection of members.” 
Inasmuch as the enactment was only permissive in character and 
the real introduction of elective principle would depend upon 
the rules under clause 1(4), they demanded that the views of
31
"recognised public bodies” should be ascertained in framing them.
♦ * ** *+ ** ** ** * * ** **
How was the bill received in Britain? The Times said that
it would generally be approved, "except by the extreme partisans
4
of the ‘National Congress* programme.” They never supposed 
that government approval of a scheme of elected bodies for India 
was in evidence, but acknowledged the desirability of additional 
members on the councils and enhancement of their powers. Referring 
to financial discussion and interpellation they claimed, "so far 
as anything like public opinion can be said to exist in India it 
will have the means of making itself heard.....” They would not, 
however, welcome the elective system. Speaking of Gladstone*s
TI The Bengalee, 27.2.1892.
2. Ibid, 9.4.1892.
3. Ibid, 3*9.3i892.
4. The Times, 16.2.1892.
(Hi
interpretation of the measure, they confessed that if the adoption
of an elective system meant merely discretionary acceptance of
recommendations of certain associations or bodies by the head of
the government when making nominations to the councils, there
could not be much room for dispute* But, on the contrary, if it
meant dependance non a system of popular election'1, the proposal
shuck "at the very root of the Indian Empire and the peace and
prosperity bound up with'lfc’. ■‘■'It was impossible to introduce
elections "in any real sense" in India because of the ignorance
of the masses, because of the differences of race, creed, climate,
habit and language of the people, and because of the repugnance
of certain classes towards the idea of election. They would not
hear of election through local bodies, associations etc.; the
position of these bodies must not be exaggerated and it must be
remembered that they could by no means represent the people of
India. They could speak at the maximum for a "microscopic
fraction" of the whole population, - the fraction who chose
representatives to local bodies etc. But the vast majority had
no role to play in the limited sphere of local affairs, and
their interests could only be in the keeping of the government
which must, therefore, "remain an enlightened despotism, subject
to the influence of opinion in England, and eager to gain any new
light from opinion in India, but independent in its acts and 
I
resolves."
When the Times thus assailed the elective system uncompromis­
ingly, the Daily News saw in the bill "a considerable advance in
I. The Times, 29.3.1892.
the direction of popular representation on the Indian councils."
Likewise, the Pall Mall Gazette thought that Curzon's acceptance
of Gladstone’s interpretation would "more or less bind the
^Secretary of State" and that it would be possible under the
/measure to initiate - let alone the rudiments of election - "the
most elaborate electoral system that constitution-mongers could 
I
wish for." Thus the difference on the bill between the parties 
within the parliament was faithfully reflected in the press 
outside.
** ** ** ** ** *♦ ** ** ** **
The reaction of the Indian National Congress - manifested
in its annual session at the end of the year at Allahabad - was
far from enthusiastic. By that time the Indian Councils Act was
an accomplished fact. While regretting that the Act did not
"in terms, concede to the people the right of electing their own
2
representatives," they pinned their hope on Gladstone’s interpret­
ation of the Act and expected the rules to conform with it. They 
were undoubtedly uneasy about the outcome of the measure. Pointing 
to the absence of a specific elective clause, Ananda Charlu said
that its presence "would put it out of the power of narrow-minded
3
men to deny the right as years elapse" . Another speaker,
M.B.Namjoshi, regretted the dependance "on the good will of the 
if
executive," and feared that nothing might come out of all this 
at all. A Moslem delegate, Hafez Muhammad Abdul Raheem, had 
similar forebodings and lamented, "We have no guarantee that the 
discretion so vested in the government would be wisely and liberality
1. Quoted in the Bengalee, 23.if .1892. 3* Ibid, p.26. ,
2. Report of eighth I.N.C. p.l. (Resolution I) if. Ibid, p«32»
mI
exercised, none even that it will not be abused.*1 A refreshing
contrast to the general atmosphere of despondency and doubts was
provided by another Moslem delegate, Mvi. Wahabuddeen. He based
his hope on the government protestation of being open to conviction,
of readiness to modify their opinions and to adopt a course
2
!,acceptable to the nation at large«11 He was, therefore,
optimistic and foresaw better results*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ★ *
The hopes, or fears as the case might be, about the real
outcome of the Indian Councils Act 1892 thus rested on the rules 
to be framed under it* The composition of these important rules 
will be the subject of the next chapter*
|. yjy itf
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Chapter IV 
The Indian Councils Act 1892 in India*
Four days before the Indian Councils Act 1892 received the
Royal Assent, Lansdowne, the governor-general, wrote a note on
16 June 1892 outlining the principles which should guide the
I
authorities in framing rules under the new Act# He briefly
described the sequence of events culminating in the passage of
the Act# In doing so, he referred to the parliamentary debates
which revealed, in his opinion, that ,fthe general feeling of
Parliament was in favour of the recognition of that (elective)
principle.” He regarded Gladstone*s speech as ”the most
important”, and did not think that the subsequent debates
materially affected Gladstone's case. In the context of these
parliamentary debates as well as of the views of the government
of India in the recent years, the conclusion was inescapable,
Lansdowne wrote, that the government should "take, within a
reasonable time, steps which will satisfy the public that the
discretion which had been conferred upon us, and which is precisely
+
the discretion for which, in l889i we ourselves asked, will be 
turned to good account.” Holding this opinion he summarised the 
mandate under which the government should act as follows 
”(1) It is not expected of us that we shall attempt to create a 
complete or symmetrical system of representation# (2) It is
I. Kimberley Papers: The note was enclosed with Lansdowne's 
letter to Kimberley, dated 23*8,1892#
+ See Ch.II, p.^
t$rO
expected of us that we shall make a bona fide endeavour to render
the legislative Councils more representative of the different
sections of the Indian community than they are at present*
(3) For this purpose we are at liberty to make use of the
machinery of election whenever there is a fair prospect that it
will produce satisfactory results* (4) Although we may to this
extent apply the elective principle, it is to be clearly understood
that the ultimate selection of all additional members rests with
the Government, and not with the electors." The function of the
I
latter will be that of recommendation only."
Lansdowne thought that the elective system should first be
introduced in the local councils only* Though he knew that once
the local councils had been reformed, the Viceroy's council could
not be left untouched for long, he preferred an interval of time
before the latter council was taken in hand* But he admitted at
the same time that the reformed local councils would perhaps be
"the most convenient electoral bodies" for the election of some
2
additional members of the supreme legislative council.
Besides, he assumed that the councils would at the first 
instance consist of the maximum number of members envisaged by 
the Act, that only a bare majority of official members in each 
council would suffice, and that the adequate representation of 
minorities could be secured "by resort to nomination pure and 
simple." The last assumption involved excluding a number of .
3
non-official seats from the electoral process.
I* Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
1ST I
Lansdowne's views were thus flexible. His private 
correspondence with the provincial governors on the scope and 
nature of the rules disclosed to him "an extraordinary variety 
of opinion" among them. While Harris, the governor of Bombay, 
took unkindly to the whole scheme and would be content to "do 
as little as possible", the Lt♦-governors of Bengal and North- 
West Provinces and Oudh recommended a "very elaborate scheme of
V
territorial representation." Lansdowne was therefore convinced
of the necessity of giving the local governments "a pretty strong
lead in order to prevent them from adopting widely divergent
I
lines of action." And this the government of India indeed did.
In letters to the four provinces on 15 August 1892 they not only 
indicated the principles on which the rules should be based, but 
forwarded three sets of draft rules regarding the constitution 
of the respective local council, financial discussion and inter­
pellation. They enumerated the classes to be represented in each 
province, and laid down the mode of securing such representation. 
They took for granted that the maximum number of additional members 
■v/allowed under the Act would be nominated. The initiative in
2
framing the rules therefore came from the government of India.
As to the constitution of the councils, the government of 
India laid down the following leading features of the proposed
|
arrangement:
a )  The officials would constitute "only a bare majority"
in the councils. (2) The non-official members were to be
1^  Kimberley Papers - Lansdowne to Kimberley, 23.8.1892.
2. I.P.P., August 1892, Nos.2*tl (Madras), 2*f2 (Bombay), 2^3 (Bengal,
! and 2k7 (North-West Provinces and Oudh).
i1
i
/re­
nominated partly on the recommendation of certain bodies and
partly at the discretion of the head of the province.. (3) The
recommending bodies were to be so chosen as to "afford a fair
representation of all important classes in the community.11
(*f) The non-official seats to be filled at the governor’s or
Lt.-governor's discretion were to be utilized to redress "fltny
I
inequality to which the system of recommendation may lead.”
The government of India emphasized representation of races and 
classes; localities and numbers were not much in view and they
disavowed any intention of treating these as factors in represent­
ation except in the case of the Presidency towns. They claimed 
that this was in conformity with the views of the secretary of 
j state as expressed in his despatch of 30 June 1892 forwarding the
new Act. In this despatch Cross, the secretary of state, had
spoken of the representation "of the views of different races,
2
classes and localities." , The government of India argued
that by mentioning 'localities* in the last place, the importance
of, and preference for, 'races and classes' in the scheme of
representation had been made clear. They desired that "all
3
important classes shall be represented on the council" and
proceeded to enumerate for each province the classes which were
considered deserving of representation. These were the following:-
1. I.P.P., August, 1892, No.2*fl (Para.4.)
2. Ibid, No.239 (Para.6.)
3. Ibid, No.2*f3 (Para.^ f.)
n r  3
Madras
(1) Hindus
(2) Moslems
(3) Non-official
Europeans and 
Eurasians
(4) Merchants, traders
and manufacturers
(3) The Urb^an classes
(6) The rural classes
(7) The professional
and literary 
classes
(8) The population of
the Presidency 
town
(9) The planting
community or Nairs 
of the Western 
Coast•
Bombay
1 to 8 of
the Madras 
list and
(9) Parsis
Bengal
1 to 8 of 
the Madras 
list and
(9) the
planting
community
North-West 
Province 
and Oudh
1 to 7 of
the Madras 
list.
The government of India pointed out that the above was 
I
"a cross-divisionM and more than one class or interest could be
represented by one person. But the councils were expected to
include representatives of all thfi^ e classes. If any class was
\
not so represented through recommendation, recourse must be had 
to nomination. If, however, all the classes received represent­
ation through recommendation, nomination at the discretion of 
the governor or Lt.-governor might not be necessary and certain 
seats might be held in reserve for future necessity, either to 
nominate an expert or to redress any disturbance in the balance 
of representation "by a change due to the selection, ory, a vacancy
I. Ibid
/s-tf
occurring, of a candidate belonging to a class different from
I
that of the person to whom he succeeds."
The government of India's decision regarding the number of 
official additional members, and of seats thrown open to 
recommendation and held in reserve for nomination in the different 
councils was as follows:-
Officials
Non-officials through 
recommendation'.
Non-officials by 
nomination
Madras 9 8 3
Bombay 9 8 3
Bengal 10 8 2
North-West 
Provinces 
and Oudh 7 6 2
They also specified the bodies to which the seats for
recommendation were to be allotted. They entrusted the itask 
mainly to the municipalities, district boards, Chambers of Commerce, 
Universities, the Corporations in the three Presidencies and 
Xemindars. The importance of municipalities, district boards and 
Corporations in the government of India scheme can be gauged from 
the fact that seats allotted to these bodies for recommendation 
totalled five each in Madras and Bombay, and four each in Bengal
o4t
and North-West Provinces. While the number remain unchanged in 
Madras and North-West Provinces, in the final regulations, these 
bodies got five members in Bengal and only three in Bombay. In 
each province one member was to be recommended by the University.
IT Ibid, No.2^7 (Para.5.)
IS*
On the suggestion of the Madras and Bengal governments, the
representation of Zemindars was left to nomination, rather than
to recommendation* The reason why this was advocated in Madras
was the absence of cohesion in the only association of landholders
I
in the Presidency, which had merely a nominal existence; in
Bengal there were several rival associations of landholders and
the Lt•-governor considered that representation of Zemindars*
interests could better be secured if he retained ,fin his own hands
2
the responsibility of nominating a suitable representative•**
This reduced the number of seats to be filled by recommendation 
to seven in Madras and Bengal*
These suggestions were accepted with minor changes by most 
of the provinces* It was only in the case of Bombay that a 
different approach was mooted though with much the same result#
The details of the case deserve, however, some notice* The 
government of India suggested that the eight seats for recommend­
ation in Bombay should be allotted to:-
Bombay Corporation - 1 seat
Mufassal Municipalities - 2 seats
District Boards or Associations of Landholders - 2 seats
Large Landholders - 1 seat
Bombay Chamber of Commerce - 1 seat
Bombay University - 1 seat
2
In their reply, the Bombay government, while expressing 
their general concurrence with the classification of races and
interests deemed fit for representation, said that the allotment
I* I.P*P. ,0ct*l892, No". 157" (Madras government letter dated 3.9*1^92) 
2* Ibid,No.l6l(Bengal government letter dated 12*9*1892)
3. Ibid, No*l62(Bombay government letter dated 29*9*1892)
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of seats might follow a different pattern. The Presidency was
divided into four divisions - Sindhi, Gujarati, Marathi and
Canarese - marked by racial, geographical and linguistic
distinctions. Each division might be considered as a distinct
unit. Without deviating from the form of the rules proposed by
the government of India, the Bombay government wanted to adapt
them to these territorial divisions so as to secure their
representation. Allotting one seat to each of these divisions
j they wanted the recommendation to be made by the most prominent
interests of the area. Thus in Sind recommendation might be
invited from an electoral body consisting of the "Zemindars
the first class Jaghirdars and the Talpur Jaghirdari". In the
Northern Division of the Presidency, Gujarat, lay important
municipalities including Surat and Ahmedabad. Hence the
municipalities of this Division would be asked to recommend a
nominee. . " The Central Division, "the home of the Marathas11
was marked by the residence of the Sardars of the Deccan, ’’the
I
aristocracy of Maharashtra.11 The Bombay government wanted to 
allot one seat to the Sardars. In the Southern Division 
municipalities did not count for much: here the district boards
would recommend a nominee. They wanted one seat to be given to 
each of the Chambers of Commerce at Bombay and Karachi, and would 
leave undistfc\y/bed the seats for the corporation and the university# 
Thus generally adhering to the government of India scheme, they 
reduced the representation of the local bodies to three in placd ^ 
of five, and increased that of landlords and commerce. Each of
I. Ibid, (Para.5*)
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these two interests got two seats* The government of India
I
accepted this change. Though the new scheme of Bombay was based 
on the representation of locality, it would be unwise to 
over-emphasize its significance. In fact it conformed quite 
closely to the approved pattern of representation, of interests. 
Besides, territorial consideration guided the allotment of half 
of the seats, and the net result was to weaken the hold of local 
bodies in the Bombay legislative council. Since the local 
bodies were, among all the electoral units, the most popular, the 
consequence of this departure, which had the appearance of territor­
ial representation, was anomalous inasmuch as unlike the usual 
consequence of territorial representation smaller and closed bodies 
stood to gain from it.
The final allotment in the various local councils is shown 
below with the number of seats in parenthesis:-
Madras Bombay
North-West 
Bengal Provinces and CU dh
Corporation (1) Corporation(l)
Municipalitie s(2) Municipalities(1)
District Boards(2) District Local
Boards (1)
Corporation(l) Municipalitie s(2j
Municipalities£) District
Boards (2)
Chamber of 
Commerce (1)
Senate of 
University(1)
District 
Boards (2)
Chamber of 
Commerce(1)
Senate of 
University(l)
Chamber of 
Commerce(l)
Senate of 
University(l)
Sardars of 
Deccan (1)
Landlords of 
Sind (1)
Bombay Chamber 
of Commerce(1)
Karachi Chamber 
of Commerce(l)
Senate of 
University(l)
T. Ibid, No. 167.
+ One seat was taken away from Commerce (Karachi Chamber of Commerce) 
and given to District Local Boards in the Central Division, some y 
years later. See Indian Pari.Debates 1897, pp.287-288.
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The government of India made clear that though the
distribution of seats was made according to the rules, the
method and the details of election were left at the discretion
of the local governments. For example, while the rules would
allot a seat to the municipalities, the selection of the
municipality or a group of municipalities and the adoption
of one of several methods of representation would be left to
the provincial governments. They would have this freedom of
adapting the rules to the circumstances of a particular case.
With the purpose of securing, for instance, an urban or a rural
member, several different methods of representation might be
adopted. The government of India in their letters to Bengal
and North-West Provinces and Oudh disclosed a willingness to
allow the widest possible variation in method to satisfy the
requirements of genuine representation of urban and rural
interests through the local bodies. They admitted the possibility
of election by delegates of several bodies, whether ”by voting
in some central place or by sending in voting papers.’1 to the
I
returning officer. They recognised that the privilege might
have to be limited to those satisfying certain conditions and
that the number of delegates of each constituent body might vary
with its importance. Later on, they included associations,
other than local bodies, in this plan, and the relevant rule laid
down.that the recommendation should be made nin the case of a
group of Municipal Corporations, District Boards or Associations
by the majority of votes of representatives to be appointed 
IT I.P.P.j August lb92, N0.2V3 (Para.6.)
/r?
+
according to such scale as the Governor in Council may from time
I
to time prescribe, by the Corporations, Boards or Associations."
The government of India informed the secretary of state that 
this was done to ensure Ma satisfactory advance in the represent­
ation of the people" in the councils and "to give effect to the 
principle of selection as far as possible" upon the advice of
such sections of the people as were capable of assisting the
2
authorities in this respect.
In the regulations made by the different local governments
this liberty was fully utilized. In Madras the municipalities
were divided in Southern and Northern groups to each of which a
seat was given. Each municipality was entitled to nominate a
candidate for recommendation and to elect a delegate to vote on
its behalf. All the delegates of a group would gather together
and elect a person from among those nominated. The same procedure
3
was prescribed for the district boards. In Madras all the 
municipalities and district boards were treated alike.
Not so in Bombay. Here participation in elections was 
limited in the Northern Division to municipalities with populations 
of 5,000 and above. No such limit was prescribed for the district 
local boards in the Southern Division. But the number of delegates 
to be selected by an eligible municipality or a district local 
board varied according to population. Every municipality with a 
population between 5,000 and 10,000 would appoint a delegate, but
+ or the Lt.-governor.
1. I.P.P., March 1893, No.150 (Government of India notification
No.339 dated 17.3.1893 - Rule V(c))
2. I.P.P., October 1892, No.l67 (Government of India’s letter
dated 26.10.1892)
3. Pari.Papers 189^,86(Regulations & Governmen't
/ bo
municipalities with a population of 10,000 and above would
appoint an additional delegate for every additional 10,000 or
fraction thereof of the population. In the case of district
local boards population up to 100,000 was entitled to a single
delegate, and an additional delegate was given for each further
100,000 or fraction thereof of the population* The Bombay
regulations prescribed postal voting for the delegates of the
district local boards* The delegates of the municipalities
I
would, however, assemble for the purpose.
In Bengal the allotment of seats to the municipalities and 
*
district boards was made to groups of these bodies. This went
according to the administrative divisions of the Presidency.
Thus while the municipalities of the Presidency and the Hajshahi
divisions shared between them the two seats allotted to
municipalities, the two seats for district boards went to these
bodies in the Chittagong and the Patna divisions. Besides, a
system of rotation was laid down alternately giving the municipal
ities and the district boards in each division an opportunity
respectively to elect a nominee; the entire cycle would be
completed with the fourth turw of elections. While in Bombay
the eligibility of municipalities taking part in recommendation
depended on population, in Bengal it rested on municipal income,
the minimum being f5s. 5*000, so that as compared with Bombay,
in Bengal the higher income would give a municipality more votes.
Again, while in Bombay more delegates were elected, in Bengal
one delegate was elected to cast all the vot^s ±o which the body 
be represented was entitled. The voting power of the municipal 
■j Tyid i (Mdtllltatxon 01 aomoay government, Dtd.30.3.189 )^
!U
representatives in Bengal was calculated according to the following 
scale:-
Vcfa
Municipalities with income of Rs.5,000 but less than Rs.10,000 1
Rs.10,000 Rs. 20,000 2
Rs.20,000 Rs. 50,000 3
Rs.50,000 Rs.1,00,000 4
Rs.1,00,000 Rs.1,50,000 5
Rs.1,30,000 Rs.2,00,000 6
Rs.2,00,000 Rs.2,50,000 7
Municipalities with income of Rs.2,50,000 and above 8
Though such detailed arrangements were made for the municipalitie
all district boards in Bengal were considered "of approximately
equal importance11, and each district board was to appoint one
I
representative having one vote.
In North-West Provinces and Oudh the municipalities were
divided into two groups, each to recommend a nominee; each
municipality within the group was given one delegate with one vote.
The same applied to the district boards. No difference was made
2
on the basis of population-or income.
Before we leave the consideration of the procedure of 
recommendation, it would be well to note that the rules required 
that a person recommended for nomination by municipalities or
3
district boards was to be "ordinarily resident", withih the area
I. Ibid (Notification of Bengal government: Resolution No.1553
OC. Z ^dated 25.3 .1893)
2. Ibid (Notification of Lt.-governor)
3. I.P.P. March 1893 No.150 (Rule VI)
of the municipalities or the district boards which elected him*
By this requirement and by judicious selection of municipalities 
and district boards it was intended to secure through these 
bodies the representation of various interests. Perhaps an 
illustration will better explain the method. As we have already 
noted, the regulations for the Bengal council allotted in the 
first turn one seat each to the municipalities of Presidency and 
Rajshahi divisions, and one seat each to the district boards 
J of Patna and Chittagong divisions. The result was to balance the 
representation of the various classes. The district board?of 
Chittagong division, a predominantly Moslem area, recommended a 
Moslem: Patna division in Behar ensured the representation of
the Beharis, and the member recommended was the biggest landlord 
of the province, the Maharaja of Darbhafi®^, The two members 
returned by the municipalities were a barrister of Calcutta 
High Court and a Zemindar of Rajshahi division. Thus the four 
seats secured the representation of Bengalis and Beharis,
Hindus and Moslems, landlords and professional classes*
** * * ** * * 4c * ** * * ** ★* * * * #
The draft rules circulated by the government of India
declared that rtno person actually in the service of Government
shall be eligible for recommendation as a representative of any
I
of the bodies or associations.M The Bombay government in their 
letter of 29 September 1892 questioned the desirability of any
T. I.P.P. Aug.1892 No.2Mk(jW£-. <&JU VTi)
such prohibition. They doubted whether this was consistent 
with the Act which declared "any person resident in India" 
eligible for nomination to the douncils. Even if correct legally, 
they did not consider such exclusion necessary, if the person 
concerned was otherwise eligible. They asserted that "one such
I
person would be an excellent representative of the Sind Zemindars."
The government of India argued in a letter to the secretary 
of state that such exclusion was legal inasmuch as they were not 
precluded by the Act from laying down the qualifications that 
appeared to them desirable in a nominee. Further, the recommend­
ation of an official was deemed "inconsistent with that represent­
ative character which we desire to give to the non-official 
2
element•"
The clause was received with hostility at Vtfhitehall# The 
legal adviser of the India Office thought that the rule was 
illegal and the matter was referred to the Law Officers of the 
Crown# The letter concurred with the government of India, and 
declared the provision legal. The India Council, however, took 
the strongest objection to the rule, which they considered was 
offensive to the official class and involved an invidious 
discrimination against them. Besides, the rule restricted the 
scope of choice. The Council declared unanimously against the 
rule. The secretary of state informed the governor-general of
1. I.P.P. °ct.l892. No.162 (Para.6)
2. X.P.P. Oct.1892, No.167 (ParaA)
the situation and wanted to know if the exclusion was particularly
desired, Lansdowne replied that his council was not unanimous
in recommending the exclusion and it would not be insisted on.
This enabled Kimberley to acquiesce to the view of his council
I
and to drop the rule.
Though agreeing to omit the rule, the government of India
did not alter their views. Their attitude towards the recommendation
of officials remained one of dislike. In their letters to the
£
provinces on 13 March 1893 conveying the secretary of state*s 
sanction to the rules, the governors and the Lt,-governors were 
advised that they would be competent to refuse any recommendation 
of an official on grounds of difficulty to release him from his 
duties or any other reason, if they considered his nomination 
undesirable. The body recommending the official would then be 
requested to recommend some one else. They made it clear that 
the official quota in the councils should in no case be increased 
at the cost of non-officials as the consequence of any such 
recommendation. If the official quota was full, the recommend­
ation was to be rejected unless a vacancy was created by the 
resignation of another official additional member. Thus within 
the limit of representation that they conceded, the government of
India were unwilling to detract from its scope.
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** +*
Another question raised by the Bombay government was
1. Kimberley Papers (Kimberley to Lansdowne Letter dtd. 3 and 17
Feb,1893 and telegram dtd. 7»2.l893» Lansdown^to Kimberley 
telegram dtd. 9«2,1893*
2. I.P.P. March l893» Nos.l^fO (Madras} l42(Bombay), l*f*f (Bengal) ,
and 146 (North-West Provinces)
!b$~
"whether the Council can be summoned for the mere purpose of
a discussion of the financial statement or of giving replies to
questions, at a time when there is no legislative business before 
I
it." They argued that since the councils were described in the
Act as councils for the purpose of malting laws and regulations,
they were really established for the purpose of making laws,
and could not meet for financial discussion or interpellation
when no legislative business was before them. The government of
the North West Provinces and Oudh expressed similar misgiving?.
In bringing th&f question to the notice of the secretary of
state, the government of India said that they did not consider
it of much practical importance. If the council could not meet
except for legislative business, it would always be easy to
"arrange for some formal legislative business to be taken in
order to admit of the financial statement being discussed or
2
questions asked." They were, however, of opinion that the 
council could meet for financial discussion or interpellation 
even when no legislation was necessary.
The secretary of state came to a different decision. He
was advised that a meeting of the council could be only for
legislative purposes, and therefore it could not legally be 
summoned, in the absence of legislative work, "for the purpose 
of merely discussion, the financial statement or of giving replies
3 /
to questions." The government of India’s desire to exclude
T. I.P.P. Oct.1892 No.162 (Para.7)
2. Ibid, No.167 (Para.7)
3. I.P.P. March 1893 No.139 (Secy.of state’s Despatch of 16.2.1893)
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officials from the quota of recommended members, as also their
readiness to convene the councils even when no legislative
business was pending, show their willingness to give the
fullest scope to the refofms.
** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** ** *
The government of India in the draft rules provided that
the governor/Lt.-governor might reject any recommendation made
under these rules by a body or association. In such cases of
rejection the body or association concerned would be requested
to make a fresh recommendation. The Lt.-governor of the North-
West Provinces and Oudh was opposed to such wide power being
left to the head of the administration. He pointed out that the
unlimited discretion would be capable of most invidious exercise
and could amount to arbitrary treatment of the recommendations.
He did not desire that the rules should arm the executive with
"an unconditional right of veto" and suggested that "some
indication should be given of the limits within which recommend-
I
ations may be rejected." Otherwise the rule would, with some 
semblance of reason, be pointed out by hostile QjLtie-s as 
setting at naught the intended changes in the constitution of the 
councils.
The government of India defended this power of rejection on 
the ground that whatever might be the procedure adopted, the
I. I.P.P., October 1892, No.166 (North-West Provinces and Oudh 
government letter dated 3*10*1892, Para.8)
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responsibility for nomination rested with the head of the 
I
administration. They invoked Crossfs letter of 30 June 1892
for their justification. Cross had emphasized that "the ultimate
nominating authority” still rested with the Heads of the govern- ■
ments and that "the responsibility attaching to the careful
2
exercise of this authority by ho means diminishes....” Kimberley,
the secretary of state, did not run counter to the government of
India in this decision.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
We have already seen that in his note of 16 June 1892
Lansdowne drew a line of distinction between the local councils
+
and the governor-general1s legislative council. Though he would 
not reconstitute the latter council on the pattern of the local 
councils, he conceived the idea of appointing to his council 
persons recommended by the members of the provincial councils.
In letters dated 13 August 1892 to the provinces, the government 
of India expressed their belief that these reconstituted councils 
would "afford the best agency by which recommendations for seats 
in the enlarged council of the Governor-General for making laws
3
and regulations can be furnished.”
This was reiterated by Lansdowne in a private letter to 
Kimberley. Professing that "there is no intention of postponing 
the introduction of the elective element into the Viceroy's 
Council for an indefinite timey Lansdowne said that he would
1. Ibid, No.167*
2. I.P.P., August 1892, No.239 (Para.6^
+ See p.iJbabove.
3. Ibid, No.2*fl (Para.7)
deal with the supreme council aftea? the constitution of the local 
councils had been decided upon. He indicated, however, the shape 
of things to come: M!Ve shall probably rely mainly on the local
legislative councils as Constituencies1 for the purpose of
I
electing1 representative members for the Viceroy’s Council.11
The same views were officially communicated by the government of
India to the secretary of state in their letter of 26 October
1892* But they refrained from drawing up the draft proposals
for the supreme council before the constitution of the local
councils had been finalised. They wanted to proceed only after
the secretary of state’s views on the local councils had been
ascertained, because, as they explained in a later communication,
they contemplated that the reform of the governor-general1s
2
council would be "based upon the general principles" followed 
in regard to the local councils.
The government of India did not think of confining the 
association of representative elements in the supreme council 
only to the provinces with legislative councils.*' They were 
willing as far as possible to admit of an element of representation 
while appointing members from elsewhere. In this they took
their cue from Cross’s despatch of 30 June 1892. Cross had 
acknowledged the possibility of consulting corporations "establish-
J
ed with definite powers, upon a recognized administrative basis" or
1. Kimberley Papers (Lansdowne's letter dated 19*10.1892)
2. I.P.P. Oct.1892 No.167 (Para.l)
associations, where these were ’’formed upon a substantial
community of legitimate interests, professional commercial or 
i '
territorial." In letters dated 22 August 1892 to the government
of the Punjab and the Chief Commissioners of Assam and the
Central Provinces, the government of India enquired whether within
their respective territories there were ’’any such classes or
bodies, representing ’a substantial community of legitimate 
interests, professional, commercial or territorial1,” who were 
important enough to be consulted, through the respective govern­
ments^ in making nomination to the supreme council. The government 
of India did not envisage any detailed rules for submitting 
recommendations in the case of these provinces for they could not
commit themselves always to nominate a member from each of these
territories to the supreme council. The exigencies of class 
representation, the needs of expert advice and better balancing 
of interests precluded them from doing so. What they were really 
driving at was in case of the allotment of a member to any of 
these provinces to clothe him with ”a somewhat more representative
character than would attach to him if he were arbitrarily
2
selected by the Head of the Administration.”
The reactions of these provinces varied. The Lt.-governor
of the Punjab replied in the negative, for ”the materials for such
an arrangement as the Government of India contemplate are in this
3
province still non-existent.” The chief commissioner of the
in I.P.P. Aug.1892 Ho.239 (Para.6)
2. Ibid, No,2^9 (Para.4)
3. I.P.P., February 1893» No.84 (The Punjab government letter
dtd• 31.10.l892)
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Central Provinces proposed an elaborate scheme of recommendation
I
based on municipalities and district councils. In Assam only
the tea-planting community was deemed to satisfy the requirements
of the government of India; in case the representation of this
interest was needed on the supreme council, the Assam government
stated that this could be secured through the local branches
2
of the IndiartTea Association.
The rules governing the constitution of the local legislative 
councils, were approved by the secretary of state in February
3 .
1893* On 22 March 1893 the government of India submitted to 
the secretary of state their formal proposals regarding the
4
supreme legislative council. Out of the maximum strength of 
additional members, sixteen, not more than ten could be non­
officials consistently with the maintenance of the official 
majority. Of these ten seats, they proposed that four should be 
filled upon the recommendation of the non-official members of the 
local legislative councils. It was further required that the 
person so recommended by the non-official members of a local 
legislative council "shall be a person ordinarily resident within
3
the province for which such Council is appointed." One seat was 
allotted to the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. A representative 
of this body had always sat on the supreme legislative council
TT Ibid, No.82 (The C.P.government letter dt. 20.9.1892) - The
replies of the Punjab and Central Provinces government*will be 
considered in the next chapter.
2. Ibid, No.81 (Assam government letter dt. l4.10.l892)
3. I.P.P., March 1893 - No.139 (Secretary of statefs despatch dtd.
16.2.1893)
4. Ibid, No.131*
3* Ibid, No.152 (Draft Regulations - No.VI)
ni
and the government of India saw "no reason why this arrangement
should not continue. ” The balance of the non-official quota,
numbering five, was wholly inadequate to secure the representation
of the remaining '’multifarious interests and numerous local
divisions” of the country# No practical purpose would in the
circumstances be served by adopting any "quasi-elective machinery.”
Nor was this practicable# The allotment of these seats would
depend on various considerations, and would be largely influenced
by the Character of business before.the council. This would
determine whether the seats should be used for hearing the views
of certain interests, or of territorial divisions, or of expejxts
I
’’upon large measures affecting British India as a whole.”
Besides, it was also intended to retain the liberty of inciting 
representatives of the native states from time to time. In view 
of all these considerations, these five seats were to be filled 
by nomination at the discretion of the governor-general. The 
government of India did not think that the circumstances allowed 
of any other solution.
In nominating a representative of a province without a 
legislative council, the advantage of the liead of the province
a
seeking advice of the persons ’’best qualified to assist" him 
was recognised. The relevant draft rule concerning these five 
i non-official seats provided for nomination "in such manner as
i +
shall appear to him most suitable with reference to the legislative
i
i  . . —  - - - - - - - - - - - -  .  .  .  .  - .  - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - — ■ ■  ■  ■  - ■
i I. Ibid, No.151 (Para.4)
[ 2. Ibid.
j + i.e. the governor-general.
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business to be brought before the council and the due represent-
I
ation of the different classes of the community". In all other
respects the rules of the local councils were followed* The
government of India commended the rules to the secretary of
state "as an adequate attempt to carry out the intention of
•Parliament that the principle of election should, as far as
possible, be given effect to in choosing representatives of the
different classes and local divisions of the Empire to assist
2
in legislative business."
The rules were approved by the secretary of state in his
despatch of 11 May 1893 with slight verbal modifications.
Though the elective principle was engrafted into the supreme
legislative council by these rules, the representative element
was much less important than in the local councils. While only
half of the non-official members of the supreme council were to
be recommended, the proportion was much higher in the local
councils. Besides, the recommending bodies in the case of the
local councils were more broad-based. Except for the Calcutta
Chamber of Commerce, a recommending body for the supreme council
would not consist of more than eleven members: in Bengal and
North-West Provinces and Oudh it would consist of even less.
But it is wrong perhaps to assess the significance of the change
by a reference to the quantity: it lay much more in the break in
principle at least from the hitherto sacrosanct tradition of the
inevitaU/^ and infallibility of executive selection.
' * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ★
1. Ibid, No.152 (Draft Rule III)
2. Ibid, No.151 (Para.6)
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In regard to the rules concerning the constitution of the 
legislative councils themmodel for the supreme legislative 
council was set by the local councils! the position was reversed, 
however, in the formulation of the rules governing financial 
discussion and interpellation. The government of India drafted 
the rules on these subjects for the supreme legislative council 
first, and the provincial governments concerned were then asked 
how far they desired to adopt these for their respective legis­
lative councils. In a letter dated 23 August 1892 the government 
of India informed the secretary of state that these draft rules 
for the governor-general1s legislative council would "form the
basis upon which the rules on the same subjects for local councils
I
will be formulated." For sake of convenience, we shall deal 
with these two sets of rules separately, and shall take up the 
financial discussions first.
The draft rules were based on the practice actually prevalent 
in the imperial legislative council on those occasions when 
financial arrangements were discussed at its meetings. The 
government of India denied any necessity for alteration. The 
draft rules for the imperial council were:-
" (l) The Financial Statement shall be explained in 
Council every year and a printed copy given to each Member.
(2) After the explanation has been made, each Member 
shall be at liberty to offer any observations he may wish i:o 
make on the Statement.
I. I.P.P., August 1892, No.230.
17 <,
"(3) The Financial Member shall have the right of reply,
and the discussion shall be closed by the President making
I
such observations, if any, as he may consider necessary.n
For the local councils the same rules were recommended with 
slight verbal changes to make clear that the discussion was to 
be of the financial statement of a particular provincial govern­
ment only. The government of India said that these discussions 
in the local councils would be "limited to those branches of 
revenue and expenditure which are under the control" of the 
respective local governments. In no case would criticism of 
Imperial finance be permitted in the local councils. It was 
pointed out that the object of financial discussions in the local 
councils was to acquaint the government with "the most enlightened 
opinion" in the province, thus making available the means of
"meeting objections and removing defects" in the financial
2
arrangements of the succeeding year.
An addition to the rules was proposed by the Bombay government. 
They wanted to include a further rule:- " (*f) The discussion 
will be limited to those branches of revenue and expenditure which 
are under the control of the government of Bombay; and it will
3
not be permissible to enter upon a criticism of Imperial Finance." 
This rule followed closely the instructions of the government of 
India, who accepted it. Madras, Bengal and North-West Provinces 
too approved of this addition, which was included in the set of 
rules for the local councils, with the words *Local Governments1 
replacing Government of Bombay1.
Ti Ibid, No ?231. 3 . Ibid, No.16^ (Draft rules with Bombay
2, Ibid, ^0|2*fl^ government letter dt. 29#9*l892)
nr
The Madras government in their reply sought to indicate
the time of presenting the "Provincial budget11 in the council;
I
they would have it "in the last week of January." This did not
find favour with the government of India. They explained to the
government of Madras the desirability of the rules for all the
councils following the same pattern. They would prefer •’Financial
statement1 to ’Provincial budget*, and discouraged any mention
of date. Though the local budget was submitted to the government
of India in January, its arrangements could not be final prior
to approval by the latter authority, which took some time.
Further, the discussion in the council was "not intended to
influence the arrangements for the year." So, for the sake of
convenience, the sanction of the government of India should
2
precede the discussion in the council.
★ * * ★ * * * * * * * * * * * # * ♦ * * * *
In a note dated 25 April 1889 Lansdowne discussed the
possible forms of restricting the scope of interpellation in the
councils. Three alternatives suggested themselves:
" (1) Questions relating to certain classes of subjects, 
e.g. the military or foreign policy of the Government of India,
might be excluded en bloc;
" (2) While no attempt was made to exclude questions of 
a particular class, the President or a Committee of Council 
might be empowered to object to any question as one which could 
not be answered consistently with public interests;
1. I.P.P., October 1892, No.159 (Draft rules with Madras letter
dt. 3.9.1892)
2. Ibid, No.1751 (India government letter dt..27.10.1892)
\ l b
” (3) Both these methods might be resorted to simultaneously,
certain subjects being excluded, the (fcC-sident retaining his ve/to
I
in regard to the rest.”
Lansdowne expressed himself in favour' of the second course 
above. He was content to leave the discretion to the President, 
and thought that in certain circumstances questions on foreign 
policy, far from-being resented, might be welcomed by the govern­
ment. He concluded that such a procedure was not liable to great 
abuse so long as the councils remained what they were.
Lansdownefs views were not shared by the governors of Madras 
and Bombay, and Lt.-governors of Bengal and North-West Provinces 
and Oudh. In their private correspondence, they unanimously 
desired to forbid questions on certain subjects by rules. But in 
his note of 16 June 1892 Lansdowne persisted in his views: he
wanted, at any rate at the outset, to preclude any such exclusion 
being laid down in the rules. He thought that it might be desirable 
on occasions to have an opportunity of answering questions on all
branches of administration, whether in the local councils or in
2
the Imperial council.
Kimberley admitted the force of Lansdowne fs ”arguments
3
against absolute exclusion of any subject,” but he was not free
from misgivings about the possible mischievous outcome of questions
on the Native States. Lansdowne replied that in his council he
would ordinarily admit such questions uwhen there i^ as no special
if
reason for objecting,” Of course, in the local councils questions
1. Kimberley Papers (Quoted in Lansdowne's note of 16.6.1892)
2. Ibid.
3* Ibid (Kimberley to Lansdowne, 22.9*1892) 
if. Ibid (Lansdowne to Kimberley, 19*10,1892)
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only on states under the political subordination of the local 
government concerned would be admissible. The governor-general 
evinced no intention of burdening the right of interpellation 
with pre-conceived limitations. This was another example of 
the desire to give the reforms their full scope.
The official correspondence on this subject, as in the 
case of financial discussion, began with giving the provinces 
draft rules. These were based on the draft rules for the governor-
V
general*s council; their main features were the following:- 
(a) The President could disallow any question "without giving 
any reason therefor other than that in his opinion it cannot be 
answered consistently with the public interests.11 (b) No
discussion would be permitted on any answer to a question. (c)
The period of notice for questions was three days, though it might 
be shortened or extended in respect of a particular question by 
the President. (d) "Questions must be so framed as to be merely 
requests for information, and must not be in an argumentative
I
form or defamatory of any person or section of the community*11
The draft rules for the provincial councils, however, had an
additional provision. This originated in the necessity of
restricting interpellation in local councils to matters under the
control of respective local governments and to maintain some
reserve in regard to matters which had been subjects of controversy* 
These were the only restrictions which the government of India
I. I.P.P., August, 1892, No.252.
I 7*
included in the rules. The relevant rule read: nNo question
' +
shall be asked or answered in the council of the Lt.-Governor, at
a meeting of the Council for the purpose of making laws and
regulations, as to any matters or branches of the administration
other than those under the control of the Lt .-Governor: and
except as to matters of fact, no question shall be asked or
answered relating to matters which are or have been the subject
of controversy between the Governor-General in Council and the
I
Local Government*M
The government of Madras acknowledged the necessity of
confining questions to matters under the control of the local
government, but considered the second restriction superfluous.
They argued that the President had authority to forbid any undesir-
2
able question, and this should be enough safeguard. No other
province took exception to this restriction: on the contrary,
the Bombay government suggested changes for the sake of verbal
precision and for including differences with the secretary of state
3
within its scope. Though the Bombay draft was not accepted by
the government of India, the language respecting this restriction
was revised as f o l l o w s : . *and, in matters which are or have
been the subject of controversy between the Governor-General in
Council or the Secretary of State, and the Local Government, no
question shall be asked except as to matters of fact, and the
k
answer shall be confined to a statement of facts.ff
I* Ibid, No.2*f6. 3  ZZTI3
2. I.P.P. Oct.1892, No.157. +  ^
3. Ibid, No.162.
4. Ibid, No.173 (Revised rules for asking questions)
The Bombay government suggested several changes in the
draft rules. They would prefer much more detailed rules, and
drafted a set "chiefly derived from the rules and orders in
I
regard to questions of the House of Commons.11 Their comprehensive
draft contained further restrictions and some procedural
directions. Some of the changes suggested were accepted by the
government of India. On the side of procedure, the 'Notice Paper1
on which the questions admitted by the President would be entered
were provided for, with some particulars of its contents. The
Notice period was increased to six days. A new rule was
included authorising the President to rule at his discretion
that a question on the Notice Paper, though not put by the
member concerned, would be answered "on the ground of public
interest." Thus was obtained the means of communicating to the
public any information that the government wanted them to know.
As to the form of question, it was to relate to facts and was
2
forbidden to be "hypothetical". All these alterations applied 
alike to the supreme legislative council and the local councils.
These rules, along with those on financial discussion, were 
sanctioned in January 1893 by the secretary of state, with the 
addition of definition of the terms 'council', 'President' and 
'Member'. In the final stage these rules were arranged together 
in three sections, - the first devoted to the definition, the 
second to financial discussion and the last to interpellation.
71 Ibid, No.176 (Government of India to Bombay government 27#10.
189/)
2. Ibid, No.l8l (Revised rules for asking questions)
iso
The only interesting point about the definition was that it
arranged for chairmanship of the councils in the absence of
the head of the administration. The senior ordinary member of
the council present would then act as President, unless in the
supreme legislative council an acting President had already
' I
been nominated by the governor-general.
★ * ** ** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** * *
The foregoing reveals beyond doubt where lay the main 
guiding influence in the formulation of all these three sets 
of rules. The decisive role was indubitably Lansdowne*s. The 
mode of admitting the elective principle was laid down by him, 
as was the broad policy in regard to interpellation. He entered 
the domain of particulars too and left his imprint there also.
For example, the extent to which elections should be introduced, 
the electoral body for the supreme legislative council, the 
appointment of maximum additional members - in all these: 
important matters he determined the policy of the government of
t
India.
While Lansdowne led the government of India, the latter 
showed the way to the provincial governments. Except in matters 
of detail, the provincial governments accepted the scheme drawn 
for them by the government of India. Deviation on details too 
was far from extensive. This agreement between the government 
of India and the provincial governments is all the more significant 
in view of the known divergence of views. Thus the provincial
• 1 . ■ ■ 1 ' • • , t ; '  'I'.)
I. ‘ I.P.P., February lb93j No.104 (Notification No.9 dt.2*2#l893)
/El
heads held widely varied opinions about the constitution of 
+
the councils; they differed from , Lansdowne on the nature
*
of restrictions on interpellation. Perhaps this underlines 
still further the influence of Lansdowne. In private correspond­
ence with the provincial heads, he may well have paved the way 
for a smooth reception of the government of India drafts.
The attitude of Lansdowne evokes special interest. A 
Conservative in politics and sent to India by a Conservative 
government, Lansdowne had indicated his views on the major 
issues of policy when the Conservative government and Cross 
were still in office. This is seen from his notes of 25 April 
1889 and l6 June 1892 as discussed above. Had Lansdowne 
enunciated these principles after the advent of Kimberley, a 
Liberal, to the India Office, it might be said that he had 
adjusted his views to suit the Liberal administration. As it 
happened, Kimberley did practically nothing but approve the 
line Lansdowne had taken. In one of his early letters, referring 
to these rules, Kimberley said that he was uvery glad11 to find 
that Lansdowne took Mwhat I may term a liberal view” regarding
the introduction of election. Kimberley himself was aware
I
!1of the necessity of proceeding cautiously” and to this might 
be traced his unwillingness to press against his council the 
prohibition of official additional members-. But this fact 
also serves to emphasise Lansdowne*s share in this matter.
+ See p./5J above.
* See pp. (7k above.
I. Kimberley Papers (Kimberley to Lansdowne 22.9*1892)
JS ^
Perhaps in this can be discerned the influence of his earlier 
political career as a Liberal,
* * * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  ' * *  * *  * *  * *  * *
foon after the enactment
of the Indian Councils Act 1892, the government were requested
to publish the draft rules. The same request was repeated often
enough. In a resolution adopted at its eighth session, the
Indian National Congress prayed ,?that these rules may be published
in the official gazettes, like other proposed legislative
I
measures, before being finally adopted." In an editorial on
5 November 1892, the Bengalee wrote on the desirability of the
local governments seeking "to be enlightened" on the proposed
rules "by at least those organizations which have taken a
prominent part in bringing about this reform," A later editorial
dilated on the importance of these rules which would determine
"the machinery for the making of laws" in India. It called
for the support of public opinion in order to ensure a fair
trial to the "novel experiment" which the rules were intended 
2
to launch.
The committee of the Indian Association in a memorial to 
the government of India in January 1893 similarly asked for 
"the publication, for purposes of discussion, of the rules" 
before their final adoption. They submitted that these rules
1, Report of eighth I.N.C, Resolution I,
2. The Bengalee, 21.1,1893*
I 5 3
were "quite as important, if indeed they are not even more 
important than any legislative proposals could be", in vie?/ of 
their momentous role in the far-reaching experiments under way. 
They deprecated the official silence over these important reg­
ulations, while "the pettiest bye-laws affecting the obscurest 
municipality in the province has to be published before it is
finally sanctioned, so as to allow the people concerned the
I
opportunity of discussion." No heed was paid by the government
to all these prayers. In a letter dated 6 February 1893 to the
government of Bengal, the government of India replying to the
memorial of the Indian Association said that the rules v/ere
still under discussion, thus indirectly denying the public a
2
glimpse of the draft rules. On 9 February 1893 in the House of 
Commons, Dadabhai Naoroji asked whether the government of India 
had been, or would now be instructed to publish the proposed 
rules prior to their adoption "so as to enable the public to 
express their views in regard to them." George Russell, the 
Under-secretary of state, disowned any intention of issuing such
3
instructions*
Though the government were intransigent about the publication
of the draft rules, the secretary of state was not opposed to some
v
discussion with non-official Indians. On 22 September 1892-, 
Kimberley wrote to Lansdowne, "You have, I doubt not, discussed
1. I.P.P. February 1893« No.107 (The memorial was forwarded to the
government of India by the Bengal government.)
2. Ibid, No.108.
3# Indian Pari.Debates, 1893* P*21.
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your proposals with some leading Native gentlemen. I should 
be curious to know their views.” Replying on 19 October 1892 
Lansdowne said, ”1 gather from the private letters which I 
have received from the heads of the local governments that there 
has been a good deal of informal discussion of this sort. I 
cannot say that I have had the advantage of conferring with
any Native gentleman since our proposals have taken a definite 
I
shape.” We can only conjecture as to the nature and extent
of such discussion, and as to the standing of persons considered
deserving of confidence in this matter by the provincial heads.
It is significant that Lansdowne*s reply did not mention the
views of these persons which the secretary of state asked for.
Further, Landdowne*s failure to consult *any Native gentleman'
can only be ascribed to a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm in
that behalf. It would thus be wise perhaps to take this
assertion of informal discussion warily, especially because
none of these consultations was reported officially - a fact
which in the circumstances was rather surprising.
** * * ** ** ** ** * ★ * * ** * *
The publication of the rules did not lead to any immediate
general uproar. Criticisms were made no doubt, but these were 
by those isolated interests which considered that the rules 
were unfair to them and discriminated, against them. Otherwise, 
the rules did not evoke a general hostility.
7/hy was this so? None, not even the most ardent seekers 
of reform and innovation, expected the Act to introduce revolution
ary changes. So, within the framework of the Act, with its_______
I . Kimb e r1 e y Pape r s .
izf
well-defined and limited purposes, there was no scope for wide 
variation* An illustration will help us to gauge how far the 
rules accorded with the nationalist wishes.
A resolution adopted by the Bengal Provincial Conference
I
prescribed the composition of the Bengal legislative council.
This gave five seats to nominated officials and four to nominated 
non-officials, the latter to secure the representation of 
Semindary interest (1 seat), Moslems (1 seat), and IflVKt*
(2 seats). The balance of eleven seats were to be filled by 
election: one member each was given to the University, Chamber
of Commerce, Trades Association and Indian mercantile interests 
represented by the National Chamber of Commerce; four members 
were distributed equally between the Calcutta Corporation and 
the district boards; the, Dittfassal municipalities got the 
remaining three seats. But for the official minority, this 
scheme followed in the main the government proposals. Excepting 
the Indian mercantile interests, the resolution mentioned no 
interest which was not recognised by the government and which 
did not receive representation, whether by recommendation or 
by nomination, in the Bengal legislative council under the new 
dispensation.
The resolution further mentioned the mode of securing 'the 
representation of the district boards and the municipalities.
They proposed delegates to represent these bodies in electing
I. I.P.P., March 18931 No.103.
Igb
nominees, grouping of these bodies, and a system of rotation - 
all these, again, conforming broadly to the arrangements of the 
government regulations.
Even though the resolution provided for a non-official 
majority, the emergence of a well-organised opposition to the 
government was not envisaged. Surendranath Banerjea, in a 
letter dated Ik February 1893 to the secretary of state, 
referring to this proposal pointed out that "the elements that
/
 ^will compose the council will be so widely divergent that a
combination for the purpose of rendering an effectual opposition
I
to official measures will be practically impossible....."
The substantial similarity of approach between the government 
and others in rule making accounts for the absence of any immediate 
vehement criticism. On the contrary, some appreciation of the 
governments work was forthcoming from what may be termed as the 
opposite camp. Thus in the House of Commons on 21 September 1893 
Schwann expressed gratefulness "to the Indian Government for 
the advantage which at present existed in having in the legis­
lative councils Indian gentlemen who were able to express exactly
2 ti
the wishes and aspirations of their own people. Similarly, 
the Indian National Congress in its first resolution of 1893 
session tendered "its most sincere thanks to His Excellency the 
Viceroy for the liberal spirit in which he has endeavoured
3
to give effect to the Indian Councils Act of 1892."
1. I.P.P., March 1893, No.lO^ f.
2. Indian Pari.Debates, 1893» p*708.
3. I.P.P. Feb.189^ Jo•203#
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But as already mentioned, criticism of the rules on the 
ground of unfairness to isolated interests was not absent. The 
strongest protests came from Bombay. Memorials were addressed 
and resolutions forwarded to the government by many municipalities 
and public bodies, like thejBombay Presidency Association, critic­
ising the allocation of seats for recommendation in the Bombay 
legislative council. On 17 May 1893 a deputation waited upon 
Harris, the governor of Bombay. The deputation consisted of 
delegates of Sarvajanik Sabha, Poona, of the Poona municipality 
and of the district local boards and municipalities of the 'fefufassal* 
One of its prominent members was Gopal Krishna Gokhale. Harris 
pleaded inability to reconsider the allotment of seats. Thereupon 
Gokhale and Satha, the secretaries of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha^ 
submitted a representation to the government of India on 3 June 
l893* Four of the eight seats to be filled by recommendation 
had been allotted to the Sardars of Deccan, the Sind Zemindars, 
the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Karachi Chamber of 
Commerce. They pointed out that the Deccan Sardars were a body 
of 190 men, that the Sind Zemindars numbered 300, and that the 
membership of the two Chambers of Commerce stood at 73 in Bombay 
and 31 in Karachi. Thus the rules gave "small minorities" a 
much'larger share in representation thate, was their due* Protesting 
against this, they demanded representation of the central division 
of the Presidency through local bodies, and of the native 
mercantile community. To the Bombay government plea that the 
council was to secure the representation of races, classes and
/ gv
interests, they objected on the ground that over-emphasis on
this would fail to attain the object of the Act "that those who
are subject to the laws.....should have some sort of voice,
I
direct or remote, in the making of the laws..’1 They pleaded,
therefore, for a re-allocation of seats:- one seat to the local
bodies of each of the four administrative divisions of the
Presidency, and one each to the University, Bombay Chamber of
Commerce, the Corporation and the Deccan Sardars. The three
seats at the governor's disposal would go to the Karachi Chamber
of Commerce, ^gmindars of Sind and Gujc^rat, and to the Moslems
of Bombay. All this fell flat on the government of India. The
Bombay government were asked to inform the Sarvajanik Sabha
that the rules could not be changed, and that the "Governor-
General in Council prefers to await experience of their working
for some time before considering whether any change in them is
2
necessary or expedient."
In May 1893 the managing committee of the British Indian
Association submitted a memorial to the governor-general praying
for the amendment of the rules for the Bengal council, to admit
of nomination of a member on the recommendation of the Association.
This was rejected because the Association was not considered
adequately representative of the iiemindari interest of the Bengal 
3
Presidency.
On 13 February 189 -^ the Madras Landholders' Association
T. I.P.P., July 1893, No.137.
2. I.P.P. July 1893) No.l^O (Government of India letter dt.l8.7»l893]
3. I.P.P. June 1893, No.31^.
addressed a memorial to the Madras government praying for the
allotment of two seats to the xemindars of the Presidency, and
demanding that both the representatives should be nominated on
the recommendation of the Association or of the general body of
I g
landholders. The Madras government did not favour any such change#
Their stand was supported by the government of India who would
not alter the rules "before a longer experience has been gained
3
of their working." An appeal to the secretary of state also failed 
and the Madras landholders had to be content with one nominated 
member•
The case for the representation of the Indian mercantile
community in the Bengal legislative council was raised in the
House of Commons on 2 August 189*+ by Sir William Wedderburn.
He also spoke of "apparent favour shown to the European public
4 ( +
bodies in Calcutta" under the rules. H.H.Fowler, the secretary
of state, denied any such discrimination and said that eight
of the ten non-official members of the Bengal council were
Indians. He declined to intervene, and would trust the
Lt.-governor to consult various interests in filling the seats
at his disposal.
I. Public letters from India 1893» Vol.I, pp.73-75•
2f Ibid, p.6l (Madras government letter dated 1^.3*189*0 
£• Ibid, p.62 (India/ government letter dated 16.^.189*0 
Indian Par 1.Debates , 189*+ * p*l83*
+ Sir Henry Hartley Fowler, afterwards first Viscount of 
Wolverhampton (183O-I9II)• Son of a Wesleyan minister, Fowler 
began his career as a solicitor. His capacity for public 
affairs fehowed itself early in municipal affairs. He entered 
House of Commons in 1880 as a Liberal, He was cautious and 
moderate in his views. Gladstone appointed him Under-secretary 
for Home Ministry in 1884, Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
in 1886 and President of the local government Board in 1892.
On Gladstone's retirement in 189**-, he became secretary of state 
for India. During his tenure in the India Office he said in the
P.T.O#
ffo
Such criticisms sprung from grievances of interests and
classes and found a united and oountry-wide platform in the
Indian National Congress. The Congress of 189^ in marked contrast 
^  V »-OexjTr^ /3 (xh&rd-
to the previous year’s appreciation^rules as ’Materially defective”
and asked for ’’fresh rules framed in a liberal spirit, with a
view to a better working of the Act, and suited to the conditions
I .
and requirements of each province.” The previous yearns sense 
of relief at the authorities not having stifled the elective 
principle had evidently given way to particular grievances which 
came to loom large in the Congress firmament. The plea for a
2
change of the Bombay rules was included in a resolution of 1893*
In the same session Pandit Bishen Narayan Dhar a delegate from
the North-West Provinces and Oudh, was highly critical of the
grouping of the municipalities for the purpose of recommendation
in his province. He also resented the officials retaining their
seats on local bodies.for electing members. Baikunthanath Sen,
a delegate from Bengal, lamented the non-recognition of the
ZJtmindan^' interest as a recommending authority in that province. 
Tahilram Khemchand
from Sind would not consider representation through the 3£emindars 
of Sind as genuine. The Congress of 1895 adopted a resolution 
protesting against the ’’retrogra.de policy” of nominating a member 
from the Central provinces to the supreme legislative council 
’’without asking .local bodies to make recommendation for such
3
nomination.”
Ti Resolution IX (b)
2. Resolution I.
3. Resolution XV.
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Though the bulk of the criticism related to the allotment
of seats for recommendation, other aspects of the rules were not
altogether neglected. R.N.Mudholkar, speaking from the Congress
platform in 1893, regretted that there was to be no voting on
the budget. Without a division, he contended,neither the
government nor the public would be aware of "the views of the
I
country with regard to these financial proposals.’1 He did not 
consider m&re discussion of much value. The same view was 
expressed by Surendranath Banerjea in the Congress of 1893. He 
wanted the members to have the power to move resolutions or to 
divide the Council on budget proposals. In view of the govern­
ment’s standing majority in the councils he could not see any 
reason why such a course should be opposed; for "if the non­
official members were united to a man they could not carry any
2
resolution if the government was firmly resolved to oppose it."
' Such criticism was in striking contrast to what Sir A.Scoble, 
an ex-member of the governor-general's executive council, said 
in the House of Commons on 13 August 189^• He asserted that 
the legislative councils though having nothing much to do v/ith 
the coUaction of revenues, "certainly had a voice in the 
disposition of the revenue." He assured the House that these 
councils "had a voice, and a patent voice, which if they chose.
3
to exercise wisely and reasonably was sure to be listened to."
1. Report of ninth .I.N.C., p.46#
2. Report of eleventh I.N.C. p.23*
3* Indian Pari.Debates 189 ,^ pp.229-230.
/fz.
No such conviction can be traced in the plaintive utterances 
of Gangadhar Rao Madhav Chitnavis in the supreme legislative 
council on 28 March 1895* He went out of his way to assure 
the government that the remarks made on the financial arrangements 
were made ”in no carping spirit”, and lamented that ”a non­
official member thus performs a somewhat thankless task. His
views are resented by the government as inopportune, and he is
I
unable to secure any benefit for the people he represents.”
On the subject of interpellation, before the rules were
published, the Bengal provincial Conference urged in a resolution
that the relevant rules should be ”so framed as to embrace all
questions except such as refer to the maintenance or discipline
of any part of Her Majesty*s Military or Naval forces, or such
as concern the relations of the Government with Foreign Princes 
2 tfcT
or Powers.” Mudholkar, in^speech mentioned above, argued that
since in the councils no motion could be brought forward, or
division taken, he did not think that ”any proper ventilation
of a grievance” had been allowed. Under the circumstances,
questions should be followed by discussion. As it was, he
3
asserted, ”it is useless to have any interpellation.” 
Interpellation became the subject of a Congress resolution in 
l893* said that the Congress ”being of opinion that the
practical utility of interpellations would be greatly enhanced 
if the members putting them were allowed to preface their
IT Pari.Papers, 1895* 283, p.125.
2. I.P.P., March 1893, No.103.
3. Report of ninth I.N.C. p.k6 *
f?3
questions by a short explanation of the reasons for them,
urges that the right to make such explanations ought to be 
I
granted." The purpose of the resolution, its mover V.R.Natu
explained, was to furnish fehort notes on the questions so that
the government might "understand the object of the questions"
2
and might "give proper replies..." From this speech as well 
as from the subsequent speeches of Gokhale and Sivaswamy Aiyar 
it would appear that there was some dissatisfaction at what was 
considered governments refusal to answer at all, or their 
answering imperfectly without divulging the information the 
questions were after. The president of that year*s Congress, 
Surendranath Banerjea, made a different case for changing the 
rules of interpellation. He referred to the opinions dxpressed 
by different high officials and newspapers that the right of 
interpellation had been usefully and reasonably exercised. He 
quoted the views of the writer on Indian affairs in the Times 
that "with scarcely an exception" the questions "have tended to 
a better understanding between the rulers and the ruled and 
in important instances they have furnished a valuable opportunity
3
of placing the actual facts before the public." Having regard 
to all this appreciation, Surendranath Banerjea urged the 
removal of restrictions on interpellation which seemed to him
k
"do defeat the purpose of a benefic^ent legislation." In fact he
asked for supplementary questions to be allowed.
1. Resolution XI.
2. Report of eleventh I.N.C* p.115*
3* Ibid, p.22.
k. Ibid, p.23.
Congress criticism also strayed beyond the scope of rules, 
particularly on one important aspect, i.e. the official members.
It was argued that inasmuch as the official members were compelled 
to toe the line of government policy, their presence was 
anomalous in the councils. Madan Mohan Malatfiya speaking in the 
Congress of 189^ referred to the debates in the governor-general1s 
legislative council on the imposition of cotton duties and said 
that the official members had made it abundantly clear that under 
the official mandate they had no choice but to side with the 
government.' So he pressed for na larger number of non-official
r
members" elected on a wider franchise. This he considered 
necessary for the protection of the interests of India, because 
the officials were not free to differ from the policy dictated 
from above. Surendranath Banerjea demanded in the 1895 Congress 
an amendment of the rules so that the number of elected members 
might be increased. Referring to the position of officials 
bound by a mandate, he pointed out that as against their unan­
imous voting "the amendments of non-official members have 
absolutely no chance," A measure was bound to be decided as 
willed by the government of India or the secretary of state. 
"Legislation under these circumstances" he said, "becomes a
foregone conclusion - the debate a mere formal ceremony - some
2
people will call it a farce."
1. Report of tenth I.N.C. p.110.
2. Report of eleventh I.N.C. p.2^ f.
nr
Such criticism was on the point of fact accurate. Writing
+
to Fowler, the secretary of state, on 7 March l89*f, Elgin , the 
governor-general, said "As it stands the Import Duty Bill, if
I
every one were free, would not; I suppose, secure a single vote."
And it is known that for some of the recalcitrant executive
councillors the secretary of state was obliged to threaten
2
dismissal from service as the price of their independence.
And where the executive councillors were treated with such 
scanty consideration, how could the other officials be inclined 
to court troubles by openly defying the government! In reply 
to a question of Henniker Heaton in the House of Commons on 
19 February 1895» the secretary of state justified the requirement 
of absolute support from official members as "in strict accordance 
both with the Acts of Parliament regulating the Government of 
India and with the constitutional and uniform practice under
3
these Acts," Not only this. The members were sought to be 
influenced to side with the government and in this task of 
canvassing sometimes even the high prestige and authority of the 
governor-general appear to have been brought into play. In a
1. Edith Henrietta Fowler (Mrs.Robert Hamilton) - The Life of
H.H.Fowler - p.293*
2. Ibid, p.317«
3* Indian Parl.Debates, 1895, pp.27-28.
+ Lord Elgin (18^9-1917)• Son of a former Viceroy of India,
Elgin was a liberal in politics. Though chairman of the Scottish 
Liberal Association, he was far from an active politician, and was 
of retiring disposition. He held minor posts under Gladstone, with 
whom his ties were strengthened by his loyalty to Gladstone at the 
time of Home Rule split. After Sir Henry Norman had declined an 
offer of the governor-generalship, Elgin accepted the post, but 
not without persuasion. He assumed change of the office on 
27 January 189^ •
m+
private letter to Hamilton, the secretary of state, on 10
February 1898, Elgin referred to the possibility of opposition
mn the legislation regarding sedition, and emphasized the
desirability of preventing, "if possible, a combination or even
apparent combination, between the Europeans and the Natives."
So at the request of his colleagues, he had "bben doing a little
lobbying1 work" The letter relates how Arthur, the President
of the Chamber of Commerce, himself a member of the supreme
legislative council, as the result of an interview with Elgin
made up his mind to support the government. "In the end Hr.
Arthur promised to recommend to his Committee" that "they would
not oppose what the Government thought more desirable and to
I
speak himself in that sense in Council." The criticism of
official preponderance in the legislative councils may not seem
exceptionable in this context.
** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** ** **
Thus the bulk of the criticism directed against thfc
government originated in the supposed inadequacy of the rules, -
particularly in respect of the elective principle. But an altogether
different view was also expressed - complaining that the reforms
I. Hamilton Papers, Part I, vol.IX(Elgin to Hamilton, 10.2.1898)
+ Lord George Francis Hamilton (18^5-1127) Belonging to a family 
of long-standing Tory traditions, Lord George Hamilton entered 
House of Commons as a Conservative in 1868; he was to sit there 
without any break up to 1906. In 187 -^ he was appointed Under­
secretary ffirslndia: Lord Salisbury was the secretary of state for
India. From 1883 to 1892 he was First Lord of the Admiralty and was 
responsible for extensive naval reforms. With the return of the 
Conservatives to power in 1895, Hamilton became the secretary of 
state for India. He remained in India Office till 1903, when he 
resigned his office due to difference of opinion with Cabinet 
colleagues on tariff and fiscal questions. (DNB)
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went too far and that the elective principle was unsuited for
I
India. In a letter addressed to the Times H.M.Ismail Khan of 
Datatfli, writing from Aligatth, asserted that India was "on the 
verge of serious danger" on account of the recent constitutional 
developments. He referred to the Congress and other English" 
educated Indians, who pleaded for reforms and who had 1 deceived* 
the parliament in making the latter believe "their cry to be the
voice of all India and their wishes to be the wishes of the whole 
country." He rebutted these claims and said that the National 
Congress "is in reality a Bengalee-Hindoo Congress", and that they 
"in no way can represent the nations who are not Hindoo : or the 
classes who do not khow English". The people who asked for 
reform were "merely a microscopic minority." He particularly 
referred to the increasing differences between the Moslems and 
the "modern Hindoo" as a result of which "national hatred and 
strong enmity is growing apace between Hindoos and Mahomedans."
"A great blunder" had therefore been committed by conceding the 
right of election on the insistence of a comparatively small
class of people. Elections, he said, were all right in a country 
inhabited by people of one race. "But to a country like India, 
inhabited by two-different nationalities, at mutual enmity, and 
of unequal numbers, and in which the persons educated in the new 
ideas and those following the old ideas form two distinct classes, 
and where these holding the new ideas have no influence in the
I. The Times, 20*9*1393♦
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country - to such a country this right of election cannot be a 
boon.” In the circumstances the recently enacted laws Mhave 
disheartened the Mahomedans." They apprehended some assault on 
their "national honour" because the Moslems could hardly be 
expected to fare well under the new system. The numerical 
majority of the Hindus would tell against them, and without the 
favour of the Hindus a Moslem would not be elected to the Council. 
This was a position which the Moslems could not accept: they
must be "able to send sufficient representatives of their choice 
to the Legislative Councils." Denied this right, they were 
liable to be treated"unfdLirly and^injustly", and, therefore, "so 
long as they do not have equal rights with the Hindoos they will 
never rest at peace." Eventual resort to arms^ if needs be, against 
the Hindus, to obtain their political rights, was not ruled out.
In view of all these difficulties and risky possibilities, the 
letter ended with an appeal to the "enlightened English nation" not 
to "thrust the constitution of England upon India," thereby enabling 
the Hindus to trample upon the political rights of the Moslems.
He said that the Moslems liked the British government, for there was
w
"not much religious difference^ between the Moslems and the
Christians. But "to bow our head" before the Hindus, the slaves
of another day, was unthinkable.
The striking similarity of this letter with Sir Syed Ahmed
+
Khan*s views, as discussed in Chapter I , point to the latterfs 
influence upon politically minded Moslems. The arguments of
111
H.M,Ismail Khan echo the views of Sir Syed Ahmfid Khan, His
letter further emphasizes the community consciousness that had
come to dominate Moslem thinking, and manifested itself in a
deep-seated distrust of the Hindus,
I
The Times in an editorial on this letter referred to the 
’’condition of unusual tension” between the two great religious 
communities of India. They saw ’’substantial truth” in many 
of the arguments of H.M,Ismail Khan, and considered that this 
must be admitted by all who were free from ”a superstitious 
v^and bigoted reverence for the latest form of modern democracy.” 
There was, no doubt, ”a large measure of truth” in the charge 
that ”a handful of Bengalee Hindus” had misled the people in 
believing that the very small English-educated class ’’represents 
the silent millions who are the real people of India.” They
saw much significance in the ’’feeling of repulsion” exhibited 
by the ’’loyal and cultivated Mahomedans” against the ’’Europeanized 
Bengalees.” The Times did not find it possible, however, to go 
the whole way with their correspondent. They conceded that 
something was owed to the people whom the latter had denounced. 
They had been taught by the British ”to aspire to place, and we 
are bound to gratify the cravings which we have implanted in 
their breasts, as far as we can do so without danger to the
internal tranquillity of India.”
* * * * * * * * id* * * id* * *  * * * * * *
I. The Times, 21.9.1892. i
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The working of the rules for the constitution of the councils
was reviewed in 1898-99 on the initiative of the secretary of
state. In a despatch dated 15 September 1898 Hamilton invited
the government of India and the local governments to say whether
the working of the rules framed five years earlier "has been
satisfactory, or whether it is considered that they call for any
amendment in order to carry out fully the intentions of the
I
legislation of l892«M
Prior to this^on 30 April 1898, the secretary to the British 
Indian Association had addressed a representation to the Bengal 
government. The Association prayed that the landlords' represent­
ative on the Bengal legislative council should be nominated on 
their recommendation and of other duly constituted associations 
of landlords. They lamented that during the last five years they 
had not been consulted by the Lt.-governor in nominating a £emindar 
on the legislative council. This they considered prejudicial to 
the interests of the landlords and inconsistent with their status 
and stake in the* country. They pointed out that the hope that some 
local bodies would recommend landlords had not been realized/ 
that they usually elected lawyers and persons '^strongly' imbued 
with Western radical ideas," who had no sympathy with the landlords 
and tenants alike, and were "out of touch with the bulk of what is 
after all a purely agricultural coi^munity." They showed that no 
landlord had been recommended to the Bengal legislative council 
in the last two terms (1895 and 1897). They, therefore, pleaded
iT I.P.P. November~l898~, No. 112
2 ° l
for an amendment of the rules to secure a better balance of
representation in the Bengal legislative council by giving the
landlords the right to recommend, and thus to recognise the claims
I
of representation of "wealth, property and social position*”
The Bengal government in their letter of 8 October 1898 to
the government of India endorsed the arguments of the British
Indian Association and admitted that the "great landed interest
of the province has not been sufficiently represented in the council
2
since its enlargement on the present basis.” They favoured, 
therefore, the allotment of a seat to associations of landlords, 
aftiproposed to take away one of the two seats allotted to the 
ffiufassal municipalities for the purpose. One member, to be 
recommended by the groups of municipalities in rotation, was 
considered adequate for the urban classes, especially in view of 
the presence in the council of a nominee of Calcutta Corporation.
The Lt.-governor did not think of surrendering a seat from those 
at his disposal. As a result, the Lt,-governor was no longer to be 
specifically required to nominate a landlord.
When the government of India, acting on the secretary of state*s 
directive, invited opinions from the local governments, the Bengal
3
government were content to reiterate the above stand.
The Lt.-governor of North-West Provinces and Oudh found the 
rules adequate for the representation of the important classes and
did^ no:t consider any modification necessary.
71 Ibid, go.Il4. T. I.P.P. July 1899, No.19
2, Ibid, No.113. (Bengal government letter dt.
11.3.1899)
^f.Ibid, No, 16 (N.W.Provinces 
government letter dt.7*1*1899)
The Madras government gave the same opinion and thought
that the rules nhave worked well.11 Their letter discussed the
interesting question of an undue preponderance of the lawyers
and professional classes. They contended that the landed interest
and the rural classes whether holding land in tenure from the
government or the Zemindars, were intimately connected, in sympathy
and in interest, with the lawyers. The lawyers generally sprung
from these classes and their earning was often invested in land.
The landed interest did not suffer therefore from their predomin-
I
ance in the council.
The Bombay government too had no suggestions for alteration, 
v*
They admitted that the district local boards and municipalities,
+
with one exception of a journalist, had invariably recommended
High Court pleaders. This they did not think Tla matter for
surprise.” The pleaders had more wide-spread influence, extending
over various districts through the hold of professional colleagues^
and they had a better knowledge of f,the art of canvassing.” On
the other hand, the local merchants or bankers or landholders had
Mas a rule, only a purely local influence.” That the members
of legal profession should fare better in the elections was thus 
2
not unusual.
The government of India, in their letter of 6 July 1899; 
advised the secretary of state that, exc ept for the modifications 
suggested by the Bengal government, "the existing system need not
be modified at present.” As regards the Imperial legislative
Ibid, No.17 (Madras government letter at.31*1.1899)
2. Ibid, No.20 (Bombay government letter dt. 12.4.1899)
+ B.G.Tilak.
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council, they found that all important classes were Mduly represent-
I
edM and they did not consider any change necessary*
2
The secretary of state accepted this advice, and the Bengal 
rule was amended accordingly*
This decision on the rules was not perhaps surprising*
The secretary of state had professed examination of the rules 
only; it was not open to any government to offer suggestions 
materially affecting the structure of the councils* And within 
the strait-jacket of the Indian Councils -Act 1892, the rules 
strove for the representation of the different interests and 
classes. No doubt, there were complaints and grievances over the 
allotment of seats; but with the few seats available for recommend­
ation no re-adjustment would easily be possible without upsetting 
what appeared to the authorities a fair balance. Besides, the 
practical difficulty of encouraging different interest to expect 
any alteration in their favour must have weighed heavily with the 
authorities. This would lead to a crop of proposals, perhaps 
running counter to one another. All these considerations might
have decided the attitude of the local governments* So far as
+
t!ie supreme council was concerned, the presence of Curzon at the
head of the government of India was unlikely to stimulate any
propensity to enlarge the narrow elective element in that body*
** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** * * **
I. Ibid, No.21
2* I*P*P., November 1899 No.203 (Despatch dated 7*9.1899)
+ Lord Curzon assumed the office on 6 January 1899*
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The Indian Councils Act 1892 and the rules made under it
constitute a decided step in the development of representative
institutions in India. Alike in the resort to the elective
system and the inauguration of interpellation and the examination
of the government's financial arrangements, a departure from the
hitherto autocratic government of India was made. Whatever
might be its extent, the actual significance lay in the
J association of representative Indians with the legislative
machinery of the country with a right to express their views
on the government's activity and policy. And by implication the
authorities admitted the obligation of listening to such views
as far as the interest of good government permitted. Despite
the safeguards surrounding the concession of election, the
J right of different bodies to elect their own representatives was
rea.l. They were free to make their own choice, which was
acdepted by the government. An interesting sidelight on the
government's policy of non-interference was seen in the House
of Commons on 12 July 1897- Questions were asked about the
nomination of B.G.Tilak to the Bombay legislative council on
recommendation. Tilak, a journalist marked for his vehemence
against the government, had already suffered imprisonment for
a political offence. It was insinuated that this nomination
should be interfered with, a feeling which received no counten-
I
ahca* from the secretary of state. The confirmation of Tilak1s
I. Indian Pari.Debates, 1897* PP.27&-279*
tor
recommendation by the governor of Bombay, and the secretary of
state's refusal to intervene were an index to the genuineness
of the .right of election. Irrespective of the interpretation
of their detractors, the reforms conceded rights which were not
compatible with any refusal to see in them the beginnings of
representative government in India. In fact, as Surendranath
I&ierjea admitted, "the foundations of representative government"
I
were "well and truly laid" by the Indian Councils Act, 1892.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ★ * * * *
The reforms did not extend to all the provinces in 1893* 
Among the territories excluded were the Punjab and the Central 
Provinces. This exclusion did not gain approval in these two 
provinces and became a subject of controversy, with what 
results we will study in the next Chapter.
I. A Nation in Making - p.114.
/
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CHAPTER V
The 1892 Act and the Central Provinces and the Punjab*
7/e saw in the last chapter that the government of India
enquired whether in the provinces which had no legislative
councils there were classes or bodies representing * a substantial
community of legitimate interests, professional, commercial or
territorial.* The government wanted to ascertain the possibility
of utilising them in the nomination of a member to the supreme
+
legislative council. The Central Provinces government replied
that no such classes T!accustomed to collective action in promotion
of their common interests” existed. Neither was there any '’widely
representative body”, nor any "association of sufficient respect-
I
ability and importance" to consult in selecting a member.
Despite this, the chief commissioner, A.P.MacDonnell, was
reluctant to rely solely on mere nomination, and recognised "the
great desirability of adopting some system of recommendation....."
This he would achieve through the local self-government agencies, -
the district councils and the municipal committees, - so as to give
the member sitting on the council "a more representative character
than would attach to him if selected by the Head of the Adminis- 
2
tration." A schdme was propounded to this effect.
The province was to be divided into two zones - Northern and
Southern - each consisting of two administrative divisions, on the
T. I .P.P., February 1893 ,No^*S2 (The G.P. government" l"e tter"-dt •
20.9.1892)
2. Ibid, (Para.3)
+ See Ch.IV, p.
2.(37
basis of well-marked differences of interests, history, race and
association of the population. Among all the local bodies, the
district councils fairly represented the territorial, commercial
and professional interest^ of a division. Municipalities, as a
rule, were much less representative, except in the case of the
five bigger municipal committees of Nagpur, Jubbulpore, Saugor,
Hoshangabad and Raipur; these five would be classed with the
district councils. These bodies would be required in each zone
to select for nomination two persons. They must be domiciled in,
and belong to an important race or interest of, the zone selecting
them. One of these four persons would be recommended by the chief
commissioner for nomination by the governor-general. The chief
commissioner, of course, would be free to turn down all these
four persons and make an independent choice, if necessary. Thus
without binding his discretion, the scheme would ordinarily
ensure some representation of interests and classes of the Central
I
Provinces population.
The government of India did not favour this scheme, and
writing to- the secretary of state they called it unsatisfactory.
They doubted whether the best available persons would compete
under such a system of election, or "whether, except possibly at
the outset, sufficient interest in the proceedings would be
aroused to guarantee a proper discrimination between the persons
2
offering themselves for recommendation." They preferred simple
nomination, which, as we saw in the last chapter, was approved.
1. Ibid, paras. 3-7•
2. I.P.P., March 1893, No.131 (Government of India letter dt.
22.3.1893)
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The government of Indiafs decision created disappointment. 
Public meetings, held at various places in the Central Provinces, 
voiced the demand for the privilege of recommending a represent­
ative of the province on the imPerial legislative council. Some 
memorials were addressed to the secretary of state to this 
effect, in identical terms, having, no doubt, drawn inspiration 
from a common source. These memorials pointed out that the 
absence of a representative of the people on the governor-general's 
legislative council deprived them of the chance of introducing 
any legislation in their own interest. They had perforce to 
depend on the initiative of the government. Also there was no 
possibility of removing any misunderstanding arising out of the 
government’s activity or policy by means of interpellation. So 
the purpose of interpellation would not be served so far as these 
territories were concerned. They sought to impress upon the 
secretary of state the justness of their prayer by a reference to 
the considerable success of local self-government in the province. 
They particularly pointed out that elections largely formed the 
basis of the constitution of these bodies. In the fifty-six 
municipal committees elected members were seventy-eight per cent, 
compared with seventy-four per cent in the seventeen district 
councils and eighty per cent in the forty-eight local boards. All 
the district councils and local boards and all but one municipal 
committee elected their own presidents and vice-presidents. This 
considerable reliance on, and utilisation of, elections bore 
territory, they claimed, to the capacity and competence of the
people, and entitled them to recommend a person to represent them
on the supreme legislative council. They further emphasized that
in other spheres of activity, - for example, in education and
commerce, - rapid progress was being made in the province which
in no sense could be treated as backward. The memorials concluded
with a request for the amendment of the rules for the constitution
of the governor-generalfs legislative council, so as to enable the
I
province to recommend at least one representative for that council*
In the House of Commons on 16 May 1893 in reply to a question
about these memorials by Sir William Wedderburn, the Under-secretary
of state, George Russell, expressed, satisfaction with the plan of 
2
nomination. In his reply to the memorialists the secretary of
3
state declined to accede to their request.
Nevertheless, it would appear that in selecting the first 
nominee from the Central Provinces to the enlarged supreme 
legislative council the local bodies were consulted* This was 
due to a misunderstanding, and the provincial government’s ignorance 
of the rejection of their plan by the government of India.
The question v/as revived two years later on the initiative 
of the government of India. The provincial government stuck to 
their former opinion and vouched for the grievous disappointment 
that would overtake ua good deal of political feeling” if the 
local bodies were not consulted in the nomination of a representative
1. Public letters from India 1893» Vol.I, pp.^93-845. (The 
memorials were forwarded by the government of India to the secretary 
of state, under their letter dated 18.7*1893» Ihid, p.^87)
2. Indian Pari .Debates p.329*
3. Public Despatches to India 1893» P*170 (Despatch dated 31*8.1893)
of the province. They further pointed out that the recommendation
in 1893 revealed that the best available men,"whom the chief
commissioner would himself have named for appointment, were
nominated by the local bodies." So the new chief commissioner,
J.Woodburn, was in entire agreement with his predecessor, though
he preferred to simplify the process of recommendation. Since
the Southern zone had been represented by the nomination of 1893,
it was proposed that on the next occasion only the local bodies
of the Northern zone should be consulted. From their suggestions,
"the Chief Commissioner has no doubt a suitable nominee will be 
I
found." He therefore asked to be authorized to adopt this
procedure at the next nomination.
The government of India did not yield. Though the chief
commissioner was free to "act with or without the advice of local
bodies,......... nothing like a system of election by such bodies
2
should be introduced." In view of such intransigence, the scheme 
of consultation was jettisoned, and pure nomination resorted to.
This was no doubt an unpalatable development. The Indian 
National Congress in 1893 adopted a resolution recording an 
"emphatic protest against the retrograde policy" of the government 
of India in nominating "a gentleman for the C. P. to the supreme 
legislative council without asking local bodies to make recommend­
ations...... " The government were urged "to take early steps to
l7 I.P.P., October 1895, No.313 (The C.P. government letter dt*
4.10.1895)
2. Ibid, No.318 (The government of India letter dt. 26.lCJ.1895)
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give to the C.P. the same kind of representation that it has
already granted to Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the North-West 
I
Provinces*11 This demand was echoed in many a public meeting,
and was regularly renewed in Congress resolutions in the following 
+
years*
It is surprising that the Central Provinces government’s 
plea for utilising the local bodies in nominating a member was 
repeatedly rejected by the government of India. The advocacy 
of two successive chief commissioners lent special weight to the 
proposal.. No doubt, they were in a better position to judge 
how the representation of the province on the council which 
legislated for it could best be secured. Further, the central 
governments attitude was hardly in conformity with their avowed 
preference for clothing, if possible, the members from the provinces 
without legislative councils with some representative character. 
Though no single association or body was considered worthy of 
consultation in' this matter, the persistence of the chief commission­
ers in utilising the local bodies should in all fairness have been 
treated with more consideration. The government of Indiafs stand 
in this matter is hard to explain.
It is also significant that despite all the popular insistence 
on recommendation and the principle of representation, no demand 
was made for a separate legislative council for the Central Province®; 
This province was smaller in area, in population and in income than 
the provinces with legislative councils. In literacy too, though
rapid progress was being made, it was lagging behind those provinces.
TI I.P.P., March 1896, No.106 (Resolution XV: the resolutions were 
forwarded to the secretary of state by the government of India under 
their letter dt. Il«3*l896* Ibid No.108)
+ For example, Congress resolutions of 1896,1898,18991 1900 and so on
With 59 male literates, and 2 female, out of every thousand, the
province was clearly at a disadvantage* Apart from mere literacy,
in other spheres of educational activity the province was far
behind. Thus in 1890-91, while books published in Bengal, Madras
and North-West Provinces and Oudh exceeded a thousand in each
province, and in Bombay was more than two thousand, in the
I
Central Provinces the number was a miserable thirteen. Perhaps
an awareness of this weakness restrained any demand for a
separate local council being pressed. It may be noted that even
the Indian National Congress did not go so far as to propose a
legislative council for the province. This bears out the assertion 
+
of Sir R.Temple in the House of Commons during the debate on the
Indian Councils Bill on 25 April 1892 that the Central Provinces
2
did not want a legislative council.
* 4 1  * 4" * * * 4< 41 4* * 4t 4c 4* 4>4c 4< 4c 4c 4c
The Indian National Congress adopted a resolution in 1892
declaring that "the creation of a legislative council for the
province of the Punjab is an absolute necessity for the good
3
government of that province ,f In this, they voiced afresh an
old demand. The first Congress in 1885 had advocated a legislative 
council for the Punjab, a stand supported in later sessions. This 
old prayer, renewed in 1892, found mention in two resolutions of 
the next year's Congress. In one, the Congress regretted that
Yl General Report on the Census of India, 1891 (C-7lSH, 1&93)
2. Indian Pari. Debates, 1892, p.2^8.
+ The first chief commissioner of the C.P.
3* Resolution XII
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’’the Punjab, one of the most important provinces in the Empire is
still denied the right to be represented!> either in the Viceroy's
I
or in any local council.” In the other, the Congress mentioned
2
again the "absolute necessity” of a legislative council for the
province. This demand was reiterated from the Congress platform
in subsequent years.
During these long years the Congress speakers seemed to have
assumed that the idea of a legislative council for the Punjab had
all along been ignored by the official world. In fact, however,
eqrly in 1891 the Lt.-governor of the Punjab, J.B.Lyall, conceded 
3
in a note the dbsirability of having a legislative council for the
province. He held that the Punjab had its own peculiar problems;
these required separate legislation, which could projperly be
undertaken by a local council only. In this view, he claimed, he
had the support of his predecessor in office, Sir Charles Aitchison.
The Lt.-governor also ’’noticed a general feeling among the educated
classes in the province, ” in favour of a legislative council for
the Punjab. He then referred to the proposed legislation for the
+ €
reform of the legislative councils in India, and sdod that the 
privileges which were sought to be conferred on the reformed 
legislative councils would enhance their value in the public/, eye 
and would add to the insistence of the ’’feeling which prevails that 
the people of the country should have more voice in its government•■ 
He was "confident that there will be plenty of work” for a local
1. Resolution I.
2. Resolution II.
3. Public letters from India, 1896, Vol.I, p.323*
+ Lord Cross's Bill to amend Indian Council* Act, l86l.
2 tLi
council, for which he had no doubt to be "able to find sufficient
non-official members willing to accept office and qualified to really
assist." He mentioned, in this connection, Indian members of the
Bar and retired government officials. Besides, English education
had rapidly spread in the recent years among the upper classes.
He directed, in view of all this, that "the Government of India
should now be addressed on the subject" and advised that all
arrangements for the establishment of a council should be made in
I
anticipation of the necessary legislative sanction.
The Lt.-governor1s note was forwarded by the Punjab government
to the government of India in August 1891, with an unabated
2
kee^ess for a legislative council. In their reply the government 
of India referred to the impending retirement of Lyall, during 
whose term of office a legislative council could in no case be 
brought into existence in the province. They decided, therefore, 
that "the question should be reserved in its integrity for the
3 ,/
consideration of His Honour’s successor. Lyallfs successor, Sir 
Dennis Fitzpatrick, vehemently opposed the idea and wrote to the 
governor-general, Lansdowne, deprecating the move. The matter did
k
not proceed further then.
The Intensity of Fitzpatrick’s dislike of a legislative 
council for the Punjab can be realised from his reaction to a much 
more modest proposal. We saw in the last chapter the government of 
India’s intention to nominate, if possible,to the supreme legislative
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, p.521 (The Punjab government letter, dated I.8.I89I)
3. Ibid, p.523 (The government of India letter dated 30.9*1891) 
Hamilton Papers, Part I, Vol.II (Elgin to Hamilton 16.6.1896)
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council such persons from the provinces without legislative 
councils as were at least in some degree representative of some 
important interests. The Punjab government’s reply to this
stated that "Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick......... regrets to find that
he is compelled to reply in the negative." His main objection to 
any such consultation was the antagonism between the different 
races and sects of the population. Any formal consultation would 
give rise to exaggerated hopes, doomed to disappointment, and
would only stimulate "the bitterness and spirit of faction" which 
prevailed among them.
No wonder therefore that when in 1896 the idea of a separate
legislative council for the Punjab was revived, the Lt,-governor
+
reacted very strongly. In a note dated 10 April 1896 Fitzpatrick 
argued in deta.il against the establishment of a legislative 
council in his province. He said that the legislation needed 
for the province was "very limited" in quantity and could easily 
be undertaken by the supreme legislative council when meeting at 
Simla, for its work was then "slackest. " — -------------- — ;>
I. I.P.P., February 18931 N0.8A- (The Punjab government letter
No. 3-C, dt.31*10.1892)
+ The move was initiated by the secretary of state in his despatch 
to the government of India, No. Public 1 of 9*1*1896* H  dealt 
with raising the status of Burma from a chief commissioner's 
province to a Lt.-governorship, with a legislative council. In 
the last sentence of the despatch, the secretary of state observed 
that "in the event of such a concession being made to Burma it 
cannot be withheld any longer from the Punjab," (I.P.P. August 
1896 No.170). The government of India thereupon wrote to the 
Punjab government asking for the Lt.-governor*s opinion, vide 
letter No,670 dt. 28.3 *1898. (I.P.P. August 1898, No.171*)
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The supreme council, for the purpose of legislation for the 
Punjab, not only received the co-operation of the Lt.-governor
and other Punjab officials who sat on the council, but also had
the benefit of "constant personal communication’' between the
Punjab officials nn the one hand and the members of the supreme
council and the secretaries to the government of India on the 
I
other* The drafting of legislative measures received the
expert attention of the government of India's Law Member and high
officials of the legislative department, and altogether a ’’wider
experience" was brought to bear on the task by the council
comprising "able men from other provinces." Therefore, the Lt.-
governor was "quite satisfied" with the existing arrangements:
indeed, he would go further and say that he "would prefer to have 
2
it so done."
He then examined the proposal from the point of view of 
"bringing Punjab opinion, official and non-official, to bear on
3
the work of legislation." So far as the official opinion was 
concerned he would prefer to obtain it in writing. This enabled 
the government to consult a large number of officials, and gave 
the latter an opportunity to put forward their views and offer 
criticism with greater freedom and frankness. The rigours of 
official discipline put a great restraint on the official members 
of legislative councils, and speaking for himself, Fitzpatrick 
would not "allow any of my subordinates to speak in council on 
any important question without giving me beforehand a note of what
TI I.P.P., August 1896', No". 17^ (Para.3)
2, Ibid (Para.^f)
3 . Ibid (Para.7)
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they were going to say.’1 This no doubt would reduce the council
I
"very much to a sham.”
Non-official opinion, because of the absence of any consider­
able non-official European community in the Punjab, meant Indian 
opinion* Any representation of this could only be through 
Indians ¥who can be regarded as really representing important
classes of the population and who are at the same time sufficiently
/ 2 
' educated to take an efficient part” in the work of the council#
Such a bombination of qualifications was considered impossible to
secure in the province then. There were enough representative
men, but they did not know English, and were not intellectually
capable of discharging their duties through the medium of Urdu#
The capable and the educated persons - for example, those whom
Lyall mentioned in his note, the membersjof the Bar and retired
officials - on the other hand, did not usually enjoy sufficient
social standing even for a Lt•-governor*s council# For these
reasons, he did not believe that a legislative council would in
3
any way admit of a freer scope for ’’real Punjab opinion.”
On political considerations too he found no grounds to 
commend the establishment of a legislative council. Lyall had 
spoken about the general feeling in favour of a council among the 
educated classes. Admitting that such a feeling existed ’’among 
a certain portion” of the educated class, he pointed out that they 
j were ”an infinitesimal fraction of the whole population”, that they 
represented ”no one but themselves”, and that lacking in social
I# Ibid (Para.8) 
2# Ibid (Para#9) 
3# Ibid (Para.10)
standing they tfhad little or no influence” upon their countrymen.
It was asserted with ”the most complete confidence” that the
"mass of the people” did not bother themselves with the idea of
I
a council. There was ”no real demand11 for it.”
Further, would the people agitating for a legislative council
be satisfied with its establishment? They would not receive ”an
effective voice in the council”, a majority of whose members
must be officials and ’’representatives of the dominant classes
in the province”, whom Fitzpatrick called ’’ciphers”. The people
who asked for the council would be far from happy with such
conditions and would ’’denounce the whole thing as a palpable
sham.” Instead of being conciliated, they would be more dissatis-
2
fied and disgruntled.
Finally, he opposed the proposal because a council would 
detract from the prestige of the Lt.-governor, which was all- 
important in the Punjab with many a turbulent element among its 
population of various religiolis and sects. They needed a strong 
hand and understood a strong hand. The open scenes of wordy 
warfare between the Lt.-governor and the none-too-influential 
Indians and subordinate officials in the council would be a 
puzzle to them and would undermine in their eyes the position of
3
the executive government and the authority of the Lt.-governor•
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ♦ ★ * *
The Lt.-governor's views did not find favour with the 
Liberal governor-general, Elgin. Referring to Fitzpatrick in a
1. Ibid (Para.11)
2. Ibid (Para.13)
3* Ibid (Para* 1^0
'U<\
private letter to Hamilton, the secretary of state, on 16 June
1896 Elgin said, "He uses arguments which, so far as they are
general, would apply to all the councils in India, and as far as
they have special reference to the Punjab, are met by the earlier
I
opinions of Sir J. Lyall and Sir C.Aitchison." He confessed 
however that it would be impossible to launch a council in the 
Punjab during Fitzpatrick's tenure of office, but argued that 
an immediate decision might be taken to establish a council in 
the Punjab the next year, when Fitzpatrick would cease to be in 
office. The incoming Lt.-governor, faced with an accomplished 
fact, would not be under the obligation of differing from his 
predecessor•
I'he governor-general1 s conviction was not shared by his
colleagues in the government of India. Writing on 21 July 1896
he informed the secretary of state of "rather a hot debate last 
2
week" which revealed as many as five members of the government
differing from the governor-general and his sole supporting
+
colleague, J.Woodburn. Replying on l^ f August 1896, Hamilton
wrote, "I cannot understand the objection " "It is, however,
a point upon which I am not disposed to yield", he assured Elgin,
3
"and some means must be found" of creating the council.
In their letter dated 25 August 1896 ? to the secretary of
state, the government of India said that they concurred with
1. Hamilton Papers, Part I, Vol.II*
+ Curiously enough, the proposal of a legislative council for 
Burma was approved by 5 to 2.
2. Ibid.
3. Hamilton Papers, Part I, Vol.I*
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Fitzpatrick, and were "of opinion that it would be impolitic at
I
present to establish a legislative council in the Punjab." They
forwarded with it two minutes of dissent - one dated 15 August
1896 by J,Woodburn, and the other dated 2k August 1896 by Elgin#
In his minute, Woodburn contested Fitzpatrick’s assertion
that a legislative council would adversely affect the Lt.-governorfs
prestige and authority# On the contrary, he thought 'that the
conduct of "local affairs in a manner consonant with local
opinion" would strengthen the authority of the government# As to
those who strove for political reform, the establishment of a
council would offer them an opportunity of expressing their views
in a responsible and patient way. No doubt, some "weary debates"
and "foolish interpellations" would take place: these would,
however, lessen with lapse of time and will all the time help to
"clear the air." He asserted that "dangers in India are more in
silence than in talk", because denial of a forum would drive the
political discontent underground, with more injurious consequences#
Woodburn also refused to agree that the step was premature: "To
those who are opposed on principle to legislative councils,
introduction will be at any time premature." He had no doubt that
a legislative council in the Punjab would be to the local authority
ies an assistance of "steadily growing value", yielding "strong
2)/
political advantages.
3
Elgin, in his minute, spoke of Fitzpatrick as a well-known.
T. I.P.P. Aug 1S96, No.177.
2. I.P.P., August 1896, No.180. .. . .l. . .
3. Ibid, No.182. ( El<r^ a W -  ^ Grfr <f ^
I <6&JL l&ii, £vfr r  F)
opponent of legislative councils, - a stand at variance with the 
government policy embodied in the Indian Councils Act, 1892. He 
v/as at one with Woodburn as to the effect on the prestige of the 
Lt*-governor, and expressed surprise at the use of the term 
"cipher11 to describe representative men. He spoke highly of the
+
then non-official additional member from the Punjab on his council,
who, though ignorant of English, v/as doing useful work. The
presence of members of his type on the Lt.-governor1s council
I
"would add to, rather than detract from,his authority."
The amount of legislation was of little account. The main
object of establishing a local council was "to be assured
ourselves, and to make the people feel, that those matters which
enter into their daily life have been decided with due regard
to their interests." And this could not be done, in the case
of the Punjab, by inviting one or two members to the supreme
legislative council. "Decentralisation is the only remedy,"
2
Elgin averred.
Dealing with the discontented section of the people, Elgin 
pointed out the advantage of meeting their accusation face to face 
in a council. No amount of open discussion would imperil the 
authority of the government, hence to oppose a legislative 
council for fear of stimulating disaffection "is to misunderstand 
the whole situation."} Elgin, at the same time, bore testimony
+ Khem Singh Bedi.
I Elgin Minute .
2. U>C&.'
He did not deny that some hidden dangers might exist or "that 
the smouldering embers may some day be fanned into a flame". But 
this risk would be overcome not by "stiflyng criticism", but rather 
by encouraging frank discussion and by a readiness to justify 
"every act" of the government*
' t i l .
to the able and assiduous work on the legislative councils by
most of "the representatives of the advanced section of Native
opinion*.....n He concluded that a legislative council "can be
I
safely introduced" in the Punjab.
Elgin followed up his minute in a private letter to the 
secretary of state on 25 August 1896. He confessed his failure 
to see any new argument adduced against a legislative council 
for the Punjab which had not already been refuted and overruled 
in other cases. RefeTring to Fitzpatrick’s mention of the turbulent 
nature of the population, he complained that no attempt to prove 
this had been made. On his part, he did not believe that this 
could be proved at all* He thought that a real stumbling-block 
was the inability of "men who have grown old in the tradition of ifcj. 
Civil Service" to put up with the representatives of the 
advanced section of Indian opinion who found their way into the 
councils. He, however, had different views: "for my part, if
these men did not find their way in by election, I should like to 
nominate them." On the council they were forced to behave in an 
orderly way and to use moderate language when complaining*
Farther than this: "they are compelled in order to justify 
themselves with their supporters, to speak out and to show their 
hand." This was "exactly the sort of information that otherwise 
in India it is so difficult to get at." So he would not bar them 
from the open rostrum of a legislative council, and drive them
I. Elgin’s Minute.
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into "secret intrigues." Affirming that this advanced school of
political agitators was not disloyal but discontented, perhaps
verging on disloyalty, Elgin concluded, "it is not the talk
that is really dangerous, it is the silent movement where we
cannot discover the motive from which it originates, or
' > I .
the means by which it works."
on 17 September 1896 Hamilton expressed his full
/
agreement with Elgin. He dilated on the reasons for his preference 
for a legislative council. Without it, the risk of "hasty or
ignorant legislation" on the initiative of a benevolent, but
misguided, executive was immensely larger. The establishment of
a council would reduce the pliability of the legislative machinery,
and to that extent would avert the possibility of unpopular
legislation leading to "wide antipathy and discontent." He also
it
referred to "the modern Civilian, who enjoying the protection of 
an omnipresent authority and army, was "a little too apt to try 
and rule regardless of native views and opinions." He regretted 
that an essential administrative quality, "the management of men", 
seemed generally speaking*, "on the wane in India." No governor, 
with some effort, could fail to make his council agree with him.
He also agreed with the Viceroy on the advantage of allowing the 
public expression of antagonistic views, for "to put an agitator 
in a responsible position, where he has to weigh his words, and can 
be answered" was "the best methodAdrawing poison from his fangs."
1. Hamilton Papers,. Part I, Vol.II.
2. Hamilton Papers, Part I, Vol.I.
The Public Committee of the India douncil approved by a 
majority of three to one the establishment of a council in the 
Punjab. Informing Elgin of this, Hamilton added, "The powers of
I
the Council in the Punjab will be limited in the fifst instance...,T
This was probably the Public Committee's decision.
The India Council in a meeting on 1 December 1896 approved
the Public Committee's draft despatch authorising the creation
of a legislative council in the Punjab "in the initial f«Jim which
2
the Statutes allow#n
*he secretary of state explained in a despatch that the 
legislative councils were created on an experimental basis by 
the Indian Councils Act, l86l. When the working of the legislative 
councils then established were found satisfactory, the Act of 1892 
"authorized a cautious extension of that experiment in the 
direction of greater liberty". Therefore, any new legislative 
council must start from the position of the earlier statute, and 
having travelled "over a similar course" could only be entitled 
to the wider basis of the 1892 Act. Hence, the members of the
Punjab council "should in the beginning be simply nominated as
■ \
provided in the Act of l86l, and none of the enlarged privileges, 
which, under the Act of 1892, may be conferred by regulation or
3 +
rule, should be extended to the Council on its first constitution."
1. Ibid, (Hamilton to Elgin 3O.lO.l896)
2. India Council Minutes, Vol.77*
3* I.P.P., February 1897» No.33 (Para.3)
+ Burma also received a legislative council under similar terms.
rThe secretary of state also dealt with the views of Sir
Dennis Fitzpatrick. He could not trace in the latter*s stand any
"conclusive evidence that a Province, which has not been slow
in other respects in accommodating itself to the principles of our
Government, will prove less capable of benefiting by a legislative
council than the older provinces were in l86l." Further, the
Lt.-governor had not adequately appreciated "the educational value
of local legislatures." It had been the government’s "consistent
policy" to initiate and develop legislative councils "as an
important agency in drawing out the latent capabilities of our
Indian subjects, and leading them from indifference, perhaps from
I
estrangement, into active cooperation with the Government."
The legislative council of the Punjab accordingly came into
existence with nine nominated members. In the first council,
four of the members were non-official Indians, one a non-official
2
European, and the remaining four European officials. With the
Lt.-governor, the officials and the non-officials were equal in
+  ■ ' 
strength.
* $ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The decision to establish a legislative council in the Punjab, 
but on a restricted basis, >j\0t with a chorus of disapproval. It 
was demanded that the council should enjoy all the benefits 
conferred by the Act of 1892. A memorial was addressed to the
1. Ibid (Para*4) . %
2. I.P.P., October 1897* No.415 (Government of India to the Punjab
government, 1.10.1897)
+ The Burma legislative council consisted of nine nominated 
members - five officials and four non-officials - and the Lt.- 
governor.
secretary of stajje to this effect by the Indian Association of 
Lahore. The Indian Councils Act, 1892 bore testimony to the govern­
ment’s belief that the elective principle was beneficent. Having 
tfrus acknowledged the utility of election, it was unjust to 
ignore it in the constitution of the Punjab legislative council*
The memorialists: strongly repudiated any suggestion that their 
province was backward and otherwise unfit for the wider privileges 
of the subsequent legislation* They pressed for the Punjab 
legislative council qn equal status with other councils, and 
maintained that without the latter's enlarged powers^ .the
former's "sphere of usefulness would be very much restricted, if
I
not rendered altogether problematical*"
The Punjab government in forwarding the memorial to the
government of India admitted that it came from "an important
body" whose "views may be held to be those of the enlightened
2
section of the community." They could not see their way, however, 
to agree with the memorialists. The government of India made no 
observation in sending the memorial to the secretary of state, who 
declined to "entertain any discussion" regarding the decision
3
arrived at.
This did not set at rest the demand for placing the Punjab 
legislative council on a wider basis. It was embodied in a 
resolution of the Indian National Congress in its session of 1898.
1. I.P.P*, June 1897, No.l4.
2. Ibid, No.13 (The Punjab government letter dt. 20.4.1897)
3. I.P.P. August l897» No.l42 (Despatch to the government of
India, dt. 15*7*1897)
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The Congress, while thanking the government for giving a council 
to the Punjab, recorded "its regret that they have not extended to 
the councillors the right of interpellation, and to the people the 
right of recommending councillors for nomination such as were
I
enjoyed by the councillors and people in the other provinces.n
This was repeated in an identical resolution in the next yearfs
Congress, and came to be frequently reiterated in the subsequent
2
sessions of the body,
* *  * *  * *  * *  * * * *  * *  * * * *
It is difficult to understand the decision not to found the 
Punjab council under the provisions of the 1892 Act. Neither 
Elgin nor Hamilton foreshadowed, much less advocated,in their 
correspondence any such limitation. Perhaps the Public ^ommittee 
of the India Council made the decision. The objection, of the 
majority of the governor-general*s executive council to a 
legislative council for the Punjab, coupled with the vehemence 
of the Lt,-governor1s antagonism, might have encouraged a dilution 
of the concession about to be granted. But for the secretary of 
state !s full accord with the governor ^  general*s views 'and his 
unequivocal preference for a legislative council, the proposal 
might well have been doomed to nullity.
It is no less clear, however, that Hamilton, though wishing 
to give a council to the Punjab, was not insistent on equipping it 
with the fullest possible privileges. This may perhaps be explained
1. Resolution XXI
2. For example, Congress resolutions of 1899» 1900 and 1905*
X T- f
in the light of Hamilton's conception of the issue* He was not
imbued with any zeal for reform, and viewed the question from
• the angle of possible administrative andjpolitical* advantages* He
often expressed to the Viceroy his concern at the widening "gulf
I
between governed and governing," and acknowledged that he could
not see "how under the conditions of education and press license
2
prevailing in India it can be otherwise." The establishment 
of a legislative council would be advantageous under the circum­
stances in several ways. %s already noted, he saw in it a
lessening of the chances of unpopular legislation which would
+
unleash widespread discontent and antagonism* Further the 
discontented elements would be better tackled through such a 
council: "If they are in earnest, contact with administrative
difficulties and realities is certain to sober their previous 
speculations, and, on the other hand, if they be dishonest and
J
unreal, they are more likely to be detected and exposed." It 
might also have appealed to him, in face of the increasing Indian 
estrangement as, what he described in another connection, a 
move "to conciliate or win over to our side any section of 
influential or well-to-do native society." He was thus primarily 
concerned with the advantages that would come the government's way* 
Popular prayers for representative institutions were hardly a 
factor in influencing his decision.
'T~, Hamilton Papers, Part I, Vol.II (Hamilton to Elgin, ?. 1.1897)
2. Ibid, Part I, Vol.Ill (Hamilton to Elgin, 21*1.1898)
+ See above p.
3. Ibid, Part I. Vol.II (Hamilton to Elgin, 1^.5*1897)• He meant 
the Congress, several of whose prime-m^io vers he considered"seditious! 
and "double-sided" in character. (Hamilton to Elgin 2^*6.1897).This 
was in sharp contrast to Elgin's views. Elgin considered the Congres 
not only essentially loyal, but seemed to accept largely the y>p-
-resentative? character of the Congress. (Elgin to Hamilton 
31.3.1896)
A. Ibid, Part I, Vol.Ill (Hamilton to Elgin, 10.12,1897)
X  *2-^
Though this might be an explanation of what happened, the 
decision was not taken on very strong grounds. The plea that a 
council should gather experience, and justify its existence, by 
working under the Act of l86l before the provisions of the 1892 
Act were extended to it, was hardly convincing. The persons 
sitting on the council would change and the new members could 
benefit only to a very limited extent by the experience of other 
persons. This was particularly so because of the too restricted 
scope of the l86l Act. The members had so little to do, and 
enjoyed such minimal privileges that any plea of building up 
traditions of legislative activity would sound extremely pedantic 
and unreal. Again, the political ideals and loyalties of the 
members would usually govern their attitude. Besides, the restrict­
ed rights burdened the members of the council with a feeling of 
disability in comparison with their confreres in other councils.
The half-hearted concession also whetted the energy of political 
aspirants and renewed their feeling of grievance at the discrim­
ination between the Punjab and other provinces. This impaired too,
what the secretary of state called *the educational value of local 
+
legislatures.* This would be greatest if the favour granted left 
behind it no trail of disappointment, and the widest possible 
experiment was tried to bring out the latent capacity of the 
people of the Punjab, Surely a larger scope for this was offered 
by the Act of 1892.
*  *  *  4c 4c 4c 4c 4e 4c* *  4c 4c 4c *  *  *4>
+ See above p.9-^^
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We have finished the first half of our analysis. Studying 
the inception of the idea of representative government in India, 
we have -traced the inauguration of representative institutions 
in the central and provincial administration,
IYe shall now commence in the next chapter the second part 
of our study, and follow these institutions in their development 
up__to 1909*
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CHAPTER VI
THE NON-OFFICIAL DEMAND FOR FURTHER REFORMS,
We saw in the preceding chapters that the Indian National
Congress reflected the hopes and aspirations of the politically
advanced section of Indian population* Thus the Indian Councils Act,
1892 had been preceded by certain proposals formulating Congress
demands for various reforms.+ The Act was followed by Congress
criticism of the inadequacy of its provisions.* Gradually this
criticism yielded place to fre^ di proposals, beyond the scope of the
Indian Councils Act, 1892. New demands were enumerated tending to
widen and strengthen the scope of representative government in India.
One aspect of these new demands was the increasing insistence
that the Indians must have a share in the highest executive counsels.
In 1898 the Congress adopted a resolution for increasing the number
of executive councillors of Bombay and Madras from two to three, one
of whom should be an Indian;^ This resolution was repeated the next 
2
year. The reason why such demands were made was explained in the 
#
Congress sessions of both these years. Moving the resolution of 
1898, V. Krishnaswamy Iyer harped on the necessity of associating 
with the executive some person who was acquainted with the needs and 
wants of Indians. This would enable the governor and other members 
of the executive council to turn to him for advice about the state of 
Indian feelings and requirements, and would obviate the risk of wrong
+ See Ch. I. 
f See Ch. IV.
1. Resolution XIV.
2. Resolution XII.
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decisions, based on imperfect knowledge and mistaken i d e a s T h e
same reason was given by the President of that year’s Congress -
Ananda Mohan Bose - who. said that the executive councils formulated
and guided the whole administrative policy and took decisions
intimately connected with the well-being of the people* In the
interest of correct information and efficient administration, it was
2
necessary that an Indian should be placed on the body. The President
of the next year’s Congress - Romesh Chandra Dutt* - pointed out that
"large and important measures of administration” did not come before
the legislative councils which contained Indian representatives. He
lamented that "the weakness of the present system of government is
that in the decision on these administrative measures the people have
3no voice and are not heard at all” He,therefore, urged the removal 
of this defect by including in the executive councils Indian members 
representing the views of their countrymen. It may be noted that 
while the resolution of 1899 prayed for the inclusion of an Indian in 
each of the executive councils of Bombay and Madras, in his presidential 
address Romesh Chandra Dutt suggested throwing open the governor- 
general 's executive Council as well by appointing three Indians to 
that body. He also suggested the constitution of executive councils 
in North-West Provinces and Oudh, Bengal, the Punjab, and the Central
1. Report of l*fth I.N.C. pp. 110-111.
2. Ibid, p.33*
3. Report of 15th I.N.C. p. 21.
+ Dutt was a retired member of the Indian Civil Service.
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Provinces with, one Indian member in each.
The Indians to be appointed thus were expected to be officials.
While V. Krishnaswamy Iyer pressed the case of ,!a native gentleman
who has risen in the service," ^ Romesh Chandra Dutt spoke of "an
2
Indian gentleman with experience in administrative work.n
The Congress resolutions of the subsequent years, on this
subject, were not, however, confined within these limits. The basis
of such demand was much enlarged in 1904. In that year a Congress
resolution urged for appointment of Indians to the igevernor-general's
executive council, and the executive councils of Bombay and Madras.
The same was proposed, further, for the secretary of .state's council.,
the India, Council in London. Whereas the previous resolutions were
content with placing the demand for the appointment of Indians to
executive council, the resolution of 1904 prescribed also how these
3persons were to be selected. These "Endian representatives" should
be nominated by the elected members of the legislative councils. This
resolution dropped the suggestion of enlarging the executive councils
of the two Presidencies. A resolution of the Congress of 1903
elaborated the previous year's proposal by asking for "not less than
three Indian gentlemen of proved ability and experience as members of
k
the secretary of state's council," and prayed for the appointment 
of two Indians on the governor-general's executive council, and one 
each on the other two executive councils. Nothing was said, however,
1. Report of l4th I.N.C. p.111.
2. Report of 15th I.N.C. p.21.
3. Resolution IX.
4. Resolution IV.
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about the mode of their selection. The next year*s resolution
reiterated these demands but refrained from indicating any number.
Instead it asked for "adequate representation of Indians" ^ on the
India. Council and the executive councils#
Though the resolutionsof 1905 and 1906 did not mention how the
Indian members were to be selected for these councils, they were
more explicit in the implication of the proposals# They claimed
these concessions because "the time: has arrived when the people of
India should be allowed a larger voice in the administration and
2
control of the affairs of their country." As such, the omission 
of the earlier proposal for nomination by the elected members of the 
legislative councils was not very significant# Instead what stands 
out is the demand for an Indian share in the executive control, and 
formulation of administrative policy of the country. The earlier 
justification of such demands on the ground of placing the Indian 
view-point and correct information before the executive council was 
not invoked# Stress was really on the right, of the Indians to be 
represented on the higher executive agencies of the country#
With regard to the legislative councils as well demands for 
far-reaching changes were made in the Congress. Romesh Chandra Dutt 
in his Presidential Address of 1899 said that it was high time for the 
expression of Indian views and representation of Indian opinions to
1. Resolution IX.
2. Resolution IV. 1905*
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have a fuller scope. He proposed enlargement of legislative
councils, and hoped that Min the not remote future"^" every district
would send a member to the legislative council. He was careful to
arm the head of the administration with power to veto, if necessary,
the majority decision of such enlarged legislative councils. These
proposals, along with pleas< for wider financial powers for the
councils, were embodied in a resolution of the Congress of 190^. The
provincial
resolution asked for "an enlargement of both the supreme and/legislative 
councils * increasing the number of non-official members therein, 
and giving them the right to divide the council in all financial
matters coming before them, - the Head of the Government concerned
2possessing the power of veto.11 The mover of the resolution spoke of
the small size of the legislative councils which did not afford scope
for due representation of the various interests, Many territorial
divisions, "with their own peculiar wahts, and manners and customs1!,'
remained without representation in these councils. It was high time
for taking decisive steps to secure "a more adequate representation
3
of the classes of people that hitherto remained unrepresented".
Regarding Budget discussion, he said that so far this privilege had 
proved to be "a fiction and a farce". No attention was paid to non- 
officials1 arguments in the legislative councils, and their speeches^
1. Report of 15th I.N.C. p.21*
2. Resolution IX.
3* Report of 20th I.N.C. p.l82.
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howsoever able, Mproduced no effect upon the policy and the 
administration11 of the government.^- He claimed that the reforms 
of 1892 had fulfilled their limited purpose, and it was now urgently
necessary to take further steps "in the direction of popularising’1
2
these institutions.
The President of that year’s Congress, Sir Henry Cotton - the 
former Chief Commissioner of Assam - too spoke of the necessity of 
enlarging jfhe councils. He advocated the increased association in 
the councils of "those noblemen whose position and status in the 
country entitle them to be recognised as legislators". Cotton was 
outspoken: he pointed out that India was "an aristocratic and ^
conservative country", and "any attempt to democratise Indian 
institutions is calculated to result in failure".^ He advocated,
r
therefore, a move to accord in the legislative councils a greater 
recognition to the nobility, and to "ensure for them a share in the
4
responsibilities of administration commensurate to their rank".
Cotton was, however, isolated in this stand: there was little
y'
support for him from other speakers at the Congress.
In 1905 si resolution was passed proposing enlargement of 
legislative councils, which the Congress recommended to achieve by 
increasing the number of the non-official and elected members so that
1. Ibid p. l8l.
2. Ibid, p.182.
3. Ibid p. k3.
4. Ibid p.44.
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the councils could be "more truly representative of the people, and
the non-official members thereof may have a real voice in the
government of the country,11 ^ The resolution also restated the
case for dividing the councils on financial matters, and repeated the
safeguard of arming the head of the government with a power of veto.
The President of the Congress of 1905* Gopal Krishna Gokhale, claimed
that in the supreme legislative council of twenty-five., the elected
members - Indians and Europeans - should number twelve; in the
provincial councils, each district should send a member. He also made
a plea for the budgets to be formally passed by the legislative
2
councils, and would empower the members to move amendment. The mover
of the resolution, J. Chowdhury, referring to Gokhale*s speech made
manifest his distrust of non-official Europeans. He regretted that
they had no real sympathy with Indians. The non-official half of the
supreme Council should not, therefore, include them.^ Surendranath
Banerjea, speaking from several years' experience as a member of
legislative councilL, supported the resolution because the permanent
official majority in the existing councils rendered it impossible for
k
the non-official members to make their influence felt. Attention may 
be drawn to the fact that neither the Congress resolutions nor the 
speakers at the Congress indicated how the larger number of members 
was to be elected. This differed from their practice before the 1892
1. Resolution II.
2. Report of 21st I.N.C. p.l6".
3* Ibid, p.2*t.
4. Ibid, p.29.
Act, when the details of the electorate were mentioned#* The Congress 
silence on this issue now could not but be calculated: it was perhaps
deemed a tactical advantage to adopt a policy of 'wait and see1, 
thrusting the responsibility on the authorities.
The Congress of 1906 called for the immediate "expansion of the 
Supreme and provincial legislative councils, allowing a larger and 
truly effective representation of the people, and a larger control over 
the financial and executive admin'§ljftration of the country." ^
For the first time, a Congress resolution specifically claimed for the 
legislative council a controll over the executive. This only reflected 
the change that had come over the ideal of the organisation. In 1899 
R. C. Dutt could discern in the increasing association of the people 
of India with the government of the country "not only the wisest but 
the only possible path" available. * But he was at pains to 
explain, "We do not wish for the absolute control of the 
administration of the country . ^ A few years later, another 
retired civilian - Sir Henry Cotton - from the same pulpit, the 
Congress Presidential c^ hair, expressed a different conception of 
India's future. He saw autonomy as "the keystone (also) of India's 
destiny," and envisaged its emergence by a gradual development. He 
foreshadowed "the establishment of a federation of free and 
separate states, the United States of India, placed on a fraternal
+ See Ch. I, pf. 1 ^  ,r > + A 1/0 &
1 Resolution IX.
2. Report of 15th I.N.C. p.23#
3. Ibid, p.21.
2 ^
footing with the self-governing colonies, each with its own local
autonomy, cemented together under the aegis of Great Britain*11
This reflected a change in the goal of the followers of the Congress.
In the same year, 1904, a delegate - Jehangir B. Petit - spoke of
self-government as a "birth-right" of all human beings, and considered
2
it "long over-due" for Indians.
The next year, Gokhale, in his presidential address declared, the
goal of the Congress - to attain a form of government "similar to
what exists in the self-governing colonies of the British Empire." ^
In a message Dadabhai Naoroji advised the Congress "never to rest but
to peto&fcvere with every sacrifice till the victory of self-government 
k
is won." Though the ideal was self-government, Gokhale admitted that
it could only be attained by gradual advances, by passing through "a
5
brief course of apprenticeship" at each stage. It was necessary for
Indians to acquire "through political training and experiment" the
responsibility requisite for the proper exercise of the political
£
institutions of the West.
At the Congress of 1906 Dadabhai Naoroji presided. He dealt with 
the ideal of the organisation. His approach to the issue rested, on 
the claim that Indians were British citizens, and were entitled to alf
the rights of British citizenship. What were these? He answered,
Report of 20th I.N.C. P.37. 
of. Sir H. J. S. Cotton, New India, p.12.
2. Ibid, p.197-
3. Report of 21st I.N.C. p.13*
4. Ibid, Appendix I.
3« Ibid, p.13.
6. Ibid, p.l4.
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’’Self-government or S w a r a j , like that of the United King d o m  or the
Colonies” ,^ and affirmed tfIn self-government lies our hope, strength
2
and greatness1’. He did not, however, seek any immediate grant of
self-government. What he advocated was ”a loyal, h o n e s t , honourable
and conscientious adoption of the policy for self-government for India -
and a beginning made at once towards that end.”*^ Thus he endorsed
Gokhale*s ideal of self-government by instalments,
Dadabhai Naoroji also answered the objection to parliamentary
institutions for India on the ground that the vast majority of the
Indian people were not ready for such far-reaching reforms. Even in
Britain parliamentary government was introduced before all the people
were fit to participate in it, ”We can never be fit till we actually
undertake the work and the responsibility,” he said, and pressed for
”a good beginning” in the r e f o r m  of legislative councils - ’’such a
systematic beginning as that it may naturally in no long time develop
itself into full legislatures of self-government like those of the
5
self-governing Colonies.”
In enunciating this ideal of autonomy, both Gokhale and Dadabhai
Naoroji evinced no desire to sever the British connections. India was
to remain in the Empire, but as a self-governing unit. Gokhale assured
his hearers, ’’the Congress freely recognises that whatever advance we
£
seek must be within the Empire itself” . Naoroji was even more
1. Report of 22nd I.N*C* p«21,
2 . Ibid, p.33#
3 . Ibid, p.28.
*f. Ibid, p.2*f.
3 . Ibid, p.23.
6. Report of 21st I.N.C.p.13#
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emphatic on this point* As already noted the whola structure of his
aspirations stood dn the belief that Indians were British citizens.
In this context can properly be understood an item of demand in the
Congress resolutionsof 1904 and 1905» claiming for each Indian province
the right to return two members to the House of Commons at Westminster.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The declaration of self-government as the Congress goal did not
satisfy a wing of extremist politicians. The political temperature of
India had been £n the rise for several years. Curzonfs + regime in
India intensified the hostility to the authorities among a section of
the population, and also precipitated, the demand for self-government*
His unimaginative handling of the nationalist sentiments and far too
obvious contempt for the Congress raised doubt as to the utility of
constitutional agitation of the Congress pattern. The partition of 
*
Bengal in 1905 added immeasurably to the unpopularity of the ggovernment
+ Lord. Curzon. (1859-1925) • A Conservative in politics, Curzon, while 
still a student at Oxford, evinced his keen conviction of the Imperial 
destiny of England. From 1883 to 1894 he undertook on seven separate 
occasiohs travels which helped him to acquire ”an unequalled personal 
knowledge of the countries bordering upon British India.” Years 
strengthened his faith in Imperialism and to some extent imparted 
rigidity to his mental outlook regarding Britain*s dependancies. He 
was appointed Under-Secretary of dtate for India in November, l891i in 
which capacity he piloted the Indian Councils Bill of 1892 through the 
Commons. In June 1895 he was appointed Under-secretary for Foreign 
Affairs under the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury* Member of the Privy 
Council at the early age of thirty-six, Curzon was appointed governor- 
general of India when he was hardly forty. (D.N.B.)
* Eastern Bengal and Assam was constituted a separate Lt.governor*s 
province with a legislative council of fifteen members: nominated 9
not exceeding seven officials; elected 6 (Municipal and district boards 
3, Association of Landholders, 1, Association of Merchants 1, and 
Chittagong Port Trust 1.)
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among the most politically conscious section of the people. Unrest 
developed and outburst of violence manifested the depth of antagonism  ^
of a section of people. By 1907, Bombay, Bengal, the Punjab and 
Madras had been the scenes of such violence. The Japanese victory 
over the Russians appeared to many as symbol of victorious Asiatic 
resurgence, and fired their imagination. The popular movements in 
Turkey, Iran and Egypt had their impact on Indian nationalism.
Within the Congress, a radical wing gained strength which put all its 
strength in the Swadeshi movement, launched at the time for encouragement
|
of indigenous industry and manufacture. While the moderates adopted 
the Swadj^Ski programme for the sake of SwaifjE>sfci^ the extremists 
valued it no less as an effective and powerful weapon to injure the 
British commercial intereste in India. Their tone towards the; British 
was bellicose and bitters in this they were distinct from the 
moderates. From the latter they gradually drifted and ultimately 
wrecked the Congress session of 1907, at Surat, amidst-rowdyism and- 
disorder. They then left the Congress fold, and disseminated their 
particular political philosophy from a separate platform. Among the 
intractable leaders of this school were B. G. Tilak and B. C. Pal, - 
the former a. Maharashtrian, the latter a Bengali, and both of them 
journalists.
The principal characteristic of the new thinking was the belief
that the British Government would not willingly yield any real power
to Indians. Tilak said that history had no record of an empire being
ever lost ffby a free grant of concessions by the rulers to the 
ruled.” No theoretical realisation of right or wrong would sway the
2.1,3
authorities; only what was absolutely necessary in the light of
prevailing circumstances would be conceded to the Indians* Hence the
Secretary of State, be he Conservative or Liberal, would always be
guided by consideration of practical politics,in dealing with Indian
demands* The only real pressure on the government at Westminster
could be exercised by the British electorate* But why should they
bother about India? It was also , impossible to convert them to the
Indian view-point* So Tilak considered any appeal #o the government,
to the bureaucracy, and even to the British public - the last, an
important plank on the Congress platform - futile. He would therefore
abjure the Congress policy and adopt a new method* What was it? "It
is the hope of achieving the goal by our own efforts,11 ^ said Tilak*
The British authority in India was maintained by a handful of white
men, whose mainstay was the assistance and co-operatlion of
innumerable Indians in the day to day work of the government. He
advocated a policy of "self-denial and self-abstinence in such a way
2as not to assist this foreign government to rule" over Indians* He
recommended the political weapon of boycott: "the remedy is not
3
petitioning, but boycott." He had in his mind not only non-co«*opera- 
tion with the government in performing administrative duties, but also 
envisaged refusal to use British goods, refusal to pay taxes,
1. B. G* Tilak, Two Remarkable Speeches, p*6.
2 Ibid, p*9*
3. Ibid, p.7.
r^'r
avoidance of the governments courts of justice, and setting up of
+parallel popular courts for deciding issues between Indians*
The goal of the new party, was self-government; nWe want a 
control over our administrative machinery*" ^ So the difference 
with the Congress was really on the method of achieving this goal*
Tilak had little respect for the Congress plea for increased
2
representation; "More representation would do no earthly good."
He said that this would only lead to the publication of a few more
speeches* But though he would not bargain for half-way houses, he
would not reject them* He wanted self-government immediately, no
doubt, but "if I cannot get the whole, donft think that I have no
patience* I will take the half they give me and then try for 
3
remainder."
Bipin Chandra Pal was no less a powerful votary of the new faith* 
He too spoke of the loss of the old belief that "England was 
conscientiously and deliberately working for the political emancipation
if
of India." The government would not listen to the prayer of the
Indians, and "the loss of faith in the foreign nation, in the foreign
5
Government, and in the foreign people," had led to a feeling of 
despair. They had realised that "England will not think of granting 
us any measure of real self-government until she is compelled to do s§.
+ Remarkable indeed is the similarity with Mahatma Gandhi’s method. It 
may be noted here that the Congress approved of boycott movement in 190£ 
as a protest against the partition . ’ of Bengal* But the Congress
adopted boycott as an emergency measure, following the failure of all 
constitutional and peaceful opposition to partition. (See resolution 
VII of 1906 Congress).
1. Ibid, p* 8. 2^ .Ibid, p. 13. 3.. Ibid, p*9.
5. B.C.Pal, Speeches at Madras, p*8. 3_. Ibid, p*17* §_• Ihid, p*3o*
Irresistible pressure of public feeling could only make the authorities
relent. But how could that be brought about? This could not be by the
timorous agitation of the Congress. They had therefore to look
elsewhere. This had made them !lto look nearer home" and had revealed
possibilities and potentialities in "the starving, the naked, the;
patient and long-suffering three hundred millions of Indian people." ^
"The corner stone"of the new movement, he declared, was "faith in the
2
people, faith in the genius of the people."
3
Declaring that "Freedom is man*s birth-right", Pal approached
the task ahead from two different angles. One was the way of boycott*
They would not only draw away from the administrative machinery, but
would offer increasing resistance to the government. This resistance
was to be "passive", but he explained that "passive resistance is not
antonym of active resistance..... It means not resistance that is not
active resistance, but resistance that is not a^ressive resistance."
And he proposed organisation af parallel national institutions, to set
up "a scheme of practical self-government," to replace the "officialised
5
institutions of self-government" in the country.
His second approach was to treat the attainment of self-
government as a psychological problem. India was under the influence
of "hypnotism," and invoking the Hindu scriptures, he called the 
What was needed was to remove this maya. 
maintenance of British authority in India mayaV- "to dispel this
+ Illusion.
1. Ibid, p. 17.
p* .18.2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
p. 23.
P*79.
p.8o.
•> 1 illusion that Indians were weak and unfit* There was neither
weakness nor any disorganisation in the national life*, this was all
2
illusory* The new movement was essentially lfa spiritual movement"* 
aimed at infusing in Indians the right knowledge about their strength 
and making them see that the British sovereignity in India was mayaic 
in character.
Referring to the Congress ideal of self-government without 
severing the British connections, he ridiculed this as impossible* 
Either there would be no real British paramountcy or there would be 
no real autonomy. He saw a perpetual: conflict between Indian and
British interests, in every phase of national existence. Hence any 
real advancement was impossible under the British aegis * "this ideal 
of self-government within the Empire, this policy of association with, 
and opposition to, the Government, this policy of helping to smooth 
down the rough places of the administration will not do*" ^ Swaraj 
could never be a gift. It must be the outcome of a process of 
evolution, and brooked no conception of petitioning a superior power 
dispensing with this boon*
Bipin Chandra Pal was opposed to any instalments of concessions 
to the people by the government. These helped to palliate the wrongs 
of the administration and to induce in the people a feeling of
1. Ibid, p* 21.
2* Ibid, p. 24.
3* Ibid, p. 48.
"generous acquiescence" to this authority. The government must not be
allowed to "capture the mind of the masses", for howsoever benevolent
may be the administration, "good government is not only no substitute
for self-government, it is an exceedingly evil thing when the authority
of the state rests in the hand§ of an irresponsible power*" ^ On this
ground he had no sympathy with the demand for enlargement of legislative
councils. He declared that the new movement "refuses to continue, if
it can help itf for one single day, in the present state of helpless
dependency to wijich the benevolent despotism of England has reduced
the people of this country. It accepts no other teacher in the art of
self-government, except self-government itself. It values freedom for
its own sake, and desires autonomy, immediate and unconditional,
regardless of any considerations of fitness or unfitness of the people
for it; because it does not believe serfdom, in any shape or form, .
to be a school for real freedom in any country and under any
2
conditions whatever."
The study of the extremist views will remain incomplete, however, 
without a mention of Aurobindo Ghose, whose influence extended
throughout India. Holding that their ideal was "Swaraj or absolute
3
autonomy free from foreign control," he explained that this did not 
necessarily mean any hatred for the rulers or the ruling race* On the ,
contrary, true patriotism "proceeds on the basis of love and
1. Ibid, p*58*
2* B. C. Pal, The New Spirit, p.236.
3* Aurobindo Ghose, An Open Letter to his Countrymen. p*2.
+ In after life, he became famous as the Sage of Pondicherry for his
spiritual leadership.
brotherhood, and it looks beyond the unity of the nation and 
envisages the ultimate unity of mankind." ^ They sought unity of 
equals and freemen, not that of master and serf*
Violence and hatred were not the means to achieve this end* Law
would be respected, but within its limits no pains were to be spared
to further the^ t cause. They relied on self-help and passive
resistance. •Boycott', which had raised so much controversy, did
indeed partake of the nature of both. In its aspect of passive
resistance, boycott meant a refusal of co-operation so long as the
Indians were not admitted "to a substantial share and an effective
control in legislation, finance and administration." "No control,
no co-operation" was their watch-word: they refused to be a party to
foreign exploitation of the country's resources, nor to the foreign
control of national existence. In its other aspect, boycott intended
2
"to help our own nascent energies in the field of self-help."
Indian industries could flourish only if the people stopped 
purchasing foreign goods: other national enterprises could survive
only if support was withdrawn from their government sponsored 
counterparts.
Ghose too believed in the latent ability of the people to 
achieve Swara.i. Asserting that "moral strength" of Swara.i was 
invincible, he urged his countrymen to accept nationalism as a faith.
1. Ibid, p.3*
2. Ibid, p.^ f.
"Nationalism is not a mere political programme; Nationalism is a 
religion that has come from God; Nationalism is a creed into which 
you shall have to live." ^ It was not political self-interest which 
moved them. They were trying to realise God in the three hundred 
million of Indian people. "It is a religion which we are trying to 
live." 2
As to reforms, if these really made for popular government, he 
weloomed them as an instalment towards complete self-government. But 
he would not reconcile himself to "any petty or illusory concession 
which will draw away our aspirations from their unalterable ideal, or
delude the people into thinking they have secured real rights": on
3
this issue he was not ready to compromise with the Congress.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *** * * * * * * * * *
While the extremists thundered against the Congress because its 
programme did not go far enough, there were other sections of the. 
population who blamed the Congress for rash advocacy of occidental 
machinery in an oriental setting.
The strongest opposition to the Congress came from the Moslems.
We traced in the preceding chapters the growth of Moslem antagonism 
to the Congress, which had resulted in a deep-seated disbelief of 
Congress motives. The Moslems thought of the Congress mainly as a 
Hindu organisation, whose objects were opposed to the interests of the
1. Aurobindo Ghose, On the Present Situation, p.2.
2. Ibid, p.17*
3. An Open Letter to his Countrymen, p.7»
Moslems. Their antagonism to the Hindu was intensified by a series of
riots throughout the country in the nineties of the nineteenth century
originating in a movement under the auspices of the Gaurakshini Sabhas,
for the protection of cows from slaughter, In December 1899 the Anti-
Congress Committee submitted a memorial,^ forwarding a series of /
resolutions adopted at a meeting at Lucknow under the organisation's
auspices. The report of the meeting reveals no trace of Hindu
was
participation in the proceedings. The organisation/for all purposes 
purely Moslem*
They claimed that the Congress stood for a handful of radical men,
as against the vast majority who were conservative by instinct, and for
whom the memorialists spoke. They averred that the Congress agitation
was resulting in "discontent and unrest11, and was "subversive of the
2
best interests of British rule in India." Further, it had created 
"a daily widening gulf between the rulers and the ruled, as well as 
between different sections of the people." In view of these 
considerations, they proposed that, in the interest of more equitable 
representation, the seats on the legislative councils as also the local 
bodies should be allotted separately to the radical and conservative 
sections of the public, according to their numerical strength. This 
would avoid a disproportionately large representation of the radical 
elements. The Congress was blamed for "adumbrating political changes
1. Public Letters from India, 1900, vol.27, pp* 1^9-152.
2. Ibid, p.153.
2 S J
for which the country is not prepared," ^ because "democratic theories
n 2are wholly unsuited to the country. The Congress policy was
injurious to the interests "of the Natives in general and specially of
those who are in numerical minority, foremost among whom are the
3
Mahommedans ..." They feared that the introduction of democratic 
institutions in India would lead to the minority communities being 
"carefully excluded from all the ’sweets of office*."
This distrust of the overwhelming Hindu majority had come to be 
the decisive factor in the Moslem politics. The departure of Curzon 
and the assumption of Viceroyalty by Minto + along with the advent of 
the Liberals at Westminster with John Morley at the India Office 
brought in their train favourable signs for political changes in 
India. It got about that the Viceroy had set up a Committee of his 
Executive Council to examine the possibility of further reforms*
1. Ibid (Resolution III)
2. Ibid (Resolution II)
3* Ibid (Resolution i)
4-* Ibid, (Resolution II)
+ Lord Minto (184-5-191*0: Lord Minto had ancestral connection with
India, his great-grandfather was governor-general of India, and his 
mother’s father was commander-in-chief of the Madras army. Minto 
joined the army, and saw active service in many parts of the world 
including Afghanistan. He was not politically inclined. The only 
endeavour he made to enter the House of Commons as a Liberal-Unionist 
in 1886 did not succeed* He was governor-general of Canada from 1898 
to 1904-. He was marked for his moderation and tact. In fact, these 
traits of his character were considered likel^to be of much use when 
he was selected to succeed Curzon, whose tenure of office in India 
had given rise to a host of controvensies, (D.N.B.)
Apprehending that the Moslem claims might not be fully appreciated,
a powerful deputation, led by the Aga Khan, waited upon Minto at
I
Simla on 1 October 1906. In their address, the Deputation made 
an emphatic assertion that "we Mohamedans are a distinct community, 
with additional interests of our own which are not shared by 
other communities," and regretted that hitherto they had not 
received a fair share of representation. They claimed that their 
position under any future scheme should be "commensurate not 
merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political 
importance and the value of the contribution which they make to 
the defence of the Empire,": their traditions and status in the
country before the British regime must be taken into consideration* 
They demanded that the government should declare the proportion 
of seats which the Moslems were entitled to in the different 
legislative councils. Further, the Moslem members should be
+
elected by electoral colleges consisting only of Moslem voters*
In determining the proportion of Moslem members in a provincial 
council, the authorities were urged to weigh their "numerical 
strength, social status, local influence and special requirements." 
As regards the supreme legislative council, they submitted that a 
due representation of Moslem interests demanded that the proportion 
of Moslem representation must not be fixed solely on the basis 
of numerical strength; "in any case the Mohamedan representative 
should never be t ineffective minority." As far as possible, 
Moslem members of the supreme council were to be selected by
I. The address was printed in the Pioneer, 3 Oct, 1906.
+ They claimed the same rights district boards and
municipalities.
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election, as against nomination. They also indicated how the
electorates for Moslem representation could be formed. For the
provincial council it might consist of "the important Mahamedan
landowners, lawyers, merchants and representatives of other
important interests, the Mahomedan members of District Boards,
Municipalities, and the Mojiamedan graduates of Universities of
a certain standing....." For returning members to the supreme
council, a similar electoral college was recommended, including
Moslem members of provincial councils and Moslem Fellows of
Universities, but excluding membera of district boards and
municipalities, and graduate®. The Moslem Deputation thus went
a step further than the Congress in prescribing the franchise for
+
election to the legislative councils.
At the same time, the Deputation pressed for the appointment 
of a Moslem in the governor-general*s executive council, in case 
admission of Indians into it was under contemplation. The address 
concluded with an assurance that these concessions would, apart 
from strengthening Moslem loyalty, lay "the foundation of their 
political advancement and national prosperity."
Two very important innovations in the sphere of political 
discussions in India were thus introduced. One was the idea of 
separate representation, through electoral collsges consisting 
of members of a particular religious faith only; the other was 
apportionment of seats on the legislative councils on grounds 
other than the numerical proportion of a community. Though
+ See above p.
dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of representation in 
the councils had been, all these years, expressed by different 
classes and interests, the idea of separate representation had 
not been put forward for very long. It sprang from a desire to 
deny the Hindus any say in the election of Moslem representatives. 
This would also make it unnecessary for the latter to court 
Hindu support, and consequently to fear an alienation of Hindu 
sentiments. By pressing for increased representation on consider­
ations of other than numerical strength, the Deputation in reality 
asked for a favoured treatment for the Moslems, necessarily at 
the cost of some other community or interest. It may be noted 
that this authoritative Moslem statement omitted any protestation 
of unsuitability of democratic institutions in India,- an argument 
which had so long been the sheet-anchor of Moslem opposition to 
the Congress ideals. This was, no doubt, due to the indication 
that, if anything, the authorities would, far from retracing 
their steps, go further in the direction of representative 
government in India.
The significance of these demands was greatly heightened by
I
the reply which the governor-general gave to the Deputation. He 
sympathized with "the just aims of the followers of Islam" and 
conceded, "You justly claim that your position should be estimated 
not merely on your numerical strength but in respect to the 
political importance of your community, and the service it has 
rendered to the Empire." Any personal enfranchisement regardless
I. Lord Minto*s reply was published in the Pioneer, 3 Oct. 1906.
of the beliefs and traditions of the different classes of the 
people was bound to fail in India. He was, therefore, ’’entirely 
in accord” with the Deputation and assured the Moslems that their 
political rights and interests ”as a community” would be safe­
guarded in any future reforms.
This was a momentous declaration, naturally much relied on 
by the Moslems ever since. Fortified and encouraged by such a 
recognition of their stand, the Moslems sought for them a 
country-wide political platform. In December 1906, the All-India 
Muslim Leagit« came into being, with the object of protecting and 
furthering the political rights and interests of Moslems, besides 
promoting among them ’’feelings of loyalty to the British Government.’ 
The President in his address identified the Moslem cause with that 
of the British, ^he safety of Moslems lay in loyalty to the 
government, he declared, and deprecated the Congress practice of 
’’rabid opposition to all Government measures.” The Nawab of Dacca* 
a prominent architect of the new organisation, affirmed that the 
new body had been forced upon them by the Congress extremism. They
wanted uto save themselves from being submerged by an enormous and
I
noisy majority of the other race*!
Henceforward the Moslem view-point was placed with increasing
vigour. In March 1907* in the presence of Gokhale, a promiment
+
Moslem politician spoke of the increasing estrangement between 
the Hindus and the Moslems and charged the Congress with wilfully 
belittling many of the benefits of the British rule. In the
I. The Times. 2 January 1907*
+ Nawab Mohsin-Ul-Mulk. He spoke at Lucknow at a breakfast 
in honour of Gokhale.
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governor-general*s legislative council, on 27 March 190^ the
Nawab of Dacca spoke of the Moslem consternation at the
possibility of being "completely swamped" by "more educationally
I
advanced communities...." For the better prospect of "the
peace and prosperity of the country", he appealed that not "the
microscopic minority of English-speaking natives alone", but
the Princes, Chiefs and the landed gentry should be invited to
2
guide and advise the government. The latter had a larger stake 
in the country, and would, therefore, be more mindful of the 
well-being of the people.
At the second annual session of the League in January, 1908 
great stress was laid on the Moslem loyalty to the government.
In April, 1908 a special general conference of the League pressed 
for adequate separate Moslem representation on the legislative 
oouncils, local bodies, Senates etc., and decided to open a 
branch in London under the chairmanship of Ameer Ali, an ex-Judge 
of the Calcutta High Court. On 6 May 1908 the inaugural meeting 
of the London branch of the League was held* Thus the League, in 
consolidating the Moslem organisation, provided itself with means 
to controvert the Congress stand and assert its own at every stage* 
It may be noticed that the Moslem politicians were concerned 
primarily with the immediate ends in view. Not that the future 
did not unfurl itself to their eyes. They never questioned the 
continuation of British supremacy in India. On the contrary, they 
considered it necessary and wholesome. Thus the Aga Khan, the
1. Pari.Papers 1907» 1^0. (p.190)
2. Ibid, (p.191)
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first elected President of the League, deprecated "the setting 
up of false and impracticable ideals." Swaraj could only follow 
achievement of homogeneity, and unity of ideal. For that India 
had still to travel a long way, and must, during this probation - 
this phase of preparation - be under a strong and stable govern­
ment. Obviously, the British government had to stay, and Swaraj 
was not possible of attainment in the visible future. He exhorted 
his followers: "British rule - not only a titular supremacy, 
but a vigorous force, permeating every branch of the administration -
is an absolute necessity. Therefore, I put it to you that it is
I
the duty of all true Indian patriots to make that rule strong."
** ** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** **
What was the attitude of the Anglo-Indians towards all this? 
Theirs was a powerful voice in the Indian affairs, and their view­
point the only important body of public opinion in India which 
remains to be studied. For apart from the Congress, the Extremists, 
the Moslems and the Anglo-Indians, there was no other body of 
opinion which assumed sizable proportions in India at the time.
No doubt, sporadic letters were published in newspapers on the 
subject of representative government. But they scarcely possessed 
the qualities of popular backing, novelty of approach, or even 
of eminence of their authors to deserve any consideration.
Interested public opinion in India at the time, - as distinct 
from the vast masses beyond whose intelligent perception and 
participation the issues were, - may be fitted into the pattern 
of one of the four schools of thought mentioned above.
I. The Times, 7 September 1908.
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The exponent of the most vigorous non-official Anglo-Indian
opinion in India was, of course, the Pioneer. With an inherent
dislike of reforms in India and antipathy to the Congress, they
challenged the authority of the Congress to speak for the Indian
people. The masses whom the Congress feigned to represent knew
little of it, and the Pioneer saw in the Congress movement the
outcome of the ambitions and aspirations of a small class of
educated men. The clamour for reforms came from "the very few....
I
who would benefit by the changes that are demanded.t! But even
the Pioneer1s persistent hostility to the Congress sometimes
seemed to flag, as when they admitted that the Congress "does
represent a great and important volume of native thought and
2
merits careful study and attention." They would not, however, be 
a party to any change which would confer on the educated an 
effective control of the Indian affairs. On what did the educated 
classes base the claim to be put over the millions of their 
countrymen? They had neither the right of conquest nor of 
hereditary claim, nor any advantage of natural leadership, not 
even a reputation for impartiality and ability to promote harmony 
between the rival divisions of the Indian population.
In fact, to the Pioneer the lack of homogeneity was the 
greatest bar to the introduction of representative government in 
India. It constituted also the soundest logic for the continuance 
of the British authority, because under its strong and firm 
influence, "which treats all with equality and refuses to look
1. 28 December 1906*
2. 20 January 1907*
ir<j
i
with mone favour upon one than upon others," the old differences
and antagonism had almost disappeared. The first duty of the
British rule was to protect the rights of every race, "to act as
2
a guardian to a minor," and to gradually fit the masses, by
spread of education, to work their own destiny. Till then the
British could not divest themselves "of the sacred obligation to
3
maintain for the minorities that perfect equality of justice"
which the British alone were capable for the present to guarantee
to all. They had no doubt whatsoever that a rash application
of Western methods would "almost inevitably result in the creation
of a Hindu domination." This would upset the good relations which
had been brought about between the different classes, and would
particularly be a source of danger to the Moslems. The old
enmities would raise their heads again, and endanger the peace of
the country. The government must prevent any race domination,
and hence "the crude principle that'the majority must rule'
4
cannot be applied to India." Because of all these risky possibil­
ities and dangers, they concluded, "It is only within the limits of
British supremacy that means can be found for satisfying all the
5
reasonable aspirations of India for many years to come...."
Coming to the specific demands of the various political
schools, they concurred with the Moslems that the latter represented
a much greater force in the life of the country than. theUs "htf^ ber
seemed to indicate. They accepted the special position of the
T~. 3 October 1906. 5*1 20 January 1907.
2. 9 February 1907* 3» 24 February 1907*
3# 24 February 1907*
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Moslem community, in view of their tradition, share in the defence
of the Empire, strength and intelligence# And because they
apprehended that the grant of "purely Western methods of election
and representation” would revive racial jealousy and antagonism,
they endorsed the Moslem demand for representation commensurate
with their importance so that their interests might not be at
+
the mercy of a ruthless majority. $wo essential principles must
t
be embodied in any change for placing the government upon a more
representative basis. The first was the Recognition of the
great racial and religious distinctions which make it impossible
to reduce the whole population to a common classification” and
the second was that any elective system must rest on a narrow
franchise, on educational, social and property basis. While
commending these to the government, the Moslems were assured that
their rulers were ”wise enough to see the prudence and also the
justice of reciprocating” the sentiments of the Moslems, "whose
I
loyal^ty is one of the greatest bulwarks of the Indian Empire.”
The declared Congress goal - self-government on Colonial
lines - was denounced as impracticable# The Colonies were the
children of the empire, jealously guarded by the parent country
"until they shall be great enough not only to protect themselves
2
but to help also in the protection of *the motherland.” India was
not a child of the empire in that sense* Besides, the Colonial
+ They did not seem to have any qualms of conscience in accepting 
the right of the Moslem Deputation to speak for the Moslem 
masses#
I. 3 October 1906.
2# 28 December 1906.
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type of democratic self-government presupposed "a fair degree of
homogeneity, some common aspirations, and above all, a common
I
national spirit." How did Indian conditions parallel this unity?
They were even more explicit on what was considered an invidious
comparison between India and the Colonies. Echoing the views of
+
Sir Alfred Lyall, an eminent Indian civilian who upon retirement
found a place on the India Council, it was pointed out that the
Colonists were transplanted Britons, and their political institutions
were necessarily imported from the mother country. There was no
question of experimenting with untried tools. Reproduction in Cl
colony of British institutions was a natural, "instinctive and
habitual" process. But without a radical change in the social
and moral circumstances of the country, the inauguration of such
machinery in India would be a senseless imitation, "& mere mockery,
a mere burlesque of democratic institutions." This did not mean
that no form of popular association was possible in India. There
2
was useful scope for "consultative bodies." They, therefore, 
advised the agitators to drop the impossible ideal of Colonial 
self-government, and instead harness their energy and will to the 
promotion of indigenous industries, and removal of social and 
moral evils.
Such advice did not, however, manifest the feelings of another
section of the Anglo-Indian community, which had different ideas.
Yl 9 February 1907- —
2. 29 March 1907.
+ As expressed in a speech in Caxton Hall, London, in 1907*
They did not discern any difficulty in the simultaneous promotion 
of political and' industrial aims in India, There was no 
incompatibility between politics and industry. On the contrary,
"the two generally march hand in hand.” There was every reason 
why ”the industrial progress of the people India and political 
reform should go hand in hand.” They went so far as to say that 
much of the Anglo-Indian antagonism to the nationalist aspirations 
sprang from a clash of interests, - industrial, economic and 
political.
Again, they did not castigate the Congress claim to Hrepresent 
all parts of the country and all classes, races and creeds.” They 
accepted it as ’'substantially true.” Even though undeniably the 
Congress was composed of the educated, and specially the English 
educated, classes of the population, there was not the slightest 
indication that ”it is devoted to the advocacy of measures 
conceived in the interests of a class and not in the general 
interest..,..” There was no reform, advocated by the Congress, 
which "would not be affirmed by a large majority of the people of
India if the opportunity of passing judgment on it were afforded
2
them.” It was indisputable too that India had gained, and was 
showing every day, a definite consciousness of her national destiny.
How had it come about? This awakening was the outcome of the 
British policy of education in India. The very aim and justification 
of education was to instil in human hearts a feeling of discontent
1. The Friend of India & Statesman, 5 January 1905*
2. Ibid.
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with the existing order, a restlessness for wider scope for the
developing individuality. The Indian aspirations for larger
participation in their own administration had sprouted from what
the British themselves had taught the Indians. Now "to look
with alarm on the success of our policy is to condemn the
collective wisdom of the statesmen who have in our name governed
I
India for the past century." The only remedy open was to bestow
on the educated classes concessions of a degree of political
liberty in proportion to their education.
®ut the nature and extent of this concession must depend
upon the political capacity, the sense of public responsibility
and the degree of judgment displayed under trying conditions
in the school of practical experience. The higher the order of
these accomplishments, the more speedy would be the process of
emancipation. This delineation of the political remedy naturally
led them to conclude that the Congress ideal of Colonial self-
government "for many years to come must of necessity partake of
2
the character of 1pious opinions.1"
Nor was this in conflict with the proclaimed Congress 
readiness to attain their goal gradually, by instalments. The 
opinion: of this school of the Anglo-Indians was thus as 
conspicuous for a wide measure of sympathy with the Congress, as 
for abstaining from any reference to the various difficulties 
propped up to oppose further reforms. This perhaps shows the 
growing appeal of the Congress. Nor was this extraordinary.
1. Ibid, 23 May 1907.
2. Ibid, 3 January 1907*
2The Congress ideals were rooted in Western origins; their method
of constitutional agitation was a product of the British political
practice: the Congress leaders - for example, Naoroji, Banexjea,
Gokhale - swore by eminent British political philosophers* All
this must have struck the constitutional instincts of the Anglo-
Saxon, How could these hut make some impression? There was too
close an affinity between the Congress and the British traditions,
to warrant a perpetual refusal to relent*
* *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *
While such excited debates centred round the issue of reform
in India, in England too there was some enthusiastic public
discussion. The keenest supporters of the reform were the British
+
Committee of the Congress, and the Indian Parliamentary Committee* 
These two organisations worked in very close collaboration, and 
derived sustenance from practically the same source. Apart from 
some work of publicity through press, the British Committee gradually 
receded i x\ -> more and more in the background, leaving the Indian 
Parliamentary Committee to wage the main battle for Indian reform. 
Naturally it was in parliament that the support for Indian reforms 
was mostly voiced* But before we proceed to consider that it may 
briefly be noted that the Minority Report of the Royal Commission 
on Indian Expenditure - appointed in May 1895 - made the following
+ Indian Parliamentary Committee was founded in 1895 with Sir 
William Wedderburn as Chairman and Herbert Robert, later on Lord 
Clwyd, as Secretary, for the purpose of promoting combined and well- 
directed action among those interested in the Indian affairs, in j 5
Parliament* It was not committed to any definite programme, but 
enlisted the support of as many members as possible under a general 
promise of attention and sympathy. The Committee was reconstituted 
after the Liberal triumph in 1906 under the Chairmanship of Sir 
Henry Cotton. (Ratcliffe, Wedderburn)
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among other recommendations:- (1) Non-official members of the
Viceroy’s legislative council to be made more directly responsible
to the Indian people; to have the right to move amendments to the
budget and to divide the council, (2) Indians to be nominated to
the secretary of state’s council, and at least one Indian to the
governor-general’s executive council. The Minority Report was
signed by Sir William Wedderburn, Dadabhai Naoroji and W.S,Caine.
The Congress demand for opening.the India Council and the
executive councils to Indians found ready backing. In the House of
Commons on k March 1897 Sir William Wedderburn broached the subject
of including in the India council ”an experienced and representative 
I
Indian.” Three years later, Samuel Smith repeated the plea ”so that
the Secretary for India may have the power of consulting a native
2
of India on points which natives alone can perfectly understand.”
On another occasion, he suggested the appointment of ’’three or four
, 3
eminent natives of India” on the India i vouncil. Herbert Roberts,
requesting ’’the appointment of one representative Indian on the
if
council of the Secretary of State,” pointed out that such a step 
while giving to the Indian no decisive voice in the council would, 
be a much-appreciated concession to the Indian opinion. These 
views were more fully pressed during the discussion of the Council 
of India bill in 1907* Of the various amendments moved in the House
1. Indiajy Pari .Debates, 1897, P*H3*
2. Indian Debates, 1900, p.76.
3. Ibid, 1905, p.329. 
k. Ibid, 190^, p.358.
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of Commons, one urged that there must be at least two Indian 
members on the secretary of state!s council, whereas another 
sought to ensure that any Indian so appointed must be an ex­
elected member of a legislative council in India* The latter
amendment, its mover explained, was intended to exclude unquestion-
+
ing upholders of authority.
Similar pleas were made for including Indians in the
executive councils. On 20 June 1904 Schwann requested that "at
I
least one representative and experienced Indian member11 should
be appointed to the Viceroy's executive council. Herbert Roberts
too sought an undertaking from the secretary of state that "he
would at all events consider the desirability of appointing at
2
least one Indian representative on the Viceroy's Council."
Samuel Smith during the discussion of the Indian budget .in the
House of Commons in June 1905 called the government of India "as
purely bureaucratic as that of Russia," and said that £he "time
had come when the ablest and best of the Indian people should be
3
associated with ourselves in the government of the country."
He wanted that the governor-general should have at least one 
Indian member on his executive council.
While the inclusion of Indians in the highest administrative 
councils constituted an important item among the reforms demanded^ 
the real emphasis was on broadening the basis of the administration
+ It must be remembered that at this time the secretary of state
made no secret of his intention of placing Indians on his council.
1. Ibid, p.256.
2. Ibid, p.357.
3. Ibid, 1905, p.328.
of the country# In 1899 a suggestion was made to make all the
legislative councils of India elective, and to extend ”a franchise
for that purpose, to all British subjects, native or foreign born,
I
who are taxed for the necessities of Indian Government.’1 In 1903
Osmond Williams regretted that India was in the grip of ’’unsympath- .
etic Imperialism.” Pointing to the ’’cast-iron exclusion of the
natives from all participation in the government of their own
2
affairs” he thought it ”a poor policy”, and wondered: ’’Was there 
no statesman to remove this devastating and blighting Imperialism 
from India and &ive the people of India some voice in the manage-
3
ment of their own affairsJ” Two years later Cathcart Wason 
referred to the spread of education and Western ideas in India, 
along with the demolition of the barriers of language and distance. 
Was it not anomalous that in face of such changes, the Indians
k
should be denied any say in the administration of their own country? 
The argument was pursued the same day with much more vigour by 
Samuel Smith. He emphasised that the reactionary administration 
which India had witnessed during the last few years, if not given 
up, would alienate the sympathy and sentiments of the people and 
create great difficulties in future. What they needed was really 
an overhaul of the machinery of government. The Indian people had 
been trained to some extent in self-government in the existing 
legislative councils* and the time had arrived ”to give India some
T. Ibid, 1899, P.329.
2. Ibid, 1903, P.359.
3. Ibid, p.360.
4. Ibid, 1905, p.324.
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i
moderate form of representative government.”
In 1906 Herbert Roberts moved an amendment to the motion 
for an address in reply to the King’s Speech. Referring to the 
unrest in India ’’due to the recent policy of the government” it 
represented among other things ’’that the reasonable demands of 
the Indian people for a larger share in the administration of
2
their affairs should receive the consideration of the Government,” 
These demands as outlined in the address of the President of the 
Indian National Congress of 19051 were:- (a) Raising the number 
of elected members in the supreme legislative council to twelve 
out of twenty-five; (b) Increasing the number of elected members 
in provincial legislative councils; and (c) Appointment of three 
Indians on the India Council* These proposals were not considered 
excessive. He explained that the amendment sought to secure ”an 
extension of the principle laid down and conceded by the Indian
3
Councils Act, 1892.” No majority of elected members in the councils 
was asked for; but there must be adequate arrangements for the 
Indian point of view to be put forward on matters of local adminis­
tration.
Supporting Robert’s amendment, Sir Henry Cotton said^ ”We had
given education to the people of India, and it was impossible now
if
to go on indefinitely refusing the concessions they demanded.” The 
education that the British had devised for Indians had planted in
1. Ibid, p.328.
2. Ibid, 1906, p«31*
3* Ibid, p.18.
Ibid, p.21,
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their minds Western habits of thought and kindled in their hearts
many aspirations. The reactionary regime of Curzon, culminating
in the partition of Bengal, fThad galvanised the people into a
I
condition of dissatisfaction and unrest,’1 All these influences
had transformed the Indian scene, and !lit was necessary not only
to appreciate the changes that had taken place but to prepare for
2
further changes1.’ For no system of administration could be beneficial 
to the people and conduce to their contentment if it did not ’’foster 
the self-reliance of the people and encourage their aspirations to 
realise their destiny through their own a*e£ion'3.”
+
Much the same line was taken by T. Hart-Da vie s. ”A new spirit,
4
a new feeling” had engulfed India, which now boasted a considerable
population trained in Western ideas by Western education. He
assured the House that it was now ’’absolutely impossible for us to
go on refusing to give them an adequate share of the government of
5
their own country.” In the House of Lords, Ampthill, an ex-governor
of Madras, gave his ’’firm opinion” in favour of some decided step
”to meet the hopes and aspirations which we ourselves have encouraged
6
among the educated classes of India.”
Amidst this chorus of support for Indian reforms, a new note 
was struck with the growing hold of the extremists in India and
the increasing unrest. The necessity of buttressing the position
I. Ibid, p.23. + Hart-Davies was an ex-member of the
2. Ibid, p.21, Indian Civil Service: he retired as
3. Ibid, p.22. Judicial Commissioner of Sind in 1897.
4. Ibid, p.38.
3* Ibid, p.39.
6, Ibid, P*305.
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of the moderate politicians in India, as against their extremist
critics, was urged. In the House of Commons the secretary of
state was reminded of f,the danger lest the party of consitutional.
agitation in India, by too long delay on the part of His Majesty*s
Government in moving forward in the desired direction, should be
discredited, and that forces should be let loose in India which
I
might in the future create a Situation of political danger.”
The same consideration was urged on Hor/^ /j by Sir William Wedderburn
in a letter in March 1907# The position of the Moderates - the
followers of the Congress - was weakening, because they had
nothing to point out in support of their assurances that by
constitutional agitation the government would be persuaded to
listen to them* ’’The popular feeling was that of hope deferred;
the heart of the people was getting sick*” The extremists were
gaining. Time was passing. Some steps must be taken immediately;
"unless some overt move were made, the best opportunity for action 
2
would be lost.”
We may briefly notice here another proposal of reform that 
was put forward. V/.S*Caine on 20 October 1902 brought to the 
secretary of state*S notice the advantage o£-reviving the 
Imperial council - consisting of certain leading Indian Princes 
which had been established by Lytton in 1877» to secure their
views and advice on general matters of state. On 21 June 1905 
Sir Mancherji Bhownaggree, an Indian member of the House of Commons,
I* Ibid, p.2^9#
2. S.K.Ratcliffe, WedderburnT p.1^3*
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renewed this suggestion. Such a body would enable the government 
of India to consult on important public questions those who by-
virtue of their large stake in the country and their responsible
QvJltJsuk
position were &9rti-#-i?sd to be taken into confidence and consult-
I
ation by the paramount power.”
Before we leave the consideration of the public support
accorded to the Indian reforms in Britain, we may also notice
another school of opinion - much weaker than the above - which
lent its full support to the cause. It came from the extreme
left and brought to bear upon the issue the vigour and force
which characterized its approach to all issues, domestic and
foreign. In a meeting in 1907, H.M.Hyndman, the socialist leader,
made a scathing criticism of the British regime in India. A
resolution which he piloted expressed full sympathy with, and
sent greetings to ”the agitators all over India, who are doing
their utmost to awaken their countrymen of every race and creed
to the ruinous effect” of the British rule. It recorded the
”fervent hope that this infamous British system which crushes
all economic, social and political life out of 230 millions of
people will, ere long, be pea<fhbly or forcibly swept away for 
2
ever. He eomplained that under the British, India had gone poorer 
and an all-sided declension had set in. It was time for vigorously
3
protesting ”against this shameful system of despotism,” and to do
our best to help the people of India if they try to remove our 
k
misgovernment.”
1. Indian Debates, 1903* P*352.
2. H.M.Hyndman, The Unrest in India. ^  /-
3. Ibid, p#13*
Ibid, p.l6.
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The sixteenth annual conference of the Independent Labour
Party, under the chairmanship of Ramsay Macdonald, also adopted
a resolution which, after a mention of the dire poverty of the
Indian people and the "reactionary nature" of the administration,
declared "sympathy with the aim of the Indian Congress", and
favoured entrusting the people of India with "more effective
I
control over their own affairs."
** *♦ ** ** ** ** ** * * **
While within the House of Commons was heard the most ardent 
support for Indian reforms, there was also some opposition to 
them there. Major Evans Gordon, with twenty years*experience 
of service in India, assured the House on 21 June 1903 that "in
2
ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the dumb multitudes of India/"
would prefer an Englishman to an Indian in a high position. He
made an appeal on a later occasion that the House must not be
swayed by the Indian National Congress which did not represent the
people. Concession to the Congress demands would not lead to a
betterment of the peoplefs conditions, but would only benefit the
+
persons who cried for the reforms. Another member, Rees, exhorted 
the House to realise that "representative institutions had never
3
been desired by the inhabitants of India." There was no evidence 
of a popular demand for the same, and introduction of a represent­
ative system would be regarded by the masses as putting them "under 
k
the heel" of the educated classes.
1. The Times, 22 April 1908.
2. Indian Debates, 1903, P*333*
3. Ibid, 1906, p.233.
4. Ibid, p.254.
+ J.D.Rees - formerly of the Indian Civil Service: retired in 
1900 as Resident, Travancore and Cochin.
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The ablest exponent of this point of view was Percy, the
Conservative ex-parliamentary secretary to the India Office. He
considered that "it would be rash to take the experience of the
last fourteen years " of the working of the 1892 Act "as affording
I
adequate justification" for further reforms. He was convinced that
2
any endeavour to "govern by majorities" in India was doomed to 
failure. This was not due to the backwardness of education and 
political training of Indians* He discerned that the impossibility 
lay "in the two facts which are at the root of the Indian problem, 
and which differentiate it from any other." The first was the 
lack of a homogeneous Indian nationality. India was really "a 
1 0f paces animated to a large extent by different and 
even antagonistic ideals," only deterred by the strong British 
rule from a resort to force and violence to settle the conflict.
The second overriding difficulty was that among these races,
"nature has chosen to assign the qualities that make for physical 
predominance to the races which are neither intellectually the 
most versatile nor the largest in point of numbers." So the intro­
duction of majority rule in India, under the circumstances, must 
mean "the government of the strong by the weak, a government which 
could not exist for a day except by the support of the British
3
bayonets." Hence so far as India was concerned, they must have 
in view good government, and not self- government. He could not 
welcome any reforms which would feive the Indians a share in the
1. Ibid, p.51.
2. Ibid, 1907, p.190.
3. Ibid, p.191.
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control of policy. The Indians, of course, could be useful in
the councils, but these must remain advisory bodies and should
guarantee adequate representation of the minorities. Such
representation f,must be based to some extent on racial and
I
religious qualifications,” for which purpose he suggested
creation of special constituencies.
While the opposition of a section of the British opinion
was thus in the House of Commons, it was focussed with
much more vigour in the columns of the Times. Resenting ”the
folly of pouring new wine into old bottlesj1 a tendency among
democratic thinkers to consider ”the fundamental doctrines of
their political creed as immutable and universal truths” was
regretted* These principles were not applicable in all places
and in all societies. ”To the great bulk of the population of
2
Asia, they are simply unintelligible.” Their traditions and 
the conception of authority ingrained in them made them believe 
only in a system of rule from above. They had no faith at all 
in impfi^ing constitutional restrictions on their rulers. In 
view of this, despite the clamour of agitators, British rule 
in India ”is a good and just rule as it stands.” Any rash 
application of the democratic tenets ”would infallibly plunge 
India into a chaos more hopeless and more destructive than the
3
Mutiny itself.”
^hey pointed out that agitation for reforms was limited to 
”the merest fraction of the population”. This was sustained by a
1. Ibid, p.193*
2. The Times, 5 Septemberv 1907*
December, 1907•
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very small part of the Hindus of the town* The Moslems held
themselves aloof from this movement, which they viewed f?with
I
mixed feelings of suspicion, apprehension and disgust." The
Rajputs, a large proportion of the Sikhs, the buJLk of the
population in the native states, had no truck with the propagators
of reform. The Congress, no doubt, ,fexpressed the aspirations of
a considerable number of able Indians,11 but could never claim to
speak for India, They, therefore, advised the organisation to
"abate its arrogant pretensions" and to reduce its programme to
limits that are possible. For India was not yet fitted for any
general form of elective self-government, and "the period when
her peoples will be so fitted is not even in sight." A long way
had to be traversed, and many obstacles surmounted, before self-
government could be achieved. Prior to the various communities
being left free to mould their own destiny must be demolished the
barriers that kept them apart. Racial and religious jealousies
must be curbed and the social system rid of many evils. To
these tasks of preparation for self-government, "thoughtful and
" 2
prescient Indians" were advised to devote themselves.
*  *  * *  * *  * *  * *  *  4 e  * *  * *  aft $  *  *
u
We have noticed above how the lack of homogeneity of Indian
*!fr
population loomed very large on the discussion of Indian affairs. 
It is interesting to note that eminent persons closely concerned 
with India held divergent views on this issue.
1. 5 September, 1907*
2. 30 December, 1907-
x%
Sir Henry Fowler, the ex-secretary of state, said in the
House of Commons on 8 August 1899 that there was no such thing
as an Indian nation. "India consists of a large number of separate
nations, of people of different creeds and races, residing in
different climates, and exposed to opposing influences, and it
I
would be impossible to weld them together as one nation.” There
had never been and there would never be a common Indian nationality.
This view was strongly supported by Sir John Strachey, the eminent
Indian official. On the opening page of his book India he asked,
"What is India?” The reply he gave wa^, "There is no such country,
and this is the first and most essential fact about India that
2
can be learned.” He considered it impossible that the feeling of 
a single Indian nationality would ever grow.
Yet, Sir Henry Cotton, also an eminent Indian Civilian, in 
the revised edition of his book New India, published in 190^, 
said, "the political problem in India is the growth of an Indian 
Nation." And how did it grow? "It is education, and education 
according to English methods and on the lines of Western Civil­
ization, that has served to unite the varying forces among the
3
Indian populations. No other bond of unity was possible...." 
D.Smeaton, an ex-Indian Civilian, said in the House of Commons in 
1906 that it was "a grave misapprehension" to say that there was 
no "Indian people" or "Indian public opinion." The people of India
1. Indian Debates, 18991 p#^10.
2. Sir John Strachey, India, p.2.
3. Sir H.J.S.Cotton, New India, p.2.
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were very easily moved in the mass when aroused by any sentiment,
I
anger or affection....” The Indian people had collective views,
he asserted.
This conflict of views, as we saw in the preceding chapters, 
permeated every stage of discussion of Indian reforms. The 
approach to the problem of representative, government in India was 
largely correlated with the way the co-existence of the different 
races, religions and ideologies was interpreted. While some saw 
in them an insurmountable barrier for Indian people to coalesce, 
others perceived an underlying common sentiment - "unity in 
diversity" in Vincent Smith"s famous phrase.
Nt* ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
We have studied in this chapter the attitude of important 
sections of public opinion in India towards the issue of further 
reforms. We have also considered the reaction of various sections 
of non-official opinion in England. In the next chapter, we shall 
see how the problem was faced by the government.
I. Indian Debates, 1906, p.^ fl.
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Chapter VII*
The shaping of the Morley - Minto reforms.
Curzon was an extraordinary man who brought to bear
upon his work in India an indom:^ j£able zeal for reform,
combined with uncommon capacity for work. Unfortunately,
much of hi s merit was eclipsed by intolerance of criticism
and tactlessness - a defect’which, bad enough in all, is
dangerous in a statesman and administrator. This was
particularly injurious in India where the rulers and the
ruled were separated by every conceivable barrier, and
where an influential section of the enlightened population
evinced every day keener political aspirations. To Curzon
the role of the British in India was one of benevolent
guardianship, and allowed of little partnership between
the rulers and the ruled in the administration. Political
concessions, he held, "could only hinder Great Britain
in the discharge of the task committed to her hands.
He did not think that "the salvation of India is to be
sought on the field of politics" without further intellectual
and moral advancement. The "perpetual clamour for constitute
2
ional change" only imperilled such progress. The"true
salvation" would not be won "by political controversy" or
•3
"by rhetoric"; it "must be created within."
1. B.L.Turnbull and H.G.D.Turnbull, GopsQ. Krishna 
Gokhale, p. 70.
2. Lord Curzon in India, p. 1V5*
3. Ibid, p. ^98.
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Quite early in his tenure of office Curzon writing
privately to Hamilton, the secretary of state, drew up a
formidable list of reforms which he was bent on carrying
out.^ It was characteristic of him that he set forth only
schemes of administrative reform, and never broached any
subject even remotely resembling a political reform.
To him "efficiency of administmtion is ....  a synonym for
2
the contentment of the governed." He ignored popular
sentiments and aspirations ..with unfailing indiscretion.
He publicly declared, "A benevolent despotism that yielded to
agitation would find that, in sacrificing its despotism,
it had also lost its benevolence."^ He was,therefore ,
"very careful to do nothing that may give colour to the
k
idea of concession to clamour or of a native victory."
Naturally, he was hostile to the Indian National
Congress. The compliments the organisation paid him left
him cold, and the hopes the Congress built upon him, he
5
was"afraid that it will be my duty to shatter." He would
not concede to the Congress "any right to pose as the
representative of more than a small section of the community^
7
and he saw it"rapidly sinking into insignificance." In this 
view he was fully supported by Hamilton, who thought that "the
1. Hamilton Papers,Part II. vol. XIII (C to H. 23-3-1899)
2. Lord Curzon in India, p. 1^2.
3. Ibid, p. 30.
A-. Hamilton Papers.Part II vol. XIII (C to H, 2-3-1899)
5. Ibid, Part II Vol. XIX (C to E. 3-1-1901)
6. Ibid, Part II Vol. XVIII (C to H, 18-11-1900)
7. Ibid, Part II Vol. XIX (C to H, 21-2-1901)
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influence of the National Congress is waning fast”, and
ascribed this largely to Curzon’s hold upon and "sympathy”
I
with the Indian people . It was not surprising then that
Curzon affirmed that "the Congress is tottering to it,s fall,
and one of my greatest ambitions while in India is to assist
2
it to a peaceful demise,”
Such being his attitude to the Congress how could 
Curzon be expected to take kindly to any of the main Congress 
demands! IVhen on 10 January 1900 R.C. Butt met him and 
submitted "in apparent seriousness” a proposal to appoint
C f
Indians to the executive councils, only the political 
11
absurdity of the claim struck him; he told R.C. Dutt
"frankly that the idea was, in my opinion, quite out of 
3
the question," That the Viceroy saw nothing but absurdity 
in this claim was in keeping with his antipathy to opening 
the higher services to Indians, In a letter to the secretary 
of state, he spoke of the "extreme danger" of the system of 
competitive examination, under which an increasing share in 
the posts "that were meant and ought to have been exclusively 
and specifically reserved for Europeans, are being filched 
away by the superior wit>j of the native in the English 
examinationst” In this he saw "the greatest peril” con- 
fronting the British administration in India#
1. Ibid, Part II Vol. V (H to C, 13-12-1900)
2. Ibid, Part II Vol.XVIII (C to H, 18-11-1900)
3. Ibid, Part II Vol. XVI (C to H, 11-1-1900)
4. Ibid, Part II Vol. XVII (C to H. 23-4-1900)
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As for the secretary of state, while he admired the
Queen1s Proclamation of 1858 as a fine piece of English, he
also wrote of ”the extreme difficulty of giving effect to
the academic utterances as to equality of races,1^  which 
*
it contained*
The only move concerning the structure of representative 
government that Curzon made during his term in India was 
consequently not one calculated to foster popular hopes.
In September 1902 he initiated a proposal for appointing to 
the Imperial legislative council a small number of ruling 
chiefs. They were to be a class apart from the other non­
official additional members and known as "extraordinary membe/td
2
of the legislative council.” The nominations, for one-year 
term, were intended Mas a compliment” to the chiefs, and 
also calculated to help them by participating in the proceed­
ings of the government. Curzon thought, however, that any 
amendment of the Indian Councils Act of 1892 would offer the
House of Commons an opportunity "to move amendments, advocatirv^
3
all sorts of extensions of an impossible character.” He was
eager to bar any proposal M for an extension of the class
of ordinary members with whom the legislative council is 
If
now-filled.”
I. Ibid, Part I Vol. II (H to Elgin, 7-5-1897).
2.1*. Ibid, Part II Vol.XXIV (C to H, 22-10-1902)
3. Ibid, Part II Vol. XXIII (C to H, 10-9-1902)
* The Proclamation of 1 November 1858: "And it is our
further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of 
whatever race or creed,be freely and impartially admit­
ted to office in our service, the duties of which they 
may be qualified by their education, ability and integ­
rity duly to discharge.” (A.B.Keith- Speeches and 
Documents on Indian Policy- 1750-1921- vol. I p.584.)
zfz.
Even this modest proposal was not carried out. Apart 
from the pressure of business in the House of Commons, the 
secretary of state was averse to increasing the number of 
Indians in the council. On certain issues they might 
combine and defeat the government. It was essential that 
there must be "a majority of white men upon your Council,”
He was also apprehensive of the Congress accusation of 
"trying to pack the Council," and i^ s not sure that the 
native princes "would dare to vote on the side of the 
government" on controversial issues at the risk of vehement 
public criticism and abuse.^ So Curzon's proposal came 
to nothing.
It can well be imagined that there was no love lost
between Curzon and politically ambitious Indians. In fact,
his regime witnessed the strengthening of extremist feelings
*
in the country. His withdrawal from the Indian scene was
welcomed by the nationalists.
* * * * * * * * # *** * * * * * * *** * * * * * * * * *
The new Viceroy, Minto^ was not inhibited by an pre­
conceived ideas about Indian affairs. He came with a more or 
less open mind. Within a few months he was aware of the forger
at play in the country. Unlike his predecessor, he
recognised the utility of cordial relations between the 
authorities and the moderate elements within the Congress.
I. Ibid, Part II Vol. VII (H to C, 8-10-1902)
* See ch. VI. p. 241
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But he did not approve of the entire organisation and saw
I
"much that is absolutely disloyal” in the Congress movement.
He was searching for Ma possible counterpoise to Congress 
2aims.” With the lapse of time he found that his
'•doubts as to the genuineness of Congress aims are growing.^
*
The new Liberal secretary of state, John Morley ,
pointed out that "most great popular movements" like the
Congress harboured many questionable people. He reminded the
Viceroy that " it will mainly depend^ourselves whether
h
the Congress is a power for good or for evil," "The only 
chance" was tp do their best "to make English rulers friends 
with Indian leaders," and at the same time to try their
1, Countess of llinto, - India, Minto and Morley. p.28#
2, Ibid, p. 29*
3, Ibid, p, 99*
4, Viscount Morley, Recollections ii, p. 171*
* Morley, afterwards Viscount Morley of Blackburn
C1S3S - 1923)! Son of a surgeon, Morley was destined for 
holy orders; but life at Oxford disinclined him for a 
clerical career. After a few years* free-lance journalism 
in London, he became editor of Fortnightly Review in 1867. 
Under him the paper was soon to be an influential liberal 
organ, marked alike for its boldness and originality of 
views, Morley indeed came to be known for his pronounced 
radicalism. i860 saw him as the editor of the Pall Mall 
Gazette. Entering $he House of Commons in 1883, Morley 
was appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland in Gladstone*s 
ministry in 1886. He favoured a policy of conciliation 
and advocated Home Rule, From 1892 te»l895 - again as Chief 
Secretary for Ireland - he helped the Liberal government 
to pass the Home Rule bill. His tenure at the Irish 
Office earned him reputation for his sympathetic and 
generous handling of the Irish nationalists. He was 
appointed Secretary of state for India when the Liberals 
returned to power in 1903: He assumed office on 12
December 1903* He was raised to the peerage in 1908- 
(D.N.B.)
I
utmost ”to train them in habits of political responsibility.”
nCast-iron bureaucracy won't go on for ever,'1 and it was up to
them to ensure that whatever change was necessary in the circum-
2
stances should come ’i’sIow and steady”. At the same time Moriy
explained that he did not think it either possible or desirable
to '’’transplant British institutions wholesale into India.” That
3
was ”a fantastic and ludicrous dream.” Universal suffrage could
not be introduced in India, nor could she be placed on the same
footing as the self-governing colonies. ’’But the spirit of English
k
institutions is a different thing.” It was possible to transplant
into India ’’the spirit, the temper, the principles and the maxims
3
of British institutions’.’:: There was no escape from it, for the
British constituencies would insist ”on the spirit of their own
6
political system being applied to India.” Even though in no 
foreseeable future the government in India could detract from 
’’the personal and almost absolute element,” there was no reason 
why the great experiment of combining a strong and effective admin­
istration with ”free speech and free institutions” should not be 
7
tried.
Minto too recognised the need of a change. He could not 
reconcile himself to the ’’impossible Congress ambitions,” but he 
perceived in the growing strength of the educated classes ’’the most
1. John Buchan, - Lord Minto, A Memoir, p.289
2. Recollections ii, / 73 t
3* Indian Debates, 1906, p.236 ' 
if. Recollections ii,
3. Indian Debates, 1906, p.236
6. Recollections, ii f^v.173'
7* Indian Debates, 1908, p.23B
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important factor” to deal with* These people, ’’perfectly loyal
and moderate” in their views, were justly desirous of a greater
share in the administration of the country. The authorities could
expect ”7rjuch assistance” by recognising them. Ignoring them would
I
only be driving them ”into the arms of Congress leaders.”
Both the governor-general and the secretary of state being thus 
in a mood to welcome change, the process of reforms only waited to 
be set in motion. On 15 June 1906 Morley, writing to Minto, wonder­
ed "whether we could not now make a good start in the way of reform 
in the popular direction.” The reforms he suggested to the Viceroy 
were "the extension of the Native element in your legislative 
council; ditto in local councils; full time for discussing Budget
in your L.C. instead of four or five skimpy hours; right of moving
2
amendments.” Officials were of course to remain in a majority in
the councils. He also hinted at the possibility of appointing an 
Indian to the governor-general1s executive council. Morley*s next
letter to Minto was pervaded by a sense of urgency in initiating
the reforms, and he desired the move "to be directly and closely
3
associated”with the Viceroy.
The governor-general set up a committee of his executive council 
by 15 August 1906, to consider the question. In a note to the 
executive council he described the political atmosphere as "full of 
change”; the government were faced with questions which they must 
attempt to answer. He further pointed out that "to me it would
1. India, Minto and"Morley, p.loV.
2. Recollections, ii p. 17^
3* Ibid, p.173*
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appear all-important that the initiative should emanate from us;
that Government of India should not be put in the position of
appearing to have its hands forced by agitation in this country,
I
or by pressure from home.” The committee had four members, -
Sir Arundel Arundel (Chairman), Sir Denzil Ibbetson, E.M.Baker,
and H.E.Richards•
Minto enumerated in a minute the subjects for the committee’s
consideration; "(a) A Council of Princes, and, if this is not
possible, might they be represented on the Viceroy’s Legislative
Council? (b) an Indian Member of the Viceroy’s Council; (c)
Increased representation on the Legislative Council of the Viceroy
and of Local Governments: and (d) Prolongation of the Budget
Debate* Procedure as to presentation of the Budget and powers of
2
moving amendments•"
Minto wrote to the heads of the provinces informing them of 
this committee and inviting their views and suggestions regarding 
the legislative councils* He laid emphasis on the representation 
of different communities and interests, and asked if they had 
"secured full and efficient representa6ion "in the legislative 
councils under the prevailing system. Asking for "suggestions for 
the extension and improvement of the present system," he wanted 
to ascertain specially "whether it is desirable to provide further 
for the representation and association in the government of the 
country —  (a) of the great landowners and hereditary aristocracy,
I* Lord Minto, A Memoir, p. 2^ -0*
2, P. Mukherji, Indian Constitutional Documents, i, pp.252-253
2-^ 7
I
and (b) of the Mohammedan Community, and if so, in what manner?"
Further, was it advisable to increase the number of members on the
provincial legislative councils? He did not raise in this letter
+
the issue of opening the executive councils' to Indians*
It is known that the Arundel Committee's report was M 
placed before the governor-general's executive council, and certain
proposals for reform were embodied in a. communication to the
\
secretary of state, dated 21 March 1907» Unfortunately, this letter
is not available to us. There is no doubt that it dealt, apart from
the enlargement of legislative councils, with the question of
appointing Indians to the executive council. Minto drew up a
minute covering this letter* In it he explained his stand on the
shape the British authority should take in India. The welfare of
India depended upon the permanence of British rule, and he was no
advocate of representative government "in the Western sense of the
term" for India. "The Government of India must remain autocratic."
But they were also, he asserted echoing Morley, "trustees of British
principles and traditions," and as such were "bound to consult the. ;
wishes of the people and to provide machinery by which their views
2
may be expressed as far as they are articulate." How could these 
two apparently conflicting principles of administration be reconciled? 
The answer lay in fusing the principle of "autocracy", derived from 
the Hindu and Moslem rulers of the country, and the principle of 
"constitutionalism", derived from the British, into a "definite 
system of government into what may be called a 'constitutional
I. Burn's collection, i.p.l - Minto to Sir .James LaTouche, Lt.-
governor of U.P., 27*8.1906. (The North-West Provinces and Oudh
was given the new name of United Provinces in 1902.)
+ For sake of convenience, we shall consider this separately later
in this chapter.  ^ <> n_______  r   2. India*. Minto & Morley, p.110
autocracy...." Different from the despotism of the Asiatic
rulers, it would bind itself "to govern by rule, which admits
and invites t.o its councils representatives of all the interests
which are capable of being represented, and which merely reserves
to itself, in the form of a narrow majority, the predominant and
absolute power which it can only abdicate at the risk of bringing
back the chaos to which our rule put an end." In trying to model
<SL constitution"based on the traditions and practice of both
English and Indian rulers," they must endeavour to "satisfy the
legitimate aspirations of the most advanced Indians." At the
same time, they must enlist "the support of the conservative element
of Native society." To the problem of fashioning a governmental
machinery conforming to this principle the only answer was to
I
"call to our counsels the people over whom we rule."
This letter of the government of India was considered by the
secretary of state in council.' Morley also placed it before the
Cabinet on 3 May 1907* The cabinet approved most of the proposals
regarding the legislative councils. The secretary of state replied
to the government of India in a despatch dated 2 August 1907*
Unfortunately again, the text of this despatch is not available to
us. On its receipt the government of India formulated with Morley*s 
+
approval the reform proposals in a letter dated 24. August 1907
2
addressed to the provinces. It may be reasonably said that this
letter contained those proposals of the government of India's
*
letter of 21 March 1907 which were approved at Westminster.
I. Ibid, pp.110-111.
2* Pari.Papers, 1907, cd.3710.
+ Cd. 3710 (1907) Telegram from secretary of state to Viceroy 
23 August, 1907*
* This letter,as also the government of India's letter dated 1.10. 
1908. and the secretary of state's despatch dated 27.11*1909 - to (pj.oj
which references are made later on - have been reproduced in 
full in P.Mukherji's Indian Constitutional Documents, vol. I
The government of India based their case for further reforms
on the spread of English education and the intellectual fitness
which this education had imparted to a growing number of Indians.
During the last twenty years education had spread widely, and had
’’penetrated to circles which a generation ago had hardly been
affected by its influence.” The ruling chiefs, the landholders
and the commercial classes had profited by education, and were now
anxious for "an opportunity of expressing their views on matters
of practical administration.” Hence any scheme of constitutional
reform, in order to meet the requirements of the time, must provide
for the representation of the landed aristocracy, the mercantile
and industrial classes and "the great body of moderate men, who,
under existing conditions, have no sufficient inducement to enter
political life and find but little scope for the exercise of their
■legitimate influence.” The masses could not yet be represented
except through those, officials and non-officials, who knew their
needs and sentiments, and were qualified to speak; for them. It
was hoped that the proposals would bring ”all classes of the people”
into closer relations with the government. At the same time, it
was made clear that the scheme did not "contemplate any surrender
or weakening of paramount British power in India”; the executive
authority of the government must be maintained "in undiminished 
I
strength.”
The proposals were expected to increase the opportunity for
the people to acquaint the authorities with their feelings and
wishes, as also to afford the government adequate facilities to
explain their measures and policies to the people. The infrequent
I. Ibid, para.2.
'1 ^0
sessions of the legislative councils were deemed insufficient, 
particularly for the latter purpose; to remedy this, Advisory 
Councils were to be set up, both at the centre and in the 
provinces.
The idea of Advisory Councils seems to have been Minto*s.
In May 1906, while the thought of a counterpoise to the Congress
was hovering in his mind, Minto had already conceived the idea of
a body composed of native chiefs and other big men.
The Imperial Advisory Council: The great ruling chiefs and
the territorial magnates of British India would be appointed to
this council to "r/?$resent the views of the hereditary leaders of 
I
the people." The council was to consist of about sixty members, 
all appointed by the.Viceroy - twenty ruling chiefs, and territorial 
magnates from every province. 'Jith no legislative or legal 
recognition, the council, a purely advisory body, was to possess 
no right of initiative and no "formal powers of any sort.’1 It was 
only to discuss matters specifically referred to it by the governor- 
general, who might decide to consult some or all members individually 
without* assembling the council. Proceedings of the council were to 
be "private, informal and confidential," though the government
2
would be "at liberty to make any use of them that it thought proper.” 
Provincial Advisory Councils: Similarly, where local conditions
permitted the provincial governments were free to have advisory 
councils, with consultative functions. The provincial members of 
the Imperial Advisory Council, coming from the great land-holding
class, would form the nucleus of the council. Smaller in number,____
1. Ibid, para.ff
2. Ibid, para.5
2-?!
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it should be chosen upon a wider basis* Besides great landholders,
it should include representatives of the smaller landholders,
industry, commerce, capital, professional classes, non-official
I
Europeans and "natural leaders of Indian society." The members of 
legislative councils might also be appointed. The head of the 
local government would nominate the members with the governor- 
general’s approval.
In other respects - status, rights and functions etc. - the 
provincial advisory council; was very similar to the Imperial 
Advisory Council.
Enlargement of the legislative councils: The government of
India regretted that under the Jndian Councils Act, 1892, all 
classes and interests had not received due representation on the 
legislative councils. The legal profession had got the lion’s 
share of the seats at the cost of other interests. This short­
coming, too palpable in the provincial councils, was reflected 
also in the supreme legislative council. This preponderance of 
the professional classes needed to be remedied. It was proposed
to supply "the requisite counterpoise....by creating an additional
2
electorate, recruited from the landed and monied classes." The 
councils must be so constituted "in respect of non-official members 
''as to give due and ample representation to the different' classes
3
and interests of the community."
But the essential condition of official majority must be 
observed. This consideration was a limiting factor to the number
1. Ibid, Para.6.
2. Ibid, Para.9* 
3* Ibid, Para.10.
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of non-official members. The problem was "how to provide for 
the due representation, within the limits thus imposed, of the
I
vast diversity of classes, races and interests in the Indian Empire."
Imperial Legislative Council: The government of India were
"impressed with the necessity for giving substantial representation
2
to the great landholders." One seat was allotted to this class 
in each of the seven Indian provinces. The representative, 
himself belonging to this class, should be elected direct by an 
electorate composed of the members of the class. Should the 
formation of an electorate be difficult, the representative might 
be elected by the landholding members of the provincial legislative 
council, or might even be nominated.
The next interest to receive attention was the Moslem commun­
ity. The government of India concurred with the grievance of the 
Moslem Deputation of 1 October 1906 about their inadequate represent­
ation in legislative councilsf and endorsed the governor-general1s
+
stand on that occasion. They suggested, therefore, that over and 
above the Moslem memberd elected in the ordinary manner, it was 
desirable "in each of the councils to assign a certain numbdr of
3
seats to be filled exclusively by Mfth$medans." Mot all these 
seats were to be thrown open to election. A few of them would be 
filled by nomination. The rest of the Moslem mfembers were to be 
elected by a special Moslem electorate, constituted ona property,
1. Ibid, Para.10.
2. Ibid, Para.l^f.
+ See Ch.VlTp.
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inoome or educational basis* Failing this# the non-official Moslem 
members of the provincial legislative council might constitute an 
electorate#
They proposed an Imperial legislative council of fifty-four members 
including the Viceroy* The elected members were to be one-third of the 
Council# and the officials# at the maximum# a majority of four* Four 
seats were reserved for Moslems# two of which were to be filled by 
nomlnation*
Provincial legislative Councils: Owing to the varied conditions
prevailing# it was not possible to lay down a uniform pattern for the
provincial legislative councils* The provincial governments wore
exhorted# however, to bear in mind the general principle that "the widest
representation should be given to classes, raoes and interests, subject
to the condition, that an official majority must be maintained*11
Referring to the fact that the largest contingent of non-offieial
members was elected by the local bodies* the government of India remarked
that these bodies were elected on a low franchise devised primarily for
the management of local affairs* To ensure higher ability in the members
of legislative councils# special qualifications for them might be
prescribed "while leaving the electoral franchise in other respects 
2
unchanged*"
To evade the possibility of electoral predominance by any ons class# 
the local government should determine the number of seats to be filled by 
the "elected representatives of the most important classes into which the
+ The details of the composition of this council# as also of the various 
legislative councils# as suggested from time to time and as finally 
decided upon, have been shown in Appendix I*
1* Ibid# Para*20*
2* Ibid, Para *21*
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population of £he province is divided” * and should. na llot these seats
to the several ©lasses*” For,the eleotion pf representative of eaeh
olass the provincial government should publish ”a list of votero
consisting of members of that class who have held or are holding office
in the Minieipal or local Boards,” supplamented by others whom the
local government may decide to add in consultation with associations or
1
bodies recognised to speak for the class*
They recommended the same principle of olass representation and
separate electorates for the constitution of municipal looal boards*
Budget: Coming to the budget, its discussion by separate heads or
groups of heads was proposed* The provisions under each head would be
explained by the member in charge, to be followed by a general debate
” in which members would enjoy the same freedom a s at present of
criticising the administration*” Though this procedure required more
time, it offered ”a better opportunity for systematic criticism,” as
2.
compared with the prevailing arrangements*
These were the proposals of the government of India* The provinces 
were directed to consult important bodies and individuals representing
various classes - a step which the public appreciated*
'X' ‘X* '*•
The replies of the provincial governments showed marked differences 
*+*
of opinion* Their reactions to the various proposals will be considered
lY" ’ibid, Bara *22,
2* Ibid, Para *2J*
+ Their views were conveyed to the government of India in the following 
letters i-
1* Madras - (a) Letter 136*222 Public Dt* 13*3*1908*
(b) Letter Do .357 Public Dt. 28 .1**1908 •
(c) letter lIo*681 Dt* 22*8*1908*
2* Bombay - Letter 36*1768 Dt *26 *3 *1908*
3* Bengal - Letter Do*l7lj6A Dt*29*2*1908*
!*• U*P* - letter Do*$$7 Dt*l6*3*l908*
5* Punjab - letter D0J4O (Home: legislative) Dt*6*7*1908*
6* Eastern Bengal and Assam «• letter Do*9ii3CJ Dt *1/4*3 *1908 • , x
(P*T*0*)
7* C#P# - Letter D o #1285/1 - 15*«£ D t #18#6#1908# (Forwarding a nc 
by the Chief Co'mnissioner, R#H# Craddook) Letters from Madras, 
Bombay, Bengal andli#P# are in Cd#!|i*35 of I9O8 , the other lettc 
in Cd .14*36 of 1908.
under separate headings#
Imperial Advisory Councils The government of Madras were struok
by the iniefiniteness of many aspects of the proposal# Ho doubt*
important matters would be referred to it# "But without some definite
functions and without regular periods of meeting, it seems doubtful
1
whether it would be able to take any real responsibility#" Again* would
the ruling chiefs like to sit together with the territorial magnates?
Even if they did, was it proper to refer to them subjects connected with
British India only?
This misgiving was given more forceful expression by the Bombay
government# They had "grave objections” to the combination of these two
classes in the same body* and their ”greatest objection” was to "the
2
incompatibility of functions of the two classes#” "While the ruling chiefs 
had no claim to advise in matters affecting the British India* the 
territorial magnates must on no account interfere in the affairs of native 
states# They opposed the proposal* but recommended an advisory council 
of ruling chiefs only to consider subjects of imperial importance#
The Punjab government repeated these arguments# The ruling chiefs 
might view this proposal "with considerable distrust” as "an attempt to 
level them down to the magnates#” It was also undesirable that they 
should have "too direct a voice in affairs concerning British India only#" 
Idke the government of Bombay* they too put forward the idea of "a smaller 
council of Prince8 to discuss matters of Imperial and general importance#" 
It might be of advantage to add to this council "a few men of wide 
reputation throughout India as statesmen*” to whom, the chiefs would
3,
perhaps raise no objection#
1# Madras (a) Para"#5 
2# Bombay, Para#8#
3# Punjab* Para #20#
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The chief commissioner of the Central Provinces followed the same
line* He was opposed to the idea, hut would welcome "a council of
1
chiefs and confinsd to chiefs#" For British India, what purpose was an
advisory council likely to serve that "could not equally he served hy a
2
legislative council, enlarged and remodelled?" The type of persons who3© 
advice the government intended to seek must he an essential component of 
the enlarged legislative councils# Moreover, the object of acquainting 
the people with the true intentions of executive measures was not to he 
served hy "Imperial conclaves#" This required "humbler1* agencies, free 
to challenge and refute erroneous impressions "at street eorners and 
market places, the very same places where lies and calumnies are now
3
disseminated hy ignorant fanatics or hy evil mis chief-monger s •"
The contrary view was taken hy the government of Bengal# The idea 
was hailed as "an excellent one#" But some change was necessary# Instead 
of confining the membership to the ruling chiefs and territorial magnates,
5
certain other classes "ought clearly to he represented#" These were the
*t.educated olass, commerce and industry# They approved the method of
6
consultation as "perfectly sound", hut would concede to the members, when
I# Chief Commissioner’s note# Para#12#
2# Ibid, Para *13#
3# Ibid, Para#ll|#
I4.# Bengal, Para#!;#
5# Ibid, Para#6#
6# Ibid, Para #9#
t They wanted the membership to he equally distributed between great 
landholders on the one hand, and the ruling chiefs and the representatives 
of these three interests on the other#
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assembled at Viceroy’s order for collective consultation, the right
1
" to make any suggestions which they may see fit to make.” The Viceroy
•would, however, have the power to veto* Any member’s desire for
secrecy of his views must be respected*
The proposal was also welcomed by the government of the United
Provinces* To maifc the superiority of the chiefs, the Lt*-governor
recommended that while the chiefs might be appointed for life, others
should sit for five years* But the oounoil should be broad-baseds it
might include "fifteen persons to be selected on account of their public
2
services, their character or their pre-eminence in other directions*"
The members should have initiative for discussion and right of asking 
for information, subject to the government’s right to refuse information 
on any particular subject* Ordinarily this would make for diffusion 
of correct information on which the government of India had laid so 
much stress* The oouncil should meet at least once a year, and on 
requisition by one-third of its members* Its proceedings need not 
ordinarily be confidential* Thus the government of the United Provinces 
broadened the scope of the Imperial Advisory Council almost beyond re­
cognition, and much in deviation from the original intentions of the 
central government*
The proposal was also approved by the government of Eastern Bengal 
and Assam*
Provincial Advisory Councils: The government of Madras were not
sure that a provincial advisory council, consisting of members less
than sixty in number, could be represenbative of all classes of the
people* Again, the representatives of the interests named by the
+
government of India could hardly be "trusted to be indifferent to press
I* Ibid, Para*li* " '  '' ' 2* U*P*,' Para •£>• .
See above p* Z<?i
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and platform criticism*” Pear of subsequent publication was a powerful
restraint in confidential consultation: in case of public conferences
»
they would "generally produce opinions designed mainly to secure the
approval of the Press*" The council might even "adopt an attitude of
habitual opposition and give only unacceptable advice," - thus forcing
the authorities into the undesirable position of persistently rejecting
non-official advice* Further, where was the guarantee that this council
would counteract the consequences of unflagging misinterpretation by the
press and constant campaigning by the agitator? They could not, therefore,
1
welcome the proposal*
The government of the Punjab did not want an advisory council* an 
enlarged legislative council should discharge all the functions that were 
expected of the advisory council*
The chief commissioner of the Central Provinces opposed the advisory 
oounoil in provinces which had their own legislative councils* The best 
course was to utilise the legislative councils after so enlarging them as 
to make them representative of all the interests in the provinces* The 
case was different for provinces without legislative councils, - for 
example, his own province* He felt that the chief commissioner needed 
the assistance and support of public expression of views on important 
matters* As a stepping-stone to a legislative council, for which he did 
not consider the province yet ripe, he proposed an advisory council of 
twenty-five membefcs, of whom officials would number eleven* A distinctive
1* l&dras (a) Para*6 (Instead they recommended two General Assemblies for 
the Presidency, consisting of two elected members from each Taluk and 
of representatives of associations and local bodies* later on they 
dropped this proposal, and suggested revision of the franchise for 
election of local bodies, giving them more voice in public affairs*
Then these bodies could be also treated as advisory councils in their 
respective areas* ^ For the province, the non-official members of the 
enlarged legislative council might discharge the advisory functions*)
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feature of his scheme was to give double value to each official vote, thus
-f
ensuring an official majority in the council* This body should possess, 
in addition to advisory functions, the right to consider the budget and to 
ask questions, and a restricted right to move resolutions of a recommend­
atory nature* Projected legislation for the province would also come 
before it for advice and suggestions* The non-official members of this 
council were to elect a member for the Imperial legislative oounoil*
Tfl/hile these three provincial goverxments did not approve of the idea 
of provincial advisory councils, it was favoured by the other provincial 
governments* The government of Bombay envisaged a council of not exceeding 
twenty members for Bombay, and a separate oounoil of not exceeding five 
members for Sind*
The Bengal government enthusiastically supported the idea* So also 
did the government of the United Provinces, who however proposed for the 
oounoil the right of initiating discussion and of asking for information 
an administrative affairs* The council should also be free to conduct 
its deliberations in the absence of any official'*
In Eastern Bengal and Assam the Lb*-governor was doubtful "whether
1
such a council could be very easily got together*" Expenses and 
trouble of travelling great distanoes were forbidding oiroumstanoes* In 
spite of evident difficultiss of assembling a oounoil in the province, not 
a word was used repud iatii^ the scheme*
^ Of the fourteen non-official members eight would be elected - six by 
district councils and boards, and two by two towns with population 
exceeding 50*000* The rest would be nominated*
1* Eastern Bengal and Assam* Para*12*
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Enlargement of legislative Councils: We shall examine the
reaction of the provincial governments to some of the general principles
enunciated by the government of India*
With reference to the excessive representation of the professional
classes, the government of Bengal pointed out that it was wrong to think
that the lawyers did next at all represent the landed interests* On the
contrary, many of them were themselves fairly large landowners* Some
had intimate connection with the landed olass and owed their election
largely to the support of that class* The government of the United
Provinces said that their experience had been altogether different# Far
from the local bodies being dominated by the lawyers, the representatives
elected by the district boards "in the course of the last fourteen years
1
have invariably been landholders*" Similarly half of those elected by 
the municipalities had substantial stake in the land*
As to the proportion of officials and non-officials, the Bengal 
government suggested that both in the Imperial and the provincial 
legislative councils these two Contingents might be equal in number, 
excluding the head of the administration# The official hold was not 
likely to be in danger, because it was "inconceivable that all the non­
official members, coming as they will from so mai$r different classes, and
representing so many different interests, will ever combine against the 
2
Government•" Even if they did, the Vote: of the governor-general (or 
governor or Lt.-governor) would ensure the official victory* The govern­
ment of the United Provinces proposed a similar ratio of officials and 
non-officials*
I* U*P* - Para *22* . 
2* Bengal - Para *17#
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A vehement assertion of the need for an official majority earn© from
Eastern Bengal and Assam# The Lt#-governor considered it "absolutely
necessary for the Government to retain a majority in its legislative
Councils •" The government must be able to govern and must not be content
with the power of veto# They must be able to pass such legislative
measures as are required in the faoe of any opposition# It was "wholly
untenable" to equip the non-offio3aIs with the power "to enforce their
advioe#" If such a condition was deemed necessary for fruitful non*
1
official co-operation, "then such councils must be abandoned#" The
chief commissioner of the Central Provinces also wanted an official
majority# "As long as the British Government undertakes to rule the
Indian continent it cannot risk being in a permanent minority on its own
councils#" This was specially urgent in the light of the reeent indication
of "the likelihood of the formation of a non-official opposition#" To
secure the official majority, without taking away a large number of
officials from their usual duties at the risk of administrative weakness,
he would confer on each official vote a double value# He did not consider
this unjust# Was there "anything grotesque in assigning a greater value
to the opinion of tried administrators of long service and proved ability,
trained in the principles and practice of government?" If the Indian
representatives were as a body equally competent, experienced and
resourceful, "then the case for the continuance of the British Government 
2
disappears •"
In striking contrast was the Bombay governmentfs proposal to give the 
non-officials a substantial majority in the provincial legislative eouneil#
1# Eastern Bengal and Assam, Bara###
2# Chief Commissioner*s Hote, Para#21}•
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They did not apprehend any difficulty, for in the council, enlarged on
the principle of representation of classes and interests, "there would he
1
greater discrepancies of views than at present••••" So the possibility
of a solid opposition was not disturbing# Ho doubt, the experience of
working the Bombay legislative council for some time past with non*
official majority had emboldened the Bombay government to make this
proposal# The authorities were none the worse for the departure# It
will be perceived, however, that underlying all these proposals of Bombay,
Bengal and the United Provinces, there was no advocacy of an effeotive
non-official dominance# On the contrary, they relied on the official
superiority being guarded by the safety-valve of dissension and conflict
among the non-officials#
To the proposals of separate representation and olass electorate,
the government of Madras were unable to agree# Uo aspect of the reforms
had caused "more general and decided disapprobation"; it had been
"almost universally condemned as likely to perpetuate differences and to
strengthen barriers" which were gradually disappearing# Anyway, "the
fatal defect1? of the scheme was the practical difficulty of arranging a
class vote throughout the province, and of canvassing over such extensive .
areas# "The candidates would be mere names to most of the voters," and
2
the latter would possess but slight interest in the election#
The government of Eastern Bengal and Assam criticised the soheme# It 
was no doubt wise to enlarge the council by including "representatives of 
additional and hitherto unrepresented interests#" But such representation 
must follow the expressed desire for it by the interests themselves# The 
government must not anticipate such desire and "move in advance of sueh
1#. Bombay, Para #20#
2# Madras, (a) Para#9«
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expressed wish#" Further, the interests admitted to representation
should, as far as possible, be left free to elect their representatives,
following their own method of election* The government should interfere
in such elections only to "assure fairness or to meet the case of a dead 
-1
block*"
The chief commissioner of the Central Provinces also differed from
the government of India* The establishment of British power had stayed
evolution on indigenous lines in India and had imposed upon the country
a Civilisation drawing inspiration from the West* Under its influence
education had supplanted birth as the basis of authority* By seising
upon education, the middle classes "have jumped a whole grade in the
2
process of evolution over the heads of the upper classes," who neglected 
it* Now the problem was "how to reconcile the growing claims of the 
educated majority with the backward condition of the upper classes in any
3
scheme of enlarged consultation with the people," that the government 
wanted to introduce* If the answer was to give more power to the classes 
which had not asked for it, how could the government escape the criticism 
of setting up the aristocracy to check the educated olassesi So the 
proper solution lay in more education and increased participation, by 
dint of greater competence, in the local bodies or other associations which 
served as constituencies for legislative councils* Then they must look 
after themselves* It would not do "to force into the councils men who
Iare not fit simply in order to secure class representation*" The chief 
commissioner wanted the constituencies to he formed by local bodies and
1* Eastern Bengal and Assam, Para *5* 
2* Chief Commissioner’s Note, Para*l|.* 
J‘* Ibid, Bara *5*
Ibid, Para .6#
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non-political associations# He did not think it desirable ttto create 
v constituencies made of artificial electorates with no common tie but'i
^ that of creed or occupation, corresponding to no local area and belonging
y ■ ■ X :
to no organised associations already in existence#1* The communities or
interests not represented as a result of such elections were then to be
nominated# The chief commissioner also said that the reforms were an
answer to the claims of the educated olasses, and could not be expected
to increase the government's contact with the uneducated masses, whose
interests must rest in the hands of their educated countiymen and the
officials# He was convinced that any further advance must be on Western
lines and discerned in education the source and justification of further
representation# He hoped that increased responsibility would lead to
moderation and give valuable training to the educated classes# He waited
for the members of the legislative councils the power to move resolutions
on matters of importance# The government of India must take "a bold
step forward,” for the risks attaching to that were "much less than those
2
entailed by an advance too small.”
Though the scheme of class electorates was criticised specifically 
by only three provinces, the others, excepting the United Provinces, were 
not enthusiastic about it# The constitution of the provincial councils 
was largely modelled on the system established under the Act of 1692# The
local bodies, universities, chambers of commerce, recognised associations
<
etc# were chiefly relied on for the return of a larger number of non-offieia| 
members# The government of the Punjab, not ready to go as far as that, 
remained content with nomination, and considered the apportionment of seats
in that province possible only on the basis of religion#
I# Ibid, Para #7#
2# Ibid, Para#38#
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Again most of the provinces did not see eye to eye with the govern­
ment of India regarding the necessity of altering the franchise and 
constitution of the local bodies* The government of Bengal stood alone
in substantial agreement with the central government* local self-govern-
1
ment was the field for "sound political training*11 And yet the scope 
of this training was denied to many important seotions of the population, 
because they could not do well in elections* To remedy this without any 
change of franchise, the lit*-governor struck upon the device of dividing 
the existing voters according to olasses and interests* Each section of 
voters must elect a member belonging to it* As against this stand, the
2
government of Bombay thought that nthe status quo should be ma inta ined •**
If anything, the franchise for the local bodies might be lowered* A 
similar view was taken by the government of the United Provinces, who 
preferred to impose special qualifications on candidates seeking eleotion 
to the legislative council* The government of jf&stem Bengal and Assam 
opposed any change in this respeot, and did not think it necessary to 
constitute the local bodies on the basis of race, occupation etc* Heither 
Madras, nor the Punjab, nor th9 Central Provinces approved the idea*
The only remaining issue of general importance was that of Moslem 
representation* Ho government disputed the principle, and in all but 
one scheme of provincial legislative councils, elective seat a for Moslems 
were included* In Bengal, separate representation was foreshadowed for 
,special classes1, and there was no doubt that Moslems would have a 
permanent share of it* But there was some difference of opinion regarding 
the method of selecting the Moslem representatives* This difference arose 
out of local conditions* While some of the provinces wanted to fora
1* Bengal, Para*22*
2* Bombay, Para *22*
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Moslem electoral colleges others preferred to use the recognised Moslem 
associations# Madras and Bombay preferred simple nomination. Again# in 
the provinces favouring separate electoral colleges# the qualifications 
deemed suitable their basis were not uniform. This was only natural 
because the conditions of the Moslem population in respect of education, 
wealth, political progress etc. - as also numerical strength •• varied 
in the different provinces.
As to the Imperial legislative council, most of the provinces had 
little or no criticism to offer. The Punjab government considered any 
eleotive scheme impossible to adopt,, and would therefore nominate all 
their members. The chief commissioner of the Central Provinces, under 
his scheme of double value to the official votes, proposed a council of 
sixteen officials, two experts and twenty-seven non-officials.
Each provincial goverment put forward in detail the composition 
of the local legislative council, which can be seen in Appendix I.
The proportion of official members including the head of the government, 
and the non-officials, both elected and nominated, was as follows
Province
Total strength 
of the council Officials
‘ "ITbn-oTflckTs ' 
Elected Nominated
Madras 22 17 3
Bombay h5 13 17 15
Bengal 37 19 18 -
United Provinces 23 16 6
Punjab 22 11 h 7
Eastern Bengal and Assam 26 13 10 3
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Thus Bombay proposed a substantial non-offic5a 1 majority, the Punjab 
ana Eastern Bengal and Assam suggested quality of officials and non- 
officials , and the remaining provinces Tire re content with slight offioial 
superiority*
In all the councils, except in the Punjab, special seats were ear­
marked for the landholders* Various proposals for constituting electorates 
for the purpose were made, based on income* In Eastern Bengal and Assam, 
and for one of the seats in the United Provinces, the association of land­
holders was to return the member*
Budget: The government of Madras suggested a more detailed discussion
of the budget both in the Imperial and provincial councils* They referred
to the practice, initiated in Bengal, of discussing the draft budget
proposals informally with the non-official members of the legislative
council* They would also follow it and thus seoure intelligent and
1
valuable critic isms” of their first draft of the budget*
The government of Bombay considered that "the only method of obtaining
a useful discussion of the budget is to allow the members of the legislative
council some part in the settlement of it*” They proposed to place the
first draft of the budget before one or more committees of the legislative
council, including non-official and offioial numbers* Their suggestions
would be considered, and if possible acted up to, by the government in
preparing the second draft* The final edition of the budget was to be
accompanied by a statement explaining the settlements arrived at in
committees, the diaoussion in meetings of the council being "confined
2
to points of difference only*" They were not opposed, however, to the 
method of conducting the debate as adumbrated by the government of India*
I* Madras (a), Para*15* 
2* Bombay, P&ra*2U*
The government of Bengal advocated informal discussion of draft 
proposals in committees, consisting of officials and half of the non-
official numbers#
In the United Provinces those financial proposals ”in respect of
1
which the Government is prepared to consider criticism*1 should he consider­
ed by an informal committee of the legislative council# Ho right to move 
amendments to the budget at a meeting of the council was to be conceded* 
The Punjab government favoured a committee of the legislative council 
consisting of three officials and two non-officials, to examine the first
draft* Their suggestions, as far as possible, would be incorporated in
-f*
the second draft*
The government of Eastern Bengal and Assam accepted the proposals 
of the government of India*
Almost all the governments pointed out that even if they wanted, 
they were unable to recommend further liberalisation of budget discussions, 
because it was the government of India, and not the local government, 
who had the final say in regard to the provincial budget* It is clear 
from the foregoing, however, that a preference for some liberalisation 
of the budget proceedings was universal*
V  .y -x • •> x-
1* U*P*, Para *1*
4 The Punjab government also recommended that the right of interpellation 
should be granted to the Punjab legislative council*
The provincial governments favoured some amount of financial 
decentralisation in India which would allow greater freedom to them*
The Boyal Commission on Decentralisation in India, appointed in September 
T9G7# then at work in India, was considering this question*
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How did the non-official opinion in India react to the 
proposals? This may conveniently be studied separately for the 
different sections of the people*
The nationalist opinion viewed them with evident disappointment.
/
The proposals "retrograde in many respects" betrayed "a prejudice
1
against the professional classes." They had too clear a tendency
of publicly disparaging the educated classes and afforded an open
display of "official animosity" to the latter. The underlying
j policy - one of ‘counterpoise1 against their influence - was
deplored. These people, "the proud product of British rule," had
a keener appreciation of that rule, to which they were undoubtedly
loyal. The educated "must mould the mind of the rising and future
generations"; only the detractors of British rule could encourage
a policy of alienating them by distrust. Instead of seeking to
curb their influence, the reforms should aim at "the readjustment
and expansion of the proportionate representation of the different
communities so as on the one hand to enable government to secure
the benefit of the knowledge, experience, advice and co-operation
of the most capable and the best trusted representatives of all
classes and interests: and on the other to stimulate and encourage
the latter to strive and work for the common good by promoting the
advancement and welfare of all, irrespective of class and race 
2.'
and creed.
Imperial Advisory Council: Coming to the specific proposals,
1~. India Office Collection No.3^5 - Enclo.XXVIII (Resolutions 
passed at the second United Provinces Conference.)
2. Ibid, Enclo.XVII - 32 (Bombay Presidency Association.)
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the Imperial Advisory Council was greeted with misgivings, A 
common criticism was that ruling chiefs had no knowledge of British 
India and no contact with the people of India. How then could 
their association be beneficial to the public and useful to the 
authorities? The case of the landed aristocracy was not very 
different. Generations of British rule had tended to "obliterate 
their social influence and individual usefulness"; any attempt now
1
at "artificial resurrection" would only retard the social evolution."
VJhile some wanted the inclusion of "persons of culture and experience-
2
and of well balanced political opinion", others plainly suggested
that without the educated men of the middle class, who had "the
confidence of the general public," the utility of the council would 
3
be meagre. Besides, nomination as the sole mode of recruitment was
unlikely to secure the selection of persons marked for their
independence and integrity. Elective method should be brought into
play:' one influential organisation demanded that at least half of
the members should be elected.
Lack of initiative of members, as also the extremely flexible
proceddre, met no approval. The members should possess "the
privilege of bringing to the notice of government such matters as
if.
they consider of importance." The proceedings should ordinarily
3
be "formal and public." The council's decisions must not be 
altogether ineffective: where a substantial majority opposed a
measure, it should not be proceeded with, or should be delayed for 
some time for reconsideration.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid - Enclo. XVIII - 16 (British Indian Association.)
3. Ibid, - Enclo. XVII - 32. See also Enclo.£XVIII.
4. Ibid - Enclo. XVIII - 16. '
5. Ibid - Enclo. XXVIII
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Moslem opinion was no more enthusiastic♦ The Muslim League 
welcomed the council as ”a step in advance in the political 
development of the country”, but then proceeded to suggest far- 
reaching modifications of its composition and functions. Industry, 
commerce and learned professions should find place on the council , 
It should be "an epitome of all the interests represented on the
J 1
provincial advisory councils,,,.” The Central National Muhammadan
Association wanted the ruling chiefs to be nominated in rotation
according to a plan ”so that they themselves may not feel that
2
their appointment is due to chance or caprice,” The Moslem 
opinion was unanimous in underlining the urgency of adequate 
Moslem representation commensurate with their political importance 
and other circumstances.
The League advocated Initiative for the members not only of 
"laying their views” but also ”of eliciting information on any
3
particular subject.” These views were endorsed by others.
Preference for collective proceedings was unmistaken.
A different approach was the Aga Klianfs'. * It was ”a great
mistake” to mix ruling chiefs with others in the same council.
They were ne'ither well informed about the changing conditions of
Erri-tish India nor knew anything of "the new desires and new spirit”
of its people. As to the territorial magnates, "India does not
contain forty non-ruling educated and enlightened men worthy of
+
sitting with the Ruling Chiefs." He proposed establishment of two
1. Ibid - Enclo. XXVI (All-India Muslim League)
2. Ibid - En. XVIII - 9.
3. Ibid - En. XXVI.
+ Here the Aga Khan was overstating his case. Surely there was 
no less education and enlightenment amon^ the territorial magnates 
than among the chiefs. If anything the balance was in favour of
the former.
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Imperial Advisory Councils - one consisting solely of ruling
chiefs to consider matters which concerned them alone, and the
1
other of sixty notables of British India.”
Much the same was suggested by the Maharaja of Coochbehar.
\
He wanted the council to consist of two sections, one entirely of
chiefs, and the other of territorial magnates and representatives
2
of "commerce, industry, capital and the professions." It is
✓V
strikig how the members of the nobility themselves considered the
A
composition of the council unsatisfactory. The Maharaja of Benares 
favoured the inclusion of public men and "some of the merchant
3
princes and the izdoneers of commerce and industry." The Raja of 
* Venkatagiri advised the addition of "men of proved and conspicuous
k
merit and established character and experience", and the Maharaja
3
of Burdwan of "specially qualified persons of education and culture."
The Nawab of Hurshidabad wanted that at least one-sixth of the
6
members "should be representatives of the educated classes."
Maharaja Jotindra Mohun Tagore thought it "necessary...to introduce 
new and more vigorous elements into the organisation to ensure 
its success"; he had in mind educated and cultured men "of
7
moderate political views." The Raja of Pithapuram feared that the 
purpose of the council would be defeated by the defects of its 
character and organisation. Ruling chiefs and territorial magnates
1. Ibid - En.XVII - 29.
2. Ibid - En. XVIII - k .
3. Ibid - En. XX - 8.
Ibid - En. X - 9*
5. Ibid - En. XVIII - 1,
6. Ibid - En. XVIII - 2.
7. Ibid - *n. XVIII - 3*
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were "too far removed to feel the pulse of the nation down below;"
1
the few who felt it saw wisdom in "the Golden Rule of Si&ence."
He prescribed election for the territorial magnates to ensure fair 
representation of the landholding interests.
The Chief of Chamba stood very lonely indeed in welcoming the 
council as proposed "as a most important and benign measure", and
a
in his distrust of educated men with "their new ideas and thoughts."
Needless to say th^at the procedure and functions of the 
council were also subjecifcl to vigorous criticism. The Raja of 
Pithapuram urged statutory composition: Maharaja Jotindra Mohun
Tagore deplored the indefiniteness of the council1s duties and 
rights. Nearly all pressed for initiative for discussion and the 
right of asking questions. Collective meetings were, of course, 
very much in demand, the Maharaja of Cooch^behar sugg esting at least 
once a year. It is surprising, in view of the foregoing, that the 
government of India should claim that from the landholders theo
scheme of advisory councils had "met with a generally favourable
reception", and that most of the Moslems "express their satisfaction'1 
3
with it. It would require a good deal of imagination to call the 
reception anything but hostile.
As to the non-official Europeans, the organised opinion was 
concerned only with the furtherance of the community1s interest.
The chambers of commerce made it abundantly clear that besides
1. Ibid - En. X - 37(1)
2. Ibid - En. XXI - p.1^0.
3. Cd. (1908); Govt, of India letter dtd. 1.10*1908 para.2*
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representing the commercial interests, they spoke also for the 
non-official Europeans as a community. The Bengal Chamber could 
not help feeling that in the scheme of reforms "the interests for 
which the non-official Europeans stand have been, to a large extent^ 
overlooked." On the Imperial Advisory Council this class had no
representation at all, although ''agricultural, commercial and
1
industrial questions can hardly be excluded from its discussions."
Therefore, at least two seats should be allotted to the Europeans,
one to represent their industrial and commercial interests and
the other the planting and the zemindary~. Similar pl€£is were made
by other bodies, - for example, the Calcutta Trades Association
and the Madras Chamber of Commerce. Strangely enough none of these
bodies went into any other aspect of this important proposal.
This was done, however, by individual non-official Europeans
whose views were also invited by the authorities*
P.H.Henderson, a tea planter and member of the legislative
council of Eastern Bengal and Assam, pronounced against advisory
councils. The enlarged legislative councils with their increased
rights and privileges "will dispense to some extent with the
2
necessity for such institutions." The procedure was very defective. 
Even when the members were not consulted, it might be supposed that 
they had given a particular advice. E.W.Parker, an advocate, did 
not favour the sitting together of ruling princes and others. Let 
there be a separate, council for the princes only. The Imperial
1. India Office Collection, No*3^5 En. XVIII - l8.
2. Ibid - En. XXIII - 5$.
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Advisory Council for British India might be constituted Mby 
selections from the provincial advisory councils", whose members
were to be all nominated. 17.H.Campbell, of the London Mission.
/ 1
did not expect from the advisory councils as foreshadowed in the 
government letter, "any real help in dealing with questions 
affecting the welfare of the masses...♦ " The chiefs and territorial 
magnates had little sympathy with the common people. MAny 
measure that would tend to add to the power of the landed aristocracy
as a whole."
It would thus be fair to say that the non-official opinion 
did not take kindly to the Imperial Advisory Council.
Provincial Advisory Councils: The provincial advisory council 
evoked less hostility, mainly due to its somewhat wider composition. 
The British Indian Association did not we,nt the council to be too 
small, and proposed the representation of eadh district upon it.
The association of non-official Europeans was welcomed^but it was 
pointed out by the Bombay Presidency Association that the full 
benefit of such association would accrue only in case of collective 
deliberation. Objections to the too narrow functions and too 
unstable proceedings were as strong as in the case of Imperial 
Advisory Council, and radical modifications were urged.
The Muslim League approved of the provincial councils. The 
trustees of the Aligarh College recommended initiative for
1
opinion be inimical to the interests of the people
1. Ibid - En. XXI - 82.
2. Ibid - En. XIII - 13 (3)
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discussion and interpellation as also collective meetings* But, 
the Aga Khan was again dubious* In'view of the enlarged 
provincial legislative councils^what kind of work could be 
referred to the provincial advisory councils! He advised post­
ponement of these councils for some years pending experience of 
the working of the Imperial Advisory Council*
Most of the criticisms levelled against the functions and 
procedure of the Imperial Council by the nobility were repeated 
in case of the provincial councils*
The non-official' Europeans did not take much notice of 
these councils, except for certain grievances about their own 
representation* Henderson and Campbell were no more enthusiastic 
about the provincial! advisory council than they had been about the 
Imperial one*
Elections: The All-India Muslim League expressed "great
gratification’1 at the acceptance of the principle of class represent­
ation* This was ’’entirely in accord with the sentiments of the
Musalman community,” and would ’’conduce to the best interests
1
alike of the Government and of the people.” The Central National
Muhammadan Association was persuaded that if anything "were wanting
to attacking our community in its devotion and loyalty to the
2
British Raj," that deficiency had been now filled. Similar 
feelings of gratefulness and satisfaction v/ere common to other 
Moslem bodies*
1. Ibid - En* XXVI
2. Ibid - En* XVIII - 9
S' 7
At the same time great stress was laid on the election of 
the Moslem members. Nomination was not favoured, and the govern­
ment were requested to concede to the Moslems Mthe right of
1
returning by election^ their representatives. This demand, put 
forward by many, received its strongest support from the Aga Khan.
A nominated member ”ca.n never carry that weight and importance 
which an elected and popular representative does carry." Nomination 
must needs be on the recommendation of government officials* But 
many really capable men, trusted and liked by the community, 
might not come into contact with the officials. They would con­
sequently be passed over, the choice falling on persons far less 
interested in public affairs but enjoying the "advantages of 
birth or fortune or other adventitious circumstances." He complained 
that the nomination of Moslem members in the past had not been
satisfactory, and entered an emphatic plea for the election of the
%
Moslem members.
What the Moslems received with glee was an anathema to V\COfy.
No doubt, Gokhale was amenable to separate Moslem representation^ 
but in-this his was a very isolated stand. Separate representation 
and special electorates^ onsidered. ^ vere) "mischievous"; they tended 
to "break the growing solidarity of the various races in India." 
^Indian conditions were suitable for territorial representation*
To base political institutions on racial, religious or class 
interests was ’’entirely dangerous." The Muslim League stand on
i.
Ibid - Sn.XVII - 29*
3 , Ibid - En.XVIII - 16 (British Indian Association)
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this matter was questioned and it was claimed that ’’with the
exception of those Mc^homedans who strive naturally enough to get
a larger share of public employment and honours”, the wants and
needs of the Moslem masses were identical with ’’those of the
1
population of which they form part”* To ensure proper representation
of the Moslems, the Bombay Presidency Association suggested laying
down the proportion of Moslem and Hindu members in each electorate
according to local circumstances. But the members would be elected
j by the general body of voters* The procedure should, however, be
uniform in regard to all minorities, and no arrangement should be
2
’’devised specially in the interests of one community,” The United 
Provinces Conference, repeating the plea for territorial represent­
ation, proposed "fixing the number of members of each class which
3
the general electorate must return to the Council*"
An able case against separate representation was presented by 
P.C.Dutt, The British rule had taught Indians, while remaining 
apart socially, to "ignore caste and creed distinctions in civic 
and political work,” Why should the government undo its past work, 
and accentuate and embitter social differences "by making them the 
basis of political distinctions”? Separate representation would 
create "jealousies, hatreds and evil passions” in everyday life, 
and would encourage the people to nurse religious differences*
The plan was impolitic and unwise, and would "assuredly lead to an
1/nC/LgA-d-e--
^of religious riots and disturbances in the future, and would thus
1. Ibid - En.XVII - 32 (Bombay Presidency Association)
2* Ibid,
3 . Ibid - Sn.XXVIII
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weaken, and not strengthen, British administration.?f If elections
failed to give any community its due, he would rely on nomination
1
in accordance with its desire*
The Maharaja of Benares recognized the need of adequate
Moslem representation and supported^separate Moslem electorate,
but strictly on^provincial basis* An all-India electorate would
be unworkable. The Raja of Pithapuram was opposed to special
representation. He refused to accept that the minorities had any
special interests requiring separate legislation. Besides, once
such a course was adopted in regard to a particular community,
’’consistency requires that the same should be done in the course
of every other.” The process was ’’pernicious” because it would set
up ’’one class against another.” If, however, the government ”be
particular about showing a concession” to the Moslems, the latter
might elect separately one member to each provincial council and
2
two to the Imperial legislative council. The Raja of Venkatagir*. 
opposed separate representation which ran ’’counter to the unifying
3
influences” at work in the country. The Chief of Nabha did not 
relish the distinctions implied in separate electorates, and 
thought that nomination or election should ’’depend upon personal
k
worth irrespective of caste or creed.” The Raja of Jind
took a similar stand: if the government persisted in separate
representation of the Moslems, the same privilege should also be 
extended to the Sikhs. All in all, the nobility was antagonistic
\to communal electorates.
1. Ibid - En.XXIX
2. Ibid - En.X - 37(1)
3. Ibid - En*X - 9*
Ibid - En.XXI - p.lM.
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The European opinion found in the separate electorates an 
avenue to pDomote its own claim, As the reforms aimed at Mthe 
representation of special interests and minorities, the represent­
ation of non-official Europeans has,*..,a very strong claim.”
This must be different from the seats'allotted to Chambers of
Commerce, because those members will have the charge of special 
1
interests,” Constitutional safeguards conceded to the Moslems
were "still more urgently required in the case of the small
2
European community, • ,,f It is not surprising that the Anglo-
+ +
Indian Association took a similar stand. The Anglo-Indians, Man
important link between Great Britain and India”, had a special
status, and as such deemed themselves unsafe without independent 
3
representation.
Opposition to class representation was not, however, lacking ■
among the Europeans. Campbell and Monahan Reared that it would
*
perpetuate division and encourage feuds. Monahan counselled the 
government to abstain from introducing a "hitherto untried method 
of giving representation - untried, I mean, in any civilized 
country.” He would prefer nomination to supplement the election. 
Campbell advocated territorial representation, the electorates 
being chiefly constituted on educe.tional tests. Of course, lack 
of education would render necessary for some time some property
1. Ibid - En.XVII -8 (Bombay Chamber of Commerce)
2. Ibid - En.XXIII - 58 (H.H.Henderson)
3. Ibid - En.X - 7*
+ Meaning Eurasians here.
* Of Wesleyan Mission.
4. - Eti .HP - *7 (&) ■
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qualifications too. But he was careful to point out that the
wealthy were not "best fitted to choose men to represent the
interests of the people," The government must not fetter the
choice of the electorate which should be free to select the person
^most competent to speak for the people, "whatever be his religion
1
or class or social position,"
At the same time some doubts^were expressed by a few - by
Parker, the Anglo-Indian Association and the Maharaja of Benares
for example. The Maharaja was suspicious of election, which made
for the dominance of persons with no attainments other than "fluency
of the tongue". Consequently, "both the head and the hand had to
2 ‘
give way to the lungs,"
Referring to the public reaction to Moslem representation,
the government of India said that the proposal was criticized by
the Hindus, who regarded it "as an attempt to set one religion
against the other, and thus to create a counterpoise to the
3
influence of the educated middle class," This was hardly the
whole story. For all purposes, the landholders had been treated 
J
as a separate class: ' the government of India should have added 
that this class, whom they were taking particular pains to rehabi­
litate in public life, was generally opposed to the move, whose 
reception by the Europeans was also by no means universally cordial. 
As to the theory of 1 counterpoise1, had not the government of India
broadcast throughout the country the idea of a counterpoise to the
n  Ibid - En.XIII - 13 (3)
2. Ibid - En.XX - 8.
3, Cd. Mt26(1908) - Government of India letter dt. 1.10.1908,
Para.30.
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professional classes by creating additional landholding electorates.
/
J  It would be naive to suppose that the same motive might not be read
by some in the special Moslem electorates*
Imperial Legislative Council; The composition of the Imperial
legislative council was variously viewed. The standing official
majority was bound "to affect injuriously the power and usefulness"
1
of the council. The character of the- council, despite enlargement,
would remain unaltered and the non-official members would "be left
2
exactly where they were." The councils must not be "reduced to
3
a position of constant impotence.**" It was now necessary for 
the government to evince greater confidence in the people1s 
representatives*. Besides, the need of official majority automatis- 
ally restricted the number of non-official members, thus narrowing 
the scope of popular representation.
Moslem opinion was amenable to official majority. The League 
agreed that "the Government should always have in the council a 
standing official majority, independent of the minor fluctuations 
that may be caused by the occasional absence of an official 
member." This view was accepted by others*
The Moslems were also almost unanimous in demanding that each
f
of the eight provinces should return an elected Moslem member, 
whereas a ninth member should be elected by the Trustees of the 
Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College of Aligc^rh. The Trustees made
+ See p .1*^ 1 above •
1. India Office Collection,ITo*3^5» En.XXVIII (United Provinces
Conference)
2* Ibid, En.XVIII - 16 (British Indian Association)
3. Ibid, En.XVII - 32 (Bombay Presidency Association)
k* Ibid, En.XXVI £ including Burma.
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clear that they sought representation Min their capacity of 
directors and organisers of the Aligarh Movement”, which they 
claimed, reflected the Moslem sentiments, aspirations and ideals. 
They availed,of the occasion to remind the authorities of the
r
chief work of the Movement. This was two-fold: (a) to make the 
Indian Moslems realise that Mthe permanence of British rule in 
full vigour and strength, in India is the first condition of their 
own safety and continual advance”; and (b) to convince the govern­
ment that the Moslems v/ere loyal in self-interest, and that ”their
1
progress and advance would mean so much strength to the Government.”
Evidently, any move to make a breach in the official stronghold
was unlikely to receive countenance from this school.
Among the landed nobility, official dominance did not evoke
much controversy. But there were quite a few who did not view
+
this provision with enthusiasm. The Raja of PiV^Njetpuram preferred
equality of officials and non-officials: ”There is absolutely
no reason why the Government should be particular about having
a numerical majority so long as the power of veto, vests in the head
2
of the Government.”
The European opinion was almost unanimous in seeking ”more extensive
3
representation of the non-official European community.”
1. Ibid - En.XX - 5
2. Ibid - En.X - 37(1)
+ An ingenious scheme was propounded by the Maharaja of Benares.
He proposed a council of fifteen officials and twenty-five non­
officials. All matters except a few reserved subjects were to be 
decided by a majority of votes, though the Viceroy tt/ould have the 
right to veto any majority decision. In divisions on the reserved 
subjects, each official■vote would count as two, thereby ensuring 
official majority. As the members "will prove themselves worthy 
of the confidence renosed in them” the reserved list would be . 
shortened. Thus the"Indians would have some "real education" in the 
art of administration. N
3. Ibid - En.X - k (Madras Chamber of Commerce;
aProvincial Legislative Council: The reaction to the provincial
legislative council followed the pattern of the attitude towards
the Imperial legislative council. The Moslems wanted more seats
and advocated return of an elected Moslem member from each Division,
Europeans too were concerned with their own representation: the
Bengal Chamber of Commerce wanted as many as five non-official
European members in the Bengal legislative council.
According to a scheme of R.C,Dutt, each district was to elect
a member, the electoral constituency being composed of the elected
members of the district boards and municipalities within the
district. If these elections failed to secure the adequate
representation of any community, the deficiency was to be made good
by nomination. The nominated and the official members were to
form a clear majority in the council.
It would perhaps be fair to conclude that there was a general
feeling in favour of larger provincial councils.
Discussion and Interpellation: The advanced opinion considered
an extension of the functions and rights of the councils necessary,
E.C.Dutt would give to the provincial legislative council ’’the
power to discuss and settle the annual Provincial Budget”, as
also ’’the right of demanding a division” in ce.se of difference
of opinion. The members should be able to initiate debates on
important administrative matters. The president would, however,
possess the right to disallow a debate attended with ’’grave
1 1
political or administrative inconvenience,” The United Provinces 
Conference wanted for the non-official members of both the Imperial
1, Ibid - En.XXIX
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and the provincial councils the power to "move amendments to and
1
divide the councils on” financial'proposals, This, the Bombay
Presidency Association contended, "will help to concentrate public
attention and will enable Government to gauge the public feeling 
2
and opinion,” On the whole the feeling was that "the representatives
of the people should have a powerful voicd" in matters concerning
3
national income and expenditure. Informal conferences between 
officials and non-officials before finalising the financial 
arrangements were recommended. This would facilitate free and 
frank interchange of views.
At the same time, right to put supplementary questions was 
sought* to obviate any misunderstanding about the object of a 
question and to help its proper rep3.y, one suggestion was that an 
explanatory memorandum should accompany it.
The Moslem opinion was practically silent. Among the important 
Moslem bodies, only the Central National Muhammadan Association 
referred to this issue, and considered informal preliminary 
i/discussions "a most desirable improvement to the present discussion
k
of the Budget*" This lack of Moslem interest in the functions 
of the councils stands in bold relief against their keenness about 
the share in representation*
The nobility was on the whole content with the proposals.
These were welcome and,under the prevailing conditions, adequate.
But voices v/ere heard demanding for "the people of the country" 
a say in financial matters. At present the budget day was "but a 
speech-making occasion": the first step towards improvement might
rribxd - jsnTnvin.---------r,Tbid'-'2n.xvm - 9--------------------
2. Ibid - En,XVIII - 32.
3. Ibid - En.XVIII - 16 (British Indian Assort)____________________ _
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1
be the power to move amendments.
The European opinion was divided. Some considered the govern­
ment proposals adequate, and hoped that the council proceedings 
would be now more real. But others thought that these did not go 
"quite far enough." Such of the budget provisions in regard to 
which the government was prepared to welcome criticism should come 
before the council as financial proposals. Then the government 
should act upon "such of the suggestions as might meet with their
2
approvalj" this would make the proceedings "more, real and practical."
'//hat stands out from the above is the agreement that further
reforms were called for. The general recognition of the advisability
of constitutional advances was striking in view of the widely
varying complexion of the different interests. If anything, mostly
inadequacies of the proposals and need of further liberalisation
were pointed out: any complaint that the proposals were not
called for was undoubtedly rare. Considering that the agitation
for further advances towards representative government had been
confined to a small section of public opinion, this revealed a
tacit endorsement of its stand by a. circle much wider tha’K it
could ever presume to speak for. This was a testimony to its
political acumen and proper appraisal of the mood of the country.
** ** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** * *
The government of India conveyed their final proposals to
2
the secretary of state in a letter dated 1 October 190o. Prior to
1. Ibid - En.X - 37(1)" (Raja of Pithapuram)
2. Ibid - En.XVIII - 18 (Bengal Chamber of Commerce)
3. Pari.Papers 1908. Cd.44-26
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this, in a private letter dated 12 August 1908,' Minto had informed
Morley of his inclination to ’’cancel the suggestion for Advisory
Councils altogether,” He was perhaps impressed by the generally
cold reception of the proposal in the country. He, however,
adopted the modification suggested by many, and wanted ”a council
of chiefs, small in number to begin with, to deal with questions
affecting Native States and their relations with British India,
for the express purpose of recognizing the loyalty of Ruling
Chiefs and enlisting their interest in Imperial affairs,” Public
criticism of other aspects of the proposals seems also to have
influenced him. He would enlarge the legislative councils "on a
more representative basis” and offer ’’greater opportunities for
1
debate in those councils.” These ideas of the governor-general; 
as we shall presently see, were largely accepted by the government 
of India,
Imperial Advisory Council: The government of India decided
to drop the scheme of an Imperial Advisory Council. Instead they
proposed a council composed of ruling chiefs for ’’questions of an
2
Imperial character.” This council ’’would not be formed by legis-
3
lation”, and the chiefs, appointed by the Viceroy, would hold 
office during the latter’s pleasure. ’’Some power of initiative” 
was conceded to the members of the council, leaving to the Viceroy 
the right to veto any discussion. The scope of consultation in
k
the council too was left ”to the unfettered discretion of the Viceroy'
1^  India, Minto & Morley - p,2lA
2, Govt, of India letter dt. 1.10.1908, Para,6.
3. Ibid, Para.8,
A, Ibid, Para,10*
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No advisory council for British India was suggested. In
<k£
case an experiment of advisory councils was to be madeA all, it 
should be first made on provincial basis only. If the provincial 
advisory councils succeeded then only should a Council of Notables 
for India be considered.
Provincial Advisory Councils: Despite the enlarged legislat­
ive councils, the government of India thought that provincial 
advisory councils were likely to be very useful. The head of a 
province might turn to his advisory council "for advice before his 
policy was definitely shaped," and might use it "as a channel of
communication with the public in matters which could not convenient-
1
ly be brought before the legislative council." The government of
India therefore recommended the establishment of advisory councils
in those provinces where the heads of the administration wanted
them. Like the council of chiefs, the provincial advisory
council too was to receive a limited right of initiative, subject
to the power of veto by the provincial head.
It appears that these proposals regarding the advisory
councils were not liked by Minto. He wanted to cancel these
+
councils altogether. But, as he informed Morley, he "swallowed"
2
them "for the sake of showing a united front here*..." Exactly 
what he meant is difficult to say. Perhaps he found the pull 
of his executive council in favour of the experiment, for without 
some such pressure why should he tolerate a scheme which he disliked I
1. Ibid, Para.15*
-• India, Minto & Morley, p,222. 
+ See p. 3 2-7
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Imperial Legislative Council: The Imperial legislative
council was to consist of sixty-fhree members, as many as twenty-
eight of whom v/ere to be elected. Maintaining that official
majority in the council was essential, the government of India
reduced it to the narrowest limit, Without the governor-general,
officials and non-officials v/ere equal in number. Moreover, they
1
were prepared "to dispense with an official majority." on ordinary 
occasions, relying on the non-official support to carry on the work 
of legislation. It was hoped that with increased responsibility 
in the enlarged council, the non-officials v/ould not lightly 
undertake a solid opposition.
Regarding the election of the representatives of the land­
holders and the Moslems, they preferred special electorates, 
constituted in consultation with the leaders of the respective 
classes. Should formation of regular electorates be found difficult, 
the most convenient method v/ould be to "recognise election by 
associations," Failing this, nominations must be resorted to 
pending better arrangements. But the two latter courses v/ere only 
provisional devices, to be dropped as soon as formulation of a 
regular electorate was possible. The principle to be borne in 
mind was that "election by the v/ishes of the people is the ultimate
object to be secured, whatever may be the actual machinery adopted
2
for giving affect to it," number of reserved Moslem seats
1, Government of India letter dt. 1,10.1908, Para,2*f,
2, Ibid, Para,29*
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was raised from four to five, and in deference to the unanimous 
Moslem demand all these seats were declared open to election.
One of the seats, for difficulties of forming a suitable 
constituency, was however, to be filled by nomination temporarily.
The same temporary device was to apply to the selection of two 
members to represent Indian commerce, which for the first time was 
allotted seats. The minorities like the Sikhs, Parsis, Indian 
Christians and Buddhists were to be represented by nomination.
Provincial Legislative Councils; In the constitution of the 
provincial legislative councils as well, the government of India 
provided for equality among officials and non-officials with the 
exclusion of the governor or the Lt,-governor• They hoped too 
that it would not ordinarily be necessary to have the full official 
contingent. The preference for election whenever constituencies 
could be worked out was repeated. But no uniform policy for all. 
the provinces was worked out; the matter was left to the decision 
of the provincial authorities.
The number-of members of each council was raised, substantially
in Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam, and slightly in other 
+
provinces•
Resolutions and Questions: In this letter the government of
India made a new recommendation of much import. The existing 
facilities for debate on general matters of administration, 
confined to the occasion of the budget discussion, were unsatisfactory
+ See Appendix
231
The members had no previous knowledge of the subjects likely to
be raised; the absence of notice prevented the officials from
being equipped with full information. Consequently, the debates
were more or less desultory. The need of improvement was felt:
the time for "further facilities for debates" had come. They
proposed, thereforce, that "power should be given by statute for
members to move resolutions on matters of general public importance.'
Any such resolution was to be subject to certain restrictions. It
2
would not also have "by itself any force or effect." If the
authorities were unable to accept the resolution, "an opportunity
3
would be taken of explaining their reasons."
Though the opportunity for discussion was thus much widened,
the scope of interpellation remained unaltered. It was decided,
however, to extend this right to the legislative council of the 
+
Punjab.
Budget: The government of India referred to the public
demand for the right of the legislative council to "record its 
opinion by vote" on the budget. They v/ere now "anxious to meet" 
this desire, and considered it advisable that opportunities for 
expressing their views on the budget should be afforded to the 
legislative councils "at a sufficiently early stage to enable 
the Government to take advantage" of the suggestions tendered.
Without divesting the government of the ultimate control of the
1. Ibid, Para.37*
2. Ibid, Para.59*
3. Ibid, Para.57•
+ And also to the Burma legislative council.
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budget, it was sought to enable the councils to make "recommend-
1
ations to the Government in respect of particular items."
Different procedures were recommended for the Imperial and 
provincial budgets.
This was inevitable because the final say about the provincial 
budgets then rested with the government of India. On estimates 
supplied by the provincial government, the latter would lay down 
the limits of the expenditure for the provincial budget. As the 
provincial government could not exceed these limits, certain 
indispensable items of expenditure v/ere to be set apart and the 
rest referred to a Standing Finance Committee of the provincial 
council, consisting equally of officials and non-officials, so 
to adjust the expenditure as to make the total estimates conform 
to the limits fixed by the government of India.
Apart from this, the procedure for both the Imperial and the 
provincial legislative councils was similar. Its chief feature 
was that the financial statement would come before the committee 
of the whole council. Ahile discussing it, resolutions proposing 
amendments could be moved and divisions taken. The executive 
would then consider the budget in the light of the Bier# expressed 
and resolutions passed. Afterwards, the budget in its final 
form was to come before the legislative council, when the government 
v/ould take the opportunity to explain their inability to .accept 
any resolution which the committee might have passed. At this 
stage neither resolutions nor divisions v/ould be permitted, though 
a general discussion was to take place.
1. Ibid, Para. 62.
3 2 3
The government of India excluded at the same time, on grounds 
of public policy, certain heads of revenue and expenditure from 
debate in the Imperial and provincial legislative councils.
These proposals v/ere distinctly a step in advance. They 
sought to associate the non-officials with the financial control 
of the government as much as was thought harmonious with the 
prevailing conceptions about the administration in India. The 
rights to move resolutions on matters of general public importance 
and to propose amendments to financial provisions would be a 
valuable addition to the powers of the legislative councils. The 
position of the non-officials was strengthened; they would now 
have an opportunity to indicate their views much . motte effectively, 
Coupled with other aspects of the reforms, particularly the frank 
recognition of election, these tended to impart to the legislative 
councils a real parliamentary bias, and raised their status. These
acknowledged the desirability of obtaining non-official support
/
for executive measures, and conceded in principle thi advantage 
of co-ordinating governments policy with the wishes of the 
governed.
The government of India also acknowledged that the new
proposals v/ere likely to increase the burden of the heads of the
local governments. It might be necessary, in order to help thenij
to enlarge the executive councils where these existed, and to
constitute executive councils wh^ro— thcoo 1 oxiote d^ in the larger
provinces where there was none. But they refrained from offering
a definite view pending the experience of the actual v/orking of
the reforms.
** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** * * **
3 3/,
Not all the government of India’s proposals were accepted
by the secretary of state. His views were approved by his council
with two dissents on 26 November 1908. The cabinet "took the
thing on trust, having rather urgent business of much domestic
1
moment on their hands."
Council of Chiefs; The idea of the council of chiefs did not
aPPea-l to the secretary of state. He was apprehensive that the
rulers, on whose enthusiasm and co-operation the success of the
scheme depended, v/ould not take kindly to it. But in deference
to the Viceroy’s prestige and out of respect for the rulers*
sentiments, the scheme was not rejected outright. Instead, it
was left to Minto to devise in consultation with the chiefs.scheme
2
that is at once acceptable to them and workable in practice.."
The Viceroy was not without his doubts, and "whilst not absolutely
dismissing the idea" would "let it stand over for the present."
Provincial Advisory Councils: The creation of provincial
advisory councils was not "likely to prove an experiment of any
marked actual value." ,A rivalry might spring up between these
councils and the legislative councils; in that case, the new
species of councils were sure to be "suspected as designed to be
4
a check upon the old." The reformed legislative councils with 
greater facilities for discussion and debate rendered the advisory
1. Recollections II. p.284.
2. Secretary of State’s Despatch dt. 27.11.1908, Par a. 3
3. India, Minto £ Morley - p.233*
4. Secretary of State’s Despatch dt. 27.11;1908 - Para*4.
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councils redundant. Morley decided against provincial advisory 
councils. Even the Central Provinces were not given an advisory 
council•
Principle of Representation: About the manner of election
and principle of representation, the secretary of state took a
completely different line. He was surprised at the extent of the
government of India*s reliance on nomination ?,to supply the
1
deficiencies of election." Wherever class electorates were
difficult to form, nomination was to be resorted to. To obviate
this he suggested "a modification of the system of a popular
electorate, founded upon the principle of electoral colleges." Pie
recommended joint electoral colleges in which the number of electors
representing each interest would bear to the total number "the same
proportion as the members of council representing that interest
to be elected bear to the total number to be elected." Each interest
should be allotted a fixed number of seats on the legislative
councils. The electoral college as a v/hole was to elect the
members, each elector having one vote* Thus each section of the
population wouldAenabled "to return a member in the proportion
2
corresponding to its own proportion to the total population."
The electoral college, to consist of a fixed number of members, 
was to be elected by landholders with a minimum property qualific­
ation, members of rural and sub-divisional boards^ and members of 
district boards and municipalities, a definite number being allotted 
to each of these interests. If any interest did not receive its
1. Ibid, Par a.. 9*
2. Ibid, Para.12.
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due share, its deficiency would be made good by nomination*
Again, if any interest was over-rex>resented, only the required 
number of seats should be retained, leaving out the surplus.
This system might secure representation not only of the Moslems 
and the landowners, but also of other interests. The only 
condition, necessary for such representation was to allot adequate 
seats on the electoral college to, the interest concerned.
Explaining the advantages of this scheme, Morley said that 
by bringing all the classes and interests within the popular 
electorate it met the criticism of encouraging separative* It 
did alike ’’establish a principle that would be an answer to
1
further claims for representation by special classes or associations”
Again, byy'.linking up the local bodies with the legislative
councils , it tended to stimulate interest in local self-government *
Morley even suggested that a candidate for election to the provincial.
legislative council might be required to have taken part in the
local administration,
Regarding the special representation of the Moslems, he
pointed out that giving them a definite proportion of seats on
the provincial councils ’’might involve the refusal to them in
that province of a right to vote in the territorial electorates”;
else they received ”a double vote”, probably causing resentment to
2
others*
Imperial Legislative Council: The secretary of state was
not satisfied with the lean official majority in the Imperial
1* Ibid, Para.l4,
2, Ibid, Para*11,
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council, secure only with the assistance of the governor-general•
He did not like any compromise. Official majority was essential.
He could not "regard with favour the power of calling into play
an official majority, while seeming to dispense with it." Nor did
he like the governor-general to be involved in "the conflict of
the division list." The official majority need not be overwhelming,
"but it must be substantial." The government of India were, there-
1
fore, asked to increase the number of nominated officials.
Provincial Legislative Council: As to the official element
in the provincial councils, however, Morley had different views.
He decided that there was no need of an official majority on
those bodies. They had a very narrow scope of legislation. It
was difficult to imagine that delay in provincial legislation^
due to hon-official opposition, might cause much administrative
mischief. It wasAunlikely that cutting across their divergent
interests, the non-officials would combine against the government.
If they did so in favour of an unwanted measure, the head of the
province had his power to v/ithhold assent. But in the concurrent
powers of the governor-general in council to legislate for any
province Morley saw the best safeguard. His decision, of course,
made it necessary to modify the constitution of the provincial
legislative councils. This afforded a chance "to secure a wider
2
representation."
An important reason for doing away with the official majority
1. Ibid, Para.22.
2. Ibid, Para.21.
was, as Morley explained in the House of Lords, that it ntends to
weaken, and I think I may say even to deaden, the sense both of
trust and responsibility in the non-official members of these 
1
councils." Helpless before an omnipotent official majority,
the non-officials were driven to "an attitude of peevish, sulky,
2
permanent opposition."
One may naturally wonder why was then the official majority
retained in the Imperial legislative council? Was not its effect
equally harmful to the non-official members of that body? Morley
explained this inconsistency by making clear his conception of
government in India. ' Any weakening of the ultimate executive
control was far from his intentions. He was not initiating a
parliamentary system. government in India. He denied that the
3
reforms "led directly or necessarily up to the establishment" of
such a system in India. Therefore, at the last stage the
government must have the means of carrying through the legislation
they considered necessary. He emphatically declared, "If my
existence, either officially or corporeally, were prolonged twenty
times longer than either of them is likely to be, a Parliamentary
system in India is not at all the goal ±o which I vpould for one 
if
moment aspire."
Morley*s verdict against an official majority in the provincial 
councils met with vehement opposition from two of his colleagues
+
in the India Council, Sir William Lee-Warner and Sir James Thomson.
1. Morley, Indian Speeches, p.89.
2. Ibid - p.90.
3. Ibid - p.91*
4. Ibid, - p.92*
+ Both of them v/ere retired members of the Indian Civil Service*
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Sir William Lee-Warner feared that /the legislative arm of 
the provincial*government will be paralysed, and public confidence 
will be shaken by the constant defeat of these governments in 
their legislative councils.” The government should have power 
not only to prevent bad laws, but also”to pass good laws” and 
”§o stop at their inception dangerous and disturbing bills.” He 
did not agree that the scope of provincial legislation was confined 
to unimportant matters, and was averse from leaving the responsibility 
of rejecting bad laws solely with the head of the province. The 
intervention of the supreme council to pass a necessary measure 
was ”a retrograde step towards centralisation and an intolerable 
buttress on the Imperial Council which would have ’neither the time 
nor the local knowledge needed for such additional legislative 
work.” The' withdrawal of the official majority would encourage non­
officials to bring forward ”hasty projects of legislation.” He 
was dubious as to the outcome of the new scheme of election sketched 
by the secretary of state: it appeared imperfect, ”at any rate
it is an experiment”. Eefore an experience of its working had
1
been gained, it was premature to surrender the official preponderance •
Sir James Thomson regarded the step as ’’subversive of British 
rule in India,” so far as the provincial councils were concerned.
The increased powers of the councils, their right to call the 
executive to account, rendered the step very dangerous. From his 
personal experience of the working of the Indian councils, he was 
convinced that ’’the animus of the non-official towards the official
1. Dissents by Members of India Council - Vol.3» PP*96“97«
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is the animus of opposition to Government." Under the
proposed set-up, the legislative councils would only intensify 
the alienation of rulers and ruled. Again, the defeat of the 
government in the council must reduce the status of the administra­
tion in the eyes of the public. This was harmful: "Prestige
as a term for government in India is a word of grave import,M 'He 
did not appreciate the difference between the Imperial Council 
and the provincial councils in this respect. Surely the latter, 
no less than the former, needed the right to legislate! The 
dependence on the central governments concurrent legislative
powers would detract from the authority of the provincial 
1
government.
Resolutions and Questions: Generally speaking, Morley
approved of the government of India*s proposals regarding resolutions
He sought, however, to extend the scope of questions, and
v/ould allow, subject to restrictions, the asking of supplementary
questions. In its absence interpellation tended to become "unreal
2
and ineffective,"
This was another remarkable accession to the power of the 
non-officials. Together with the right to initiate discussion 
on important public matters, the right of "cross-examining the 
Government on its replies to questions" served "the purpose of an
3
inquest into the doings of Government•11
Budget: The proposals for the discussion of the budget
~Tl Ibid, pp.9&-104,
2. Secretary of state*s Despatch dt. 27*11*1908 - Para.3.,0,
3* Montagu - Chelmsford Report, Para.79*
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were approved. Morley Underlined the necessity of leaving no 
one in doubt that the ultimate control of executive action resided 
exclusively in the government.
1
The need of "an effectual advance" in the sphere of local
self-government was urged by Morley. He also touched the question
of executive councils in the provinces. In view of the increased
burden that the reforms would lay on the provincial heads, he
favoured adding one member each to the executive councils of
Bombay and Madras, and to create executive councils in larger
provinces. Hence, he planned to seek powers "to create Executive
2.
Councils from time to time as may be found expedient."
This despatch is an outstanding evidence of Morley*s contrib­
ution to the reforms. In many important respects, he took 
significant decisions. He rejected the Council of Chiefs, vetoed 
the provincial advisory councils, dispensed with the official 
majority in the provincial councils, granted wider powers of inter­
pellation, and sought to devise an electoral scheme which 
assured to each interest its due share of representation while
uniting then in one electoral college.
* * ** ** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** **
The government of India were not favourably disposed towards 
Morley*s electoral scheme. It was unlikely to give to a minority 
a representative of its own choice. The voting strength of the 
Hindus in the electoral college could be so manipulated that with
1. Secretary of statefs Despatch 27-ll*1908 - Para.33«
2. Ibid, Para.^l.
Shi,
the support of a few Moslem members, a Moslem might he elected
rto the legislative council, who did not possess the confidence 
V
of the majority of the Moslem members of the electoral college.
The Moslems were at a disadvantage in the formation of the 
electoral college too. On the local bodies, - the principal 
constituent of the proposed electoral college, - they were not 
sufficiently represented. It was possible for the majority to 
select not only their own representatives but the Moslem represent­
atives as well. Thus the Moslems were ’'liable to be deprived of 
•i the privilege of choosing their own representatives on the electoral
college, and might have to accept such candidates as commend
1
themselves to the Hindu majority.” Further, at a bye-election
the minority had not the least chance of having its own way.
The scheme was /extremely complicated,11 and was unsuitable for
the common run of intelligence and public spirit of the primary
voters who elected the local bodies. The government of India
"doubted whether the result anticipated can be obtained for many
years to come": at any rate, "the immediate consequence will be
that for a considerable time the electoral system will be in the
hands of the professional wire-puller, the only person who will
2
be able to manipulate the voting power effectively."
The same difficulties jv/itiated the representation of land­
holders under the new scheme. It was impossible to include the
Indian commercial interests in it*
1. Burn’s Collections II, p.l6l (Govt.of India to Govt.of U.P. -
letter Ho.127 dt. 9.1.19090
2. Ibid, p.162.
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Reference was also made, without any note of disapproval,
to the Moslem complaint that the scheme was in direct conflict
with the assurances given by . : I-iinto on 1 October 1906, which
+
the government of India subsequently endorsed. It had been
contended that "these public declarations amount to a pledge on
the part of the Government" to give separate representation to 
*
the Moslems,
/
The government of India concluded that for the present the
new scheme was impossible to adopt, and the principle of separate
communal electorate must be acted upon.
Nor did they share Morley^ misgivings about giving a
±
double vote to the Moslems. His argument hardly gave weight to
the consideration that the Hindu influence was sure to dominate
the presidency corporations, the Universities, the landholding
and the Indian commercial electorates. In view of this, no
objection to the double representation of the Moslems seemed fair.
It might at least be regarded "as satisfying their indefinite
claim to be allotted a number of seats corresponding, not merely
to their numerical strength, but also to their political and
1
historical importance."
The decision to do away with the official majority in the
provincial councils was accepted. The provincial governments were
advised to determine the strength of the non-official majority in
the respective legislative councils, and to distribute the
+ See above p.2.^ 2
* Morley*s scheme of a joint electorate had excited indignant and 
vehement protests from the All India Muslim League. In January 1909 
a League Deputation waited upon Morley, and, among other things,
reiterated their preference for separate electorates.
See above p.336
1. Ibid, p.163*
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additional non-official seats among the various interests 
selected for representation in the government of India's letter 
of 1 October 1908.
** ** ** * * ** ** ** ** ** **
The Morley-Minto reforms were not confined to the legislative
councils. No less important were the steps they took for
admitting Indians into executive partnership, vie saw in the
previous Chapter that the claims for appointing Indians to the
executive councils and the India Council were more and more put
#
forward. In March 1906 Minto privately discussed with some of
his colleagues the possibility of appointing an Indian to his
executive council. The majority opposed the idea and the Viceroy
1
did not pursue it. Instead he then preferred the idea of giving
2
more power to Indians in district councils and municipalities.
The idea of appointing an Indian to the Viceroy's executive 
council was revived by Morley in his letter of 13 June 1906, and 
was received with sympathy by Minto. The governor-general thought 
that the risks of committing state secrets to an Indian colleg^ue 
might be exaggerated, perhaps because of Mour own inherent 
prejudice against another race." Had not the time come "to offer 
to recognized ability a more direct share in the government of Indi 
The more he thought of it, the more he was inclined for an Indian 
on his executive council: "It would be an immense move forward." 
Morley thought it "the cheapest concession we could make." It would
1. Lord Minto, A Memoir - p.231.
2. India, Minto & Morley - p.98
3. Ibid.
345-
leave the executive power "as strong and as absolute a.s it now is", -
a condition which was "the cardinal requirement" of any proposed 
1
reform.
The matter was considered by the Arundel Committee, Two of
1
its four members were amenable to the proposal. But it was stoutly 
resisted by the members of Minto*s council. The opposition was 
based "almost entirely on the assumption that it is impossible to 
trust a Native in a position of great responsibility, and that 
the appointment of a Native member is simply a concession to 
agitation," This view the Viceroy failed to accept. By this time, 
he had come to regard such an appointment as "infinitely the most 
important" of all proposals. l/hen the matter came formally before 
the governor-general-in-council, Minto and Baker were its only 
supporters. Kitchener, the commander-in-chief, was "my strongest 
opponent.....he looks upon the appointment as an entire subversal
3
of the old order of things."
Nor were things smooth for the secretary of state. The India 
Council was opposed to the idea. Morley spoke of"intractable
b
forces" against the move, and on 26 April 1907 had already mooted 
the idea of appointing one or two Indians on the India Council, 
evidently as compensation for the Indian disappointment, V/hen the 
matter was raised in the Cabinet on 3 May 1907* the decision was 
averse. The Cabinet felt the weight of the adverse decisions of 
the governor-general1s executive council and the India Council, and
1. Ibid, p.101.
2. Recollections, ii, p. 192* fV 
India, Minto & Morley, pp.103-10^. 
Ibid, p.llA-.
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was apprehensive of. bitter opposition from the Anglo-Indian
community. Two ex-Viceroy members of the cabinet - Ripon and
Elgin - were against the proposal "mainly on the secrecy argument -
that the Member would have to know military and foreign secrets
etc. etc." Fowler, the ex-secretary of state, also opposed the
idea. But it was striking that Morley himself did not press for
the appointment. He was held back by the prospect of the inevitable
Anglo-Indian resentment, and concluded that the advantage of such
an appointment "was not decisive enough to justify the risk of
1 + 
provoking European clamour." It would appear, however, that what
really decided the matter for Morley was the opposition he en­
countered in the cabinet. The argument about Anglo-Indian 
resentment was perhaps just a device for graceful retreat. But
he was far from happy in this decision.
Morley, however, received the cabinet's sanction to appoint 
"one or possibly two" Indians on his council. Minto was previously 
not enthusiastic about this suggestion, but now hoped that the
step might "to a certain extent counter-balance disappointment"
2
at the denial of Indian membership of the executive council*
The appointment of Indians to the India Council was strongly 
ob jectajto by one of its members, Sir William Lee-'.Varner, who had 
also opposed the abandonment of the official majority in the pro­
vincial legislative councils. In a minute of dissent he said that 
the appointment "would impair and dilute the -efficiency of the
1. Recollections, ii, p.211.
2. India, Minto & Morley, p .156•
+ In the light of his telegram to Minto on the Cabinet Proceedings - 
India, Minto & Morley, p,156.
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Council." They must wait till Indians had acquired the requisite
training and insight in Civil administration. Appointment of
*
Indians "at the present moment would exclude from our discussions
the ripe experience needed for'the work before us." Further, the
time was inopportune• The secretary of state had "too small a
field for selection, and he will satisfy no one." There were
different interests whose susceptibilities had to be respected.
Any hasty appointment "would be invidious as well as difficult
1
and would not pour oil on the tro®q/led water."
On 6 June 1907 Morley informed the House of Commons of his
decision to appoint Indians to his council for the purpose of
2
"hearing the voice of Indians". But it was not before 26 August
1907 that he made the formal submission to the King for the
appointment of Krishna Gobinda Gupta and Saiyid Husain Bilgrami.
The King approved the appointment, thereby admitting the Indians
+
for the first time into the executive Holy of Holies.
Morley asserted later on that the purpose of this appointment
was to assuage the grievance of racial domination which the
Indians nursed, and which lay at the root of the Indian problem.
He wanted the English rulers in India to realise that "in the
eyes of the ruling Government at home, the Indian is perfectly
worthy of a place, be it small or great, in the counsels of those
who make and carry on the laws and the administration . j
IU Dissents by Members of India Council, vol.3, pp#9^-95•
2. Indian Debates, 1907, p.l85.
+ K.O,Gupta was a retired I.C.S. official, who had been a member 
of the Bengal Board of Revenue - the highest post to which an 
Indian had yet been appointed.
S.H.Bilgrami was a minister to H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad, 
and was for sometime a member of Imperial legislative council.
l
of the community to which he belongs."
■Vhile writing to Minto about these appointments on 23 August 
1907, Morley described "the present move as the sure precursor
2
of a move in the very near future as far as you would like to go.”
He meant the appointment of Indians to the executive council. The 
Viceroy felt that without this the reforms would sound rather 
hollow. He wrote to Morley on 1 July 1908 that "nothing would 
tend more to prove the genuineness^of a Native member to the
)7
Viceroy's Council.... In its absence "there must be a want of 
reality in respect to the^rreater popular powers" now being conferred
3
on the legislative councils. An Indian might be placed in charge 
of the legislative department. In his letter ofi 21 July 1908 
Minto was more insistent, and remarked that there was no legal 
bar against appointing straightaway an Indian as member of his 
council. He had already S.P.SiTjha, of the Calcutta Bar, in his 
mind for this unique honour. It is worth noticing that Minto 
slightly shifted his ground and remarked that SmJila's appointment 
would only admit the great principle that an Indian would "not be 
excluded from a share in the Supreme Government if his qualifications
k
meet the requirements of the Appointment." Henceforward, this 
argument was more and more relied on, though undoubtedly the move 
had been conceived as a political concession. In a letter on 
12 August 1908 the governor-general reiterated his intention of
appointing an Indian to his executive council. He went further,
1. Indian Speeches, p.^.
IP-dia, Minto £ Morley, p.138
3. Ibid, p.212. 
k. Ibid, p.21^ -.
3*1
and expressed his desire for enlarging the executive councils
of Bombay and Madras and of establishing such councils in the
United Provinces and Bengal. Each of these councils would
include an Indian. This, he said, in his letter of lA- October, .
1
1908, went "much nearer to the heart of things."
(Bhe India Council remained adamant. By five votes to three,
2
the c o u n c i l  again threw out the proposal. But now Morley was
determined to meet Minto*s wishes,mnch to the latter*s pleasure
3
who was sure that "the appointment would be right." On 17 
December 1903 Morley expressed his decision in the House of 
Lords. It must be "common sense" for the governor-general and 
his European colleagues "to have at their side a man who knows 
the country well, who belongs to the country and who can give 
him the point of view of an Indian. Surely that cannot but
k
prove an enormous advantage."
At this time, Morley faced a problem in the Muslim League 
demand for equal share in the Indian, quota of probable appointment 
to the executive council. A deputation of the London branch of 
the League waited upon him in January 1909 and put forward the 
demand for parity. Morley rejected the plea as "dubious tactics"
on part of the deputation and said that reference to any community
in regard to the appointment was "entire iy wide of the mark...."
V/hat he and Minto had in view was the desirability of demonstrating
1, Ibid, p.222.
2* Recollections, ii, p.278.
3* India, Minto & Morley, p.233*
L, Indian Speeches, p«9^ (At one stage during their correspondence
Minto put forward very similar arguments in favour of the Council 
of Notables. He spoke of the disadvantages which the government 
sometimes had to face "for its want of contact with the Native world]’ 
' (India, Minto & Morley, p.137)
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that they held to the famous Proclamation of Queen Victoria in
1858 promising1 that "if a man is fully qualified in proved ability
and character to fill a certain post he shall not be shut out by-
race or religious faith." He refused to acknowledge any other
1
principle in regard to this matter.
Another hurdle presented itself in the shape of the King’s
misgivings. He felt strongly on the subject, and in a talk with
liorley expressed himself in a tone of "earnest, but extremely '
2
kind remonstrance." Minto wro.te to the King assuring him that 
the appointment would really mean the removal of 3fc<Xcial disability 
in case of an Indian possessing the necessary qualifications. This 
was not a move to satisfy a claim for racial representation.
For "a seat held on racial qualifications would indicate a.
disregard for the soecial qualities which would ehtitle an
3
individual to hold such a seat...."
In March 1909 > Morley presented the case of Sinlafs appoint­
ment before the Cabinet. He opened the matter by saving, "Ho
k
more important topic has ever been brought before a Cabinet." The
Cabinet this time gave unanimous approval to the proposal. The
King accepted the recommendation of a unanimous Cabinet. Soon
after S.P.Sinha was appointed as the first Indian member of the
+
governor-general1 s executive council as the Lav/ Member.
Y/hat were the factors which influenced the allocation of
1. Ibid, pp.109-111
2. Recollections, ii, p.299*
3. Lord Minto, A Memoir, p.286. 
if. Recollections, ii. p.302.
+ One of the reasons why Morley did not make this appointment
earlier was the possibility of antagonising the Conservative 
opposition and the consequent risk of losing his Reforms bill in 
the House of Lords*
is-'
legislative department to the first Indian member of the government 
f
of India. In July 1908 Minto, first mooting the idea of appointing
an Indian^ in charge of the legislative department, referred to the
1
Indians1 ’’peculiar aptitude for the profession of Law.” Many
Indians had high reputation at the Bar. He also seemed to favour
the idea because such an appointment would not necessitate any
fresh legislation. Morley, writing in September 1908, conceded
that one advantage of the proposal ’’would plainly be that such an
appointment would not b'e taking the bread out of the mouths of
2
the Civil Service.” Apparently, this might make the step less 
distasteful to that powerful body. Later in the month Minto, 
elucidating his stand, pointed out that the charge of legal 
department would not impose great administrative duties upon the 
Indian member, who was consequently less likely to be faced with 
difficulties which the lack of administrative experience might
3
entail. It may be said here that Morley could not conceal from 
himself the fact that the Indians were unlikely to be satisfied 
with being perpetually confined to the department of Law.
This appointment was an important landmark. Gokhale hailed
h
it as ”in some respects the most notable part of the Reforms...”
An Indian was for the first time given a share in formulating the 
administrative policy of the country. As such something more
than the purely advisory role, to which the Indians had so long
1. India, Minto Sc Morley, p.213.
2 • Ibid , p". 216'• ,
3 . . .
^. Ioid, p.289.
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been used, was granted. The persistence which marked the demand 
for.executive partnership by Indian politicians was only a measure 
of the value they attached to such an appointment. It heralded 
racial equality between the rulers and the ruled, and was an 
eloquent gesture of confidence in the ability and trustworthiness 
of the latter. Perhaps it also served to assure the Indians that 
their wishes and wants would not go by default in the highest 
administrative counsels of the country.
The .<ftjo(jfcLSsion of Indians to the provincial executive council 
was now only a question of time•
* * * ★ * * * * * * * *
Vie have considered in this Chapter how the reforms were 
shaped by the authorities in India and in London. Vie shall now, 
in the next Chapter, study their progress through parliament.
3Chapter VIII 
The Indian Councils Bill, 1909» In Parliament,
The Indian Councils Bill was presented to the House of Lords
by Morley on 17 February 1909* Read a second time a week later,
the bill, passing through further stages of consideration, was
+
passed by the Lords on 11 March, 1909*
Moving for the second reading of the bill, Morley spoke of
two rival schools of opinion regarding the government in India#
One school believed that better government depended on efficiency
of administration. The other, with which Morley associated
himself, while not ignoring the cause of efficiency, "looks also
I
to what is called political concessions." Without political
concessions, "true, solid, endurable efficiency" could not be
ensured. He was aware that the risks attendant on a policy of
political concessions had been pointed out. Referring to
Salisbury*s misgivings about applying * occidental machinery* in
India, he said,"Well we ought to have thought of that before we
applied occidental education; we applied that and occidental
machinery must follow." He claimed, however, that the bill did
not make any violent departure. The Indian ^ Councils Act of 1892
had admitted the elective principle in the legislative councils;
2
"now this bill extends that principle."
+ The peers whose speeches in the Lords have been considered in the 
following pages are:- Ampthill(Conservative), Courtney(Liberal), 
Crewe(Liberal), Cromer (He had no pronounced party leanings), Cross 
(Conservative), Curzon(Conservative), Lansdowne(Conservative), 
MacDonnell (Liberal) , Mid^(leton(Conservative ) , Morley (Liberal) , 
Northcote(Conservative), Reay(Liberal), Wenlock(Conservative), and 
Wolverhampton(Liberal).
I. Indian Debates, House of Lords, 1909* p#l^*
2# Ibid, p*15*
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Morleyfs view of the result of Western education in India
found some enthusiastic support* MacDonnell considered the bill
as ’’the latest product of that system of education which the
I
wisdom of our predecessors introduced into India.” Ampthill
reminded the House that the Indian political aspirations ”we
2 +
ourselves have taught and fostered.” Middleton, the ex-secretary
of state, remarked that the education introduced by the British in
India had enabled a considerable section of the people to take an
interest in political affairs. By their own example, the British
3
had ’’inspired them with the idea of political activity.” Reay
k
saw in all this ’’the natural result”, and eromer ”the natural and
5
and inevitable result”, of the educational reforms which the
British initiated*
But Morley*s claim that the bill was merely an extension of
the Act of 1892 found no such hearty endorsement. Ampthill no
doubt saw it as ”a moderate and just expansion of the present 
6
system”, but Lansdowne thought that the Act of 1892 was ’’child’s 
7
play” compared to the bill. He protested that the bill went "very 
far indeed beyond anything you can find in the Bill of 1892”, and
1. Ibid, p.4l. 5* Ibid, p.73*
2. Ibid, p.50* 6. Ibid, p.52*
3. Ibid, p*60. 7• Ibid, p.l83»
k* Ibid, p.69*
+ St.John Brodrick, Lord Mid/leton (1856-19^-2): Conservative 
in politics Middleton entered House of Commons in 1878 and sat 
there until shortly before his Accession to the peerage in 1907* 
He was secretary of state for War during the South African war 
(1900-1903)* when he was responsible for many reforms in the 
War Office. He was secretary of state for India from October 
1903 to December 1905*
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was ^not merely a step forward, it is a plunge forward, and a
I
plunge which will lead us we cannot yet tell where*11 The bill
tended to make the legislative councils "in effect little
' 2
Parliaments with a great many of the attributes of a Parliament."
Middleton regretted that the bill introduced "some of the very
3
worst features of our own Parliamentary practice," even though
the secretary of state had denied any intention of introducing
+
parliamentary government in India. He thought that the new
k
legislative councils were "semi-Parliamentary institutions."
Curzon noted "a great difference" between the Act of 1892 and the
3
bill, which created "almost representative government." The bill
introduced some of "the features inseparably attached to a
6
Parliamentary system" which system would "inevitably be the
consequence" of the new measure.
** ** ** ** ** *★ ** ** **
Coming to the particular provisions of the bill, the
enlargement of the legislative councils was vehemently attacked by
Curzon* This was "a most immense and in its consequences
7
revolutionary change•" It was sure to cause administrative
difficulties as more and more officials would be taken away from
their routine duties to attend the session of the legislative
councils, thus inflicting a "very serious blow on the continuity 
8
of 7/ork*" in government departments* A chain' of temporary 
appointments would be necessary, and this raised the question of
Y] Ibid, p.216. 5". Ibid, p. 177•
2. Ibid, p.138. 6. Ibid, p.131.
3. Ibid, p.66. 7. Ibid, p.28.
*f. Ibid, p.68. 8. Ibid, p.30.
+ See Ch.VII, p.-^*
expense* Besides, suitable men were not always available*
All in all, he could not "conceive anything more dangerous
to the morale and efficiency of the service."^ Midleton
raised a similar objection: he regretted that senior
officials were to remain in enforced idleness, away from
their proper duties: he did not believe that there would
be enough work in the councils to keep them fully employed*
He had no doubt that "you will have a very costly system
2
set up by these proposals’.1 Lansdowne entirely agreed with 
these views. The work on the legislative council was sure
to distract the officials and divert their attention from
3
their "real official business." Had some of his hearers
never felt when they had office work to do and when they
were to make a speech the next day, that the "office work
A
rather suffered in consequence?" He said that the evil
effect would be to disorganise the departments to which
the officials belonged.
To all this criticism Courtney replied that it was
3
"no use to grumble about the consequences" once it had been 
decided to make the council representative. (He was speaking 
about the supreme legislative council in particular.)
As a way out of the practical difficulties, he suggested that 
the officials should be allowed to vote by proxy, without 
leaving their stations, their proxies being in the custody 
of a member of the government. Referring to the question
1. Ibi^ j, p. 131.
2. Ibid, p.66.
3* Ibid, p. 93*
4. Ibid, p. 9^*
5. Ibid, p. 8*f.
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of expense Reay said, "I do not think that in India this
expenditure will be grudged."^"
** ** * * ** ** ** ** ** **
When enlargement of the legislative councils had
come in for so much criticism, it was to be expected that
the frank recognition of election, which the bill included,
should excite controversy. Though the details of the
procedure of election were to be settled under the regulations
later on, it had been decided, as Morley said("that there is
to be election in the proper and natural sense." In view
of this decision, any ratification of election by executive
2authorities would "look farcical."
Curzon thought differently. Election was "profoundly
3
unsuited to the Indian system, and the Indian character."
He feared that the Hindus, by their greater capacity of
organisation, would so manipulate the electoral colleges
that before long they were sure to capture the representative
system of the country. Ampthill also stressed the unsuitability
of elective system in India. "To most Eastern gentlemen,"
he asserted, "there is something positively degrading in
k
the mere idea of popular election." They were proud to 
serve on the legislative councils, but they hated to attain 
that honour by courting the favour of the ordinary people.
This they considered "humiliating and even disgraceful."
1. Ibid, p. :71»*
2. Ibid, p. 1UL.
3. Ibid, p. 33• 
if. Ibid, p. 31*
He was opposed to elections also because elections meant
representative institutions, and "representative institutions
mean self-government and self-government means the surrender
of British rule in I n d i a . H e n c e  the continuation of the
existing system was much to be preferred. In this he was
supported by Lansdowne, who wanted the head of the government
to have the authority to keep put of the legislative council
"an unsuitable and undesirable member." Without this power,
how were they to stop the election of a person whose presence
"would fatally impair the efficiency or good order of the
council.....?" He too asserted that election was "foreign
2
to the ideas of the people of India."
Curzon also feared that under the new arrangements 
the great mass of the people would suffer. The silent 
millions did not care for political reforms: "What they
want is not representative government, but good government," 
and to them good government was a synonym for government 
by the British. The classes which would most benefit by the 
reforms were those who flemished at the cost of the people*
So Curzon felt sure that as "government in India becomes 
more and more Parliamentary - as will be the inevitable 
result - so it will become less paternal and less benefic^ent
i
to the poorer classes of the population." Reay emphasized 
the need of securing proper representation of tenants and
1. Ibid, p. 52.
2. Ibid, p. 92. 
3* Ibid, p. 2^ +.
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"for agriculture is in India the great industry of the 
country."^ But he pointed out, in answer to Curzon*s 
misgivings, that the vast mass of the people would retfcive 
in the future, as in the past, the protection of the 
administration. It is remarkable that none of them, though 
they belonged to opposite political camps, could rely on 
the Indian members of the councils for a fair deal to their 
countrymen.
* * ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * *
Regilgj&ing the election of the Moslem representatives,
Morley said that to the best of his belief the scheme of
joint electorates* which he had proposed would enable the
community to return "their own representatives in their
2due proportion" . But the Moslems were opposed to the 
scheme as they feared that under it only pro-Hindu Moslems 
had any chance of election. The government of India were not 
satisfied with the scheme, which would not be pressed.
Morley regretted this decision of forming religious electorates 
and wished "that it were otherwise." He hoped that "time, 
with careful and impartial statesmanship will make things 
otherwise." The government not only intended to fully meet 
the Moslem demand of electing "their, own representatives to 
these councils in all the stages, " but also their claim flor a 
number of seats exceeding their numerical proportion. Morley 
justified this departure from democratic precepts by reminding
1. Ibid, p. 71.
2. Ibid, p. 16.
+ See Ch. VII, 326
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the House that the difference between Islam and Hinduism
was not merely religious* MIt is a difference in life,
in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well
as articles of belief that constitute a community.^
This decision met with a chorus of welcome* Curzon
2
hailed it as"a wise and statesmanlike decision*" Ampthill, 
a protagonist of proportional representation, enthusiastically 
approved separate Moslem electorates* Proportional 
representation might work in a homogeneous community, but 
it did not "blend antagonistic elements." The difference 
between the Hindus and the Moslems was permanent: these
two elements "do not mix and interchange." This was the
i
justification of Morley's decision to grant the Moslem, demand. 
The government had long held the scale even between the 
two: with the reforms this would be over* The Moslems must 
now fend for themselves. Any decision which left them 
discontented was "a distinct weakening, not only of the power, 
but of the prestige and the influence of British Government 
in India.
Reay pointed out that the Moslems had not asked for 
any special privilege, "but they wish to be represented as 
a distinct community forming a nationality by tradition/of 
race and religion." Referring to the fervour of the Pan- 
Islamic movement, he stressed the need to remove the Moslem
1. Ibid, p. 18.
2. Ibid, p. 33 •
3. Ibid, p.
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grievance of inadequate representation. Separate representation
would also ensure the smooth working of the legislative councils,
and thus "avoid accentuating the divergences" which existed
I
between the Hindus and the Moslems. Courtney accepted 
Morley1s decision, but with regret. He wished, as Morley 
did, that the Hindus and the Moslems could be brought 
together in the same electorate, "in order, if possible,
2
to break down these antipathies which exist in so much force."
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
In the light of the frank acceptance of election, the 
issue of qualifications of members of the legislative councils 
assumed importance. Some categories of persons were of course 
to be declared disqualified for membership. This question 
had attained more than ordinary importance at the time because 
of the problem of persons deported in India under Regulation 
III of l8l8.+ Ampthill said that the head of the administration 
could of course be given the right to veto the election 
of a member; but he preferred to depend on the regulations to 
"safeguard the purity of the councils..." Among the categories 
he suggested for disqualification, v/as, "any man who has 
incurred a penalty, under the criminal law of India; under
1. Ibid, p. + Under the regulation, the government
could keep a person in indefinite
2. Ibid, p. 85# detention without any trial. Morley had
at the time sanctioned the detention and
deportation of several persons under
this regulation. The deportees included
well-known political figures of India.
Morley had come in for severe criticism
especially by the Radical membenaof the
House of Commons, for sanctioning these
deportations, which had been proposed by
m . Indian authorities to cope with the___________________________xan u-jreai* _______________
<3 £>2.
the law of sedition.”'*’ Midleton wanted the deportees to be 
excluded: he seemed to apprehend that the election would
2
tend to return a solid team of obstructionists to the councils.
Lansdowne likewise thought that under the system ’’men will
be elected who can be familiarly described as very dangerous
firebrands, and who will take advantage of their presence
on the Council in order to make good government extremely
difficult, if not impossible.11 To prevent this a list of
disqualifications was not enough. He would arm the head of
the government with the right f,to object to the appointment
of an unsuitable and undesirable member.”^
This suggestion was not received sympathetically
by the government. The Lord Privy Seal, Crewe, said that
this demand for veto was ’’going very far.” What was the value
of confiding the right of election, if the elected person could
be’’declared incapable of sitting not on any specific ground,
but simply because the Lt.-Governor or Governor Gneral does
knot desire to see him on the council?”
Morley said that the cessation of ratification of election 
by executive authorities led to the necessity of going into 
the question of qualification. The regulations to be made 
under the &ct would lay down the categories of persons
1. Ibid, p* 55*
2. Ibid, p. 6 5*
3. Ibid, p. 92.
Ibid, p. 101.
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disqualified to be members of the legislative councils.
Though no final decision had been made, he indicated the
rough outlines of disqualifications. Making a specific mention
of the deportees, he refused to give any assurance that they
would be disqualified. For the success of the reforms it
was essential to leave "as little ragged edge as possible..."^
He therefore discouraged the idea of making the list of
disqualifications too long. Needless to say, the idea of
veto was not accepted even though Mintoy exercised over the
question of disqualification by regulations, ’’much preferred
that the ultimate power to nominate should rest with the
2
Viceroy and the heads of Local Governments.11
Morley*s repjly failed to satisfy Ampthill. In the
committee he moved an amendment authorising the government
of India to frame rules laying down conditions under which
persons otherwise eligible for membership would be disqualified.
He noted that Morley "hesitated and refused to commit
himself to a definite conclusion” for the disqualification
of seditionists and votaries cf anarchism in India; he
asserted that the inclusion of these persons in the councils
would introduce an element of trouble "preventing the
3
smooth perfection of the whole scheme." No loophole must 
be left for the election of these persons, and steps must be 
taken to demolish the idea that the surest way of finding a 
place on the councils was political notoriety*
1. Ibid, p. 112.
2 . ^dtc, . , T  3
3* Indian Debate, House of Lords (1909) p* 168.
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Morley said that the question of deportees was still 
under discussion with the government of India. He refused, 
however, to accept the position that the fact of participation 
in a mischievous political agitation should bar any one
permanently from the councils. Besides, he did not anticipate
that the elections would return many "extreme and obnoxious"^ 
characters. In fact, his bill rested on the belief that 
the reforms would reduce the hold of extremists. It is 
interesting to note that Morley also envisaged the possibility 
of the legislative councils ftjtaluding by by-laws or other 
means a really undesirable person. Ampthillfs amendment 
was withdrawn.
4( *  * *  *  *  4c 4c 4c 4c * *  4c 4c 4c 4c 4c 4c 4c*
Another aspect of the bill with which the elections
were closely linked was the proprtion of officials and
non-officials in the legislative councils. Morley said that
the supreme legislative council formed a class by itself.
It would be wrong to place the provincial legislative
councils on the same footing with it. As to the former^
he reiterated the basic approach of the bill which rested
on the need of political concessions and extension of the
elective principle. What was the value of adopting elections,
he asked, "if the councils had at the same time retained the
old method of an official majority which would reduce the
2power of elected members to a mere farce? The retention
1. Ibid, p. 171.
2. Ibid, p. 13*W
st r
of official majority in any form militated against the 
principle of the bill. It was "a complete mockery" to invite 
the people to a greater share in the affairs of the country 
while retaining the official majority thus rendering the
J\*-eru^ 4 j
resolutions and votes of the councils "mere private opinions." 
Answering the criticism; of administrative dangers of 
withdrawing a large number of officials from their routine 
duties, he said, on the authority of a private telegram from 
the governor general, that many of the officials nominated to 
the legislative councils would be those posted at the different 
headquarters. Thus they would be able to carry on their 
normal duties.
While Morley conceived the non-official majority as 
the logical consequence of elections, Curzon thought that 
the secretary of state was "breeding great mischief" in this 
matter. The non-officials would be able, if they chose,
"to bring the government to a stand-still." The secretary 
of state had in his despatch relied on the government of 
India* s^ur rent power of legislation and the withdrawal of 
consent by the head of the province"1". Curzon argueej that the 
former course was incompatible with the urge for decentraliz­
ation which Morley had evinced. Again, if the secretary of 
state required an effective official majority in the supreme 
legislative council to ssave the Viceroy from the conflict 
of the division list, why should not he save the provincial
I. Ibid, p. 135•
+ See Ch. VII,
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heads also n from the invidious task of exercising the veto? 
The decision was particularly risky as the new councils would 
differ from the existing ones inasmuch as these would be 
mainly elected, "We have to see what the character of
g
these bodies will be as time develops.*’ Another reason for
Curzon’s disapproval was that without the official majority
the government would not be able to pass a law for the
benefit of the masses.+ He entered emphatic protests
against this decision, and pointed out that the government
did not really carry their trust in the people "to its
logical conclusion.” While seemingly making liberal
concessions, they relied on the powers of the government of
India or the head of the province to "set matters right"
if the councils proved wayward. He deprecated bringing in
these high dignitaries "to extricate the provincial councils
3
from the mistakes which they may possibly make."
»
Lansdowne thought it was "dangerous" to expose the
provincial governments to "the risk of being out-voted in
if
council." This would be"a shock to their authority." 
Northcote” , in the same vein, argued that the bill contained 
proposals for a large increase of power for Indians. Even if 
the non-official majority in the legislative councils was 
withdrawn, they "would reap very distinct advantages under
I. Ibid, p. 32. + Was not he anticipating the
character of the new councils?
2* Ibid, p. 132.
3. Ibid, p. 13*. ' = Ex-governor of Bombay.
Ibid, p. 93•
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the Bill." He could not see "why what is sauce for the
goose should not be sauce for the gander," and why it was
essential to retain official dominance in the central council
while dispensing with it in the local councils. He submitted
that the bill was "more in the nature of a disfranchising
than an enfranchising measure," because it took away power
from the "British representatives who alone represent
the hundreds of millions of agriculturists," and gave the
control of the councils to the spokesmen of "an insignificant
minority of the people."'*’
MacDonnell had no objection "so long as the nominated
members and the official members are a majority in the
Council." Ordinarily, it should be possible to carry any bill
by the combined forces of these two ranks. Among the elected
members there would be Europeans representing the chambers
of commerce, and a strong Moslem contingent; "you will also have
men of standing and sense nominated by Government on whom
2they can generally rely." He made it plain, however, that
3
he rejected the idea of an elective majority.
Ampthill thought there was "needless apprehension" 
regarding this matter. It was hard to imagine circumstances 
in which all the non-official members, elected and nominated, 
would combine together against the government. Besides, the 
officials would be supported by the representatives of the 
planters, landholders and commerce. Thus, "the non-offidal
1, Ibid, p. 120.
2. Ibid, p. *f8.
3. Ibid, p. 137*
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majority is not an actual one: it is only a seeming one.11*
Reay, of the same opinion, accepted the governments
proposal: "It is very unlikely that the non-official members
2
of the legislative council will form a bloc." Crewe held 
the same views: he also thought that it should be possible 
for the governor to "somehow find means of detaching some 
of the non-official members from their colleagues and
3
transferring them to the supporters of his own point of view."
To this Curzon rejoined that one must not feel sure that
majority of the members would be amenable to these influences.
He foresaw that the elections would return in future "a strong
body of extremists who will constitute what in this country
we should call a permanent Parliamentary opposition.11 It
would be well nigh impossible for any governor to "exercise
successfully these powers of persuasion" to which Crewe 
khad referred.
* *  * * Hi* * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * *
With his wonted forcefulness Curzon attacked the 
concession of supplementary questions. Regarding this as 
a great drawback, he wondered whether Morley "realised the 
enormous difference between the Indian system and our 
system....." The Indian lawyers, who would be the principal 
components of the new councils, were certain to attain a 
skill in this matter before which "the utmost achievements 
of the experts in the House of Commons will pale." But on 
the official side, no such felicity could be expected.
1. Ibid, p. 33*
2. Ibid, p. 70.
3. Ibid, p. 102.
4* Ibid, p. 133*
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The Indian officials were first administrators and then 
writers. They were not speakers. Nor had they any training
protection of any tradition. Thus the government proposed 
to put ” a burden on our administrators in India which will 
bear hardly on them and will react unfavourably on the
Midleton, supporting Curzon, thought that supplementary 
questions would be a source of annoyance and distress to 
"an official who is suddenly asked after twenty years* service 
to place himself in the position of a cockshy for every
It was a source of unnecessary waste of time, and was more
likely to be abused in India for the purpose of discrediting
the authorities. Cromer expressed his "very cordial concurrence**
with Curzon and Midleton. Whatever was done, many of the
elected members were certain to be ’’professional agitators
or astute lawyers, who will be able to take full advantage
3
of any opportunity of that kind.”
Ampthill stoutly refuted the idea that the official
would be no match for ”a Hindu lawyer.” It was also”ungenerous”
to the majority of the members who would be elected to suppose
that ”the privilege of asking supplementary questions will
if
be systematically and constantly abused.” He did not believe
in evasion or repartee. They also lacked the
administration itself.”I
missile in the shape of questions that may be hurled at him.**2
1. Ibid, p. 29*
2. Ibid, p. 67.
3. Ibid, p. 82.
if. Ibid, p. 56.
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this and welcomed Morley's decision. Courtney pointed out
that the rules and regulations governing supplementary
questions would be drawn up by the governor general in
council, who would be free f,to make rules which shall
deal with any appearance of abuse of privileges.”  ^ But it
was essential that the privilege should be granted. Without
it, the officials might reply without divulging the information
that the questioners sought. Crewe supported the concession
as in its absence much of the reality of the legislative
councils vanished. It was, besides, ”a very useful safety- 
2
valve.” People liked to talk about their grievances. As
to the projiesied discomfiture of the officials, those who
knew their subject and were in possession of the full facts
were sure to make good speeches* No serious difficulty
needed to be anticipated.
Morley said that the rules about the supplementary
questions would be made by the government of India, who
had not yet made up their mind. He however gave a brief
outline of the rules which were provisionally proposed.
There were enough safeguards against reckless abuse of the
privilege, including one which authorised the president
of the council to disallow any supplementary question
without giving any reason for it.
♦ * * * ** ** * * +* * * ** ** **
There was universal support for reforms like the 
giving of wider scope for discussion of the budget, and the
I. Ibid, p. 83. 2. Ibid, p. 103
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right to move resolutions and amendments. Curzon said that 
"the lack of the opportunity of explaining our policy to 
the people” was commonly felt. Government measures and 
motives were subjected to grievous misrepresentation and 
mischievous abuse. Official communiques and other methods 
had not succeeded. He hoped that under the provisions of 
the bill the government would receive "the much desired
I
opportunity of explaining its policy and stating its cause."
Reay too emphasized the need of counteracting ignorant and
mischievous criticism of the government policy* The wider
facilities for the consideration of the financial proposals
were "politic-". The government should know "the views of
the non-official members with regard to the distribution
2
of expenditure and the ways and means of meeting it."
* * * * * *  * * * *  4c* * *  * * * * * *
As has been mentioned many important matters were 
left to the regulations and rules to be made under the $ct. 
The details of election, interpellation, resolution, 
amendements etc., were to be so decided. Morley admitted 
that the bill might be called "a mere skeleton of a Bill if
3
you like," but he justified it recalling that the Indian 
Councils Act of 1892 had also left many important matters to 
the regulations. Gladstone had on that occasion stated th&t
1. Ibid, p. 31*
2. Ibid, p. 70.
3* Ibid, p. 15*
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the details of the work must be left to the men on the 
spot, the government of India. He was therefore taking 
no unusual course.
Ampthill agreed that rules must be framed in India; 
but important as they were these should not be given 
effect to without the knowledge of parliament. They ought 
to lie on the *fable of both Houses for forty days, and 
"should take effect only if no objection has been made 
during that period."* Midleton said that by passing the bill 
they were giving"a blank cheque" to Morley - "a blank cheque 
on the filling up of which depends practically the whole
2future of our government and perhaps our rule in India."
Of course, they could not frame the rules themselves, but 
should they place the rules beyond their effective control 
and guidance? It is clear that Midleton*s mind was full of 
misgivings arising from the changes which the secretary of 
state had made in many vital points of the government of India 
proposals, making them more far-reaching and radical. What 
if the regulations "are permeated by the more adventurous 
spirit" of Morley? This distrust of Morley must largely 
account for his suggestion that the regulations "should be 
laid before Parliament for forty days and should not take 
effect if either House of Parliament presented an address to 
the Crown to nullify or alter them."^ Cromer thought it very
1. Ibid, p. 33*
2. Ibid, p. 6l.
3. Ibid, p. 62.
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desirable for the parliament to have the opportunity of
seeing these regulations. Lansdowne wanted the entire body
of rules and regulations to be placed before the parliament,
and even foresaw the possibility of any member moving a
resolution regarding them. It was, however, farthest from
his intentions to suggest that these rules should be
debated clause by clause.
Not that there was no opposition to these suggestions.
Courtney did not favour the idea of placing the regulations
before |varliament* "I think the regulations must be made in
Calcutta, and must come into force t h e r e . C r e w e  thought
that by claiming to exercise an effective control over
the rules etc., they were asking for "control over purely
2
administrative matters..." He also appealed to Gladstone^
dictum, and rejected the plea of changing the rules as a
result of parliamentary interference. Cross, the former
secretary of state, objected to the proposal. No doubt
the lJouse would expect a statement from the secretary of
state on the broad principles of the regulations. But they
must l^ave "matters of detail to be settled entirely by the
3Government of India."
But all this did not deter Ampthill from moving 
an amendment in the committee requiring that "before any 
Proclamation, rule or regulation under this Act is made,"
1. Ibid, p. 8*f.
2. Ibid, p. 10^.
3. Ibid, p. 129.
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the draft of it should lie on the table of both the Houses
for at least sixty-five days. If during this period any
ftddress was presented by either House against the draft,
or any of its part, it was not to be brought into force.
The object of the amendment, he explained, was "to reserve
to Parliament the right of considering constitutional changes
in the Government of India before they were actually carried
out."^ Curzon supported the spirit of Ampthill's amendment,
not its details. He would be content to have an opportunity
of discussing the rules etc., before they came into effect,
and if necessary of making representation to the secretary
of state. Morley did not agree that the rules should not
be given effect pending parliaments consideration. His view
was that they "should come into force as soon as they have gone
through the framing by the Government of India and received the
approval of the Secretary of State....." Though he would not
suspend their operation "for one minute", he was quite willing
to ir.^ e&t a clause requiring these to be laid before both Houses
2
"as soon as may be after they are made."
Ampthill withdrew his amendment and Morley moved the 
insertion of a new clause: "All regulations and rules made under
this Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon 
as may be after they are made." His object was to bring these 
within the cognisance of parliament and offer the parliament the 
the opportunity, should it be deemed fit, "to pass censure upon
1. Ibid, p.172.
2. Ibid, p.179*
/
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the Government in respect to any of the rules." Midleton drew
a line between ordinary and important rule^ and proposed an
amendment requiring the latter, before being brought into force,
to lie on the ^able of both Houses for forty days. Ampthill
supported this proposal on the plea that the changes which the
regulations and rules would inaugurate were "more than administra-
2
tive and executive acts; they are acts of constitutional change." 
Lansdowne supported Middleton in desiring that "before new 
measures of really cardinal importance, measures such as those 
dealing with the introduction of popular election and things of 
that sort, are finally dealt with, there should be an opportunity, 
before it is too late, for Parliament to express its opinion upon
Iwhat is proposed. Curzon gave his support to this yi’ew; but
Morley remained adamant. Ultimately his proposal was accepted.
★ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ★ ★ * * *
Throughout the debates in the House of Lords there was a
distinct tone of distrust of the Liberal secretary of state by
the Conservative peers in particular. The innovations which
Morely had introduced on his own initiative in important respects,
without the support of the government of India, had no doubt
deepened the feeling of uneasiness. Curzon thought that Morley
"is disposed to go a little too fast", and advised him to
"moderate his pace" and "adjust his measure to the slower gait
k
of the 'men on the spot1...." Lansdowne pointed out that Morley's
1. Ibid, p.196.
2. Ibid, p.202.
3. Ibid, p.203.
Ibid, p.^ fO.
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scheme went "very considerably beyond what was suggested to him
by the Government of India." The net result had been that
Morley "has converted an extremely cautious proposal made to him
by the Government of India into a scheme which in my judgment is
X
very much less cautious and reaches very much further." As he
saw it, the government of India's scheme had two limbs: one
mildly democratic dealing with legislative councils; the other
"distinctly conservative" concering the advisory councils. ^
2:
Morley had not only "lopped off altogether" the conservative
limb, but had also made the mildly democratic limb much stronger
by additions which the government of India never proposed. These
views had more champions.
Yet despite thtf evident dislike for the bill they did not
move for its rejection. Why? The basic principles of the bill
had the approval of the governor general, who, one must remember,
was a Conservative. Not ohly that. The men on the spot - the
government of India and the local government# - had all acknowledged
the need for reform. And, as Lansdowne said, the question
"whether the time has not come to go a step further" hadilfby
3
common consent been answered in the affirmative." Xt was 
therefore unlikely that anyone should be willing to court the 
responsibility of throwing out the bill, which might intensify 
greatly the political unrest in India. Besides, even if the
Lords rejected the bill there was the Commons. Relations Ibetween
1. Ibid, p.91*
2. Ibid, p.217.
3. Ibid, p.89*
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the two Houses were already strained and one could hardly welcome 
with equanimity the prospect of any added bitterness*
But members of the Opposition were restive, and their 
determination to curb the pioneering spirit of Morley found 
expression when they came to consider the clauses regarding the 
provincial executive councils* On this they were on stronger 
ground* In their despatch of 1 October 1908 the government of 
India had distinctly stated that they would not make any definite 
recommendation about provincial executive councils until they had 
gained some experience of the working of the new reforms and
+
had consultation with the heads of the provincial governments*
Yet the bill contained two clauses dealing with provincial 
executive councils.
Clause 2 provided for raising the number of members of the
*
executive councils of Bombay and Madras to four of which only 
two must have served under the Crown in India for at least 
twelve years. That meant that two members did not have to be 
recruited from the services. This possibility assumed new 
significance in the light of Morleyfs pronounced decision to 
appoint Indians to the executive councils. MacDonnell moved an 
amendment in the committee requiring all the four members to 
have served in India or in native states for at least twelve years* 
The executive council of a presidency was its "supreme administra­
tive agency", and there was great risk in making thet 'appointments
+ Para.76 
x from two.
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to it Mthe spoil of politics." It was essential that persons
appointed must have long administrative experience, so that
they might bring to bear upon their work "that knowledge which
I
could only be acquired by experience." Lansdowne pointed out
that the governor might find himself in an awkward situation
"with two members with official training on one side of him, and
two members without any official training, and possibly both of
2
them natives, on the other." Morley replied that the amendment 
put a limitation upon the choice of a member. Why should not 
they appoint an eminent judge, who had served less than twelve 
years? He said, however, that he intended to appoint only 
three members when the bill was passed. Morley was shifting 
his ground under the pressure of the Opposition. He made this 
declaration apparently to show that there was no question of 
appointing more than one IndiaV Yet a little earlier he had 
expressed a desire to have a non-official Anglo-Indian on the 
executive council. If only three members were contemplated, 
there could not be place for both an Indian and a non-official 
Anglo-Indian assuming that the two officials were to be 
Englishmen. MacDonnell withdrew his amendment.
But another amendment to drop the clause altogether was 
moved by Wenlock, the ex-governor of Madras. His object was to 
await further consideration of the matter in India, and he hoped 
that the government "would consent to postpone the passing of the
1. Ibid, p.l^ fO.
2. Ibid, p. 1^ +1.
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clause.” Lansdowne suggested that the provisions regarding
exeuutive councils might be dealt with in a separate bill, after
having ascertained the views of the provincial authorities.
+
Morley and Wolverhampton, the Lord President of the Council,
pointed out that the clause was purely permissive. If the
government of India and the secretary of state did not want to
enlarge an executive council, there was nothing to compel them
to do it under the clause. Lansdowne nevertheless wanted an
assurance that no immediate action would be taken pending further
consultation in India. Morley disavowed any intention of taking
any action Ttwithout full consultation with the Government of
2 3
India..... ” He had absolutely uno desire to act precipitately.”
Thereupon Wenlock*s amendment was withdrawn and the clause
passed. It may be noted, however, that one consideration which
might have waighed with the Opposition was Morley*s assertion
that the Law officers of the Crown had advised him that without
any further legislation it was within his power to add a third
member to each of these executive councils, and that this third
member need not possess the usual service qualifications.
mi ** ** ** * * ** * * ** **
The Opposition was to prove less amenable regarding the 
next clause. Clause 3 empowered the governor-general in council, 
with the sanction of the secretary of state, to create by 
proclamation an executive council of not more than four members
T, Ibid, p.142.
2. Ibid, p.1^3*
3* Ibid, p.1^6.
+ the ex-secretary of state, H.H.Fowler.
2 > 2 o
for a Lt.-governor• The same authority was to decide the exact 
number, qualifications, powers and duties of these executive 
councillors. MacDonnell moved an amendment.in the committee to 
omit this clause. He was not impressed with the argument that 
the clause was only permissive. If it was allowed to stand, 
public agitation and political pressure would "force the hands
I
of the government" and compel them to create executive councils.
If the Indians were to be given a share in the executive govern­
ment, the experiment would be made at Bombay and Madras. But 
with regard to the Lt.-governors* provinces they had to go by
different considerations. They had to decide which was better -
*
the "corporate government, whereby the executive government was
weakened, or personal government, whereby the executive govern-
2
ment was strengthened "? He felt that personal government made 
for better administration, whereas executive councils would divest 
the Lt.-governors of their personal rule. If the dilatory 
practice of consulting a council was initiated, it would disable 
them from offering speedy remedy while on tour. The Lt.-governors* 
efficiency would be reduced. The change was not in the interest . 
of the people, and had been "demanded by a very small and 
microscopic part of our Indian fellow-subjects." He felt that
3
in this matter, Morley was f!^ p«ing a little too far."
Curzon pointed out that the main objection of the Opposition
IT Ibid, pl46. (This was the view of Lansdowne and Curzon as well.
* : Ibid, pp.190 and 19^)
2. Ibid, p.1^7.
3» Ibid, p.1^8.
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rested on the ground that the proposal had been put forward
without any consultation with the heads of the provinces concerned:
I
besides, "this change had never been asked for."
Lansdowne thought this "a very serious innovation", and
repeated that the point of the Opposition was that "we have not
been supplied with any sufficient information as to the reasons
2
for which this change is desired," On the contrary, most of
the speakers who had Indian experience did not like the change*
3
He made it clear that they did not want "to wreck the clause*"
What they wanted was to hold it back f o ^  sometime and enable 
the secretary of state to "collect a great mass of that information 
which he has not yet been able to produce*•••*" They might then 
consider the proposal afresh. It is interesting to know that one 
of Lansdowne*s objections was that it would deprive the Indian 
service "of some of the few great prizes open to it*" One cannot 
help noticing that the clause created prizes which did not exist 
at the moment. Even if non-official Indians were appointed, 
they could not fill all the posts1 So the clause only opened up 
new scope for the service^- far from robbing them of some prize 
posts.
Morley replied that the situation in India did not permit 
piece-meal treatment. The conditions in India were acknowledged 
to be serious and they had to face them "seriously, firmly and
T. Ibid,p.l5^
2* Ibid, p.162.
3. Ibid, p.163.
4. Ibid, p.164,
3I
completely....." Referring to the demand for the views of 
Lt•-governors, he pointed out that the House had to make up its 
own mind* The government of India supported the clause: the Lt.-
governor of Bengal wanted an executive council. No doubt, there 
were doubts among the Lt•-governors about the availability of
suitable men* But he did not think it advisable to put on record
the views of any particular Lt.-governor against the executive
council, because that would tend to weaken his hold on the public.
Morley called the arguments against the clause "bureaucratic"
and then proceeded to say, "but it is the bureaucratic system
that we are going to make a breach in, and this is one portion
2
of the operation."
Wolverhampton said that the bill rested on the theory of 
"association of the elective principle with the Government of
3
India." They wanted a greater popular force behind the government
than was existing at the time. So they were unable to foster
the principle of personal government* Besides, if the executive
councils functioned efficiently in Madras and Bombay, "why should
k
they not work well in other Provinces?" Lansdowne replied that
the real popular contaet was secured by the enlarged legislative
councils. Executive councils were a different matter and "only
2
a small fraction of the proposal."
Ampthill stoutly rebutted MacDonnellfs suggestion that
I. Ibid, P.139.
2. Ibid, p.l6o.
3. Ibid, P.133.
k. Ibid, P.152*.
3. Ibid, p.164.
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personal government was stronger than corporate government and
that executive councils undermined the personal character of
governors* rule* "The government of a Governor-in-Council was
I
every bit as personal as that of a Lt.-Governor*" Crewe pointed
out that agitation would not be stopped by dropping the clause.
in fact, that would intensify agitation.
But all this argument did not avail. The amendment for the
omission of the clause was carried by 59 to 18 votes. This was
on A- March 1909* On the next day of the bill*s consideration -
9 March 1909 - Morley took the somewhat unusual course of
proposing the full restitution of the clause. He quoted a
telegram which he had received meanwhile from the government of
India in support of the clause. They spoke of the changing
conditions, and anticipated that "a large increase in the work
2
of Lt.-Governors" would make necessary further assistance to them, 
both in the work of administration and the work of the legislative 
councils. They considered that the executive councils would 
perhaps be the best means of further assistance, and were "in
favour of having the power proposed by clause 3  u They had,
however, no desire to create executive councils for all the Lt.- 
governors forthwith. There was "no present necessity for a
3
general change of this character*," the new executive councils would
be created only gradually and cautiously in the light of the
experience and condition of each province.
_
2. Ibid, p.185.
3. Ibid, p.Il86.
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But the Opposition did not give way. Lansdowne claimed 
that the government of India only substantiated the Opposition 
stand# It had been admitted that the need of the executive 
council was still only a matter of conjecture, r&sting on the 
experience to be gained after the reforms came into operation*
The government of India had not yet been able to ascertain the 
position in each province. Only in one province - Bengal - the 
executive council was known to be wanted. After further debates, 
Morley was obliged to surrender, and the clause was not restored#
j
Thus the bill was passed by the House of Lords, where the
Opposition did its -best to water down what they conceived to be
the dangerous innovations of a Liberal secretary of state.
* * ** +* ** ** ** ** ** ** **
The Indian Councils Bill was read a second time by the House
of Commons on 1 April, 1909* It went to the committee on 19 April
and was read a third time and passed a week later# The bill was 
piloted in the Commons on the first day by Buchanan, the under­
secretary for India. But he fell ill soon after, and the bill, 
was ,throughout the rest of its career in the Commons, in charge
of C.E#Hobhouse, a former under-secretary for India, then
+
Financial Secretary to the Treasury#
Buchanan claimed that the proposals regarding the legislative 
councils were an extension of the Act of 1892. Some cities had 
denied this and pointed out that the scheme of reforms went nso
far and so fast that the analogy fails#TI They forgot, Buchanan
+ Those who took prominent part in the debates on the bill in 
the Commons were:-
P.T.O*
 ^Conservatives Liberals
A* J.Balfour
Sir F.Banbury
Carlisle
Sir Henry Craik
Joynson-Hicks
W.J.MacCaw
Meysey-Thompson
Earl Percy
Earl of Ronaldshay
Asquith
Buchanan
Sir Henry Cotton
Sir Charles Dilke
John Ellis
George Gooch
Hart-Davi^j
Hobhouse
Sir J.Jardine
A.Lupton
MacKarness
C. J.O'Donnell 
Rees
Dr.Rutherford
D.M.Smeaton
Labour
Keir-Hardie
Nationalists 
John Dillon.
regretted, that the government was not going fast, "but India
which is going fast11, specially in the last few years. '
They were merely trying "to satisfy the political aspirations
/
of the loyal people of India at the present moment." In doing
this they were pursuing the only right course. They were
retaining British rule "strong and stable beyond all dispute",
but in order to maintain strength and stability, it must also
be progressive. And "it can only be progressive by giving to
the Indians something to live for; by associating them freely
Z.
and generously" in the administration of the country.
The Prime Minister, Asquith, asserted that the bill was 
merely a further step in the development which had been taking 
place for many years past. It was not a revolutionary measure:
3
in it there was no "sudden or violent break at all." The
advances which the bill made were inevitable due to the changing
conditions in India, where education had spread, great inter­
im
communion between the East andAWest had taken place and ideals 
had developed among the educated classes "which 50 or 60 years 
ago were perfectly alien to them and which nobody ever imagined
£
would exist." This made it impossible to "rest where you are..." 
The bill was really a moderate measure, "consistent in every 
respect with the maintenance of our Imperial Supremacy."
Tl Indian Debates (House of Commons) 1909$ p*?.0d.
2,. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid 
r. Ibid
p.ll8.
P.139. 
p.140.
P.147.
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Cotton took the same line* The bill only carried further 
the "germ of representation"^ introduced by the Act # I8&1
A ct '
rt\Of 1892.
But Percy, the Conservative ex-under secretary for
India, thought it was "perfectly idle" to make any such
claim* The bill was "in fact transforming and revolutionizing
2
the whole character" of the legislative councils* Even then
the bill was unlikely to satisfy the Indian political
aspirations. On the contrary, the reforms would only
afford the Indians " a vantage ground for claiming further
3
constitutional changes," and thus lead to further clamour*
The same stand was taken by Ronaldshay* The scheme 
wexs "a capitulation to the agitators among the professional
if
classes." It filled him with "grave apprehension and
very serious misgivings as to the future of the British
3
government in India."
Meysey-Thompson thought that the reforms went too
far. Referring to Buchananfs plea that India was going
fast, he replied that it was hardly a justification for
"letting them go at a high rate of speed to the bottom of 
£
the hill." On the contrary, it was their duty first to 
put the brake on so that the Indian coach might not overturn. 
Joynson-Hicks found it impossible to accept the principle 
of the bill. It was "a serious danger to the continuance
1. Ibid, p. 169. Ibid, p. 195*
2, Ibid, p. 123* 5* Ibid, p. 156.
3* Ibid, p. 122. ' 6. Ibid, p. 179*
of British rule in India, and a serious detriment to the
well-being of that country.”^
In contrast to these views - holding the bill either
a moderate expansion of existing trends or a dangerous break
from the present- stood Rutherford. To him the bill was
2"a very tiny and a very modest step.1' The prevailing
form of government in India was the ’’lowest type in the
civilised w o r l d , a n d  he had expected from Morley a
larger and a handsomer measure.
* * ** * *  * *  * *  * *  ** * *  * *
Buchanan denied that it was the government’s 
intention to reproduce in India popular representative 
government of the British type. Their object was ’’much more 
modest and more practical.” While they desired to bring 
the Indians in contact with the administration, they wanted 
to make sure the representation of ’’the varied opinions 
of large and important classes in India...” This might 
sound anomalous to the democratic theories of representative 
government, but they had to deal with a practical problem 
and^therefore to choose a practical solution. No doubt 
the professional classes constituted”a highly intelligent
body of men,” but after all they stood for ’’only one set
i|.
of ideas and interests.”
The under-secretary’s contention about the professional 
classes was heartily supported by the Opposition, though with 
a different purpose. While the former utilised it for
1. Ibid, p. 196. Ibid, p. 210.
2. Ibid, p. 209* Ibid, p. 109.
justifying representation of classes and interests, others
argued that the reforms benefited only the educated classes -
an insignificant minority - and were therefore not in the
interest of the people* Ronaldshay said that the bill
had been designed to satisfy the aspirations of a small
section of the Indian people - the educated classes. To
the latter the bill might be very welcome , but "upon the
great silent masses of India" its effect might be an evil
one.^ The vast majority of the people "would probably not
be benefited, probably very much the reverse, by any wide
scheme of popularisation of the government unless careful
2
safeguards were introduced into the scheme" Balfour 
expressed the same view. It was"quite certain" that they
were not going to get "better consideration" for the
3
ordinary people.
Joynson-Hicks said that the section of the population
who would be affected by the bill, and would understand any
of its implications, "will be something like I per cent of
4
the entire population of India." These people had no
touch with the great mass of their countrymen; the latter
had no trust in them, nor any’liking for them. The common 
people had much more faith in the British officials who 
lived among the people and were the only persons "who ifcan- 
effectively represent the great mass of the Indian community."
1. •Ibid, p. 148.
2, Ibid, p.149.
3* Ibid, p.166•
4. Ibid, p. 190.
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In view of all this he warned the government that they had 
Mno right to establish representative government" and thus 
lift the one per-cent above the rest and give it a higher 
poisition. The vast majority would be no better for all 
the changes.^
Keir-Hardie ridiculed this idea that the educated could
not be relied on to do justice to the ordinary people, and
offered "one plain remedy, namely to enfranchise the men 
2
an the field." This might be done by creating village councils
to look after the well-being of the village people. He also
asked if the middle class in India could not be trusted to
speak for the ordinary people, "what right have we to assume
that the educated middle classes in England are to be trusted
3
to do justice to the working classes in this country?"
Buchanan*s disavowal of representative government in the 
western sense Jo/t India did not protect the government from 
.attacks on the means adopted to secure representation of 
interests in India. Ronaldshay accused the government of 
"trying to plant on Eastern soil a plant which comes from; 
the West11, and warned the House that the elective principle
4was "wholly alien to Indian thought and to Indian traditions.** 
it was discordant with India*s social conditions: it was
unpopular in the country. Judging from the experience of the 
working of the Act of 1892, far from securing representation 
if or the different classes, it would make for predominance of
1. Ibid, p. 191. Ibid, p. 153.
2. Ibid, p. 205.
3. Ibid, p. ZOk.
3 j v
t
a single class*
Balfour re-stated the ag/ument that representative 
government was suitable only in a homogeneous community, 
where the minority willingly accepted the decision of 
the majority* This was not going to happen in India; nor 
was it pretended by anybody that the bill was a step in the 
direction of representative government in India* Yet they 
had introduced certain features which only went with 
representative government. They had none of the advantages 
of representative government, but ’’are you quite sure that you
I
will not have some of its disadvantages?” In many ways,
the legislative councils would be ’’mimics of all the worst
and most laborious parts of our procedure”,though they
were not intended to be representative assemblies. The
2
whole thing was an enigma to him.
But to Cotton it was crystal clear* It was”a complete
3
misconception of the facts” to suppose that the bill did
nothing towards introducing representation into the government.
No practical man could deny that the ’’effect of this bill
is to extend the principle of representation in the legislative 
kcouncils.” Smeaton held that the bill ”is intended to be
a step towards representative government - I do not say entire
representative government, but at any rate quasi-representative
government.” Its tendency was to place the administration in
5
India ”on something approaching a democratic basis.” Studied
T.Ibid, p. 164.
2. Ibid, p. 167.
3. Ibid, p. 170.
Ibid, p. 169.
3* Ibid, p. 184.
in the light of the despatches which passed between the
India Qi fice and Calcutta it was clear that the measure
granted "something very little short of Parliamentary
government. Rutherford saw in the bill ”an instalment,
though a modest one, of self-government,” and hoped that
2
it would be worked with sympathy in India.
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Speaking of Moslem representation Buchanan acknowledged
that the community had na special and overwhelming claim
upon us”, a claim which ”solemn promises” made by persons
entitled to speak for the government had recognised.
Minto, Morley and the government of India had all assured
the Moslems of ’’adequate representation to the amount and
3
of a kind they want.” That promise they meant to keep.
a
He then informed the House that Morleyfs scheme of^joint
electorate had been dropped.
The debate that followed Buchanan’s statement was
not strictly on party lines. Whereas opposition to separate
representation was confined to a number of liberal members,
it was given support by both Conservatives and liberals.
The support for separate Moslem representation was
based on the belief, as expressed by Percy, that it was
’’absurd not to recognise the fact that the Mahomedans are
If
not only a separate religion but also a separate race.”
1. Ibid, p.185.
2. Ibid, p. %09.
3. Ibid, p. 110.
Ibid, p. 129*
3?2~
Balfour thought that the religious differences in India were 
the "mark and symbol of other differences, not strictly or 
technically religious," and divided the population into 
segregated and separate sections.^ Rees considered
Moslem stand valid for "historical, racial, political,
2
physical, every conceivable reason..#" Smeaton and
Joynson-Hicks were of same opinion: the former thought
that Morley had decided upon the "only solution" possible
3
under the circumstances; the latter felt sure that Moslems 
preferred English rule feT Hindu domination. The latter 
possibility would only turn the Moslems "devoted to
(English rule" against the British. x
The Moslem demand for extra seats and separate
representation on local bodies was also supported. The
local bodies were a useful training gerund for administrative
experience; the Moslems should obtain representation on
5
them "as a stepping stone to the legislative councils".
Percy and Rees stressed the importance of giving the Moslems
a number of seats in excess of their numerical proportion.
To refuse this, Rees thought, would be " a grave political 
£
error". Percy wanted to know how this was going to be 
done. To this Asquith replied that in addition to the 
seats earmarked for them, Moslems might be included in
1. Ibid, p. 161. Ibid, p. 162.
2. Ibid, p. 199. 6. Ibidi p. 19s.
3. Ibid, p. l8l.
*f. Ibid, p. 193*
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the official quota. There was no reason why the chambers
of commerce and other bodies should not return a few Moslems.
But this did not satisfy the Opposition.
Those who opposed separate representation would not
admit that the differences between Hindus and Moslems were
anything but religious. C.J.O'Donnell* denied that there
was a separate Moslem nationality. He blamed the government
for adopting a policy of "religious discrimination"'*', which
militated against the "old policy of this great Empire,"
2
that "we should treat all religions with equality." 
Introducing religion into politics was dangerous: it would 
only add to bitterness. The government were blamed for 
discouraging the "idea of promoting harmony."^ O'Donnell 
himself thought, "That there is unwise favouritism going
if
on seems certain." Cotton said that the interests of the
Moslems were "identically the same" as those of the Hindus;
"to attempt by legislation or by administrative acts to
place theatre ligious communities apart from one another,
or in antagonism to one another, is to lead to the greatest
5trouble in administration which is possible to imagine." 
Keir-Hardie questioned the extra Moslem seats.
What justified this? Superiority in intelligence, wealth
and education? "If not, why is this minority of people to .
receive specially favoured treatment at the hands of the
I. Ibid, P* 156. + O'Donnell was an ex-I.C.S. man.
2. Ibid, P* I6l. He retired in 1900 as a 
Divisional Commissioner.
3. Ibid, P. 158.
4. Ibid, P* 160.
5. Ibid, P* 172.
3Government."**' Subsequently he expressed his preference for 
mixed electorates: it would train all, Hindus and Moslems,
"to vote, not because of religious differences, but to 
vote as citizens having a common interest in the good
p
government and well-being of the nation."
On the Opposition insistence in^committee on some
satisfactory assurance of government determination to
meet the Moslem demands, Hobhouse, replying for the government,
read from a telegram received from the Viceroy on 12 April
1909 and explained that in general electorates for provincial
councils and local bodies Moslems, Hindus and others would
vote together. In addition to the seats gained by Moslems
from these elections, certain number of seats would be
reserved for them, to be filled by exclusively Moslem
electorates. In case of difficulty to form electorates,
nomination would be relied on. About numbers, the government
adhered to Morley*s "pledge" as to "the sufficient, and indeed,
over-sufficient representation from the numerical standpoint
3
of the Mohomedans."
Hobhouse's reply added fuel to the fire. Apparently,
the government stuck to joint electorates so far as the main
stream of elections went. Neither in provincial councils
nor in local bodies would the Moslem representation be mainly 
♦
secured through separate registers. This, Ronaldshay pointed 
out, did not meet the Moslem demand nor carry out the governments 
pledges. "Everybody knows that where a system of mixed
1. Ibid, p. 207m 3» Ibid, p. 239*
2. Ibid, p. 336. (He advocated nomination to supplement the
Moslem quot^'
electorate is Vn force the Mohomedans have not got and 
undoubtedly will not get their fair share of representation#
And did not everyone know that they had been promised not
/  (( 2 ^only a fair share, but an additional share”? He put in a
strong plea for separate Moslem electorates in all the stages*
Needless to say, the Moslem opinion, voiced by the A n  -India
Muslim league, raised vehement protest against what was
considered as violation of solemn promises.
Ronaldshayfs concern for the Moslem interest impelled
him to move an amendment, during the^reading of the bill,
"that the ratio of Mussulman and Hindu representation on
all representative bodies, from the rural boards upwards to
the Viceregal council, be fixed by executive authority,
and that in every case in which any seat on a representative
body thus assigned to the Mqhomedan community is to be
filled by election, the necessary electorate be composed
exclusively of Mahomedans#"^ He referred to the consternation
among the Moslems after Hobhouses*s statement and to their
indignant protests against joint electorates# A Moslem
member, not elected exclusively by Moslems, "will not be in
the least the sort of man to represent real Mahomedan interests#"
It was necessary for the authorities to honour "a promise
5which was given to the Mahomedan community" , and to maintain
£
"the inviolability of their pledged word*" In pressing the
1. Ibid, p. 260. 4, Ibid, p. 325,
2. Ibid, p. 261. 5. ibid, p. 321.
3. Ibid, p.321. 6. Ibid, p. 327.
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IMoslemA seats, Ronaldshay-and after him Percy- assured the
[government that in that case the Moslems would not vote
:in joint electorates*
Hobhouse put in the plea that owing to the differing
.'local conditions it was "perfectly impossible to apply
•a uniform system"^ under which the elections would take
place* The government of India had to consult the local
governments. Further discussion to surmount the difficulties
would take place, and every effort would be made "to remove
any sort or kind of obstacle which may be found to lie within
our power to the carrying out of the pledges which have
been given**.." Meanwhile, "Wherever elections are found
possible they shall be conducted on the basis of separate
2
representation of the Mahomedan community."
Balfour welcomed Hobhouse*s statement which gave him 
satisfaction. He heartily supported separate electorates 
for the Moslems. To him the problem appeared in a different 
light. It had not been claimed that the bill extended 
representative institutions of the western model to India.
! It was necessary to impress upon the authorities i'h India 
that they were not intended to "assimilate the system in 
India to the system here", but to ensure that full 
v/representation, not necessarily based on numerical proportion,
1. Ibid, p. 338.
2. Ibid, p. 339*
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^should be given to every section of opinion.^ O’Donnell
repeated his vehement protests against the first statutory
discrimination between different religious communities in
India, If the Moslems required separate representation,
why not other minorities? What about the Sikhs? He complained
that conscious endeavour was under way f,to set the two
religious sects one against the other”, and protested against
"the introduction into India of a system hostile to all
civilisation, and, I believe, hostile to religious peace 
2
in India,"
Eonaldshay withdrew his amendment in view of Hobhouse*s 
assurances,
** ** ** i* #* ** ** ** **
As to the non-official majority in the provincial
legislative councils, Buchanan pointed out that official
dominance was not harmonious with the increased rights and
privileges of these bodies. That would render the concessions
somewhat unreal. Reminding the House that the Bombay
legislative council was functioning without any official
majority for some years past, he considered it "a most
unlikely thing" that all the non-official members, representing
such a variety of interests, would combine in opposition to
the government. Even if they did, they would not have their
way. The restrictions on their power were effective. All in
all, it was unlikely that "anything but good can result from 
3
this proposal,"
1. Ibid, p. 3^3. 3. ibid, p. 113.
2, Ibid, p. 3^8,
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Percy thought otherwise. Did not the considerations 
which justified a non-official majority in the provincial 
councils apply equally to the supreme legislative council?
If a veto by the Viceroy was undesirable in the case of 
his own legislative council, how could it be more desirable 
Min order to over ride the opinion of a refractory provincial 
council?11^  By hurriedly dropping the official majority, 
the government were depriving the vast majority of the people, 
who could not be participants in any scheme of representation, 
of that protection and security which only the bureaucracy 
could offer. Along with other rights, the power of passing 
resolutions, which though technically recommendations of 
advice to the authorities Mwould in fact be regarded as
2
tantamount to a vote of censure on the Administration,” 
lent special significance to the matter. Besides, the non­
officials would be encouraged to adopt a perpetual stand of 
opposition. Relying on the ultimate use of executive authority 
for preventing mischief, they were likely to "always vote
for a measure which they know to be popular, although they
know it to be unsound..."^ Unlimited right of criticism 
without prospect of responsibility was sure to help mischievous 
agitation in the councils, much to the detriment of governments 
prestige in the public eye. Percy also said that this 
concession was contrary to the prevailing principles: hitherto
1. Ibid, pp. 125-126.
2. Ibid, p. 123.
3. Ibid, p. 127.
non-official majority had been granted only wherey if necessary, 
the non-officials might undertake the responsibility of forming 
an administration. In India this concession was nothing but 
"a dangerous sham”, as it tended to back the erroneous belief 
that "you are making a first step by this Bill towards setting 
up a Parliamentary constitution in India.
Balfour regretted that this decision would only add to
the burden of the officials by subjecting them to the
embaryassments of a parliamentary system, without its
corresponding benefits. The great mass of the people were
not going to benefit from this innovation. The government
which looked after their interest were being subjected to
control which stood in the way of the impartial discharge
of their duties. Again, what was the good of giving the
non-officials the chance of perfecting parliamentary skill,
when they were barred from putting ' into practice when
in office the theories which they championed when in
opposition? The frustration of perpetual opposition would
only make the educated classes "more aggrieved and embittered
2
than at present."
3
Ronaldshay deplored this "very serious step" which 
Morley had taken flouting the most decided opinion of the 
government of India. It was surely going to react unfavourably 
on the interests of the common people, cultivator and villagers. 
For their sake the official majority in the councils must
1. Ibid, p. 381.
2. Ibid, p. 168.
3# Ibid, p. 132*
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be retained. According to Joynson-Hicks the non-official 
majority "must cause the most intense friction."’*' It was 
futile to expect the non-officials to take the veto 
lying down.
Asquith pointed out that a non-official majority was 
"not at all the same thing" as an elective majority. The 
non-official element would contain many nominated members. 
This was quite different from "giving the elective 
representatives of particular classes or communities a 
voting majority on the council to which they belong".
The safeguards were adequate. So the risks were minimal.
On the other hand, it was desirable to make the Indians 
feel that the councils were "not mere automatons" the wires 
of which were manipulated by the officials. This introduced 
an element of reality, and far from stimulating reckless 
trends, with proper safeguards, was likely to obtain a truer 
reflection of the opinion of the community.^
Smeaton welcomed Morley*s decision, which would 
enable the authorities to have "representative public opinion 
on every public question in a living and corporate form."
It was bound to be of great assistance to the government, 
which need no longer grope in the dark. This gave the
secretary of state and the Viceroy for the first time "a
4
great working plan." They would gain knowledge more 
useful than any so long available. Rees looked upon
this concession as the least costly device to satisfy
1. Ibid, p. 193• 3. Ibid, p. 1^2.
2. Ibid, p. 14-1. 4. Ibid, p. 183.
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Indian aspirations* From his personal experience he assured
the House that in India "administration is everything,
legislation matters very little."'*' Hence the concession
looked much larger than it actually was*
It is interesting to note that only one member raised
his voice against the official majority in the governor-
general^ legislative council* All others accepted it
without demur* Rutherford felt it was "a great misfortune
that the non-official majority is not extended to the
2
Viceroy*s Council." In the committee he moved an
amendment requiring that in all the legislative councils
"the number of official and nominated members shall in no
case exceed that of the elected members."^ Thus what he
wanted was not only that non-officials should not be in the
minority, but that the elected members should not be in the
minority. Without this condition, the supreme legislative
council would be no better than "a ventilating chamber",
if
lacking the power to achieve really good ends. The bill 
was a step towards representative government: his 
amendment only sought "to make it a still more important
step towards representative government - a surer, a safer
5
and a more substantial step..."
I. Ibid, P* 201. + Rees was opposed to reform of
Ibid, r\ 209. local self-government as that£• • would stimulate political education
3. Ibid, p. *
-=}■C\] and intensify keenness for
4. Ibid, p* 245.
representative government in 
India, (p. 202)
3. Ibid, p. 247.
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Hobhouse opposing the amendment, reiterated the
essential difference between the supreme legislative council
and other councils* The,scope and rights of the former were
much larger. The effect of giving the elected members a
determining voice in the supreme council would be "to hand
over the destinies” of the council to a small section of
Anglicized. Indians. That the government could not allow#
Further, the amendment breathed a deep distrust of the
nominated members. This seemed unfair to Hobhouse, for
the nominated members were, and considered themselves to be,
’’entirely independent”, and could often be found in opposition
I
to the government.
In claiming this Hobhouse indeed went rather far,
and only drew upon himself an immediate refutation by
Smeaton. From personal experience he said that the nominated
members ’’are not likely to ventilate independent opinions
if they think these opinions are adverse to the opinions
2
of the Government of India.” The amendment was withdrawn.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * # * ★ * * *
The question of disqualification was naturally connected 
with the issue of elections. We have seen that the Viceroy 
was so concerned that he preferred the idea of retaining 
the 1892 system of nomination which amounted to ratification 
of elections.+ In this matter Morley was destined to brave 
a determined assault on his Liberal conscience. For Minto 
did not rest there. Soon he made clear that he favoured the
1. Ibid, p. 252.
2. Ibid, p. 253#
+ See above p
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disqualification of deportees whose election soon after
release "would be a serious blow to the position of
Government and the Council." To this view Morley could not
bear to bring himself and argued that to add disqualification
for election would indeed widen the scope of regulation III
of l8l8 , by authorising the executive government to exclude
"at its own discretion, from effective public life, without
limit of time, any person who has been so detained."^
As the debates in the House of Commons drew near, Morley1s
anxiety grew and he refused to accept Minto*s plea for
disqualification of deportees with a right cfl waiver to
be exercised by the Viceroy and provincial heads in their
discretion. That would tend to make deportation seem a
normal process, instead of an emergency measure. Besides,
they could not justify in the Commons a policy which
Morley*s own reasoning refused to defend. On 19 April
1909 - the day 'Jtf the committee stage of the bill in
the Commons - he informed Minto that with the Prime
Minister*s knowledge he had decided that deportation of
itself was not to be a ground of disqualification.
As he expected, the issue was pointedly raised by an
amendment in committee. Moved by Mackarness it declared that
none was to be disqualified from membership of any legislative
council "by reason of his having been^ charge el with and
2
convicted of any offence." Mackarness emphasized that 
these persons had not been convicted, nor any charge made
1. India, Minto and Morley, p. 301.
2. Indian Debates, House of Commons, (I909)i P* 215*
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against them, nor even had they been told of what crime they 
were suspected. They had no opportunity of proving their 
innocence as the law which kept them confined deprived them 
as well of the right to habeas corpus proceedings. He 
thought that to disqualify them would be a gross injustice, 
and "would be adding a fresh indignity to the indignities 
that have already been imposed upon them," Pointing out that 
persons convicted under martial law - for example^ in 
South Africa - suffered under no such disqualification-,
'he called any effort to disqualify the deportees by
I
regulations as "perfectly novel and unprecedented,"
Hobhouse underlined the need for disqualifications
<-and also the right for the head of the government to waive
-disqualification in favour of an individual• As regards the
.deportees, he made it "quite clear" that the government
.did not intend "that the fact of a man having been deported
.shall, after his release, of itself be a ground of dis-
2
(qualifying him for election to a legislative council."
Percy said that Hobhousefs declaration might be
interpreted in India to mean that "this House does not take
?a serious view of the kind of offences" of which the deportees
were guilty. He suggested that disqualification should
^attach to deportation, with a right for the government of
3
India to waive it in particular cases.
'I. Ibid, p, 218.
2. Ibid, p. 222.
3. Ibid, p. 224 (Smeaton was very much of the same opinion.
ibid, p, 225)
Carlile complained that the government had "climbed
down under the pressure of clamour," and opposed the
amendment.*^ Sir Henry Craik pointed out that the amendment
was contrary to the basic principle of the bill, which left the
details to the men on the spot. What did this amendment amount
to? It restricted the discretion of the government of India,
and hence was open to grave objections.
John Ellis accepted the spirit of the amendment.
There was no reason to suppose that a person once dealt with
under the regulation of l8l3 should be1 necessarily, for all
time or for the remainder of his life, incapable of doing
2good service to the country in which he lives." But he
also agreed that the discretion of the authorities in India
must remain largely unimpaired, and was unable to support
the amendment.
Sir Charles Dilke reminded the House that exclusions
all over the world "almost always tended in the opposite
direction from what was desired by the government." Besides,
a
in India it had the risk of spoiling the whole graciousness
of these reforms" by exciting doubts that the authorities
would keep out all these persons "to whom, as it were, they
3
have taken a governmental dislike." Gooch stressed the point
that if the bill was to succeed, "it must be a measure free
k
from anything suggestive of petty tyranny." He pointed 
out, however, that though the government had refused to
I. Ibid, p. 23^. 4. Ibi^, p* 226.
2* Ibid, p. 223* + A former Under-secretary for India.
3* Ibid, p. 223.
lit 6
accept the amendment, they had accepted its spirit*
The amendment was negatived. Subsequently, Balfour 
expressed substantial agreement with ihe government policy*
He accepted the material objection to the universal exclusion 
of deportees, because a deportee might with lapse of time 
change his policy and views and "become an excellent and 
useful citizen."^*
Underlying all this was the acceptance of the position 
that the government of India might exclude a person, 
including a deportee, if sufficient reason existed to make 
his election undesirable* But in case of a deportee those 
reasons would cover new grounds and were not to be any 
lingering after-effect of his past deportation.
This decision was again an additional evidence of
Morleyfs imprint upon the reforms. As already noted Minto
favoured disqualification of deportees. His view was
endorsed by the government of India. The local governments
were "practically unanimous in holding that deportees should
2
be disqualified.
But as Minto pointed out, Morley* s liberalism was 
satisfied only by conceding to the government of India a 
much wider power than had ever been asked for. TJjough 
deportation was not included in the list of disqualifications, 
£he government of India had now the power to exclude any one 
whose character was deemed "to be likely to injuriously 
affect the reputation of the Council." In Minto*s words:
1. Ibid, p. 387.
2, India, Minto and Morley - p. 303»
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'"it offers a law of political restraint exactly parallel 
to the law of personal restraint contained in the 
^Regulations of l8l8..."^
Morley acknowledged that this was a wider power, 
but hoped that judicious use U/ould make it effective.
No doubt, Minto thought that participation in elections 
by deportees would cause extreme political excitement 
during the elections, and violent disturbances afterwards 
if their elections were set aside. Also^specific cases 
of disqualification would provoke keener resentment 
than a general disqualification. But this argument 
ignored Morleyfs desire that deportation by itself was 
not to entail disqualification. Fresh detractory 
evidence must be adduded to declare a deportee*s 
candidature void. The new circumstance, and not 
the fact of earlier deportation, would justify the penalty. 
Of this the public opinion must take note. Morley*s 
decision was wise in the interest of the smooth operation 
of reforms in India. There deportation was very much in 
the forefront on the political field, and disqualification 
of deportees would disturb the unstable political feelings 
out of all proportions. The reforms were then likely to be
subjected to great handicaps even before any start was made.
** ** ** ** * * ** * * ** + * **
Supplementary questions which led to much difference
I. Ibid, p. 30^.
of opinion in the Iprds, hardly received any attention in the
Commons. The other aspects of the enlarged scope of
discussion also excited no serious controversy. If anything,
there was an anxiety that under the rules and regulations
these rights should not be diluted. The relevant clause
authorised the rules to be drawn up by the executive
government. These rules were not liable to alteration by
the legislative councils. Smeaton felt that this placed
the councils "in a false position."^ Surely the councils
should have some voice in determining the scope of their own
debates and discussions] His experience in legislative
councils had given him a feeling that the government desired
2
"curtailment of free speech*" and wanted to restrain 
debates. To guard against any such misgiving it was 
desirable that the legislative councils should be able to 
discuss the rules and regulations before they came into 
force, and to indicate their view, if needs be, by division. 
This was particularly necessary because these rules were 
not to be subject to the parliaments approval. Smeaton 
made it clear, however, that the councils were not to possess 
any right to alter the rules. He only wanted them to have 
an effective scope of examining them. He moved an amendment 
in the committee to this effect.
Rutherford supported Smeaton's amendment, and said 
that "representation without freedom of discussion and 
debate would be absolutely ridiculous."*^
i"] Indian Debate (House of Comm'onsf •"277♦
2* Ibid, p. 278. 3. Ibid, p. 283.
wThe government could not see their way to accept the
amendment. Hobhouse said that the bill ’’enormously increased”
the councils* power of discussion. But even then there must be
a limit to this right if the councils were to be under any check
at all. It was quite impossible ”to pass at once from restricted
2
to entirely unrestricted debate.”
Smeaton*s amendment was negatived, but the concern
which it manifested revealed itself again towards the very
end of the bill*s career in the Commons. Sir Charles Dilke
drew the prime minister's attention to the existence of a fear
’’that a possible limitation of the powers of debate in the
councils might be brought about by rules under this Bill.”
He wanted an assurance that the existing opportunities of
debate were not to be reduced, and that the ”new facilities”
would not be utilised ”to limit the old ones.” This assurance
Asquith gave readily, when he said^  "There is no intention in
3
any way to limit existing facilities.”
* * * * ** ** ** * * ** * * * * **
The misgivings of Smeaton and Dilke were confined to
the field of debates and discussions, but Cotton was troubled
by doubts spreading over the entire scope of the rules and
regulations, including electoral procedure. The bill was ”a 
mere skeleton", the rules and regulations were its "heartblood 
and life”, the task of drawing which, he hoped, the government 
of India would approach in a liberal spirit. But there was
1. Ibid, p. 281.
2. Ibid, p. 282.
3. Ibid, p." 395.'
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Mno guarantee to that effect," and the recent repressive 
measures of the Indian authorities only filled him with 
despondency.^ He did not accept the plea that these rules 
were only matters of detail: to him these were matters of 
principle. The parliament must have an opportunity of dis­
charging its responsibility as to the nature of these 
important rules. Fearing that the rules might not be 
liberal enough, Cotton moved an amendment almost identical 
with the one which the opposition had moved in the Lordsf+ 
out of the contrary fear that the rules might go too far.
The rules which required the approval of the secretary of 
st&te in council were to lie on the Table of both the Houses 
for at least forty days before they received such approval.
Hobhouse argued that the proper way of challenging the 
rules and regulations was to attack the policy of the 
secretary of state for India. The amendment, if accepted, 
might cause dangerous delays in important matters of Indian 
administration. Cotton withdrew his amendment.
No better result was yielded by Cotton's efforts to 
elicit by another amendment a definite statement from the 
government about the procedure and basis of elections in 
India. His plea was that after the representation of minorities 
and special interests, the rest of the seats should be filled 
"by means of territorial electorates based on the village
I. Ibid, p. 173- Evidently, he was referring to 
the Newspaper (Incitement to offence) Act and 
the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908.
+ See above pp. 37 3-^7^
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communities system.” Hobhouse forcefully affirmed that the
village system was dead, and they could not discuss any proposal
2
which was,fbased upon a factor which no longer exists♦ ”
* * -  * *  * *  * *  *  *  * *  * *  * *  4 c  a|c
The government never made secret of their desire to restore
in the Commons the clause providing for executive councils in the
Lt.-governors1 provinces. During the second reading, Percy
opposed the move. As in the Lords, much was made of the change
in the views of the government of India. ”What new circumstances
3
have arisen to change their views?” Referring to the recommend­
ations of the Decentralization Commission which proposed, in the 
recently published report, executive councils for all the provinces, 
it was pointed out by the Opposition speakers that the Commission 
had not advocated executive councils for Lt.-governors. They 
wanted the provinces to have governors recruited from Britain.
That certainly was different from the proposals of the governmenti 
Again none but the Lt.-governor of Bengal wanted an executive 
council. Percy thought that it was all the more a reason for 
not taking the proposed course. Together with the provision 
regarding executive councils of Bombay and Madras, and non­
official majority in the provincial legislative councils, this
4.
constituted ”a great leap in the dark.”
Keir-Hardie thought differently. The executive councils
5
would ensure ”continuity of policy” in Lt.-governors * provinces -
T. Ibid, p.285. ~
2. Ibid, p.286.
3. Ibid, p.137*
Ibid, p.139.
5* Ibid, p.205.
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an argument also put forward later on by Hobhouse. To Rutherford
the restoration of the clause was essential. It would be a
I
"considerable concession" to Indian public opinion.
Moving for the reinsertion of the clause in the committee,
Hobhouse made an urgent plea for believing in the discretion of
the government of India. The provinces got legislative councils
as they became fit for them, though the power for creating the
councils was always there. That did not hurry the government of
India into creating legislative councils! Why should they not
t/ivyst that authority with regard to the executive councils as
+ X
well? He quoted the views of Minto, Baker, and Adamson, as 
also of non-official Anglo-Indian organs in support of the 
clause. These arguments he reinforced by his own observations.
As Chairman of the Decentralization Commission he had an opportunity 
to see the working of the administrative machinery in India.
There was no doubt that the Lt.-governors were overworked, and 
over-burdened with responsibility*
Percy of course opposed the move. He feared popular 
agitation in India which looked upon the executive councils as
tt
"fresh avenues for the appointment of Indians; he staid that
the Opposition was afraid of pressure from another quaifcer as well.
"We are almost as much afraid of the pressure which may be exerted
2
by the Secretary of State at home." They believed that the
change which the opinion of the government of India had undergone
1. Ibid, p.209*
2. Ibid, p.303*
+ Lt.-governor of Bengal, Sir E.N.Baker.
X Home Member, government of India, Sir Harvey Adamson.
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on this matter was due to pressure from Britain, If an executive
council was now wanted in Bengal, they had not been told what
special circumstances had come into light to warrant this change,
or ”what may be the special circumstances under which alone a
I
similar system will be set up in any of the others.”
To MacCaw the probable appointment of" Indians to the new
executive councils was the most obnoxious element: ”That, I think,
2
is really at the bottom of the opposition to this clause.”
The appointment of Indians was sure to gradually weakejv*the British 
power. Due to the background of social and religious differences, 
it was impossible to find a single Indian who would be looked 
upon by all his fellow-countrymen as purely impartial and neutral. 
The appointment of an Indian therefore could only mean a correspond 
ing loss of faith in the impartiality of the administration.
Rees feared that Indian members of executive council would 
unduly influence a governor, lacking the experience of Indian 
service•
+
Sir J.Jardine, with nearly thirty years* experience in the 
Civil Service in India behind him, welcomed the clause exactly 
on the grounds which repelled Rees, MacCaw and others. He 
favoured the clause because it afforded ”the opportunity of 
giving to the natives of India a larger share in the general
3
executive government” of the various provinces.
Hobhouse*s motion for reinsertion was carried by 118 votes 
to 22. But the matter was not to rest there. During the third
1. Ibid, p.30^ -.
2. Ibid, p.308.
3* Ibid, p.30^. + He retired as Judge of Bombay High Court in
1897.
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reading Percy moved an amendment to restrict the application of
the clause to Bengal alone. On this occasion, Percy too openly
confessed: "It is the prospect that natives will be appointed to
I
this council which has really altered the clause." There was
also danger in modifying the qualifications of members by relaxing
the requirement of service experience, which increased the
potential evil. The agitators would be free to claim that the
councils were meant for giving appointment to Indians. He made
it clear, however, that he did not advocate detailed legislation
every time a It.-governor was sought to be given an executive
council. But some means must be found to give the parliament a
chance to exercise effective control, and the power of challenging
the secretary of state. He thought that a compromise on this
line was desirable.
Smeaton said that an Indian, however eminent, could not be
expected to overcome the evil influence of an usually illiterate
wife and family. This influence often led him "into devious
2
and tortuous ways", and therefore in the discharge of public 
duties an Indian could not be trusted to be absolutely straight­
forward, Apart from this rash and unseemly assault on the Indian 
character, Smeaton thought that the appointment of Indians was 
undesirable in the interest of the British in India. The British 
civilians would increasingly be reluctant to serve under Indian 
members of council, and their number in the country was likely to 
dwindle. ’’Should that catastrophe occur”, a crisis must develop
I* Ibid, p.351*
2. Ibid, p.356.
imperilling the government. Another probable result was that
British capital in India might get scared, and disappear. "Capital'1,
he told the House, "of all things in the world, is peculiarly
I
sensitive to anything in the shape of revolutionary change."
This concern for British interests in India was voiced by Joynson-
Hicks as well, who lamented, "We are making no provision in this
2
Bill for the British in India."
Hobhouse did not accept Percy's amendment, but he evinced a 
desire for compromise by which "this delicate and difficult point
3
might be withdrawn from continued and protracted debate...."
He was not certain, however, as to the nature of the compromise, 
and left it to be decided afterwards.
Balfour welcomed the offer of compromise and stressed the 
need of devising a method, short of passing a bill, which would 
ensure full parliamentary control. Percy's amendment was withdrawn.
This offer of compromise was no doubt forced upon the govern­
ment (fcj the Opposition's insistence, and by the realisation that
the government's intransigence might lose the bill in the House 
+
of Lords. This was recognised in the Commons. On 19 May 1909»
Dillon and Ellis made pointed reference to this risk. The latter 
said, "We must not blink the fact that if compromise is agreed to 
by the government under force majeure it is in order to get a 
great Bill of which we all approve through the Houses of Parliament." 
As to the executive councils of Bombay and Madras, Joynson-Hicks
1. Ibid, p.357*
2. Ibid, p.364.
3. Ibid, p.371*
*f. Ibid, p.MfO. + In the Lords, the Opposition had an
overwhelming majority*
moved an amendment seeking to limit the membership of each council
to three. His main objection was to the appointment of Indians
who were bound to lack administrative experience and ability.
It was essential that "the administrative element should not be
swamped by the non-administrative because the Governors of those
I
two provinces are not men of experience.” If the councils were 
7hjL  ^ , Ufa** r^\
to consist of four members each, this would be the consequence.A
It may be permissible here to briefly refer to Morley's 
fear of appearing as "a horrible double-faced JanuS" in dealing 
with the bill in the parliament: to satisfy the Lords the govern­
ment must look moderate in reforms; to satisfy the Commons they
2 J
"must pose as the most ultra-reformers that ever were known."
In reality, however, the government had to plead moderation not
only in the Lords, but also in the Commons. As already noted, to
dispel the doubts of the Opposition the government spokesmen took
pains to explain that the bill was not revolutionary: it was an
extension of the existing set-up and did not undermine the Imperial 
+
supremacy. Buchanan assured the House that the non-official
majority in the provincial councils:didtnot really deprive the
f "f 4"
executive of final say in matters of legislation. Asquith comforted
the Opposition by reminding them that non-official majority was not
*
J same as elective majority. In many other aspects the govern­
ment reply to Opposition criticism followed the same pattern. Thus 
far from the flourish of 'ultra-reformers’, there was almost a
Ibid, p.2^8.
2. India. Minto & Morley - p.28^.
+ See above, p.3?r 
+ See above, p. 3*n 
-><■ See above p. lt°o
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strain of plaintive protestations of moderation, which the
Radicals deprecated. The arguments put forward by the government
in reply to the latter, as we have seen, never boasted of
* *
ushering in a new era in India.
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * *
In the House of Lords on May 1909 Morley offered the 
compromise regarding the clause restored in the Commons. The 
executive council was to be created in Bengal only; in any other 
case, the Proclamation creating the council would lie before both 
Houses of parliament for sixty days. If within this period an 
Address was moved against the Proclamation by either House, the 
matter would not be proceeded with. The Proclamation was to be 
operative after the period of sixty days if no Address was moved. 
It was pointed out that any single House would be able to stop 
the executive councils.
Curzon did not relax his bitter attack even after Lansdowne 
accepted the compromise. Roberts complained that the native 
chiefs would not like the change, - an opinion which had earlier 
found some exponents in the Commons. MacDonnell,,full of dark 
forebodings, made a last-minute attempt to provide a safeguard 
against the 1undesirable1 experiment. He moved an amendment 
authorising the governor general in council to temporarily 
suspend, or reduce the strength of, executive councils in 
Lt.-governors * provinces. Morley saw it as a sheer innuendo, 
expecting the executive councils to fail. MacDonnell withdrew 
his amendment.
** See above pp. Lfoh, Lfc</
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In the House of Commons, the government motion for accepting
the compromise was passed on 19 Hay 1909, but not before a bitter
attack against it by some members, Rutherford moved for the
rejection of the compromise. The issue gained fresh significance
as some members took it as the humiliation of the Commons by the
Lords, Hart-Davies urged that as it stood the compromise was
full of risks of conflict between the two Houses. What was to
happen if the Lords rejected the Proclamation and the Commons
approved it? He therefore wanted the Address to be moved by
^oth* Houses instead of *either*, The arguments against reforms
based on heterogeneity of the Indian population were discounted
by Lupton, who pointed out that despite these differences the
various races and interests might be drawn together by a common
hatred for foreign rule, Percy had asserted that the Opposition
saw the question of executive councils nfrom the point of view
I
of administrative efficiency, and that alone.11 Lupton regretted 
this, for there was a different view, which held it "better to
2
govern ourselves badly than to be well governed by foreigners."
The opponents of the compromise forced a division which found
yne(Lcr>\
2**5 in favour of the governmentAand 10^ - against it. Needless to 
say, the division was not on strictly party lines: Conservatives
were allies of the government.
** * * 4c* ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Though many of the speakers, as we have seen, pointed out 
that in several important respects the provisions of the bill
T. Ibid, p.^37.
2. Ibid, p.MU.
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reproduced features of parliamentary government, very few of them
indeed looked forward to self-government as India*s destiny*
In the House of Lords only Courtney saw "no reason whatever for
laying down the maxim that colonial self-government can never
under any circumstances, come to pass in India*,! He foresaw,
on the contrary, that, MBy and by you will come more and more to
I
government by the people*11
In the Commons, Cotton was not satisfied merely with the 
assertion that the bill introduced representation in the govern­
ment, but also hoped that it would be succeeded in future "by a
2
further development in the same direction 11 Such caution
was not, however, observed by Rutherford, who declared that
t!India can never be truly contented until she is in a position in
3
which she governs herself.11 He hoped that they would not make 
the bill "the finale of our efforts but shall try to extend these 
institutions and freedom in India on a very much larger scale in
k
the early future*11 The national movement was "irresistible"♦
This must be recognised. It was "our duty as a nation and a
3
country to foster this spirit of nationalism...**" Any effort 
to stop it would lead to anarchy and destruction.
Endorsement of this view came from a different quarter too* 
The same future was foreshadowed by Sir F.Banbury, who opposed 
the measure, because "when you once begin to give way, it is very
difficult to stop." He was sure that any belief that the bill
7^ Indian Debates, House of Lords(1909) p.§7* 5* Ibid, p.211.
2* Indian Debates, House of Commons(l909)p*170. 5* Ibid, p.42*f.
3. Ibid, p.210,
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was TTa final measure” would be doomed to disappointment....”
* *  * *  * *  * *  * *  * * * *  * *  * *  * *
Another thing that stood out from the proceedings of both
Houses was the Conservative antagonism to the Indian reforms.
In the House of Lords as also in the House of Commons, the
Conservatives made the bitterest attack on the bill short of
+
moving for its rejection. As already noted they had valid reasons 
for avoiding such an extreme course. But in according a 
grudging welcome, they tried their best to whittle down the 
measure. The Liberals, on the other hand, enthusiastically 
welcomed the bill. If anything, some of them considered that it 
fell short of the actual needs of the moment and would welcome 
more extensive changes. Thfcs all the amendments moved in the 
Commons by the Liberal members wanted to further the concessions.
hi
Of th£ ^ amendments moved by the Conservatives - Ronaldshay,
Percy and Joynson-Hicks - two distinctly sought to restrict the 
scope of reforms. The third - Ronaldshay*s amendment - had also 
no liberal sentiments about it.
No doubt some Liberal members - for example, Smeaton and 
Rees - expressed themselves strongly against certain aspects of 
the bill. But they accepted the measure as on the whole desirable 
and never questioned its basis. The number of such doubters was 
very small, and they were evidently influenced largely by their 
intimate knowledge of India. Their difference with other Liberals
I. Ibid, p.393*
+ S e e above , p^. 3%
/fll
lay in the fact that they found it difficult to see the wood 
for the trees. The same may be said of some members of the House 
of Lords, notably MacDonnell who proved such a formidable 
obstacle. He was not a Conservative, yet out of his long-standing 
experience of India had been born certain impressions and ideas
whose tyranny he found it impossible to cast aside.
At Curzon!s intransigence none need be surprised. The bill
stood on the principle which he hated most - the need of political 
concession. It was not unnatural,therefore, that this votary of 
efficiency should have proved such a vigorous opponent to it*
The attitude of the parties is strikingly illustrated by an 
analysis of the voting in the House of Commons on 19 May 190^,' 
about the acceptance of the compromise on the executive councils 
for Lt.-governors. Thirty Liberals voted against this compromise, 
which had been accepted by their government. Seventy-two 
Conservatives voted for the compromise, but none against. That 
Conservatives should vote for the compromise was natural, for after 
all it was their creation. But what is significant is that 
there was no Conservative who considered the compromise undesirable 
for any of its many controversial aspects.
It may be mentioned that in this division, the Nationalist
and the Labour members arr£Mjp£d themselves with the radical
elements of the Liberal party. But except Keir Hardie no Labour 
member took a prominent part in the debates. Nationalist particip­
ation too was unimportant. So it would be unsafe to take this 
voting solely as a valid indication of their attitude towards
iy!2.
Indian reforms, though, generally speaking, they undoubtedly 
welcomed the measure.
** ** ♦* ** ** ** ** ** ** * *
Immediately after the consideration of the Indian Councils
Bill was concluded in the House of Lords on k May 1909, Curzon
raised the question of Moslem electorates. Asking for further
information on this matter^ Curzon stated that his object was to
draw a fresh declaration from the secretary of state that "whatever
be the actual method or variety of method^ adopted in the last
resort, the Mahomedans will still retain their separate register,
§
and will not be required to go through the double process of
taking part first in a general election, and then in a special 
I
election."
This desire for clarity was also shared by the Moslems 
themselves, who had been somewhat puzzled by Hobhouses* statement^ 
in the House of Commons. Many a meeting was held in India and 
many a memorial submitted to the governor general. Minto realised 
that Hobhouse's statementsjwere liable to different interpretations. 
In a private telegram to Morley on 2 May 1909 he restated his 
government's stand. For election of the Moslem representatives 
to "a number of seats closely approaching that to which their 
numerical proportion in the population would entitle them," they 
would rely on separate electorates. In addition to this, they 
would obtain some seats from mixed electorates. Minto pointed 
out that Hobhouse's statement seemed to suggest that the major
I. Indian Debates (House of Lords) 1909* p«279*
*Z3
portion of the Moslem representation was to be given through
joint electorates and that communal electorates would only
"supplement general election and will carry onl^a small number
of seats." This was "not at all what we contemplated", Minto
said, for in the opinion of the government of India the main j
channel of Moslem representation was to be separate electorates.
It was also clear that under the scheme of the government of India
Moslems were sure to receive seats in excess of their numerical
strength. Hobhouse's statement that wherever elections were
possible they should be conducted on the basis of separate
Moslem representation whs. capable of being interpreted literally
to mean that communal electorates were to be introduced in the
local bodies, universities etc. "This is manifestly impracticable
I
and has never been suggested", protested the Viceroy.
Morley, in reply to Curzon, quoted extensively from the
Viceroy's telegram, and assured the House that "We can have no
part in any scheme which is not felt to be a loyal adherence to
the pledges which both the Viceroy and I have more than once
2
given to the M^hamedans...." Lansdowne was grateful to Morley
for these assurances, for "We must all feel that it would be a
phblic disaster if anything were to happen which would make it
open to the Indian MoJiamedans to contend that these pledges had
3
not been fulfilled to the utmost extent."
71 cd. 4652 (1909)
The gpvernmenljof India also issued a press communique on 
4.5.1909 assuring the Moslems against the ’^erroneous1 impressions 
created in course of discussion in the House of Commons, vide 
The Pioneer 6 May 1909*
2. Indian Debates (House of Lords) 1909* p.28l.
3. Ibid, p.282.
Though the word 'pledge1 was so emphatically used by the
secretary of state, he was soon to resent the use of the term in
this particular context* The assurances they had given the Moslems
were "not in return for any ’’consideration"" from the latter ”as
the price of our intentions,” "This is assuredly not a 'pledge*
I
in the ordinary sense," Morley remonstrated. As time elapsed
he got tired of Moslem importunity, and exclaimed: "Whatever
happens, I am quite sure that it was high time to put our foot
definitely down, and to let them (the Moslems) know that the
process of haggling has gone on long enough, come what come may,
2
I am only sorry that we could not do it earlier," Why? Because 
"if we had not satisfied the Mahometans we should have had opinion
3
here - which is now with us - dead against us," Exactly whom 
Morley meant can now be only a matter of surmise. It is fair to 
remember that with few exceptions, speakers from all the parties, 
in the Lords and in the Commons, welcomed separate Moslem represent­
ation.
All the government's anxiety to respect the pledge did not, 
however, satisfy the Moslems. The Sll India Muslim League meeting 
at Lucknow on 23 May 1909 recorded an "emphatic protest" against 
the limitation of separate electorates only to a number of seats 
justified by population. This was "a distinct departure from the 
pledge given by the government," and the League re-affirmed that 
"a full adequate and effective representation of the Indian 
Musalmans cannot be secured without providing for them, by special
Tl Recollections II, p.31^«(Letter of 6.8.1909)
2. Ibid, p.317 (Letter of 26.8.1909)
3. Ibid, p.323. (Letter of 18.11.1909)
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and separate electorates composed entirely of Muhammadan electors, 
a number of seats fixed not only on the basis of numerical 
proportion, but also in accordance with their political importance*M 
Not only this. The League also pressed that separate represent­
ation in excess of numerical strength should be given to the
I
Moslems in the municipal and district boards*
* * ** ** ** * * * * * * ** **
The principle underlying the provisions for Moslem represent­
ation has ever been a question mark. What was the governments 
motive? Was it one of ^divide and rule*? Were the Moslems 
specially favoured to curb the influence of the Hindu-dominated 
nationalist movement?
We saw in the last Chapter that Minto was suspicious of
the Congress and was thinking of 'a possible counterpoise to 
+
Congress aims.1 He was then - 28 May 1906 - thinking of a
council consisting of native rulers and ,fa few other big men’1 whose
stake in the country ought to make them interested in good 
2
government. Does it necessarily follow that it was impossible
for him to turn to any other interest for the counterpoise? If
the Moslems served his purpose, might not he as well have utilized
them] This possibility is suggested by the fact, as stated by
Lady Minto, that the Moslem Deputation of October, 1906 arose
from a feeling of frustration that the Hindus were receiving
preference from the government and that the Moslems, though
T. Burn's Collections Vol.II, pp.288-289.
2. India Minto & Morley. p*29*
+ See ^h.VII p. l%3
kU
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’’intensely loyal” were ’’slighted in many ways*” The younger
Moslems were inclined to throw in their lot with the Congress:
but before the final plunge was taken it was decided to approach
the Viceroy. Lady Minto seemed to endbrse the significance of
the event as expressed by an official that it was ’’nothing less
+
than the pulling back of sixty-two millions of people from
2
joining the ranks of the seditious Opposition.” It may be 
remembered that the risk of the Moslems joining the Congress 
was all the time discussed. In June 1906 Morley had written 
to Minto that he had been warned by influential persons of Indian 
knowledge that ’’before long the Mahomedans will throw in their
3
lot with the Congressmen against you ”
A.H.Albiruni has contended that the idea of the Moslem 
Deputation was initiated in mid-August 1906 by the Moslem leader, 
Mohsin-ul-Mulk, who succeeded Sir Syed Ahmed as the Secretary of 
the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligareh. He has concluded 
from this that the Deputation was therefore not a ’’Command Perform - 
ance.” A supporting argument he puts forward is that the 
Deputation insisted on election, ignoring the advice given by 
persons in close touch with Minto to be content with nomination.
But he admits that the good offices of Archbold - the 
Principal of the Aligamh College - were utilised by Mohsin-ul-Mulk 
in this matter. Archbold assured the Viceroy's private secretary
1. Ibid, p. 5^* — —
2. Ibid, p.*f8.
3. Ibid, p.30.
4. A.H.Albiruni - Makers of Pakistan - p.92*
+ Meaning the Moslems.
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that the Address of the Moslem Deputation "would contain nothing
that was in any way disloyal and that I was also certain that the
Mahomedans had no wish whatever to do anything that would cause
I
difficulty to Government." Thereupon the Viceroy consented to 
receive the Deputation, if offered. Even before any formal 
application was sent to the Viceroy with the request for 
receiving a Moslem Deputation, an entente had thus been achieved. 
Can anyone deny the possibility that these preliminary exchanges 
might have covered wider grounds?
It is not intended to assert here that there was a pre­
arranged agreement between Minto and the Moslem leaders. But it 
is difficult not to question any belief that there was no such 
understanding, or that even without any understanding Minto did 
y not utilise the opportunity primarily to balance one community
against the other, utilising Islam as a buffer against nationalism.
The question must remain an open one, and can only be answered
+
as further light is thrown on this subject.
But whatever may be the motive, there is no doubt that the 
policy was Minto*s. There is nothing to show that Morley had any 
prior knowledge of Minto1s intention to promise to the Moslem 
Deputation separate electorate and extra seats. Long afterwards, 
Morley was to remind Minto, in a rather petulant tone, "it was 
your early speech about their extra claims that first started the
I. Ibid, p.93*
+ The voluminous correspondence between Morley and Minto, as 
printed in Morley’s Recollections and Lady Minto's book, does not 
give any clue as to how the government stand about Moslem represent 
ation came to be taken. This is surprising because their letters 
covered matters of much less import.
4 0-8
+ I •
/Vj hape .M But Morley »s immediate reaction was one of enthus­
iastic approval• MThe whole thing has been as good as it could
2
be • •. . , M he wrote to Minto# The secretary of state was perhaps 
lured by the prospect of some vocal popular support for the 
government in India# He was soon to feel unhappy about it, and 
the plan of joint-electorate which he fathered was born out of 
this conflict in his mind. In fact, he would much prefer it, 
and gAve it up only in face of uncompromising opposition# In 
this Chapter as also in the last one, we have had recurrent 
evidence of Minto’s single-minded loyalty to the policy he 
declared on 1 October 1906# Perhaps it is no exaggeration to 
say that in this affair, "Minto’s was the propelling force, and
3
Morley was gradually dragged into an untenable position.M It is
not astonishing that the Moslems should look to Minto ”as ak
champion of their rights#H
It is intriguing, however, that knowing Morley as he did,
Minto promised extra seats to the Moslems without Morley*s consent* 
This was an innovation which had many undesirable features about 
it* If the Viceroy has to be criticised for his stand, it can 
only be in respect of this issue. For separate electorate was 
the logical consequence of the representation of classes and 
interests, which was the government’s accepted policy. Throughout 
this work, we have noticed how the Moslems, practically at each 
stage, were opposed to the Hindus. Was it unnatural, therefore,
Yl Recollections IIT 0.^525(Letter of 6.12.09)
2. India Minto & Morley - p.*+8.
3. The Calcutta Review, December 1939 - p.328.
*f. India, Minto &• Morley - p.?3*
+ Moslem*
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that the Moslems should endeavour to secure that the selection
of their representative should not in any way be influenced by
\J non-Moslem vote# Knowing the nature of the representation
conceded to the people of India, it is impossible to say that
+
the separate electorate, however undesirable, was unjustified.
But net so the additional seats. This was definitely
r
favouritism of one section of the people. The move was impolitic
as other communities could not but resent this. If it was the
desire of the authorities that the different sections of the
Indian population should live in mutual amity, this step was a
serious blunder, as it was bound to accentuate the already
strained feelings between the two major communities of the
country. This was bound to raise in the majority community
doubts as to the government’s fairness, thus weakening their
confidence in the latter. Besides, what was the justification
for such speeial treatment?
The grounds mentioned were political importance of the
community, its contribution to the defence of the empire, and
*
past traditions,  ^We have seen in the earlier Chapters that the 
Moslems themselves declared, time and again, their political 
backwardness. In its light was sought to be justified the fear 
of Hindu domination and dislike of representative institutions.
In the country as a whole the community did not carry more weight
+ See Montagu-Chelmsford Report, paras.227-231•
* See Ch.VI p. 2-5X
than others. In most of the important spheres of national
progress — social, educational and political — there was nothing
to sustain any idea of Moslem advancement in strides longer than
others. As to the part played in the defence of the empire, the
+
Indian soldiers - Hindu or Moslem - always looked upon an army
career from a mercenary view-point. There was certainly not
that intelligent perception of duty which might ascribe to the
Indian forces anything in the nature of higher principles, which
called for special recognition and reward. The past tradition
by itself, without the support of present achievements, can
hardly be accepted as a valid ground for a rather exceptional
departure such as the communal preference in representative
set-up was. It should also be remembered that on this analogy
special claims on special grounds might be made by other sections
of the population, - for example, on grounds of educational
advancement, larger experience of local self-government, wealth,
or industrial and commercial progress. Surely, these would be no
less valid grounds!
It is unfortunate that ignoring all these flaws and risks,
Minto, out of his anxiety to meet the Moslem view-point, should
have made concessions which even to a well-informed British mind
appeared as "the encouragement of Mahommedan loyalty as a counter-
/
poise to the Hindu movement for self-government.11
------------------ yc  —  at  :------
+ The geographical distribution of population and their traits - 
physical and mental - were favourable to the Moslems of Northern 
India for an army career. 
t. W. S.Blunt - India under Ripon - p.298.
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CHAPTER IX
The Indian Councils Act 1909 in India*
The Indian Councils bill received the Royal assent on 
23 May 1909- Long before this, and even before the bill was intro­
duced in the House of Lords, Morley had been pressing the government
of India for draft rules and regulations to be made under it. The
I
latter was "anxious to meet his wishes without delay," ^raft
regulations were therefore sent by the government of India to the
2
government of the United Provinces on 9 January 1909, Similar 
drafts were presumably sent to other provinces as well. Thus, as 
in the case of the 1892 Act, the initiative in this matter was 
taken by the government of India, This initiative was maintained 
throughout. In July 1909 the government of India were advising 
the United Provinces government about the formation of constituen­
cies, particularly those of landholders and Moslems. They 
emphasized the need for proper consultation with the interests 
concerned as also the necessity of forming "constituencies with 
sufficient cohesion to be able to work together in practice and
to return persons who may be trusted genuinely to represent the
3
interests concerned,"
In a despatch dated 22 July 1909 the government of India
submitted to the secretary of state their recommendations about
the composition of the different legislative councils, along with
+
draft notifications. The matter was considered by a committee of
1, Burn*s Collections II. p.73*
2. Ibid, p.159.
3* Ibid, p.120.
+ Sir Guy Fleetwood 7/ilson, member of governor-general * s 
executive council, wrote a minute of dissent: unfortunately, its 
content is not known.
the India Council, and was discussed In the Council on 23 August
1909* The members of the (Jouncil divided equally on the issue, and
I
Morley cast his vote in favour of the regulations. The secretary
of state’s decisions were communicated in a telegram to the
2
Viceroy on 1 September 1909* The regulations were published on 
13 November 1909* On the same day a government of India resolution 
was also published explaining the prominent features of the 
regulations.
The government of India fixed the normal official majority in
*
the supreme legislative council at three, and "the minimum strength 
of the non-official majority" in the provincial councils at ten 
each in Bengal and Bombay, six each in Madras, United Provinces, and
3
Eastern Bengal and Assam, and four in the Punjab. These figures
left out of account the two experts who were proposed for each
council: they might be either officials or non-officials. In the
latter event, the supreme legislative council would be left with
the majority of one official only. The head of administration was
not included in this calculation. But ultimately, the non-official
majority in each of the three Presidency councils was increased,
to seven in Madras, eleven in Bombay, and fourteen in Bengal. To
+
what influence this was due is now open only to conjecture.
The term of office for members of council was raised from 
two to three years.
I* Recollections II, p.317*
2. Burn’s Collections II, p. 13^ +*
3. Ibid, p.302 (Government of India to secretary of stafe, 22.7*1909
k. cd.^987(1910) Encl.XI. para.4.
* The committee of India Council considered "by a large majority"
that this was "unsubstantial and inadequate," Dissent of Lee-Warner 
dt. 23.8.1909* Para.3 (Dissent of Members, vol.Ill)
+ Because official correspondence after 1902 is not open to the 
public.
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The following categories of disqualification, besides the 
i
usual ones like females, insane, batakrupts etc*, were proposed by 
the government of India:- (i) persons dismissed from government 
service, (ii) lawyers debarred from practising by order of 
competent authority, (iii) persons convifcted of certain criminal 
offences and sentenced to imprisonment or whipping, and (iv) 
"persons whose candidature has been disallowed by the government on 
the ground that their character and antecedents are such that their 
election would be contrary to the public interests." The govern­
ment of India did not intend these disqualifications to be 
permanent in all cases, and proposed "to guard against possible
hardship by vesting in the Government power to remove the dis- 
I
qualification." But the power for removal of disqualification 
was sought for the first three categories mentioned above; the 
last was not included. They recommended that this power of 
removing disqualifications should be vested in the provincial 
governments as well in regard to election to provincial councils.
If the power was vested only in the governor-general in council, 
prompt decisions would be difficult about provincial candidates 
due to needs of correspondence between the central and provincial 
authorities. "If the decision were delayed until canvassing had 
made some progress, the rejection of a popular candidate, might 
give rise to undesirable agitation." Making a pointed reference 
to the deportees and Morleyfs decision imposed upon them on the 
issue, the government of India remarked, rr»Ve cannot be regret 
that a highly critical issue, arising on the regulations to be
I. Burn's Collection, II, p.303*
framed by us under the Act, should have been decided without
I
hearing our mature conclusions on the subject."
Morley directed the omission of the word 1whipping1 from the
regulations, and recast the last category mentioned above as
follows:- a person "declared by the Governor-General in council to
be of such reputation and antecedents that his election would, in
the opinion of the Governor-General in council, be contrary to
2
public interests." He directed that this clause should also be 
included in the proviso enabling removal of disqualifications. He 
assented to this power being vested in the local governments as well.
In the course of his correspondence with Minto about disqualif­
ications, Morley had put forward the idea of an oath of allegiance. 
This the government of India accepted^and their draft regulations 
prescribed an oath of allegiance for non-official members, elected 
or nominated. Morley did not like this distinction between official 
and non-official members, and directed that all the members should 
take the oath.
Another provision, not mentioned in the draft regulations but 
included in the regulations, was about corrupt practices in 
elections. No election was to be valid if the candidate, or with 
his knowledge his agent, was found guilty of corrupt practices.
The validity or otherwise of any election would be decided, on 
application, by the governor-general in council, governor in council, 
or Lt.-governor, as the case might be. It was explainted that "the 
great extension of the principle of election andlthe probability
1. Ibid, p.30^. _
2. Ibid, p.1 5 k  (Secretary of state to Viceroy. Telegram dt.l*9»1909)
of keen contests render it desirable to provide safeguards against
I
the employment of improper practices." False personation, threat
of injury and purchase of votes were barred under this rule.
The government of India did not favour the Moslem demand for
Separate representation at every stage:' "We cannot from a broad
political point of view think it advisable in the interests of
2
Mohammedans themselves." Under exclusive representation the 
Moslems "will be to a great extent cut off from the stimulating 
influences of political life." The government of India plan, on 
the other hand, while assuring the Moslems by separate electorates 
a fair measure of representation, afforded them the opportunity of 
"extending their influence by competing for seats allotted to
3
general electorates." In view of further increase in the non-official
Sjujl Lz, %1 A hAM<L ~ntr* -
^majority, the Moslem strength in local councils was raised.
The final composition of the supreme legislative council
provided for twenty-five elected members - eleven by non-official
+
members of provincial legislative councils, six by landholders, 
five by the Moslems, two by Chambers of Commerce and one by the 
local bodies of the Central Provinces. Besides in the second, 
fourth and succeeding alternate elections, Moslem landholders of 
Eastern Bengal and As An, and the United Provinces were to elect 
one member each.
Because of the widely varying conditions of the provinces, it
was impossible to lay down any uniform franchise for the landholder
T. cd. k9&7 (1910) Ends.XI, Para.12.
2. Burn’s Collections, II, P.305 (government of India letter
dt.22.7.1909)
3. Ibid, p.306.
+ The C.P. landholders were to elect a member. It is interesting
to know that Morley had meanwhile agreed to sanction an advisory
P.T.O.
(council for C.P., but the government of India did not pursue 
it because the demand in C.P. was really for a legislative 
council and not an advisory council. See Burnfs Collections 
Vol.II, p.309* (government of India letter dt. 22.7*1909)
f
4-34
and Moslem electorates. The qualifications were, however, f,in
accordance for the most part with the specific recommendations
of the local governments11 J the governor-general in council would,
I
however, ,fhave preferred some nearer approach to uniformity.11 In 
Bombay the Moslem electorate consisted of the Moslem non-official 
members of the provincial legislative council. Elsewhere, the 
Moslem electorate was mostly based on property qualifications, 
titles, Fellowship of universities, and pension for gazetted or 
commissioned service. Except in Eastern Bengal and Assam, Moslem 
members of provincial councils were also included. The property 
qualification varied from land revenue of Rs.750 in the two 
Bengals and income of Rs.3,000 from land in Madras to land revenue 
of Rs.10,000 in the United Provinces. The vote was also given to 
those who paid income tax of Rs.6,000 in Bengal, Madras and Eastern 
Bengal and Assam, and Rs.10,000 in the United Provinces. These 
qualifications were high and did not admit many voters. They render­
ed the electorate for all practical purposes a close preserve of 
monied people. In the United Provinces the property qualifications 
for the Moslem and the landholding electorates were identical* 
Anyway, the Moslem electorates were unlikely to be favourable to the 
Moslem: section of the much criticised professional classes. This 
was regrettable, inasmuch as the most politically conscious and 
educated elements of the Moslem community were thus disabled, and 
an additional premium was attached to material well-being*
In the provincial councils, the qualifications for Moslem 
electorates, following the same pattern, were more flexible because
I. cd.4-987 (1910) Ends.XI, Para.15.
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the requirements regarding imperial legislative council were 
naturally stricter and higher* In Madras, registered graduates 
were voters. In the United Provinces and Bombay graduates of five 
years1 standing, and in Bengal those of ten years1, got votes*
In Eastern Bengal and Assam graduates, without any restrictions, 
were included in the electorate* In the two Bengals, some teachers 
satisfying certain easy conditions, and in Bombay practising 
attorneys and advocates, were given votes* Thus the rigidity 
marked in the Moslem electorates for the central council was 
largely absent in the provincial arena.
The landholding electorate in Bombay was to be composed in 
alternate elections by the jagirdars and zemindars of Sind and 
the Sardars of the Deccan and Gujarat* Elsewhere, the property 
qualifications varied, not only from province to province, but in 
Bengal also from division to division, from the minimum of Ps.5,000 
to the maximum of Rs.20,000 of land revenue* Titles were taken 
into account, except in Madras.
The election of a member by the district councils and the 
municipal committees of the Central Provinces was to be by an 
electorate consisting of twenty-two delegates chosen by seventeen 
district councils and twenty-eight delegates chosen by twenty 
municipalities. The delegates were themselves to be members of 
these bodies. The member chosen must have served at least for 
three years as a member of a district council or municipal committee.
The members chosen by these electorates, as also by the non­
official members of local legislative councils, were to satisfy 
residential qualifications. A member must have residence within
wthe territorial jurisdiction of the electorate concerned. For
the Moslems and the landholders the members must themselves be on
the respective electoral rolls; the members elected by local
councils must have ’’such practical connection with that province
I
as qualifies him to represent it..... ” Thus it was sought to
minimise extraneous influences and to ensure that each interest 
should return a bona fide representative. This underlined once 
again the government repudiation of representation as understood 
in the West, and stress on representation of interests and classes. 
Each of the Chambers of Commerce of Bengal and Bombay was to elect 
one of its own members.
The provincial electorates largely resembled the central ones. 
Naturally, the qualifications and conditions for provincial 
elections were lower. The residential requirement was everywhere 
insisted upon.
The most important of the provincial electorates were the
local bodies - the municipalities, district and local boards - who
were to return a very substantial portion of the elected members.
In Bengal and United Provinces, these were to return twelve
members each, in Madras, Bombay and Eastern Bengal and Assam
+
eight members each, and in the Punjab three members. Except in 
Madras - where the candidate was to be on the electoral roll for 
these local bodies - in all other provinces the candidates were 
themselves to be members, present or past, of these bodies. If
I. cd.^S^^Encls.II, Sch.I, Rule 5(i)
+ This does not include the members allotted to corporations.
wnot a member at the time of election, the candidate must have
*
at his credit at least three years* service in such a capacity.
For members to be returned by district boards these conditions
were relaxed in the United Provinces and Eastern Bengal and Assam.
A candidate would be eligible if instead he satisfied certain
proprietary standards. This is understandable, because the
members to be returned by district and local boards were expected
to represent the rural classes, and more particularly the landed
interests among them.
Only the non-official members of the local bodies had the right
to participate in these elections, either as candidates or delegates
or mere voters. This denied the official members of the local
bodies any say in the matter. It may be noted here that the voting
strength of these bodies varied, either on the basis of population
or of income: to the former category belonged Bombay and the
United Provinces, to the latter the two Bengals. In Madras and
the Punjab no such difference existed: all the bodies carried
equal weight. Again, in Bombay and the United Provinces the
higher population gave more delegates to the local body. But in
the two Bengals higher income gave more votes to the body, to be
+
cast by its sole delegate. All these manipulations showed the 
desire to make these indirect elections as much broad-based as 
possible. Apart from other considerations, the educative value 
of these elaborate arrangements was likely to be great. Besides
* This condition was originally absent in Bengal, but introduced 
on 2^.11.1909* At first in Bengal onlhy sitting members were 
declared eligible. (See The Pioneer, 26.11.1909)
+ cf. Rules under the 1892 Act. Ch.IV pp.
organisational and electoral lessons, by linking the local bodies,
however tenuously, with the larger issues of a provincial
election they would catch in the stagnant pools of local politics
the shadows of a larger horizon.
Sir William Lee-Warner recorded a minute of dissent on
25 August 1909* He thought that "these regulations will not only
clog, but..... will stof the legislative machinery of the British
I
Government....." His principal objection was on the issue of 
majorities, - official in the supreme legislative council, non­
official in others. The official majority in the supreme council 
was too small. This was unsafe. He wanted to increase it by 
taking away one member from the quota of ; two allotted to the 
non-official members of the legislative councils of each of the 
four major provinces. In this view he was supported by the 
majority of the committee which the secretary of state had set up 
to examine the regulations. They thought that "as a quasi-state
or territorial unit each province....should send one member elected
2
by its own legislative council." Lee-Warner considered a higher 
margin of official majqft$ty essential, particularly because of the 
non-official majority in local councils, into which, he complained*
3
the government of India had been "coerced" by Morley. It was now 
"inevitable that a large stream of provincial legislation will be 
blocked under the new scheme and find an outlet into the Imperial 
council." To meet this strain of additional legislation, it was
essential to leave no chance of deadlock in the supreme legislative
1. Dissents of Members, Vo'l .III (p. 112 8c f f. ) Par a.i.
2. Para.3.
3. Para.2.
council. With a meagre official majority, no one could guarantee
that the sickness or pressure of business of high official members
might not lead to such difficulties. He considered these provisions
I
as "more than rash risks.....
Another ground of his objection was the lack of clarity about 
the governments pledge to the Moslems. It was high time for an un­
ambiguous declaration of what the *pledgef meant, so that uncertain- 
ty and doubt might cease, Further,if the Moslems were ready to
Z
forego the right of voting in mixed electorates it was "expedient" 
to meet thrift desire of electing all their members by separate 
electorates. He was also in full sympathy with the Moslem demand 
for election as opposed to nomination. Lastly, the government of 
India should permit the provincial governments the widest discretion 
in framing the rules which must remain "tentative and must hereafter
3 -
be altered as experience may require." Elections were going to be 
tried for the first time in India, and in order to guard against 
future impatience and grievances, the public should receive 
assurances of the possibility of alterations to meet genuine 
difficulties.
* * * ,* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *V
The rules for financial discussion in the governor-general1s 
legislative council drew a line between financial statement and 
budget: the former was "the preliminary financial estimates" and
4
the latter "the financial statement as finally settled." Resolutions
T~* Par a. 4. ~
2. Para.6,
Para.7*
k , cd.4987i Encl.X, Notfn.23 - ch.I(5)(6)
were allowed at two stages on the financial statement - immediately 
on presentation or afterwards during the discussion of the state­
ment by heads or groups of heads. The resolution was to be "in
the form of specific recommendation" addressed to the government,
I
and was to raise "a definite issue". It was not to contain
arguments, inferences, defamatory statements or reference to the
private conduct and character of officials, nor was it to challenge
the accuracy of any figure in the financial statement. The
President was authorised to disallow any resolution "without
giving any reason therefor other than that in his opinion it cannot
be moved consistently with the public interest or that it should be
2
moved in the Legislative Council of a Local Government," Any 
discussion of the Presidents order was banned. These effective 
checks, clearly meant to counteract possible misuse of resolutions, 
were reinforced by a time-limit on the speeches of members on any 
resolution and by the President’s right to close discussion at his 
discretion. Votes were to be taken by voices or by division as 
the President decided*
In presenting the budget, the government would explain "why
3
any resolution^ passed in the Council have not been accepted'.* No 
resolutions and no divisions were to be allowed on the budget. But 
there was to be a general discussion, in course of which too a time­
limit for speeches was contemplated. The President had very wide 
powers: he could even suspend any of the rules.
On many important matters the council was given no voice.
T . I b i d , cl.6
2. Ibid, cl.8
3. Ibid, cl.21 (1)
^ 3
These included foreign relations and relations with native states,
customs, army, military works, state railways, marine, interest
and debt, political, and territorial and political pensions.
The same features of eheck and restriction were present in
the rules about the discussion of matters of general public
interest. These rules permitted resolutions and amendments to
resolutions: but no amendment was allowed ’’which has merely the
I
effect of a negative vote.” Resolutions, when passed, were to 
possess the force of recommendation.
The rules governing interpellation had few new features: they
ffollowed the rules made under the 1892 Act. The only important 
departure was the provision for supplementary question. This 
was confined to the member who put the original question. Again,
not more than one supplementary to any particular question was
allowed, and the government spokesman was free to decline to answer 
a supplementary without notice. In this set of rules too restraints 
were ample, including the President's right to disallow a question 
"on the ground of inconsistency with public interest or that it
2
should be put in the legislative council of a local government."
The rules for the provincial councils differed but little
from those of the supreme council.- One distinguishing feature
was that the provincial financial statement was to be first
examined by a committee of the provincial council. This committee
would consist of twelve members, - six to be elected by the elected
members of the council, and another six to be nominated by the head
of the province.
IT Ibid, Notfn.21)-, cl.
2. Ibid, Notfn.25, cl.8.
The dominant tone in these rules was one of caution* The 
authorities seemed to have been influenced by the dark forebodings 
of the detractors of reform, and therefore hemmed in the concessions 
they made with rigid safeguards. Some wariness was, however, 
understandable. The councils, with all their new privileges, were 
to remain advisory bodies, except for legislation. Their voting, 
no more than their resolutions, would be mere expression of opinion, 
without any binding force. It was too much in the circumstances to 
expect for them the full rights and unhampered powers which went 
with assemblies exercising a much more real and effective control 
on the administration. In India where the authority of the 
executive remained as paramount as ever, its ultimate dominance 
over the legislature was thought essential. Whether this needed 
to be made as prominent as in the rules, particularly in view of 
the new spirit the reforms betokened, must remain a matter of 
opinion.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The first reaction of the Indian National Congress to the
reforms was one of enthusiasm. A resolution adopted by the
Congress in 1908 expressed ndeep and general satisfaction” and
offered”sincere and grateful thanks” to Morley and Minto. The
scheme was accepted as ”a large and liberal instalment of the
reforms needed to give the people of this country a substantial
share in the management of their affairs.” The Congress hoped
I
that the details of the scheme would be as liberal in spirit.
Rash Behari Ghose, the president that year, claimed that 
they were ”on the threshold of a new era.” The reforms had given
I. Resolution II.
them na fair share in the government of our own country*” But he
I
made it clear that these were only ”a great step forward” in the 
direction of their ideal - self-government on the colonial lines* 
Worked satisfactorily these reforms were sure to lead to further
2
reforms* ”Remember” he said, "there is no finality in politics*”
At the same time, obviously having in mind the extremists
who wrecked the previous year!s Congress and had since found new
3
moorings, he counselled against "reckless change” , and warndd. 
his audience that the ideal of self-government could "only be
k
realised in the distant future*” Another speaker, Krishnaswami 
+
Rao, said that absolute autonomy was no doubt ideal "as a matter 
of abstract principle and as a philosophic doctrine*” But they 
were concerned with practical politics, and could not ignore their 
difficulties and their dangers* The industrial resources of the 
country had to be developed as also their "capacity for corporate 
action.” In view of all this, as full a self-government as could
3
be had within the British empire was a "noble and inspiring" ideal.
To him the reforms were "conceived in a liberal spirit’1, and the
6
tone pervading them "welcome*"
Contentment was also the key-stone of other speeches*
Surendranath Banerjea expressed a feeling of "high appreciation and
of deep admiration" for the statesmanship which prompted the 
7
proposals* Another speaker, L.A.Govindaraghatfa Aiyar, pointed 
out how in one respect - the non-official majority in the provincial 
councils - the proposals went beyond their expectations and were 
a pleasant surprise.
T. Report of 23rd I.N.C. - p.35. Iulbid1 p.W. + He was chair -
O TV.-J ~ in 5. Ibid, p.29. of the2. Ibid, p.37. g Ibid p. 26. Reception
3. Ibid* n Tbid n 55* Committee.
All the time it was made perfectly clear, however, that the 
reforms were another step towards the goal. Kirshnaswami Rao
I
spoke of them as "a substantial instalment1,’, and Surendranath
Banerjea confessed that they were not "even with/* a measurable
distance of the goal of our aspirations.” They had received
effective control neither over the finances nor over the executive
which they sought. But in their development the reforms, ”in their
2
ultimate evolution, will give us both." Growth was the universal 
law and they must pin their faith to the development^ which the 
reforms were undoubtedly capable of.
The same view was heard outside the Congress pandal as well.
On 2k December 1908 a representative deputation of Bengalis waited 
upon the Viceroy to thank him for the reforms. The deputation felt 
that ”it is the first instalment of the reforms which are yet in 
store for us or which will be introduced with the growing capacity 
and fitness of our people, and will give them a definite and effect-
3
ive voice in the government of their country.”
It may briefly be noted here that this hopeful optimism of the
Congress was not shared by the extremists. They had no faith in the
+
Congress way of constitutional agitation. They condemned the reforms 
as ’’conceived on wrong lines”, calculated to ’’accentuate differences
k
and encourage self-seeking...” B.C.Pal called the proposals 
’’political lollipops”; he advised the authorities to openL,acknowledge 
’’the legitimacy of the desire of India to be a free nation”, and to 
adopt a policy of laissez faire leaving the people free, so long as
5
they respected the laws of the land, to work out their own destiny.
l7 Ibid p.26. 4. The Times. 21.12.1908 (Report of a
2. Ibid, p.48. meeting at Caxton Hall, London^
3. The Times, 23.12.1908. 5* The Times, 13.2.1909.
+ See Ch.VI, p.2-^ ff
The Congress attitude underwent, however, a change with the
publication of the rules and regulations. The Congress of 1909
regretted that the regulations had "not been framed in the same
liberal spirit” which pervaded Morleyfs despatch. The regulations
had caused "widespread dissatisfaction", the specific grounds of
which were separate electorates, varying qualifications for voters
belonging to different religions, The disqualifications, and
"ineffective and unreal" non-official majorities in local councils.
The regulations, it was complained, showed "general distrust of the
I
educated classes." The next year too the Congress repeated these
criticisms. Both these years, modification of the regulations was
urged upon the authorities.
In his presidential address at the Congress of 1909» Madan
Mohan Malatfrya pointed out that only in Bengal had the non-official 
— + 
majority been effectively preserved. At other places distribution
of seats, particularly nominated seats, rendered this majority
meaningless. SurEndranath Banerjea complained that, as conditions
were, the nominated members would not oppose the government to
whom they owed their position in the councils. Without an
elective majority, the official views would always prevail.
Writing in his paper, the Bengalee, Surendranath Banerjea called
2
the non-official majority as it stood, "a meaningless sham." There 
was no denying the fact that the official interests and the 
popular interests often collided. In India, the standard of 
public conduct was lower than in England or America: it was futile
to expect of Indian public men the same level of independence. In
1. Resolution IV. + Bengal council had an elective
2. The Bengalee, l6.11.1909* majority.
the prevailing circumstances, regrettable as they were, it was 
essential that the legislative council must be ,!so representative
I
in character that it may have the courage as well as the inclination”
to record a hostile vote against the government if needs be. Unless
regulations were modified, ”the official view of things is bound to 
2
prevail....”
The Congress also bitterly attacked the provisions regarding
Moslem representation. Not only was their separate electorate on
a religious basis resented, but also the extra seats and the
necessarily easier Moslem franchise. Malaviya regretted that ”a
3
wall of separation” had been set up between the Moslems and others. 
Harnam Das complained that the regulations meant ”a permanent 
cleavage between Hindus and Musalmans” , and that they would 
’’accentuate, nay perpetuate” the differences between these communit­
ies. Not only had, for the first time, the principle of equality 
of all religions in India been violated, but ”the Hindus, the Sikhs> 
the Parsees and the Christians are being relegated to a position of 
unmerited inferiority.” He protested against the provision
k
’’because it means the partition of the whole of living India ”
Tej Bahadur Sapru demanded that in political representation ’’there 
should be absolutely perfect equality between the various sections
5
of the community.”
Surendranath Banerjea said that this would result in the 
Moslems ’’gradually isolating themselves from the general community",
1. Ihid 17.11.1909*
2. The Statesman, 29*11*1909*
3* Report of 2^ fth I.N.C. p.32* 
k. Ibid, p.68.
5* Report of 25th I.N.C., p*87*
and identifying themselves with the bureaucracy* The interests
of real Indian unity - ’’not mechanical but organic unity” -
demanded that the extravagant claims of the Moslems must not be
timidly accepted. They must not sacrifice the future by submitting
to these separatist manoeuvres encouraging the Moslems to believe
that there was "an eternal conflict” between themselves and the 
I
Hindus•
On the Congress platform and elsewhere Moslem voices were 
also raised in protest against separate representation. Mushir 
Husain Kidwai pointed out that separate representation would 
’’retard the progress of nationalism and unification of India*” 
National interests would be subjected to communal interests,and 
thus the general interests of the country would suffer* Again, 
the officials would be in an embarrassing position: their ’’agree­
ment with any community will always be misunderstood*” In the 
country as a whole, the Moslems would be sufferers* The non- 
Moslem majority would tend to hostility against the Moslem minority
’’bent on revenging the policy of separati/6^  introduced by certain 
2
Muslims,” Sayed Hasan, in the Congress of 1909f regretted that
opportunities for united action had been missed* In next year’s
Congress, Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan protested against this 'undoubted1
departure from ’’the traditional policy of just and equal treatment”
of all classes of the subject. For the first time religious
TI The Bengalee, 4*7.1909* Similar protests were made by other 
influential public bodies - e.g. Bombay Presidency Association, 
Hindu Sabha Lahore etc* See the Bengalee of and 10 July 1909*
2* The Pioneer, 2*f.3*1909*
bro
distinctions were set up "as important elements in the extension
of political privileges to the people...." He warned his fellow-
Moslems that ultimately these separatist, trends would do them no
I
good, Mfor they are sure to alienate the Hindu sympathies*...,f
Much was made of the varying basis of franchise. Mal&viya
thought it ’’deplorable" that the "direct representation and a
fairly liberal franchise" given to the Moslems had been denied to 
2
others. He resented this "invidious and irritating distinction"
3
between Moslems and others. The Bengalee t citing the regulations 
of Eastern Bengal and Assam where a Moslem graduate had the vote 
but not his Hindu counterpart, argued that the Hindus were being
4
discriminated against. Besides, why were Moslems given special
representation in provinces where they formed the majority? All
this was sure to alienate Hindu sympathies. "For, does not this
rule practically tell the Hindu that he is a member of the politic-
3
ally inferior community, and that the Mahomedan is his superior?"
The differential treatment must create "a most baneful impression"
6
on the Hindu mind.
It is difficult to justify this criticism of the franchise. 
Granted a separate electorate for a community, its franchise must 
be settled by the needs and conditions of the community itself; ' 
those of other communities had no relevance. It may be mentioned 
here that Gokhale, one of the most respected Congress leaders of
1. Report of 23th I.N.C.p.90.
2. Report of 24th I,N.C.p*28.
3. Ibid, p.32.
4. The Bengalee, 20 & 21 November 1909*
3* The Bengalee, 16.11.1909* ,
6 . The Statesman, 25ai.l909.(g^T*«X»^<J£
JfXt
the time, was amenable to separate representation for Moslems,
In his opinion, however, separate electorates were to ’’redress
I
the deficiencies and inequalities of general elections,” But
he was opposed to the claim for extra seats. Its ’’undoubted and
irresistible implication” was that the other communities were
comparatively inferior and should receive less than their share,
’’That was a position to which naturally the other communities
2
could not assent,”
Separate representation of the Moslems gave rise to similar
demands in other quarters, Kane, an Indian Christian delegate to
3
the Congress, advocated the same for his community, E,H.Thomas 
regretted that the community ’’has been left altogether in the 
dark”, and spoke of ”a keen disappointment” among the Indian
4
Christians for this omission.
Another complaint was that the rules were unfair to the 
educated classes, Malaviya pointed out ’’the small room for
3
representation” left for the educated classes. Harnara Das
affirmed that the underlying motive of the regulations w^s to
&
’’dish” the educated classes.
Surendranath Banerjea discerned a ’’sedulous attempt” to 
exclude "the educated middle class of the Hindu community....”
Had not this class been the "perennial recruiting ground for 
'agitators”’? Had not it built up the Congress and public opinion 
in the country? The boycott of British goods had been launched by 
the same class. Surely, "such a class would hardly be calculated
1, The Times, 15♦7*1909*
2. The Bengalee, 16,7*1909*
5* Report of 24th I.N.C.p.63*
4. The Pioneer, 4.12.1909#
5. Report of 24th I.N.C. p.32,
6 . Report of 24th I.N.C, p.69#
k^
to make the life of the bureaucracy exactly happy in the Parliaments
I
of their own making." He had no hesitation to say that the
regulations v/ould Malienate the sympathy of the educated community"
2
from the experiment about to be made.
Once again the Congress criticism cannot stand scrutiny. It 
is difficult to justify such bleak forecasts for the educated 
community, because of the share it was sure to receive in the 
representation of the local bodies, Presidency Corporations, 
Universities and of part of landholding interests.
But the Congres^were on surer ground when they criticised 
the requirement that the candidates for election by local bodies 
were themselves to be members of such bodies. The result, as 
Malaviya said, was to "exclude a number of men of light and
3
leading...." Surendranath Banerjea pointed out that many of the
ablest leaders of Bengal were ineligible under this condition,
iokereas many an unknown person, who had served on the local bodies,
would be qualified. This, he said, "is in itself quite sufficient
to condemn the Regulations, so far as they concern the members to
k
be returned by the local bodies." Though the governments motive 
was perhaps to improve the working of the local bodies by making 
really capable persons interested in it, the practical difficulties 
involved should have been foreseen, and suitable remedies 
prescribed so that able men might not be disqualified at least 
for the first few years,
1. The Bengalee, 20.11.1909*
2. The Statesman, 25.11.1909*
5. Report of 2^th I.N.C. p.28.
km The Statesman, 25.11.1909*
Coming to disqualifications, the provision was considered
I
'•unnecessarily stringent and exclusive.” Particular exception was
taken to the government's power to declare a person disqualified
because of his past antecedents and character. Was not this
provision "comprehensive enough to include, at least potentially,
2
all capable and patriotic Indians?” It might mean the exclusion
of persons who did not see eye to eye with the authorities.
Anticipating difficulties for a person convicted of sedition, it
was argued that if he was afterwards willing to take the oath of
allegiance, "there is no reason why such a person should not be
admitted into the council.”
The President's control over the deliberations of the council
"can have the only effect of gagging the mouths of the public”
k
about the matters on which they possibly felt most keenly.
Much of this criticism took only the blackest view of things.
It is refreshing to find that Surendranath Banerjea^ himself a 
rather staunch critic, recognised that the spirit in which the 
reforms were worked was no less important. It was possible to 
work them in a manner that would make the non-official members 
"popular representatives in the proper sense of the term.” If 
persons at the helm of affairs had "sympathy with popular aspiration^ 
the new councils might then bring the goal of their ambition 
"perceptibly nearer.” He also acknowledged that the reforms offered
5
valuable scope of training.
TI Report of 24th I.N.C. p.29 (Malaviya) '
2. The Bengalee, 16.11.1909#
3. The Statesman, 23.11.1909 (Surendranath Banerjea) 
k. The Bengalee 16.11.1909#
3. Ibid, 17.11.1909#
Despite all this criticism, it proved difficult to resist
the temptation of asserting the Congress influence on the
evolution of reforms. Surendranath Banerjea claimed that the
Congress, "the platform of constitutional agitation", had never
taken up any issue altogether in vain. In many cases their
efforts had been crowned with success; in others they brought
the questions "within the range of practical politics." The
reforms were "the crowning triumph" of their endeavours in one 
I
sphere. In his presidential address at the Congress of 1910,
Sir William Wedderburn said that "Lord Morley's benefic^ent
measures have followed Congress lines." Ever since the first
session of the organisation, the reform and expansion of legis-
2
lative councils had been "the leading Congress proposal....."
** ** * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * *
Turning to provincial matters, the Congress advocated in
1908 a legislative council for the Central Provinces and Berar.
This prayer was repeated in 1909 and 1910. We have seen that at
one time Morley was willing to grant an advisory council for the 
+
province. The government of India's refusal to have an advisory
council while they would not recommend a legislative council is
hard to understand. If the advisory council was to possess the
functions proposed for it by the chief commissioner of the Central 
*
Provinces, it would indeed be a. better representation of the people 
of the province than two members on the supreme legislative council.
71 Report of 23rd I.N.C. p.48.
2. Report of 25th I.N.C. p.29*
+ See p.^ 35" footnote.
* See Ch.VII, p. ' I W
'ft''
The Congress also criticised in two resolutions in 1909 and 
1910 the composition of the Punjab legislative council. The 
grounds of criticism were smallness of size, inadequacy of elected 
element, and improbability of a non-Moslem being ever returned to 
the supreme legislative council. In 1909 an additional grievance 
was lack of protection for non-Moslem minorities, which made way 
in the following year for a fresh grievance as to unproportionately 
large nominated element.
Both in 1909 and 1910 resolutions were adopted by the
Congress pressing for establishment of provincial executive
councils. But whereas in the former year the demand was for
executive councils in the United Provinces, the Punjab, Eastern
Bengal and Assam, and Burma, in the latter year the claim was
confined to the first two provinces only. Perhaps it was realised
that the smaller provinces had no chance at all,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * #
The Muslim League was not satisfied with the arrangements for
Moslem representation, as explained by Morley in the House of Lords 
+
on 4 May 1909* Ameer Ali made a strong plea for increasing the 
number of seats thrown open to separate electorates. That was 
"the wisest and most equitable course” for redeeming the govern­
ments pledge to the Moslems. If, on the contrary, the government 
stuck to their declared intentions, the community must recognise 
that the minimum representation secured through separate electorates 
”is sure to become the maximum.” In the mixed electorates, the 
Moslems would have to depend on the good will of the majority 
community. The Moslem members returned would be pledged to the
+ See Ch,VIII, p. ^13
lift
political programme of their supporters: "they would be constantly
at variance with their MoJ&edan colleagues. The Maframedan party
will thus be split up into two factions." The Moslem influence
I
v/ould consequently be weakened.
In a speech at Caxton Hall, London, the Aga Khan repeated
these demands. If these were not conceded, the Moslems would be
"disappointed and left without representation." In that event the
2
"reforms were doomed to failure."
The executive council of the United Provinces Muslim League 
declared, in a resolution on 15 August 1909* that participation in 
the mixed elections was injurious to the Moslem interests, and 
therefore the community would boycott them. In an explanatory 
letter addressed to the Chief Secretary of the United Provinces, 
it was pointed out that mixed electorates, far from securing real 
representation of the community, would increase the friction
3
between the two major communities.
With the publication of rules and regulations, however, all
such remonstrance ceased. The Aga Khan telegraphed to the Times:
"I consider new regulations respecting council constitute fulfilment
(of) pledges made to Moslems, and far in advance of earlier 
4
proposals." He strongly urged the Moslems to loyally accept them. 
The rules safeguarded the Moslem interests "as a most important
5
element of Indian life." Ameer Ali acknowledged that the rules
"represent a considerable advance on the original proposals of the
Government of India", and hoped that the Moslems would give them a 
6
fair trial.
Ti— The 'lime's, 20,3.1909 (letter dated 14.3.19U9' 'from Ameer AfO. T
2. Ibid. 25.6.196?. TT ,,0 ,,Q 5. Times of India Illugtrat-
3. Burns's Collections, II, pp.138-139. ed <fe?kly «
Thsi Times, 16.11* 1909* 6. <phe Times,l6.11 *1909*
ktl
The lead given by these two leaders was faithfully taken
up by the League. The Punjab Muslim League "gratefully11 recognised
that the regulations "constitute a distinct improvement" on the
original scheme, and fulfilled "to a material extent" the pledges
I
given to the community. Similar sentiments were expressed by
other provincial branches. The Central committee of the League,
meeting on 28 November 1909f adopted resolutions recording
"sincere gratitude" of the community for the regulations which "to
a great extent" redeemed the government pledges. These had been
"a distinct advance" on the original proposals. At the same time
the League requested for the Punjab the right of electing
representatives to the supreme legislative council. Besides, "in
the interests ofAMahomedan community" relaxation of residential
qualification in favour of Moslem candidates was urged. A Moslem
should be free to seek election also in constituencies ,rother than
where he was an elector for there was "no conflict of interests"
} 2 
between Moslems in different areas.
The extent of Moslem approval of the rules was more obvious
in an article by Ameer Ali. He expressed full satisfaction with
the rules and explained that the disappointment in some other than
Moslem quarters was "merely a revulsion from the immoderate
3
anticipations of the last few years based on erroneous calculations',’ 
The regulations might have few flaws, but "taken broadly they
1. The Pioneer, 29*11.1909*
2. The Pioneer, 1.12.1909•
3. The Nineteenth Century, March 1910, p.396*
If Si
represent a distinct and remarkable development in the administrat-
I
ion of the country." The honest views of the representatives of the
people would now be available to the authorities; the rules
guaranteed "a genuine participation of the representatives of the
2
people in the work of administration." With the provisions for
3
disqualifications he had no quarrel: they were'Very wise."
Scope of discussion was large; restrictions such as there were 
would only prevent "interminable discussions", which might other-
4
wise destroy the "usefulness of the councils." All in all,
5'
"ample facilities" had been given to the representatives of the
people for helping the administration. The reforms were "certain
6
to become the means of incalculable benefit to the country."
Omission of any reference to the Moslem representation in this 
long article was perhaps due to the absence of even1a feeble sense 
of dissatisfaction with the state of Moslem representation in the 
Councils, Why this was so can perhaps be realised from the 
following table which shows the state of Moslem representation in 
the first legislative councils constituted under the new Act.
Territory Percentage of 
population to 
population.
Moslem
total
Percentage of Moslem 
members in the legis­
lative council to the 
elected and nominated 
non-officials.
British India 23.2 33.3 , 1• 1
Madras 6 A 11.5 A ' ^t V
Bombay 20.2 28.5
Bengal 17.7 19.3
United Provinces l^ f.l 3^.6
Punjab 53*2 30.0
Eastern Bengal and Assam 57*7 3^.7.
5. Ibid, $>05;
3. Ibid, pA02. . 6. Ibid, p.3?8.
+ In Bengal there were besides two Moslems among the officials.
The percentage would be higher if only elected members were taken*
In every council Moslems had captured seats besides those allotted 
to the exclusively Moslem electorates* In Eastern Bengal and 
Assam they fared comparatively worse due to lack of organisation
and weaker hold on the local bodies*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 4c*
In the Anglo-Indian press in India the rules and regulations
evoked little controversy. In considering these reforms the
Pioneer* s attitude was throughout cautious. Only|on certain
specific issues were their views expressed with their usual
vehemence. That Morley was unlikely toobe swayed from a course
which he and Minto took every opportunity to reiterate, was perhaps
a largely influential factor. The Pioneer supported the Moslem
League stand haartily, though they rebuked the League for claiming
parity in the appointments to the governor-general *s executive
council* That involved ”a misconception and degradation of the
I
character of the Council.” They thought, however, that Morley 
himself was responsible for such feelings, as he had created an 
impression that appointment to executive councils was to be a 
political concession.
Morley’s attitude regarding executive councils for Lt.-governors 
was also harshly criticised. Why should his opinion, and Minto*s 
personal views override the widely-believed nearly unanimous 
opposition of other competent authorities? Why was not the latterfs 
opinion made public? They reproved Morley’s silence in this respect:
I. The Pioneer, 28.1.1909*
1(1) o
"The business man who is applying for a big loan must not conceal
I
his circumstances.”
V/hen the Act was passed, they saw it as ’’peculiarly the work
of the Secretary of State.” The government of India had ’’moved
from one position to another” to meet the wishes of Morley. Never
before had an important measure .’’so little real support from the
men with practical experience of Indian administration.” The whole
episode showed how a ’’doctrinaire Radical” might exercise practically
2
unbridled powers.
The rules and regulations were accepted as devoid of any
particular surprises. But representation was considered to have
been conceded in a larger dose than anticipated. The reforms had
’’grown in liberality under the finishing process.” But the Pioneer
had no quarrel on that account; controversy as to the policy of
the measure ’’now disappears in the hope that it's results may prove
3
equal to the most sanguine anticipations.”
* * * * ** * * ** ** ** ** ** ** **
The Statesman supported the Moslem view-point. There was no
universal mode of representation: to achieve the end of represent-
7l
ation^might vary. And in deciding upon the method, in the light
of the great divisions of the population, the minorities must have
their say. The Hindu-Moslem differences were regrettable, ’’but ..they
if
cannot be disposed of by denying that they exist.” The government
5
decision in this respect "seemed to be the only solution.”
1. Ibid, 15.3*1909.
2. Ibid, 3.6.1909.
3. Ibid, 17.11.1909. ■
if. The Friend of India and Statesman 28.1.1909. 
5. Ibid, if.2.1909.
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As,.the rules and regulations, the Moslems had reason to be 
"extremely pleased" with them* "Their wishes have been complied
I
with No other community has received such favourable treatment,,"
Referring to the criticism of differing franchise for Moslems
and others, the Hindu leaders were reproached, "Jealousy of this
description will not hasten the day when the special Mahomedan
2
electorate can safely be abolished," After all, in a separate 
electorate, it was the business of the Moslems to decide how 
their representatives were to be chosen. The Moslems, in their 
turn, were advised to abstain from insisting on "a Mahomedan
3
to every Hindu appointment"*, this would imperil the
success of the experiment about to be launched.
The proposal for establishing executive councils in the
provinces was welcomed. Under the prevailing circumstances, "the
Lt,-Governor is scarcely ever seen by the vast bulk of the population
4
under his charge." This was undesirable. An executive council, 
by reducing his burden, would enable the Lt.-governor to go about 
more frequently among the people. The complaint that the executive 
council would detract from the personal character of a Lt.-governor1s 
rule was challenged. Were not the educated classes already aware 
that many decisions were reached at the lower level and were only 
endorsed by the Lt.-governor? As for the masses, they would hardly 
realise the difference with the creation; of executive councils!
The executive council was specially desirable because "to entrust 
the final authority in dealing with the complicated affairs of a
vast Province to one man, however great his ability, is an
Yl The Statesman, l8.ll.i909. 3* The Friend of India & Statesman,
2. Ibid, 25*11.1909. 4.2.1909.
4. Ibid, 4.5.1909#
kU
I
anachronism.” The council would stimulate a waak Lt.-governor 
and restrain an impetuous one.
The rules and regulations were considered satisfactory.
They were conceived in a liberal spirit, put the ’’broadest 
construction” possible on the. provisions, and infused reality into 
them. They were sure to increase the popularity of the reforms,
2
as they ’’surpass the hopes of the most sanguine friends of reforms.” 
The members of the new councils had been enabled ”to exert an
v
influence which cannot at present be safely estimated upon both
3
administration and legislation.”
Referring to the non-official majorities, they pointed out 
the risk of government defeat, even though ordinarily the Moslems 
and the landlords would identify themselves with the government 
and minimise such a possibility. But this caused them no 
uneasiness, for they confidently hoped that the increased power 
would bring in a sense of responsibility among the non-officials. 
More scope for discussion would lead to respect for arguments, and
k
beneficial legislation was not likely to be hindered*
They were less happy with the condition that candidates for 
election by local bodies were themselves to be members of those 
bodies. The representatives thus elected ’’will be indirectly 
representatives of ordinary tax-payers and rate-payers.” It was 
unfortunate that their selection should be under such restraint. 
Whatever might be the arguments in favour of the requirement, -
T. Ibid, 18.3 .1909.
2. The Statesman, l8.11.1909*
3. Ibid, 25.11.1909.
4. Ibid, 18.11.1909.
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and undoubtedly there was many a valid one, - it must be acknowledg
ed "also that hitherto the local self-governing bodies have not
possessed the degree of independence or the amount of means which
would render them attractive to men of ability.” Further, the
working of the new councils would be keyed to a lower note if
persons of best competence and highest ability were thus shut out
of them. It was unfair to the people as well. Members whom they
elected to the local bodies for one purpose, should not be
rendered "the only eligible candidates for other and more important
duties." In view of all these reasons, and also because no
previous notice of the governments intentions had been given, they
proposed that at least in the first election the local bodies
I
should have an unfettered choice.
Miff ** * * +* ** ** * * * * ** ** * *
The reactions of a few other Anglo-Indian papers may also
be briefly noted. The Empire recognised the "substantial merit"
of the scheme, and specially "the enlightened and progressive
spirit which it displays." It was very unlikely that, despite
the restrictions, any resolution of importance would be disallowed.
They could not but regret, however, the time-limit on speeches.
After all the council was more than a debating society! The more
Z
freedom there was the better.
The Indian* Daily Nev/s was "firmly persuaded" that the reforms 
would prove "entirely beneficial". They had introduced "the most
3
decisive change" in the system of government in India.
1. Ibid, 18.11.1909.
2. Ouoted in the Pioneer, 19.11.1909*
3. Ibid.
IrtH
The Times of India was on the whole happy with the rules and
regulations, A genuine concern to secure as fully as possible the
real representation of the different interests was writ large upon
them. Their ’’guiding principle” was ’’election by the wishes of
the pe.ople,” They were cJvcCfcfui , however, of the method of
representation of the Punjab and Bombay Moslems on the imperial
I
legislative council,
A discordant note was struck however in the Englishman,
”The enlarged councils would have been wrong at any time,” They
were doubly so now because a section of agitators would construe
t&em as concessions ”wrung by threats.” Besides, could ”any sane
man believe” that larger legislative councils made for efficiency?
On the contrary, they would make the task of administration
2
’’more complex and more difficult.”
* * * * * * * * * * * + * * * * 3)1% * * **
In the British press, the Times was tfie most influential
national paper which followed Indian affairs with consistent 
interest. It is desirable, therefore, to follow the Times 
throughout the course of reforms for a proper understanding of an 
important section of opinion interested in India. It may be said 
here that following the publication of the rules and regulations, 
many an important paper wrote benedictory articles on them.
In August 1907* referring to the chasm which separated the 
government and the people in India, the Times hailed the reforms 
proposals as ’’another generous, yet prudent^ attempt to bridge that 
chasm by bringing the people of India into closer contact with 
the work of administration.
I. Ibid* 2. Ibid The Times, 27*8.190?•
Lfhr
The idea of advisory councils was warmly welcomed, as it would
harness to the services of the community the great conservative
forces which the ruling chiefs and the landed magnates stood for.
These councils by stimulating in them Ma sense of civic duty and an
independence of judgment” would gradually restore them to their
rightful position in the Indian polity. So long they always
avoided the heat of public controversy and thus left public opinion
I
to be organized by ”a small but active minority.”
Referring to the proposed extension of legislative councils, 
they approved the '‘increased opportunities of consultation with the 
responsible public opinion in India*” The British authority in 
India had nothing to lose and much to gain by this. It was high 
time, however, that the expression of popular views should cease
to be the monopoly of the professional classes, who wielded an 
influence “entirely out of proportion to their real stake in the 
country.” Hence the proposal to secure representation of the 
various classes was welcome. The utility of the enlarged powers
of the councils would, of course, depend upon the success of the
2
scheme of representation.
This ^ .initial approval was maintained all through, though 
the ardour of appreciation was somewhat damped by subsequent dev­
elopments, It was impossible"to stand still.” One must go forward* 
But with all their sympathy, they were unable to be enthusiastic 
over the proposal to include Indians in the executive councils. It
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
H i
was impossible to choose any individual who would be acceptable to
more than "one of the great divisions of his province.” There were
other considerations too. The Indian member, hov/ever able, was
bound to be influenced by his environments. This atmosphere,
different from that of his European colleagues, was bound to
exercise constant pressure upon hiflj. Further., he would have access
to all the secrets of the administration. The proposal was indeed
I
’’full of peril for the security of the State.” Administrative 
ability and local knowledge had been mentioned in some quarters 
as the requirements for the past* But these were not the real 
test of fitness. The members were more than advisers; they had 
intimate knowledge of the affairs of the government in formulating 
whose decisions they had an effective voice. Their primary qualif­
ication must always remain ’’fitness to take their share in the
2
gravest duties” of the government. What qualities this meant was
3
not explained. Anyhow, the Times had "the gravest doubts” of the 
wisdom of such a step which was deemed neither in the interest of
the efficiency of Indian administration nor of the wider imperial 
responsibilities. They, therefore, urged upon Morley to avoid ”the 
fatal dangers” that might follow a ’’mistake” of the most momentous
k
consequences.
Subsequently, they complained that ’’the cautious and conserva­
tive” proposals of the government of India had been made much less
T. Ibid,' 18.12.1908.
2. Ibid, 9.2.1909.
3. Ibid, 29.12.1908.
4. Ibid, 9.2.1909.
so by "great innovations." The alterations made were sure to be
"used as instruments for the attainment of further concessions."
Unhappy with the provision which left the details of electorates
to the - government of India, they pointed out that this would
leave "any future Indian government" free to do whatever they
I
wanted in this respect.
The Muslim League view point received full support. If 
joint electorates were insisted on, the Moslem community would not 
possess any guarantee that the Moslem members elected would be 
"really representative of the Mahomedan point of view." The Moslem 
representation in that event would be Utu sory." The authorities- 
were warned that no reforms which left the Moslems with "a just 
sense of grievance" could be expected to work for the good of India
3
as a whole. The rules and regulations were, hov/ever, accepted as
k
"a reasonable attempt to fulfil the pledges" given to the Moslems.
To the Hindus, nevertheless, "must inevitably fall the lion!s 
share" of the political powers given to Indians. It was up to them 
to show by their behaviour whether they were ready to pursue "in a 
spirit of statesmanlike moderation" the courjse of constitutional 
progress, or whether, having displaced the British, they aimed at
5
subjecting their fellow-countrymen to their "intolerant" rule.
The rules and regulations were approved. It was very wise to 
refrain from enforcing uniformity upon all the legislative councils 
in respect of their composition and the mode of the election of their 
members. This variety refuted the theory held by many a Radical
T. Ihid, 27.4.1909.
2. Ibid, 29.12.1908.
3. Ibid, 9.2.1909.
k.l Ibid, 16.11.190^
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enthusiast uthat such a congeriefl of people as India really is
as:
can be rega.rded as a nation ripe for democratic institutions."
This wa$ all the more clear in other provisions.
The Times was not "very happy with the enlarged scope of inter­
pellation. Who knew that this would not be a source of annoyance
and spiteful criticism? Disqualifications were considered
adequate.
To the British public it was pointed out that the checks
provided, which might seem to many of them inharmonious with the
democratic spirit, were necessary. Even then-much power would
pass into the hands "not of the people of India, but of those
who resent the checks which the British raj has placed upon the
oppression of the people of India, or, at any rate, of professional
politicians who are far less for, and are much more ignorant of the
real needs of the people of India than the British officials whom
2
they make it their business to traduce." This in their last
words on the subject the Times could not help making once more
patent their dislike for a class of people whom they unfailingly
distrusted and opposed.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The Quarterly Review discussing the reforms eonfessed that
alienation between the government and the people in India was 
taking place. That confidence "in the beneficent intentions of
3
government has been impaired" was impossible to deny. To argue 
that dissatisfaction was confined to the educated community - just 
an insignificant minority - was "true, but it is not the whole j
truth..." There was no other influential opinion in India to be
I. Ibid 7.12.1909'; 2. Ibid 17.XI.1909. 3.?uarte£ly Rgview ;
April 1909, P«d9p *
       — :------------------------------ —  ....... ._     ..
wset against that of the educated class* The people might not be
much interested in political ideas yet, but the absence of any
rival school left the path of the educated class free* Their
thought reigned supreme* Since ’’ideas can only be combated by
ideas”, it was necessary to take steps to remove the gradually
I
expanding discontent. The central problem was ’’how to recapture
the confidence of the sober-minded majority of the educated 
2
classes*” The need of reforms was unquestioned, particularly
because it had never been contended that India would be held
indefinitely by the sword in defiance of popular feelings,
Coming to the definite proposals, it was pointed out that
there was ”a serious misapprehension” on the relative importance of
the two major branches of the changes, - those regarding legislative
councils, and executive councils. The public had been worried
less about the former than about the latter* Appointment of
Indians to the executive councils would leave the authority of
the executive unimpaired. But the reform of legislative councils
was a much more dubious experiment: ”it is the first step down
that slippery slope at the bottom of which lies a parliamentary
government for India.” Despite Morley’s protestations, he had
definitely started the Indian administration on a career ’’which it
$
will be hard to arrest until the parliamentary bottom is reached."
They were not happy with the non-official majority. It was 
difficult to look forward with confidence to its outcome. The
1^  Ibid, p.69V. ~ ""
2. Ibid, p.695*
3. Ibid, p.696.
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non-official majority was unlikely to acquire any sudden ’’solicitude
for the dumb peasantry”: the increased representation of landlords
probably pointed to a contrary direction* Wider powers were not
certain to be followed by greater responsibility* Nor was it
improbable that the rival non-officials might ’’have a disagreeable
I
way of coalescing to out-vote” the government# But all these
risks must be taken, as also it must be recognised that in the
devolution of power from the bureaucracy, it could be ”transfe.Yvred
2
only to the classes which are capable of exercising it*”
Straight!orward acceptance of election was not approved* It
would greatly augment the extremist elements in the councils# But
there was no way back# ”If the new situation is not free from
3
hazard, the old one was well-nigh intolerable#”
* * ** ** * * ** ** ** ** ** ** **
The British public enjoyed through this period the benefit 
of ’expert1 advice from retired high officials from India*
Sir Charles Elliott, a former Lt.-governor of Bengal, 
feared that the danger involved in non-official majorities had not 
been fully grasped* This would increase the difficulties of 
legislation ’’for the protection of the rights of the tenants”, 
and would consequently shake their faith in the government's power 
to save them from "oppression and exaction*” In spite of this 
risk, however, he supported the non-official majority for "enhancing
1. Ibid, p.703.
2. Ibid, p#702*
3* Ibid, p*703*
*f# The Nineteenth Century - February 1909 - p*l83*
I
the self-respect and dignity of the councils*”
Interpellation, division and resolution were powerful
instruments replete with serious possibilities* They conceded
to the non-officials the right of censuring the government which
2.
might lead to "disastrous results.” Hostile votes would enfeeble 
the authority of the government; rules and regulations must, 
therefore, be so framed as to minimise these risks.
Sir Chaises Elliott could not persuade himself to support 
the creation of new executive councils, nor the appointment of an 
Indian to the Viceroy's executive council* Apart from the 
difficulties based on the racial and communal distrust among 
Indians, which rendered it impossible to appoint an Indian held 
in universal respect and confidence, there were considerations of 
fitness for the post. The incumbent would be more than a mere 
adviser; he would be head of a great department* To fulfil his 
tasks he should "have passed through an elaborate training and to 
have risen to a' high position in the Administration*” There was 
scarcely any Indian of such attainments. Even the legislative 
department must not be cut off from”the influence which the best 
thought of England can bring to bear on the improvement of the
3
Indian codes” , and should not, therefore, be the permanent charge 
of an Indian member*
Sir Andrew Fraser, also a former Lt.-governor of Bengal, 
called attention to the necessity of a proper appreciation of the
T. Ibid, p. 184.
2. Ibid, - . ~ .
3. Ibid, pp.187-188.
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educated classes. Their importance should neither be exaggerated 
nor unduly minimised. It was a misconception to think that the 
educated were wholly confined to the professional classes. Among 
the landed and the commercial classes there were now many educated 
persons, whose voices were submerged by the clamour of the pro­
fessional classes. In any case, it would not do to ignore and 
treat lightly the educated classes. They had been nourished on
V/estern education: "by many indications and positive declarations
I
of our policy we have given them their hopes and ambitions."
Their reasonable claims must have considerate hearing.
Sir Andrew Fraser favoured all the important provisions of the
reforms. A separate Moslem electorate was desirable. Special
electorates for the landlords and other interests were necessary,
so that while getting rid of the system of nomination the services
of "the natural leaders of special sections of the community"
2
might be secured. To those who favoured nominations to supplement 
elections, he said that nomination would fit ill with the more 
important roles that the new councils were intended to fill. He 
supported non-official majorities, considering the safeguards of 
veto and the right of concurrent legislation vested in the govern­
ment of India sufficient. The appointment of Indians to the 
executive council was welcomed. For one thing, the educated
3
Indians attached "the utmost importance" to the appointment of 
Indians in high places. Perhaps none other of Morley's proposals 
gave them greater satisfaction. And such appointment was in one
I* The Empire Review - March 1909 ~ p.102.
2. Ibid, p.106.
3* Ibid, p.lO^ f.
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sense only "one step further in the policy of employing Indians
in the public service, laid down in Queen Victoriafs proclamation
I
and steadily pursued by the Government ever since *" He^  however,
thought it preferable that the Indian member should possess the
same qualifications and the same training as the British members*
Sir Bamfylde Fuller, a former Lt*-governor of Eastern Bengal 
+
and Assam, thought that the reforms modified "very profoundly" the
ideals of British administration in India* They marked "the
abandonment of our philanthropic interference on behalf of the
2
poor", which was so long "the leading feature" of British rule*
In the provincial councils the government could hardly be expected 
to persist in a measure which was unpopular with the non-official 
members* Apart from the risk of an adverse division, the combined 
voices of the non-officials against any measure would render its 
passage exceedingly difficult* In the supreme legislative council, 
the official majority was too lean to encourage the government to 
excite heat and clamour by forcing their way against the non­
officials. Thus the government’s power of remedial legislation in 
the interest of the ryots had for all practical purposes been 
surrendered. He feared that the peasant proprietors of India
might, without the government’s protection, be reduced gradually
3
into "field or casual labourers."
He was sure that the reforms had been carried too far* The
extremists in Indie 'might construe them as concessions, and render 
TI Ibid, p.loS.
2* United Empire - January 1910 - p.^ +3*
3* Ibid, p#^*
+ He resigned due to difference of opinion with the government
of India over certain measures he proposed to take regarding a
school, whose students had taken part in political agitation*
the measures, desirable in themselves, "exceedingly dangerousJ they
I
may act as a stimulant to violence," Otherv/ise, the measures
’^represent an honest and courageous attempt to raise the status
and increase the influence and self-respect of the Indian educated 
2
classes." On the whole, he was non-committal as to the possible 
outcome, and derived re-assurance from the thought that the
3
mercantile classes and the Moslems were "our active supporters."
** * * * * * * + * * * * *
When the rules and regulations were published the House of 
Lords was not in session. The House of Commons was, but only for 
a short while afterwards. Sir Henry Cotton's efforts to raise 
certain points failed, because the under-secretary for India would 
not welcome sporadic discussions without the entire body of rules 
in hand, which had not yet arrived from India.
A member of parliament, Ramsay Macdonald, who was then travel­
ling in India, criticised the rules and regulations sharply. It 
was a "mistake" to provide for only indirect election by the 
delegates of local bodies. The distrust of Hindus, in comparison 
to the favourable treatment of the Moslems, was particularly a 
great blunder. This would "widen, instead of lessening, the gulf 
between the two communities." He was convinced as to "the entirely
4
mistaken policy" of the reforms. The regulations were "unjust,
3
contradictory and insulting to the educated community."
When parliament re-assembled in 1910 no mention was made
2. The Nineteenth Centnr"y - January 1910 - p • 8•
2. Ibid, p.7.
3. Ibid, p.8.
The Bengalee, 21,11.1909.
5. Ibid, 23.11*1909.
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of the rules and regulations, which had by then taken effect.
Speaiding on the Indian budget in 1910, the under-secretary
for India, S.S.Montagu, declared that the reforms had been ”a great 
I 2
success.” The results "actually surpass our expectations.11 The
debates in the councils were remarkable for moderation and reason:
nthe old idea that non-officials must necessarily be in opposition
3
seems to have disappeared.” The non-official members had displayed 
'•admirable dignity and sense of responsibility”; the officials
if
had discharged their duties with "conspicuous and gratifying success.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
It is clear that the Indian Councils Act, 1909, made important
+
changes. The immense increase in the non-official representation,
the introduction of proper elections, the greater authority for the
members to assert their views, and the obligation the officials
were necessarily put under to try to approximate their views to
)
the non-officials - all these made for closer association of 
Indians with the administration. Though the authorities did not 
think that parliamentary government - the accepted ideal of 
politically active Indians - was feasible, some of the institutions 
given to India were distinctly parliamentarian in character. This 
was no doubt a source of considerable comfort and satisfaction to 
educated Indians. The appointment of Indians to executive councils 
might, if narrowly viewed, be less significant. But in the eyes 
of Indians it was no less desirable, as it was the practical
recognition of the Indian's fitness to govern. It was no less
iT Indian Debates - House of Commons (1910; p.l§6.
2. Ibid, p.187.
3. Ibid, p.189* 
if. Ibid, p.18?*
+ See Appendix.
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gratifying because it removed the stigma of racial inferiority*
It is significant that although bringing about these changes, 
Morley and Minto never tired of declaring that parliamentary 
government was not India*s destiny. Soon after the Act was, passed,
Minto wrote to Morley, nWe are ready to accept Indian assistance,
to share our administration with Indians, to recognise their
natural ambitions, but, for their own sakes, the supreme guidance
I
must be British..... '* How Indian ambitions could be met, while
giving them a share in the government of the country, without intro­
ducing parliamentary government he never explained.
Thinking of the transient nature of the British population 
in India, Morley confessed his realisation "how intensely artificial
and unnatural is our mighty R§j ;1 and was convinced that it could 
2
not last. While the bill was still being debated in the House of
Commons, he wrote that he dared ”not suppose that we have finally
3
settled this business.M Again, in another context, after the 
reforms had been brought into force, he expressed the same belief 
about the future of British rule in India. He was "not certain 
that it will last for ever, or even for many years to come.” Yet 
he never hazarded a solution of the problem which sprang from his 
reading of the future of Indian administration. Even otherwise, 
if parliamentary government would not do for India, what was to be 
the next step? Surely, Indian political aspirations would not stop
IndiaT"Minto 8c Morley - p.30% (Letter dt. 17.6" .1909")
2. Ibid, p.133 (Letter dt. 15.8.1907)
3. Recollections t II - p.303 (Letter dt. 2.4.1909)
4. India, Minto 8c Morley - p.4l8 (Letter dt. 19#10.1910)
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at the concessions of 1909! It is unfortunate that no indication
of the views of Minto and Morley in this respect can he found. It
has been argued that Morley*s assertion that occidental machinery
*
must follow the occidental education held the key to the future. 
Probably it did, but whether that was Morleyfs decided view must 
remain a matter of conjecture in view of his subsequent repeated 
assertions that India's political future did not lie through 
parliamentary government. Is it that his conscious mind refused 
to accept the answer which his sub-conscious self knew as very 
probable?
* * ** ** lie* * * ** ** ** **
The Indian Councils Act, 1909, has variously been claimed as 
I 2
a starting point, and as the culmination of a process. If, with
the knowledge of later events, it is contended that this Act
marked the utmost extent to which representation without political
responsibility had been conceded, it was indeed the culmination.
But it is valid at the same time to say that the right to elect
representatives without the sanction of the executive, along with
the non-official majority in provincial councils, was really the
starting point of the political evolution which was destined to
end in the supremacy of the popular will as expressed through
the elected representatives of the people. In fact, the story of
the development of self-government in India can best be viewed as
1. "The Morley-Minto reforms were the first real breach in the 
system of l86lM - Cambridge History of India, vol.VI, p.237*
2. "The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 marked the close of the 
first phase of Indian politics." - C.H.Philips - India - p.109*
+ The Congress reckoned the reforms as only an instalment. See 
above p. bLjb
* House of Lords, 23*2.1909, See Ch.VIII - p.
a continuous process. Any division into other than broad phases
must be more or less incongruous. Thus regarded, no single step
in the progress is isolate$,and no single contribution insignificant. 
** ** ** ** ** ** ** * *
.It is appropriate to say something of the respective roles
of Morley and Minto. It cannot be disputed that the principal
ideas of reform were first mentioned in the correspondence between
+
Minto and Morley by the latter. We have also seen from time to time
that many important decisions were Morley*s. Particularly his
decisions regarding non-official majority, executive councils for
Lt.-governors, supplementary questions and disqualifications were
calculated to increase the popularity of the measure with Indians.
Ih reaching these decisions Morley looked far ahead of others, and
left on the reforms an impress of his convictions*
But it would be unjust to conclude from this that the part
played by Minto was unimportant. Far from it. It must not be
forgotten that the main structure of the reforms, in its multiple
ramifications,was erected in India, There is no doubt also that
Minto's was the initiative in India. ■ The central and the provincial
governments were always under the pressure of his persistence.
Besides, without Mintofs wholehearted cooperation, many a time
given despite his colleagues* opposition, the course of events
would have taken a very different turn. Even when Minto differed
from Morley, he placed the interests of reforms first, and did
nothing to increase Morley's embarrassments. To take this as
evidence of Minto*s weakness is to debase the sincere cooperation
which existed between Minto and Morley. But Minto*s greatest________
+ Letter dt. 15*6.1906. See Ch.VII p. 2.&S~
hl°[
contribution was to remain steadfast to the reforms in the face
of a violent outburst of extremist nationalism, along with the
clamour this raised both in India and in Britain* He was greatly-
perturbed and was unable to take them as coo!|y as Morley. He
could have suggested waiting until the political sky cleared to
some extent. That Minto stood firm was because the reforms were
as much his child as Morleyfs, and because he was convinced that they
would help, not hinder, the administration of the country.
** ** * * +* * * ** ** ** **
Throughout this work it has been noted that the educated 
classes were often represented by officials as incapable of looking 
after the interests of the vast mass of their countrymen. The 
suggestion hai been made that being a small body themselves, their 
concern was too personal. It was said that the interests of the 
ordinary people would be much safer in the hands of the British 
officials. This view overlooked the fact that elsewhere, even in 
England, the interests of the ordinary people had been in the keeping 
of persons other than their own representatives for centuries. What 
proof is there that the Indian educated classes were unequal to, 
and unwilling to fulfil, the duties v/hich their compatriots in 
other lands discharged?
The educated classes might mean many things. To some they 
meant the professional classes, though all the educated persons were 
not in the professions. To examine how far the educated classes 
thought of the country and its people, going beyond their own 
interests, we may perhaps take the Indian National Congress as the
typical organ of the educated classes.
The Congress proceedings do not sustain any chaiige of narrow 
self-interest of the educated community. Though more attention was 
paid to political programmes, - the Congress being a political 
organisation this was not surprising, - there was repeated 
reference to other issues with which the welfare of the masses 
were closely linked. There were demands for the revival of indig­
enous arts and manufacture, the introduction of new industries 
and of technical education. A knowledge of improved methods of 
production and distribution was sought, and the need for organisation 
of capital and credit pressed. Resolutions were adopted seeking
increases of wages for tea estate labourers, and a decrease of the
I
salt-tax "which produces geat hardship to the poorest classes."
In the field of education, they requested "a much larger allotment
than at present out of public funds for educational expenditure, so
as (a) to spread primary education more widely among the mass of
the people, and to make a beginning in the direction of free and
2
compulsory education " Manual training, scientific agriculture,
and technical institutes were among other proposals. The improve­
ment of agriculture was yet another frequent appeal/ and experiment­
al farms were asked for. The indebtedness of the peasantry gave 
rise to concern as did some times the high prices of food-stuffs.
Land revenue was a perennial source of controversy. The Congress 
disliked the periodical increase in revenue and called for "a
3
reasonable and definite limitation of the State-demand." Conceding
T! Resolution XIX(ii)(b) of 1901.
2. Resolution II of 190^.
3» Resolution XV of 1905*
kv
for the sake of argument that this last demand was more in the
+
interest of the landlords than of the ryots, we cannot dismiss most
of the other proposals in the same way*
It may be said that adopting resolutions was an easy affair,
and cost the educated classes nothing. But in spheres where they
could take action?they were not idle. For example, in the field
of education, the contribution of the educated people was far from
insignificant. Compared to 28,944 public educational institutions
in India in 19^7, there were 75*624 private aided and 96,189 private
I
unaided institutions. The keenness with which the educated classes
sought a wider scope of education for their countrymen soon found
strong expression in Gokhale's "heroic efforts to make Government
accept the principle of compulsory education." In this Gokhale
was probably encouraged by the example of the Gaekwar of Baroda,
who had introduced compulsory education throughout his state in
1906. In March 1910 Gokhale moved a resolution in the imperial
legislative council recommending that "a beginning should be made
in the direction'of making elementary education free and compulsory
2
throughout the country." His subsequent efforts, which included 
a bill in the following year, did not succeed.
Even the Swadeshi movement, shorn of its political outgrowth, 
was basically well-intentioned and far from sinister. But its 
constructive aspect was lost to view in the turmoil of factious 
frenzy and the boycott of foreign goods. Had this move been kept
1. J.D.Rees - Modern India - p.194
2, Syed Nurulla & J.P.Naik - A history of education in India - p.93^ 
+ See .'Land Revenue Policy of the Indian Government (Calcutta
1902) - Published by order of the governor-general in council.
Jf?z-
on a primarily economic and industrial level, the story of Swadeshi
might have been very different.
But many a nascent good is lost in the wake of blind fury. Thus
indeed it was in India, especially at the turn of the century. The
distrust between the officials and the educated classes had become
so deep that the cool stream of reason often lost its way amidst
the dreary desert of excited antagonism. Neither was able to
properly evaluate the actions and motives of the other. The educated
classes also failed to appreciate the benefic^ent legislation which
the government passed for the welfare of the tenants. Much had been
done to protect the ryots against exorbitant demands of unscrupulous
landlords, just as much had been done to give them fixity of tenure
at fair rent. Similarly the controversy over the Age of fonsent 
+ f
Bill and the plague-prevention measures now seem unnecessary. Even
some of Curzon's educational reforms, which enraged the educated 
people then almost to fever heat, are now acknowledged to have con­
tained germs of good. In educational circles the sentiment for 
him today ”is one of appreciation and understanding. Curzon, it is 
now admitted, did yeoman service to the cause of education. He was
the author of the great movement for educational reconstruction
I
which started in the beginning of the century.” But in those days 
of controversy the benevolent intentions of either party did not 
Hatch the eyes of the other. The effect of this psychological 
maladjustment in their mutual relations was harmful. More than 
anything else, it' put at a discount the idea of peaceful and planned
* Feeling rose &e high against the preventive measures, that Hand 
the Plague fommissioner of Poona, and his assistant, Lt.Ayerat, lost 
their lives at the hands of assassins.
P.T.O.
+ The Age of Consent Act raised the ^ e of consent from 10 to 
12 years. The measure originated in a move by a noted Indian 
journalist, Malabari, but was vigorously attacked by Tilak*
4 £3
development, and gradually made for circumstances in which 
building barriers and creating deadlock were to be more usual in 
Indian politics than compromise, constancy and collaboration.
was perhaps to some extent inevitable. The latter, by their 
western education, deemed themselves on a level with the officials 
in the intellectual sphere. They were not ready to accept willing-
concern for the downtrodden masses, which tended to weaken their
eyes, the officials were the powerful links which held together 
the barrier to Indian self-government. The officials, on the other 
hand, perceived in the educated community the only real challenge 
not only to their position, but also to what they symbolised, - 
British supremacy in India. The demand for self-government, which 
the educated classes made^ put them apart from other Indians, and 
revealed them as potentially the greatest peril to the continuance 
of British authority in India. The officials generally could not 
take kindly to them and saw them as an upstart class, "whiuh has 
no affinity with the landed aristocracy or the natural rulers of 
India or the mercantile, or the agricultural communities; which
were "simply the artificial creation of British rule", and would
be "the first to disappear" if that rule ceased: their demands
3
were "crude and foolish utterances." That the educated classes
between the officials and the educated classes
ly any claim of the officials, including the latter*s much vaunted
case for a share in thejadministration of the country. In their
I
has nefeer before occupied a position of any importance....." They
2
1. Sir George Chesney - Indian Polifcy - p.380
2. Ibid, p.399«
3. Ibid, p.387
justified their stand by resort to Western thinking and that they
swore by Western Masters did not mojfify the officials. In their
eyes the educated classes were mere imitators of Western ways
without any real capacity for governing. In their perplexity some
of them sought comfort in the thought that the Assumption that
all the races of the earth possess the same natural power, and
that the backward ones may by training and propinquity be readily
brought up to the level of a higher civilisation, has yet to be 
I
established.'1 It does credit to neither party that this somewhat
natural clash of interests deteriorated into an attitude of set
conflict, conspicuous more for passion than for reason.
* * ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Out of these differences grew divergent notions about rep­
resentative government in India. The votaries of Indian self- 
government took for granted their title to represent their country­
men. That the vast masses of people v/ere mostly incapable of 
signifying their political convictions, if any, did not assail 
them with doubts. To themselves their bona fides in this matter 
were beyond question. Evidently, they deemed themselves more 
entitled to speak for their countrymen than a body of foreign 
bureaucrats, who had nothing in common with the indigenous populat­
ion and who were there avowedly to sustain a foreign regime. On 
the other hand, the officials, many of whom had an intimate know­
ledge of, and insight into, the cross currents of the Indian 
population and of their widely varying, - and sometimes rival, -
I. Ibid, p.398
interests, beliefs and ideals could not accept that being an Indian, 
by itself, was adequate credential to stand forth as a popular 
representative, v/ithout the addition of any compelling tie to bind 
the people and their representative. Their theories of represent­
ation did not support such a tenuous link between the people and 
their spokesman. They,therefore, felt themselves justified in 
defying the claim of the small class of politically advanced 
Indians to shape the destiny of millions of their voiceless country­
men. conflicting interpretations of representation were
responsible for much of the complexity and bitterness which vitiated
the political development in India,
* * ** * * * * ** ** ** * * **
These approaches to the political issue were closely linked 
with the purpose which the two opposing schools intended represent­
ation to fulfil. The Congress case was initially based on the need 
for offering the people an opportunity to make known their desires 
and wants. But this argument soon receded into the background,
 ^and instead the right of the people to participate in their countryfs 
administration was stressed. Representation came more and more to 
be regarded as the preliminary for Indian self-government. The 
officials never accepted this stand. From time to time they spoke 
of the need to meet the just hopes and aspirations of the educated 
community. This might sometimes sound like an advocacy of political 
concessions; but to them representation was principally the means 
of ascertaining the wishes and aspirations of the people, gnd of 
explaining the policy of the government to them. Since the Indian
mpopulation with its multiple divisions and rivalries did not 
appear to them to be a homogeneous body, they expected through 
representation to find out how the different interests reacted toJ  
governments policies and measures. Hence their insistence on / 
representation of classes and interests. They considered popular 
representation in the accepted sense of the West as risky, because 
they did not believe that the rperesentative of a particular 
section was aware of, or willing to further, the interests of others. 
The interminable divisions of the population and the impossibility 
of universal suffrage in India were the insurmouhtable barriers.
This view of representation explains why it was thought that
the interests of the landed classes could be represented by a
landlord only, or that only a Moslem could be the proper spokesman
of Moslem opinion. Separatism was thus the basis and the outcome
of the official interpretation. But this faith in separate
representation and the difficulty of any interest being represented
except by its own members, did not prevent the government from
asserting time and again that the interests of the masses were safe
only in the hands of the officials. If the latter were capable of
representing interests outside themselves, why should not the same
be expected of others? By claiming the monopoly of this arduous
and responsible task of representing the masses, however, the
authorities not only betrayed a lack of faith in the non-officials
as a class, but also deviated from the raison d'etre of their
approach to representation.
* * * * * * * + * * * * * * * *
h V
This set attitude of the officials perhaps explains why on 
the side of the government, the initiative for reforms tended to 
come from persons who were not usually immured in the traditions 
and beliefs of the Civil Service in India. Ripon, Dufferin,
Morley and Minto - to whom- the case for reforms was obvious and 
therefore fit to be taken up - were free from the handicaps 
ensuing from a too thorough knowledge of the details of a political 
problem. This left their vision comparatively unclouded by the 
difficulties and doubts which bristled through official thinking, 
and enabled them to bring to bear on the issue the fresh outlook 
of a wider knowledge of human affairs. It was left to them to 
begin and to carry the official world, often unenthusiastic and 
dubious, with them.
On the who}.e, one cannot but be struck by the government's 
disavowal of representative government for India and their simul­
taneous political concessions to Indians which clearly headed that
way. This contradiction between ideas and actions - symptomatic 
of a confusion about the aim of the British rule in the country - 
robbed the government of the lead which they might otherwise have 
gifeen. As it was, the Congress was left to take charge, and the 
government - no less than other bodies of non-official opinion - 
presented the appearance of being unwillingly caught in the Congress 
tide. Lacking convincing evidence of drive and purpose, the reforms 
looked pale in the context of the nationalist ardour, and were 
liable to he taken as halting and half-hearted measures granted 
under the force of circumstances.
I Li**
2 *xi <D
43 -p 
t as 
>>-P 
to
*0 <*4© O 
R
O
•H
•P Off
2 43 R ©
CS Vi ra o 
©
to to
< i
%
IS
©.
CO
§
u
©
■§
43
o
Vl 
©
> 
o
bOO
©
x:
43 «*4
G
u
©
-p43'O©
a *O m 
U  *H 
Pi *t?
n h
«i
o
•H
o
*H
Oh
t
.9
•' •
CO
o
•H
0 
•H
<V|
1
8  
' •
<
£ © ©
■2 S ’
bQ bO
© ©© to
to ©
■S
s,
•k
© ••
g-s
*© &
£  •
5
I
£
a*
o
*o w +»
© ©
PM oo o
. . to bO c3 V.
, o 43
+  PQ O
© &o 43
t
3
K m u
©
u
©
' i
*T3
©43
©
w
. •
p
1
CS tS a  as
© cs
pq *n>
•H T3
© PQ r-i
CS •V
-=f ' CVI 1*°* x j-
•g in LTvrn
© * I
© © iH
© •P © &
b © P Vi
pm © © ©
© Vi i - I © R
V. © to \ ©
42 S to0
$  ^
gj 1
43 Vi
. © •CJ Q*© H  ,0 © R
© <*5 43 U43 •H O <9 ©
S O 43 R >R © •H O•H Pi O P bO
g ra fe 2O •P R ©
R »o Xi
R Vi © 43
© cs as x»
H
©
x i 
ra 43 0 V•H © 43 •H
O •h ra u *T3
•H 43 ra •t as R
<V1*H 0 m ra r4
<V-J Vi H 43 ra O
O
£ l |
Ti ©
©
©
5
<0 E S fl U
5^ W O
• •
Pi
L
I P
j °
o
o
©
, >
1 P
| -P
\AI W
I tfl
J
oa
g
TS
© •
41 © '  
P  P' 
t as: 
>»P  
,Q W)
tJ Q-b
ffi 0» 
8
O >5
P  P,
P  ©>
2 +* 8 <D>
Off Pt
OB 05 
©> 
m  to 
-4
co Pi
O •rH
to
%
TS
J»«=3
©
p
J*
*° -43 © 803 <Do | cu 8 
o p 
^ © Pm j> 
O
w fcO 
< 1
KN rev
CVJ
cu a
o
P
O
•H
<H
<1-1
O
' •
<
tc\
©
•H
<H
<1-1
0
1
K
< 1
cs n
© <H
Pi o
p  ©
ra m
© M
a
XfS
©
*d
© _
 ^pra ra P
© © ©
^  OJ
P P  
tJ 0to _ © Ov._/ c £3 ra
O *p p H
ra
pq ^
O
^  O
© 42
u
3
p
©
>o
to
©
42
P
pq
«
42 rH
43 5© O 
JL, P  
O <W| 
8 <1-4 
O
"8 © 8 42
•» O 
•t? p  
©
P >»
s*g
P  ©
8 fe 
.5 •£
pq
K\
©
P
©
*8
i
*o
©
p
o
©
rH
W
o
»H
OJ
J
p
%
£ "H
© as
■g6 _T§*H•H iH
2 § 2
£ § 8O ©
© I> © 
O P  p  
• H P ©  
<P 8 O 
Oh O O 
O © >  
IK * ©  
H ©cJl 
M
O
P
o Q
00
8 *2O 8
P ©
P
© •3 ©
P P «H
0 © P
Pi O P
P H
O
O P  St s
© P m
09 P 0 P
© P P ©
P P  8 >
*© ra p P
P  g 8
jS O P
/—\
© 4» ©
w
p
©
T3
H
42
*8
a
*p
8
3
8
IP
P
*
3
Pm
rH
©
 ro © W)
CO H  4  CJ H
ra
tflitH
s 3
TS 0
© p
© <P
© <P 1
0 #•
© 09
© p
P  42 ©
Q -Q
8 0
p ©
*> 8
8
© © •p
P © ©
P p
8 42 0
p to ©
£ *H rH
0 © w
•18
• 0
PQ
8o
p
p
©
o
Pi
p
o
o
©
g
ts
3
©
8
©
3 ©
8 «H 
© P  
O P  43 rH
P  Si 
© P  
P  © 
Sw P  
P  8
•s i
Q
P
P
©
©
£
ra
P
©
TJ
*H
■a
3
©
0
p
i
0
0
n
2 u8 ©© 43H 8ra
5
0
_ _
© <H
If
J
©
P
©
1
f a  
© 
p
p  
©
r-i
as 
P  
O 
P
©
42 
EH
r-i
43
O
P
©
o
©
8
3
pi
H
£
p
8©
*>
o
to
©
£
IPp
*§
«H
p
o
p
£
©
>
o
to
©
42
P
IPP
'O
3
©
5
P
O
18
92
 
Ac
t 
wa
s
ri0
©
>♦H
w
©
•H
Wl
•3
£I
1 18
to
© •
X ©
p P
©
I>5P
X ra
ru
9 oR
o
•H 17
P ©
Q p
R ©
© R
ra ©
©
ra ra
q. • 
O CD
•g &
R R 
© © 
>  X  O O
t o p
©© o
X  »**
P «H
fl °
•H R
©ft3 p 
© P  ra © 
O H  
P-i 
O' © 
R, »H
^ • acm M
< 1!
ca,<->
€o
CQ
©
A
P>
X>
T3 P
o  R
to © 
O  S &  2  
o  R JR ©
^ g
to tO«Kt|
kn
o•ri
©
•ri
<R
<R0
1
K
to
* 0
c
•ri
fco
k
*
s
r i
OJ OJ
H
OJ
R
J!P
©
R
©
1)XR op
*TJ fl^3© © ©
P © «r!
P  ©R R *rl•H P «Rs © «RtR OrH
•
to
R  
*  O
ra
-15 |H 
M © © »ri ft O 
K »H
©
<TJ
©
P
§•ri
R
jS
O
rH
a
5
SsO
R
R
»o
©p
o
©
rH
w
p
CJ «-* Rs ©/NH
o •ip •H ©
iH P nO •H
RO T5 ©
R © «H•H
R
ra
ra ©
R
1 © 
> 
o
to
©
X
-p
tf•H
TJ2  
iH
S
«H
R
O
Li‘id
tc\
OJ
R
3 r 3
* $ © O 
R «H 
9  <H
o © 
R x
% o
*o -p 
©
P  >»
a - i
1 1 
& *
■ •
to
«-* -Cj- -Dt iH KN KN CM
ra
*©
R
R 0
o O»H X
1 P© ra rH— R © ©ra O •ri O
R
©
>9
eo
P
iH
S3
o
&
P©
£ 1>) •H •H
© O RT? X •rl P© R R ra
p o P •H© to P©rH
to © X o
+5•ri
©
R
©
JS
R
to
©
R
©
•©
1  IX  ©
•o rH
ra
M
R
a
o  *rf
O P
© o
rH to ©
o
K\ ON LT\
iH
*t3 ©
OJ
to
R
a
R
©
>
O
to
©
Xp
3
I
i
R
O
©
xp
o
ra *■© 
R R 
© cs
& I*
H
•rt HI
£
a
O  ©  V  
■ri >* ©S *ri 4a 
P  CS <Rl 2  O *R © O
? 8 1  
£
ra
rH
&O•ri
£
0
TS
©ps
«H
1to
to
ra|H
a
«4
%
a
§
TJ
©
P
I
O
ra
R
©
■§
»©
©
■6
H
P
$© CS
ra *o
©
X a e
O to rH
I i s
rH S_j
•9 oPQ o
<1—^
© X o
•ri
ra
R
©
.5£
»o
CSna ra 
R R
cs csra,H
P R
g©rsics
O  03
<R R
O C3
O r©ra o R R © *H 
cs P CO 
*©
CS o oCQ
©
raI!
©X  R
P ° R *ri
9 P
* • $  
© o 
>  o  
•H ra p ra 
csA
<R
©
©
R
X
P
^ " S
O *H
ra *© 
© R 
•h «
s s
&.S
•H ra 
O *H 
•H {>
R *H 
P *o
X )
CO
ra
r 'S
© © 
ox g
rH O
ra *H o ra O *H 
rH |> 
H  
p •© 
O
•H © 
R © 
P  R ra X
•H p
P
R
§
R
©>
Oto
©
Xp
SP
• r i
'B
iH
I
R
O
(© • 
»sfi 0 
4P  -P
!>»' ria 0
to 
18 °
£  £*
-P 0 
O P
:fi 0(0 (hi 0 O 
0 0 0
■“3
0
Ft o
Op
Fl
P 0 •Q 0 0
Fl P rH
Fl as* 0 •ri
TO > ©
0 0 •ri
P
fi
0
fc
& Fl o•ri 0e .2 ® 
£ * - °
'• •
<J
rH NO vO rH
Fl
O•ri
P
0
Ft 0
O 0 no
P t 0 Fi
Fi •r i 0
O P O
O •r i &
rH P
0
P & s
•r i
0
P •r i •r i F i
Ft q Fi 0
O •ri P >rH fi 0 •ri
0 p •ri fi
O 13 « £>
/~ s
0 O no*W»
0
Fi
0
O
u
Fl
.3
10rH
0
s
0 <F| LD .3
& rHin
t
s
0 UJE3 o
45 g 
0 
>  
•ri O•O E»0
A
s•ri
bll
V
u
o
vO
OJ
CM
rO «H
0
©
•ri
P•ri
rH
8.
•ri
5
b
0
*0
Fl
0
o
.O
P
©•riu
p
•ri
Q
>>
P
•r l
0U
0
5
£
n
V*
0nz)ri
O
*C
"S
a
!»s
o
o
if
■B
A
(U
0iri
0
0
O
u
0
oo
<ri
O
Fi
0
FtO•ri
P
0•ri
O
o
0
0
<
0
0no
E
Eh
rH
■S
OFt
©
o p1 
O •ri
Ft
a
•o
AM
'V 0 ho JC *rl •O
m
s CM
0
rH
A
A
«-i
8
Fi
0
t*
0
0
<iHo
I•• n
0 0 
F« «ri eg
© *G fi•a 5 5
© 0fi ri<ri 
as > no © *ri © 5 no
o© •'“N
iri at
- •
FQ
fi
o
•ri
P
Eo
&o
©
as
P
P
Po
rH
3
•ri
0
U
0
>•ri
Fl
J=>
5
Fi
0
Fl
5
P
0
0O
0
0
O •ri Fi 0
O O 0 0
*Sh
O
0 1
0
Fi AO 0 O 0 ©
Fi «*C
o a rH
0 0 Fi o 0
£ 0 0 x •ri
n •VS •ri no O0
•fi E fi fia
0
PiO EH H CO
/«—N /-S n
•o 0 $H &Q JCS
' w> ■+ '-ri•x.
Fi •o P
TO fi P
0 Ft o
p 0
<ri
© > no0 0
0 o rH o M
Jd 0 to  F l
p Fi CO 1O
0 • £fl p. © Po fl P  Iri 0
Fi 0 ,o<ri<§ TOrH 0Jfi noP P  rH
rH rH O P
0 0 £
0
t>>
P
Q
Ho &
fi •ri 0 *TS ra
Fi P ra 0 0
0
A
w Fi Pa a •r iP e
0 0
.fl
© O10
o
p
P rH
0
Fi ©
0o *2 •r i F l rH© fi O O 0
0 « 0 •r i
p
.3 •r i
0
©
p i ra ra 0 A
fccO Fi Fi o «o•r i 0 0 © 0
rH s i JA o P-V O EH ra•riP
o •x.. 0 ra
Un
it
ed
 
Pr
ov
is
oe
s 
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
Co
un
ci
l
©
-P©
fl©©
ra
©
ra-p
*
so ••ri © 
•P -P© as 
fl -P © © ©
© O<3
vOOJ
•P
§
©«*.©
©fl o © -p
•9d o
i w
fl
•fl ©  ©  o i! H 
■p -p ©
<5fi © o
fl ^  «H
8 & S <floI
OJ
fl
©
S 
©%
ra 
-P 
fl 
©
fl o
©
©
»0 H rH 
© © © 
4? *n *ri © C O  •ri «ri 
<ri*ri *fl O O
k
g
&
©
•ri
I
©
a
©
!
*EJ
©
-PO
©rH
ra
o
a
& cu CO
TO
rH
O
© O
•ri
-P f l »o•ri •ri ©
rH •P
© 2L
ra -P 
© «r|
tO *ri E
fl q 0
a t <ri
fl to
>> d 0 '
PQ •P
/—•» ' “ 'OJ
© ra
OJ rat rH
3  3
k n
a
©
>0 to1
J§
•p
IP•riTJ
fl
•ri
flO
f OJ
fl
-§
■P
©
fl
8 jsrH
■8 a 
fl.s
© o 
■p
I -2
fl o 
«o -pfl?
©
©
•ri
£
rH
&  
I *ri •* O
© -ri 
fl fl
©
*1
I
*fl
©
-po
©rH
ra
ra
§
a
©
to
a
©
© *©© © •ri .O
&
a
r-i
<
M
•P •ri ra fl
I
s§
° & ra *ri •o ©fl *ri CS flO fl ra fi
-p a © © *ri rH 
fl rH
*E S © « •ri ©
Q
«fl©
aOra
!§
a
©
rH
TO
J9ri
©
©fl rH
I aO ©aO
M 10 >»-P© •ri
u fl
© tsfl
*1 a i
© 0ra a ©
0 M
rs
**H to
fl
§©>0
to1
a
©ra•p
ip•H
I
I
ao
ti©
a©>o
to
ra
©ra
■p
o*ra
©
©o
rao
fl
ra
©
81
TOri
a
Ch
8 
- *
OJ KN rH rH
© 
rH  
< TO
©©©ra©
rH
aoaco
©
rafl
©
*d
I
»©
©-p
©
a
w
*
o
o
fl
©
oo
%
fl
©
CD OJ
© ra T3
OJ OJ
aW
© ra
© ©
a
© ©
t ra ro
©
I *
©rH
ra
*fl
ra?
fl
I
©
>0to1
a
©
ra•p
ip
•ri•O
flrH
©
$
flO
Th
e 
to
ta
l 
st
re
ng
th
 
un
de
r 
th
e 
18
92
 
Ac
t 
wa
s 
16
#
Ea
st
er
n 
Be
ng
al
 
an
d 
As
sa
m 
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
Co
un
oi
l
>>
fl
©43
2
0
©
09
©
43
43
>»
43
•O
S
0 ••H ©43 4*
2 ©S3 43
© rara
44
ra 0
SI OJ
iri 01 aH 01 h
I*
fl
©&4>
43
£
©•O
o43
* fl «»TJ <T #H
© © at43 43 -H
fl ©©  *H> Q-J _ © 4h© n oS
ft
A
15
Wu
©
©43o
fl«
o
ra
fl
fiH
&
«rlO
fH
©
i
ua
43o
•h n  
fl *p 43 fl
fl g
ft 43
ra14
©
3
o
45
c
fl
fl
ra
ss5
ra 0
•H tp
© 43 •© 4h bD
r4
CU
«fl
JSfl
43 o «rt
84^§<fl O
43 43 Ofl o 
43
*0 fl 
© © 
43 ©
£bO
•
CO CU Cl H
43O
•H
fl43
fl
»o
*§ ra 0 *p 
flf r a ©  w © O ra «H ,© 
fl 43 ra © «H f*4 fl 
•O H fl ©
I  S I ?
s i s !
+* .8 ~ o 3
fl ~
W a
A
O *0 © 44
fl
K\ CU kn
fl
fl
fl
«  io
h
£
*d
©43
{fl
ft
&
ra
ra 43
43 «
ra ©
© fl
fl ©
©
*g 1
fl
©
© 4£
© fl
64 *9
/■*
© 44
a
<M a
.o tuo
e to s
8>fi 1
uo
UM VO 
CU cu
+ g $ A
©4<43
O
1
I
flo
Th
e 
to
ta
l 
st
re
ng
th
 
un
de
r 
th
e 
38
92
 
Ao
t 
wa
s 
36 
•
OS43
©s
©a
J§
•P
£
© •A ©
•H «f 
■Po ra
© 4l ra O
St cu
u
i
©
n it 
* 8
is©*> ra
•O H  H
£ 3 3
S 5  
•a
° 3
. 44
K\
.j +
to
a
u
©
f
•a
©43o
©|H
■ •
o
VO
CU Kr
1 § 
S i
© o
J z  ho 
43
I
1
*4o
a K\ I *
IT\
CU
a
U
©
•©
©
3w
•
to
a
3
s
o
*«
©
fcO
*4
©
1
K\ CU CU
3
3
3*4
«s
3
3
34»
J§ *•H*
*©
©
438 I*H
8
3
n
3i |•H
1
•
I *4w CO
©
/~s
43w
0s *^
*a
«w*
ra
U
©■i s
•a
©
•8
a
43
©bU4i
>*
s
©
u
©
£
fl (£
W
so CM 01
<s•p
©
£
•fl
a •o •
•H 4>
1 *  fi a
a
<
5
i
fi
l
© a 
a 49 © a
PM fi © © fi -g
O 5  
£■«
«
•§
£
■S3
H  a
| |
•P 49  
©
** 81 
3
GO CM
I * IT
•O -fi 
© fl
fl
fl
fl
s
CO
2
fl
5
8
© 49
© O
© 4-4
fl
fl
fl
hS
fl
fl
&
a
•a
©
-p
*H
§
R
PQ
fi
©-P4h
«S
«H . .
« I
t & l
.S fl®
b’e -s 's
otO % fi * a
Sfl fi o ©•H fi •d © 43 O 
© Jfl C5 «rt 42 4s *H m fi - o a •H -fl O 
fi4> a
■B<jy
©
&
to
I
©
1
2
fi
o
o
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A* Private Fa parts
I Kimberley Papers at Wymondham*
II Hamilton Papers at India Qffioe Library*
III Gladstone Papers at British Museum*
17 Ripon Papers at British Museum*
I have also seen the Campbell-Bannerman Papers at British Museum but 
found no information of significance to my subject*
Beoords
I Indian Councils Collections of Sir Richard Burn*HThese collections
in four volumes cover the period from 1907 to 1909* Burn, then serving 
in the United Provinces, ■was placed on special duty in connection with_^ 
implementing the Indian Councils Act I9O9 in that province* The firs^ 
two volumes concern the formulation of the United Provinces government 
policy regarding the Morley-Minto reforms* The last two volumes 
contain a mass of information about the drawing up of rules and 
regulations for the United Provinces* These collections contain 
official correspondence, memoranda^, public representation, office ,
notes etc* j
II At India Office* (a) India Public Proceedings, 1880-1902* ^
(b) Public letters from India, 1880-1902* j
fc) Public Despatches to India, 1880-1902*
(d) India Council Minutes, vols*XLI7 to LXXXIX,
1880-1902.
(e) Dissent of Members (of India Council), vol.III.
(f) India Office Collections, Ho*3l|5 & 5/+5A.*
C* Parliamentary Papers
1880-C2732* Condition of India* Report by Mr*James Caird, with 
correspondence »
1888— 22Zj.s "Bill - Indian Councils Act, 1861, Amendment*
1889 - 05715* Indian Administration during the post thirty years
of British rule in India *
1890 — 56* Bill - India Councils Amendment.
81: Bill - Local councils*
Ij2: legislative councils: Returns of the dates of
establishment and members etc*
C595°* Rumbers and Functions of the several councils in India: 
correspondence*
I39O-9I - 67, 171* Bill: Indian Councils Act 186l, Amendment*
1892 - 186, I93: Ditto.
1893 • C7181: General Report on the Census of India, 1891*
I89U- 86: legislative councils: Return showing the composition of the1
several legislative councils in India# and the regulations 
made under the Indian Councils Act, 3892*
1895 - 283s Financial Statement (Government of India) for 1895^96 •
1896 - 08258s Expenditure of India: First Report of Royal Commission# 
I9OO - CI3OS Expenditure of India; Royal Commission - Appendices
to report by Sir W.Wedderburn, Mr*Caine and Mr^lfeoroji# 
l90l|. - C20l|.7s Census of India in 1901s General Report#
1905 * C2658: Eastern Bengal and Assam: Papers relating to the
reconstitution of the provisoes of Bengal and Assam#
1906 - C27I46: Ditto#
1907 - C37IO: Imperial Advisory Council and Provincial Advisory
Councils, the enlargement of legislative councils, and 
the discussion of the Budgets Papers# 
lip: Financial Statement for I907 - 08, and proceedings of
the legislative council of governor-general thereon#
1908 - Cd*i4426: East India (Advisory and legislative councils etc#)
Vol#I# Proposals of the government of India and 
despatch of the secretary of state#
Cd#l^35* Ditto: vol.II, Part I: Replies of the local governments 
etc#
Cd.J4Ij.36: Ditto: vol#II, Part II# Replies of the local
governments etc#
1909 * Cd#l4630s Report of the Royal Commission upon Decentralisation
in India#
Cd#l4652* East -^ndia (legislative councils) - representation 
of Muhammadans*
1910 - Cd#lj987* East India (Executive end legislative councils) -
Regulations etc# far giving effect to the Indian 
Councils Act, 1909#
I9I8 - Cd*<|i09: Report on Indian Constitutional reforms# (Montagu -
Chelmsford Report)
Reports etc#
I Reports of the Indian Rational Congress, 1885- 1910#
II Parliamentary Debates - Official Report of all questions,
proceedings and debates relating to Indian affafifch,
18814-1910# (The short titles of these volumes vary# They 
are called (i) Hansard, Indian Extracts, (il) Indian 
Parliamentary Debates, and (iii) from I909, Indian Debates, 
House of Commons/or House of Lords)•
Presss Foot-note references have been made to the following
I newspapers: (a) The Times, (b) The Bengalee, (c) The Pioneer,
(d) The Statesman, (e) The Friend of India and Statesman, and
(f) Times of India Illustrated Weekly#
II Periodicals: (a) The Nineteenth Centnyy, (b) The Quarterly
Review, (o) The Empire Review, fd) The TTnited Empire, (e) The 
Asiatic Quarterly Review, and (r) The Calcutta Review#
F Published books and pamphlets*
Ahmfcd, Sir Syed - (1) Th© present state of Indian
polities
(2) Review of Dr •Hunter1 s Indian 
Musalmans: Are they, bound in 
oonscienee to rebel against 
the Queen?
Albiruni, A#H# - Makers of Pakistan and Modem
Muslim India
Banerjea, Sir Surmdranath - A Ration in Making
Beek, Theodore - Essays dn Indian Topios
Bhinga, Raja of - Demooraoy not suited to India
Blunt, 1T*S# - India under Ripon
Buohan, John - Lord Minto, A Memoir
Cambridge History of India - vol#VI
Chesney, General Sir George - Indian Polity
Chirol, Valentine •• Indian Unrest
Cotton, H.J*S* •* Hew India
Coupland, Sir Reginald - India, A Re-statement
Duty of Ms homo dans in British India towards the 
Ruling Power* (Published by Erasmus Jones)
Fowler, Edith Henrietta 
(Mrs ♦Robert Hamilton) - The Life of E«H#Fowler.
Fraser, Lovat - India under Cur son and after
Ghose, Aurobindo - (1) On the present situation
(a) An open letter to his 
countrymen
Hamilton, Lord George - Parliamentary Reminiscences
and reflections: 1886-1906
Hyndman, H*M* - The Unrest in India
Ilbert, Sir Courtenay - The Government of India
Allahabad 1888
1
Benares 1872
Iahore 1950
London 1927
Allahabad 1888
Calcutta I906
London I909
London I92U
Cambridge 1932
London I89U
London I9IO
London 1885 
London I90I+
London 19^5
Caleutta I876
London 1922 
London I9II 
Madras I909 
Calcutta 1909
London 1922 
Iondon I907 
Oxford I898
Keith, A#B# - (l) Speeches and documents on
Indian polioy, I750-I92I 
(2 vols*)
(2) A constitutional history of 
India, 1600 - I935
land revenue polioy of the India Government published 
by order of the governor-general in council*
Lord Curson in India - Being a selection from his 
speeches as Viceroy and ^overnor-§enera 1 
of India
Iyall, Sir Alfred - The Life of the Marquis of
Duffer in and Ava {% vols)
MaoDonnell, Sir A*P« - Selections from Speeches of
Majundar, Bimaribehari - History of political thought -
From Rajcpohun to Dayananda
Martineau, John
Masani, R*P* -
Midleton, Earl of - 
Minto, Countess of -
The life and correspondence of 
Sir Bartle Frere (2 vols)
Dadabhal Ifeoroji, the Grand 
Old Man of India
Records and Reactions, 1856 -1939 
India, Minto & Morley, I905-I9IO
Ultra, Krishnakumar - Atmacharita
Montagu, E*S, An Indian Diary
Morley, John, Viscount - (l) Indian Speeches I9O7-I909
(2) Recollections (2 vols)
Uukherji, P* 
Murdoch, John -
Hag, Girish Chandra
Hewton, Lord -
Rurulla, Syed 
and 
Haik, J*P.
Indian Constitutional Documents,
1600 - I9I8
India*s Heeds - material, 
political, social, moral and 
re ligious
D^ ptitir Jiban
Lord Iansdoune, A Biography
A history of education in India
London 1922 
Iondon 193&
Calcutta 1902
London I906
London I905 
Ea initial l90/>
Ca leutta 193b
London 1895
London 1939
Iondon 1939
Iondon 193^4-
Ca leutta 1937
London I93O
Iondon I909 
London 19^7
Calcutta 1918
Madras 1886 
Dc^ oca, 133 +^ B *S *
1929
Bombay 1951
Pa 1, B #C • —
Philips, C.H. - 
Ratcliff©, S#K* -
Roes, Sir J*D* - 
Singh, G*H* -
(1) Speeches at Madras
(2) The Hew Spirit
India
Sir William Wedderburn and the 
M i a n  reform movement
Modern India
Madras 1907 
Calcutta I907
Iondon 19^9
Iondon 192J 
London 1910
landmarks in Indian Constitutional 
and national development vol*I 
1600 - I9I9 Delhi 1950
Sitaramayya, Dr#Fattabhi - The history of the Indian
Rational Congress, Vol*I (1885-1935) Bombay 19^
Strachey, Sir John - India, Its Administration and . „
Progress
The Datives and the Government of India
/
Tilak, B#G# (l) Two Remarkable Speeches
(2) Speeches
Tope, Ishwar Hath - The growth and development of
Rational thought in India
Turnbull, E#LucIa. 
and
Turnbull, E#G.d # Gopal Krishna Gokhale
Wedderburn, Sir William - Allan Octavian Hume, C*B«,
"Father of the Indian Rational 
Congtess", 1829-1932
Wolf, Lucien - Life of the first Marquess of 
Ripon (2 vols)
London I9O5
Ld^dch ^
Sylhet 1907 
Poona I9O8
Hamburg 1930
Trichur I93U
London 1913 
London 1921
Dictionary of Rational Biography 
Dictionary of India\ Biography (Buckland) 
Indian Biographical Dictionary (C*E*Rao) 
The India Office List^*
Whitakerfs Almanack#
